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ABSTRACT 
The vast majority of the world's M&A activities are represented by takeovers of 
privately held targets. Yet, this sector of the market for corporate control has received very 
little attention from academic researchers. This thesis thus sets out to provide a 
comparative analysis, both theoretically and empirically, of gains to bidders of private 
targets in relation to gains to bidders of public targets. When targets are privately held as 
opposed to publicly held or listed, there are reasons to believe that bidders gamer material 
gains even with full competition. By recognising the possibility that the decision of the 
owners of a private target to agree to a takeover (i) represents the exit strategy or (ii) is 
reflective of the passage of the firm through its life cycle, this thesis provides a new 
perspective on the wealth consequences of private-firm takeovers on bidder shareholders. 
The empirical analyses in this thesis reveal that not only bidder gains, but also bidder 
characteristics, distinctly differ between private-firm takeovers and takeovers of public 
targets or divested subsidiaries. This thesis also provides evidence on the largely 
unexplored determinants of the choice of payment methods in private-firm takeovers. In 
several important aspects, the findings contribute to the extant evidence on determinants of 
payment methods in takeovers of public targets. 
Considering the costs known to be associated with the decision to go public facing 
the owners of a privately held company, acquisition by a listed bidder is potentially a cost-
effective means by which the firm owners can exit or the firm can gain access to funds 
necessary for financing the unexploited investment opportunities. The common 
knowledge of the cost savings arising from choosing the takeover route implies that a 
portion of these savings is also available to be garnered by bidders of private targets. On 
the other hand, these savings are either trivial or absent when targets already have access to 
the capital market (i.e., public targets and divested subsidiaries). Given that the bidder is 
willing to pay the acquisition price that fully reflects its valuation of its target, there is 
hence no guarantee that the bidder earns positive gains when acquiring a public target 
whereas the exit costs savings provide a source of ex ante gains to the bidder if it opts for a 
private target. Around the bid announcement, bidders of private targets are found to earn 
positive gains. In contrast, when taking into account the event windows leading up to the 
announcement date, evidence emerges that public-firm bidders experience losses and 
bidders of divested subsidiaries overall fare no better than breaking-even around the bid 
announcement. Also at variance with the experience of public-firm takeovers, this thesis 
documents that announcement-period gains to bidders of private targets are positive 
irrespective of the payment method and that equity financing in private-firm takeovers 
leads to larger bidder gains. This positive announcement-period effect of equity financing 
appears attributable to the positive information about the bidder's prospects rather than the 
expected performance monitoring by the target owners. 
Given the considerably small size and closely held ownership of private targets, 
which are in contrast with public targets and divested subsidiaries, bidders of private 
targets are unlikely to be motivated by the empire-building objectives. Instead, the 
characteristics of private targets imply that their bidders maximise the realisation of 
expected synergies rather than personal utility for the bidder managers. The closely held 
ownership and small size of private targets also imply that they are much easier to integrate 
than public targets or divested subsidiaries. The analysis of long-term bidder abnormal 
return reveals that while private-firm bidders breakeven during the post-acquisition period, 
11 
there is evidence that public-finn bidders, and particularly bidders of divested subsidiaries, 
experience losses. 
The difference in ownership structure between private targets and public targets 
also leads to the difference in the change in ownership concentration in the bidders. While 
equity financing leads to a ceteris paribus increase in ownership concentration in private-
firm bidders, the opposite follows for public-firm bidders. The owners of a private target 
in an equity offer, as rational large shareholders, have economic incentives to monitor the 
performance of the bidder managers whereas atomistic shareholders of public targets in an 
equity offer do not. During the post-acquisition period, equity financing overall leads to a 
normal rate of return for private-firm bidders. This finding is consistent with the notion of 
rational pricing that the amount of compensation for the monitoring services by the target 
owners in equity offers reflects the incremental benefits of the services accruing to other 
bidder shareholders. In contrast, equity financing results in long-term losses for public-
firm bidders. 
Considering the differences in the wealth effects on bidder shareholders between 
private-firm takeovers and public-firm takeovers, this thesis also empirically explores two 
additional largely neglected issues. First, why do some bidders choose private targets and 
some others choose public targets or divested subsidiaries? Secondly, why equity 
financing rather than cash financing is used in some takeovers of private targets and not 
others (and vice versa)? In the main, the results of investigating the potential factors 
influencing bidders' target choice decision reveal the importance of managerial ism in the 
bidder and the pressure to improve growth prospects facing the bidder. However, hubris 
arising from past performance does not appear to affect bidders' target choice decision. 
lll 
The analysis of the potential determinants of payment methods in private-firm takeovers 
shows that the level of informational asymmetry in private-firm takeovers is likely to be 
trivial. The analysis also provides evidence that the choice of payment methods in private-
firm takeovers is ceteris paribus endogenous to the investment objective(s) of the target 
owners and that agency conflicts in the bidder can deter the target owners who have the 
objective to hold equity stakes in the combined firm. 
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Takeovers are one of the most important corporate decisions that have for decades 
been attracting extensive academic interest. A large body of empirical evidence 
unanimously indicates that shareholders in the target firm enjoy large gains from the 
transaction. Although takeovers represent a large capital outlay committed by the bidding 
firm or acquirer, it has been extensively documented in the market for corporate control 
literature that bidder shareholders suffer losses, or at best, breakeven from the transactions 
(for a review, see Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000; Bruner, 2002; Jensen and Ruback, 1983). The 
existing research has also documented that losses to bidder shareholders are evident not 
only around the announcement period, but also in the long run during the post-acquisition 
period. However, these wealth losses are limited primarily to bidders that finance their 
takeover attempts with their own common equity. 
Several theories have been advanced in the literature as plausible explanations for 
the wealth losses suffered by bidder shareholders. One of the most, if not the most, 
predominant explanation is rooted in managerialism. The agency-theoretic explanation 
holds that corporate takeovers are the symptom of agency conflicts in the bidder (e.g., 
Jensen, 1988; Muller, 1969; Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). With respect to the association 
between bidder gains and payment methods, the explanation for the negative wealth effect 
of equity financing lies principally in the existence of informational asymmetry between 
the bidder managers and target shareholders (e.g., Travlos, 1987; Loughran and Vijh, 
1997). In addition, the wealth destruction of corporate takeovers has also been attributed 
to excessive self-confidence of the bidder managers (see Roll, 1986; also Gregory, 1997). 
Interestingly, these descriptions of the wealth effects of corporate takeovers on bidder 
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shareholders have been ascertained based on the body of research which focuses virtually 
exclusively on the experience of takeovers of publicly held or listed targets. 
Although the vast majority of the world's M&A activities are represented by 
takeovers of privately held targets (see Ang and Kohers, 2001; Draper and Paudyal, 2004 ), 
the existing literature has largely neglected this sector of the market for corporate control. 
Only very recently has some evidence on the wealth effects of takeovers involving private 
targets come into view. This limited evidence indicates that the announcement of private-
firm takeovers leads to positive wealth gains for bidder shareholders irrespective of the 
means of payment (see, for U.S. Ang and Kohers, 2001; Fuller et al., 2002; Moeller et al., 
2004; for U.K. Draper and Paudyal, 2004). These findings carry at least two important 
implications for the corporate control market literature. First, takeovers of private targets 
are unlikely to be driven by managerialism. Secondly, equity financing in takeovers of 
private targets does not signal to the market that the bidder's equity is overvalued at the bid 
announcement. These two implications are prominent deviations from the experience of 
takeovers of public targets. As a consequence, the traditional theories of corporate 
takeovers, which have been formulated based almost exclusively on the empirical 
experience of public-firm takeovers, are unlikely to be generalisable to the vast majority of 
the M&A universe. 
The recent studies of private-firm takeovers have offered several competing 
explanations for the positive announcement-period gains to the bidder shareholders. In a 
nutshell, these explanations attribute the gains to: (i) the absence of the equity of a 
privately held target in the investment portfolio of bidder shareholders (see Hansen and 
Lott, 1996); (ii) the closely held ownership structure of private targets (see Ang and 
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Kohers, 2001; Chang, 1998); (iii) the relatively low marketability or liquidity of unlisted 
assets (see Fuller et al., 2002); and (iv) the off-market nature of private deals and ensuing 
low level of analyst coverage (see Ang and Koher, 2001). While these theoretical 
explanations are consistent with the general characteristics of privately held companies and 
the bidding process for private targets, they appear inadequate given the observed empirics. 
An obvious example can be motivated. Moeller et al. (2004) observe that takeovers of 
private targets occur in an industry with higher liquidity than takeovers of public targets. 
This observation is direct evidence against the liquidity explanation advocated by Fuller et 
al. (2002). Further, none of the offered explanations distinguish between short-term and 
long-term wealth effects. More specifically, these explanations implicitly assume that a 
takeover announcement conveys complete information about the transaction. 
Given the deficiency of the existing theoretical construct as well as the sparseness 
of empirical evidence, a thorough understanding of the wealth effects of takeovers of 
private targets remains a particularly challenging gap, both theoretically and empirically, in 
the literature. Accordingly, this thesis has two research objectives, one theoretical and one 
empirical. By recognising (i) the possibility that the decision of the owner(s) of a private 
target to agree to a takeover is the decision to exit and/or reflective of the passage of the 
firm through its business life cycle and (ii) the information about the takeover that is 
observable and unobservable at the announcement, this thesis first aims at providing more 
coherent description for the wealth effects, both short-term and long-term, of takeovers of 
private targets on bidder shareholders. 
Considering the costs known to be inherent in the decision to go public, acquisition 
by a listed bidder is potentially a cost-effective means by which owners of a privately held 
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company can exit or the firm can progress through its life cycle. In this view, the Exit 
Costs hypothesis is proposed in Chapter 2. The hypothesis posits that when opting for a 
private target, the bidder stands to enjoy a fraction of the savings on the exit costs resulting 
from the target's decision to choose the takeover route over the choice of going public. 
The Exit Costs hypothesis hence predicts a positive market reaction to bidders announcing 
a takeover of a private target. Within the same framework, it is proposed that the medium 
of exchange that is inconsistent with the consumption preference or investment objective 
of the target owner would result in lower utility for him/her and in the outright rejection of 
the offer. With this conjecture, the Clientele Effect hypothesis posits that the medium of 
exchange is simply endogenous to the consumption preference of the target owner and 
conveys no incremental valuable information about the bidder. This hypothesis hence 
predicts that the announcement-period gains to bidders of private targets are identically 
positive regardless of the means of payment. 
Drawing from the closely held ownership and relatively small size of privately held 
companies and the off-market nature of private deals, three additional hypotheses are 
proposed in this thesis as the descriptions of the long-term wealth effects of private-firm 
takeovers. The Wealth Maximisation hypothesis argues that, unlike bidders of public 
targets, private-firm bidders maximise the realisation of expected synergies even when the 
acquisition yields little or no personal utility for the bidder managers. Specifically, the 
hypothesis implies that bidders of private targets are wealth-maximising bidders and 
should earn at least a normal rate of return in the long run during the post-acquisition 
period. Although an acquisition is an option rather than an obligation to the bidder, there 
exists a situation in which a wealth-maximising bidder may not be able to exploit the 
option. When faced with the pressure to improve its growth prospects, it is likely that the 
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bidder will opt for a large target rather than a small target ceteris paribus. As a 
consequence, the choice of targets for the bidder is likely to be a public target rather than a 
private target even in the absence of the bidder-side agency conflicts. Due to the extent of 
the agency conflicts inherent in the dispersed ownership structure of a public target, the 
bidder is therefore likely to face relatively difficult post-acquisition target integration. The 
post-acquisition difficulty also arises from the suboptimal decision making associated with 
the open bidding process for a public target. Accordingly, the Ease of Integration 
hypothesis implies that bidders should fare better during the post-acquisition period ex post 
when acquiring private targets than when acquiring public targets. 
Based on Chang's (1998) increased monitoring argument and the premise that the 
information about the monitoring services by owners of a private target in an equity-
financed offer may well be incomplete at the bid announcement, the Monitoring hypothesis 
is proposed to describe the long-term effect of equity financing in private-firm takeovers. 
As target owners in an equity offer commit a substantial amount of their wealth and 
become large shareholders in the bidder, it is cost-effective for them to monitor the 
performance of the bidder managers following the deal completion. In this view, the 
notion of rational pricing holds that the target owners will require compensation for their 
monitoring services, and that the amount of compensation reflects the incremental benefits 
of the services that accrue to other shareholders in the bidder. In equilibrium, both the 
target owners and other bidder shareholders therefore earn in the long run a normal rate of 
return on their equity investments in the bidder. The Monitoring hypothesis hence argues 
that private-firm bidders in equity offers earn a normal rate of return in the long run 
following the deal completion. 
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As the second research objective of this thesis, the implications of the hypotheses 
proposed in Chapter 2 are empirically investigated using the U.K. data. With the recent 
exceptions of Da Silva Rosa et al. (2001) and Draper and Paudyal (2004), the existing 
studies of takeovers of private targets all employ the U.S. data. The empirical analysis in 
this thesis thus provides a further out-of-sample comparison for the extant U.S. evidence. 
At variance with the recent study by Draper and Paudyal (2004), this thesis also employs 
and separately examines, in addition to a sample of public-firm takeovers, a comparison 
sample of takeovers of divested subsidiaries. Though unlisted like private targets, 
subsidiaries are owned by a listed parent or atomistic shareholders (see also Fuller et al., 
2002). Including and separately examining subsidiary takeovers in the analysis hence 
enables a more direct investigation of the proposed hypotheses, particularly in the light of 
the competing theoretical suppositions offered in the existing literature. 
In estimating abnormal return to the sample bidders in this thesis, the potential 
biases caused by bidders making multiple acquisitions during the sample period are taken 
into account. Given that bidders engaged in an M&A programme or frequent bidders tend 
to prefer private targets (e.g., Asquith et al., 1983), this is an important improvement on 
the conventional methodology adopted in the previous studies (e.g., Fuller et al., 2002; 
Moeller et al., 2004). The results of examining announcement-period abnormal return to 
private-firm bidders in comparison to bidders of divested subsidiaries and bidders of public 
targets are supportive of the Exit Costs hypothesis. More specifically, when the savings on 
the exit costs are available (as in the case of private-firm takeovers), bidder gains during 
the announcement period are positive. When the exit costs savings do not exist (as in the 
case of takeovers of divested subsidiaries and public targets), on the other hand, the 
evidence observed in several windows during the announcement period together indicates 
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that bidder gams overall range from zero to significantly negative. In addition, the 
evidence is also unsupportive of Hansen and Lott' s (1996) diversification effect and the 
liquidity effect advocated by Fuller et al. (2002). Partly inconsistent with the Clientele 
Effect hypothesis, the results show that bidder gains are more positive when equity 
financing is used than in cash offers. This positive short-term impact of equity financing is 
attributable to the positive information effect rather than the increase in monitoring 
hypothesised by Chang ( 1998). 
Since a corporate takeover is a long-term investment project, its wealth 
consequences on bidder shareholders depend not only on the expected profitability of the 
transaction, but also on the ex post acquisition profitability. At variance with the existing 
studies of private-firm takeovers, long-term gains to bidders of private targets are therefore 
also of primary interest in this thesis. In support of the Wealth Maximisation and Ease of 
Integration hypotheses, private-firm bidders earn a normal rate of return in the long run 
during the post-acquisition period whereas bidder gains are negative when targets are 
publicly listed or affiliated to a publicly listed entity (i.e., when targets are divested 
subsidiaries). By examining the largely unknown effects of payment methods on long-
term abnormal return to private-firm bidders vis-a-vis public-firm bidders, an intriguing 
difference between private-firm takeovers and public-firm takeovers is revealed. In 
support of the Monitoring hypothesis, equity financing overall leads to a normal rate of 
long-term return for private-firm bidders, but long-term losses to public-firm bidders. 
Given the differences in the wealth effects on bidder shareholders between private-
firm takeovers and public-firn1 takeovers, two obvious questions arise naturally. First, why 
do some bidders choose private targets and some others choose public targets or divested 
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subsidiaries? Second, why cash financing is used in some takeovers of private targets and 
equity financing is used in some others? Unfortunately, these questions thus far appear not 
to have received any academic attention. To fill this important void in the literature, this 
thesis also empirically investigates factors influencing the decision to choose among 
targets of different status and the payment method decisions in private-firm takeovers. 
Indeed, these analyses also serve to provide further insights into and understanding of the 
wealth effects of private-firm takeovers. 
The results of the multinomial logistic regression analysis suggest that the extent of 
the agency conflicts in the bidder plays an important role in its target choice decision. 
Evidence is also found to suggest that the pressure to improve growth prospects can drive 
even a wealth-maximising bidder to choose a large target that has dispersed ownership 
instead of a private target which is much easier to integrate. This particular finding 
substantiates the view that takeovers have long been perceived by corporate managers as a 
quicker way of achieving growth (e.g., Firth, 1980). However, the pressure to buy quick 
growth per se is not sufficient to drive a wealth-maximising bidder to discard the benefits 
of the off-market bidding and try to acquire a public target in the open bidding 
environment. Interestingly, there is no evidence that bidder managers' self-confidence 
arising from their past performance motivates them to choose a target that later proves to 
be suboptimal or difficult to integrate ex post. 
The analysis of the largely unexplored determinants of payment methods in private-
firm takeovers reveals results that are important contributions to the extant evidence based 
on the experience of public-firm takeovers. The results support the view that the level of 
informational asymmetry in takeovers of private targets is likely to be trivial. Also 
- -~----------
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intriguing is the evidence which is in line with the conjecture that the means of payment in 
private-firm takeovers is ceteris paribus endogenous to the consumption preference or 
investment objective of the target owners. 
By recognising (i) that the decision to sell by owners of a private target may well be 
motivated by reasons more strategic than just the realisation of capital gains and (ii) what 
is observable and unobservable at the bid announcement, this thesis makes a notable 
contribution to the theoretical literature on corporate takeovers. By empirically examining 
gains to bidders of private targets on a comparative basis as well as investigating factors 
influencing the decision to choose a private target over targets of other status and the 
choice of payment methods for private targets, this thesis provides a new understanding of 
the wealth consequences of private-firm takeovers on bidder shareholders. 
This thesis proceeds in the following manner: a review of the relevant literature on 
the market for corporate control is presented in Chapter 2. Chapter 2 also critically 
discusses the theories of takeovers of private targets advanced in the recent literature. In 
Chapter 3, the implications of the Exit Costs and Clientele Effect hypotheses are tested by 
examining announcement-period abnormal return to bidders of private targets in 
comparison to bidders acquiring divested subsidiaries and those acquiring public targets. 
Based on the implications of the Wealth Maximisation and Ease of Integration hypotheses, 
long-term post-acquisition abnormal return to private-firm bidders is examined on a 
comparative basis in Chapter 4. In this chapter, the factors influencing the target choice 
decision are also empirically investigated. In Chapter 5, the implication of the Monitoring 
hypothesis is empirically investigated by examining the effects of payment methods on 
long-term abnormal return to private-firm bidders. The potential determinants of payment 
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methods in private-firm takeovers are also analysed in Chapter 5. Finally, Chapter 6 




LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1) Introduction 
Due to the economic importance of corporate takeovers, the corporate control 
market literature is replete with studies that evaluate the impact of the transactions on 
shareholders in the participating firms and offer explanations for the takeover behaviour. 
The literature is practically unanimous on the wealth effects of takeovers on shareholders 
in the target firms. Target shareholders gain significantly from a takeover announcement 
(e.g., for U.S. Bruner, 2002; Jarrell et al., 1988; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; for U.K. Draper 
and Paudyal, 1999; Franks and Harris, 1989). 
Although a takeover is an investment made by the bidding firm, the existing 
evidence on balance indicates negative wealth effects on bidder shareholders. Around the 
announcement of a takeover bid and in the long run following the deal completion, the 
U.S. evidence suggests that bidder shareholders either breakeven or make losses (see 
Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000; Bruner, 2002). In the U.K., the evidence of wealth losses to 
bidder shareholders is much stronger both in the short run (e.g., Draper and Paudyal, 1999; 
2004) and in the long run (e.g., Baker and Limmack, 2001; Gregory, 1997; Sudarsanam 
and Mahate, 2003). Both in the U.S. and in the U.K., the literature has documented a 
general pattern indicating that takeover losses, both short-tem1 and long-term, are limited 
to the bidders financing their takeover attempts with their own common equity. 
Interestingly, the general conclusions drawn from the existing literature that (i) 
bidder shareholders earn non-positive takeover gains and (ii) equity-financed takeovers 
destroy the wealth of bidder shareholders are based on takeovers of publicly listed targets. 
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While the existing literature has focused almost entirely on takeovers of publicly held 
targets, the vast majority of the world's M&A activities, as pointed out by Ang and Kohers 
(2001), involve privately held targets. Only recently has some evidence on the wealth 
effects of private-firm takeovers on bidder shareholders been documented. This evidence, 
albeit limited, consistently suggests that the announcement of private-firm takeovers leads 
to positive wealth gains to the bidder shareholders (for U.S. Ang and Kohers, 2001; Fuller 
et al., 2002; Hansen and Lott, 1996; Moeller et al., 2004; for U.K. Draper and Paudyal, 
2004). The evidence also indicates that these positive gains can be larger when the 
transaction is financed entirely with bidder equity (for U.S. Chang, 1998; Fuller et al., 
2002; for U.K. Draper and Paudyal, 2004; see also Kohers and Ang, 2000)1• Not 
surprisingly, studies in which privately held targets from a weighty part of the sample also 
find that bidder shareholders gain from a takeover announcement (e.g., Asquith et al., 
1983; Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000; Loderer and Martin, 1990). 
The documented wealth creation and the positive wealth effect of the 
announcement of equity financing in private-firm takeovers suggest that private-firm 
takeovers are likely to differ from public-firm takeovers in the causes and consequences in 
the short run as well as long run. Thus, the traditional theories of the market for corporate 
control, which have been formulated based almost exclusively on the empirical experience 
of public-firm takeovers, may not be as generalisable as one might have once thought. In 
an attempt to explain the positive market reaction to bids for private targets, several new 
hypotheses have been put forwards in the recent studies of private-firm takeovers. 
Nevertheless, none of these new hypotheses appears to provide a coherent explanation for 
1 The samples of bid announcements for private targets used in the existing studies include only the 
announcements of successfully completed transactions. Unlike bids for public targets which are required to 
be publicly announced from the first bidding, bids for private targets are unlikely to be publicised if 
unsuccessfully completed. For a further discussion, see Section 3.4. 
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the observed empirics. It is plausible that the deficiency of these new hypotheses lies in 
the non-recognition of (i) the possibility that the decision of the owner(s) of a private target 
to agree to a takeover is the decision to exit and/or reflective of the passage of the firm 
through its business life cycle, and/or (ii) what is and is not observable at the 
announcement of a takeover. As a consequence, this chapter attempts to provide more 
coherent explanations for the wealth effects of private-firm takeovers, both short-term and 
long-term, on bidder shareholders. 
The rest of this chapter begins by providing in Section 2.2 a review of the 
traditional theories of the market for corporate control, which are based on the experience 
of public-firm takeovers. Section 2.3 provides a critical discussion on the hypotheses that 
have been offered in the recent literature as plausible explanations for bidder gains arising 
from the announcement of private-firm takeovers. Also in Section 2.3, the Exit Costs and 
Clientele Effect hypotheses are proposed as alternative explanations for the announcement-
period wealth effects. The Wealth Maximisation, Ease of Integration, and Monitoring 
hypotheses are then advocated as the descriptions of the long-term wealth effects of 
private-firm takeovers. This chapter is summarised in Section 2.4. 
2.2) Theories of Takeovers: When Targets are Publicly Held Companies 
Several theories have been advanced in the literature as plausible explanations for 
takeovers of publicly held targets. These competing theories can generally be categorised 
as wealth-maximising and non-wealth-maximising behaviour of bidder managers (Halpern, 
1983). Entangled in the behaviour of bidder managers, whether or not wealth-maximising, 
is the issue of how the transaction is financed. There exists extensive evidence that cash 
financing does not destroy the wealth of bidder shareholders whereas financing a takeover 
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purely with bidder equity leads to wealth losses to bidder shareholders both around the 
announcement period and in the long run following the deal completion (for a review, see 
Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000; Bruner, 2002). 
2.2.1) Value- and Non-Value-Maximising Behaviour 
The most dominant theme in the value-maximising takeovers can be captured by 
the term "synergy", which may be operational and/or financial (see e.g., Copeland and 
Weston, 1988, Chapter 19; Halpern, 1983). Operational synergy arises when the expected 
cash flow stream of the combined entity is greater than the sum of the individual streams of 
the bidder and the target. The potential sources of operational synergy primarily include 
economies of scale and/or scope in the production factors and/or management functions2. 
Financial synergy provides a motivation, though often viewed as a dubious reason (e.g., 
Brealey and Myers, 2000, Chapter 33), for a takeover when the combination is claimed to 
result in a lower cost of capital via reductions in the bankruptcy risk or to result in a 
redeployment of excess cash flows in either the bidder or the target or both. 
Corporate takeovers may, as originally put forwards by Manne (1965), also be 
motivated by the benefits from removing inefficient or bad management of the target (see 
also Jensen, 1986; Morek et al., 1989; Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). As pointed out by 
Jensen and Meckling ( 1976, p. 308), "if both parties to the relationship are utility 
maximisers, there is a good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best 
interest of the principal". The separation of control from ownership gives managers 
discretion to pursue personal objectives inconsistent with shareholder wealth maximisation 
2 Tax considerations (see Copeland and Weston, 1988, p. 689 - 690) and the creation of monopoly in the 
product markets or an increase in the market share (e.g., Eckbo, 1983; Ghosh, 2004; Stillman, 1983) have 
also been offered in the literature as takeover motives. Since tax reductions and monopoly creation lead to 
increases in cash flows, these motives can be viewed as fundamentally coming under the general umbrella of 
synergy. 
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(Mueller, 1977; also Fama and Jensen, 1983a, 1983b). To the extent that shareholders in a 
publicly listed firm are generally well diversified, an individual shareholder has no special 
interest in personally monitoring in detail the behaviour of the managers (Fama, 1980; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1986l This is because the cost of monitoring managers borne by 
individual atomistic shareholders more than offsets the cash flows accrued to them. Given 
that managers are rational utility maximisers, they have incentives to ward off the 
possibility of a disciplinary takeover. In order to preserve their employment and 
perquisites, managers can entrench themselves by investing in projects which require their 
specific skills so that they are expensive for shareholders to replace (see Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1989). 
If synergy of some form exists, a takeover is a positive Net Present Value (NPV) 
investment project for bidder shareholders ex ante4 . As noted by Halpern (1983), the 
value-maximising motivation hence implies that bidder shareholders should on average 
earn at least a normal rate of return upon the bid announcement regardless of the degree of 
competition in the market for corporate control. In a competitive market for corporate 
control, however, the takeover gains to bidder shareholders should be zero if the expected 
synergy is not strictly unique to the combination. 
3 Indeed, the portfolio theory indicates that the optimal portfolio for any individual investor is likely to be 
diversified across securities of a number of firms (e.g., Copeland and Weston, 1988, Chapter 6). In addition, 
Hansen and Lott ( 1996) argue and provide evidence to suggest that shareholders in a public target are likely 
to be much more diversified than those in a private target. 
4 In this case, the realisation of synergy is conditional upon the bid being successfully completed. Although a 
failed or unsuccessfully completed bid seems to suggest that the bidder shareholders would suffer the loss of 
expected synergies, the extant empirical evidence suggests that this is unlikely to be the case. Around the 
announcement of the bid termination, bidder shareholders generally earn abnormal return that is 
insignificantly different from zero (see e.g., Chang and Suk, 1998; Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Parkinson and 
Dobbins, 1993). This evidence indicates that unsuccessfully completed takeovers are on average negative 
NPV investment projects for the bidder shareholders. The main focus of this thesis, however, is on the 
wealth effects of takeovers of private targets which are usually publicised if successfully completed. In the 
interest of relevance and parsimony, the discussions that follow in this chapter therefore take successful 
completion of takeovers as given. 
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The existence of the market for corporate control also allows bidder managers to 
pursue their personal interests via making a non-value-maximising takeover. In this view, 
takeovers are the manifestation of managerialism or agency problems in the bidder. Since 
a takeover increases firm size of the bidder and the ensuing managerial perquisites, the 
bidder managers have incentives to make an acquisition even at the expense of the wealth 
of their shareholders (e.g., Firth, 1980; Jensen, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). First, as 
noted by Jensen (1989), it is well documented in the literature that executive compensation 
increases with firm size rather than shareholder value. Moreover, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1989) show that managers have incentives to make investments by which they can 
entrench themselves even though such projects destroy shareholder value. As their firm 
grows larger via acquisition, it becomes more expensive for a raider to launch a 
disciplinary takeover and thus to replace them. Indeed, bidder managers also have 
incentives to make acquisitions that are large and complicated. Using a sample of public-
firm takeovers in the U.S., Grinstein and Hribar (2004) find that bidder managers receive 
large bonuses for making acquisitions and these bonuses are positively related to the size 
and complexity of the transactions. 
To the extent that takeovers are the symptom of managerialism, the non-value 
maximisation conjecture is supported by the extant empirical evidence that bidder 
shareholders on balance suffer wealth losses both in the short run and in the long run. At 
the bid announcement, the probability of divergence from shareholder wealth 
maximisation by bidder managers can be rationally expected by the market (e.g., see 
Travlos, 1987). However, there exists no mechanism by which the market can correctly 
anticipate the post-acquisition divergence. Since only the past, or at best, current 
behaviour of bidder managers is observable at the bid announcement, the market may well 
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ill-anticipate the divergence. Fama (1980) shows that as long as (i) firms are characterised 
by the control-ownership separation and diffuse ownership and (ii) managers' employment 
horizon differs from shareholders' aggregate investment horizon, there are always 
situations where the ex post managerial behaviour deviates from what is expected based on 
the current performance assessments. Due to the difference between the employment 
horizon and investment horizon, these situations exist even though there is a properly 
functioning labour market. The market therefore may well ill-anticipate the post-
acquisition divergence especially if the bidder somehow exhibited favourable performance 
prior to the bid announcement. 
Indeed, Conn et al. (2002) note that self-serving bidder managers are unlikely to 
reveal their true takeover motives when announcing a takeover bid, but instead, likely to 
exaggerate the profitability of the transaction. Using a sample of public-firm takeovers in 
the U.K., Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) find that the evidence of negative bidder 
abnormal return is weak during the announcement period but strongly significant during 
the three-year post-acquisition period, and maintain that "the bulk of the wealth loss is 
experienced in the period after completion of the takeover" (p. 316). 
The extant evidence of takeover losses suffered by bidder shareholders is also 
supportive of Roll's (1986) hubris hypothesis, which posits that the bidder managers 
infected with excessive self-confidence or arrogance overestimate gains from the 
transaction and thus pay too much for the target. Hubris-infected managers are not 
necessarily self-interested managers, however. Although Roll's (1986) hubris hypothesis 
implies overpayment (see also Morek et al., 1990), excessive self-confidence of the bidder 
managers can also lead them to acquire a target from which it proves too difficult extract 
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the expected synergies ex post. Rau and Vermaelen ( 1998) hypothesise that bidders that 
have performed relatively well in the past are likely to be infected with hubris and make a 
value-destroying acquisition. Using the U.S. sample, the authors find that bidders with a 
relatively low pre-takeover book-to-market (BM) ratio (glamour bidders) experience 
wealth losses up to three years post-acquisition whereas those with a relatively high BM 
ratio (value bidders) earn positive gains5. In a comparable study, however, Sudarsanam 
and Mahate (2003) find that this glamour-value effect is not present among the U.K. 
bidders, but that bidder gains are dependent on the means of payment. 
2.2.2) Payment Methods Issues 
The market for corporate control literature has documented several theoretical 
explanations for the negative wealth effect, both short- and long-term, of equity financing 
in public-firm takeovers6. The widely accepted explanation for the losses to bidders in an 
equity offer is Myers and Majlufs (1984) asymmetric information hypothesis. Myers and 
Majluf (1984) show that, in a world where managers have information that investors do not 
have, firms make a public issue of equity to fund their positive net-present-value (NPV) 
projects only when their equity is overvalued7• On the other hand, firms will rationally 
5 Rau and Vermaelen (1998) contend that the BM ratio is a variable negatively correlated to Tobin's q which 
is, as suggested by Lang et at. (1989) and Servaes (1991 ), a proxy for the market's assessment of the firm's 
managerial performance. As noted by Dong eta!. (2002), however, the BM ratio may also be a proxy for 
market misvaluation. 
6 In the U.S. setting, the difference between the effects of payment methods and mode of acquisition (merger 
or tender offer) may be ambiguous. In a tender offer, the bidder makes an offer directly to the target 
shareholders. In a merger or a takeover by scheme of arrangement or a recommended offer, the bidder makes 
an offer to the management of the target. Travlos (1987) observes that mergers are usually financed with 
bidder equity whereas tender offers are usually cash-financed transactions. Martin ( 1996) finds a 
significantly positive relation between the probability of tender offers and the probability of cash fmancing. 
Travlos ( 1987) finds that the payment method effects on announcement-period bidder abnormal return 
dominate the effects of acquisition mode. Similarly, Loughran and Vijh (1997) fmd that the payment method 
effects also dominate when bidder abnormal return is measured as long-term post-acquisition abnormal 
return. Since takeovers in the U.K. are mostly tender offers (e.g., Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003), the 
difference between the effects of payment methods and mode of acquisition is more clear-cut for the U.K. 
bidders. 
7 In their model, Myers and Majluf(l984) assume that all projects facing the firm are positive-NPV projects. 
Cooney and Kalay (1993) extend Myers and Majlufs (1984) model by allowing firms to face both positive-
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forego positive-NPV investments and issue no equity if their equity IS materially 
undervalued. This is because the claim dilution suffered by the existing shareholders may 
well more than offset the expected gains from financing the positive-NPV project(s) with 
the proceeds from a public equity issue. 
Because the issue of bidder equity to shareholders in a publicly listed target as a 
medium of exchange is equivalent to a public equity issue, an equity offer to a public target 
in the Myers and Majluf (1984) model signals to the market that the bidder's equity is 
currently overvalued. The model therefore predicts a decline in the bidder's share price 
upon the announcement of an equity offer. This prediction is consistent with Hansen's 
(1987) model when there is informational asymmetry on the bidder's true value. Hansen 
(1987) illustrates that because the marginal cost of signalling decreases with the true value 
of bidder equity, the bidder prefers to make an equity offer when the market valuation of 
its equity is [falsely] high. The extant empirical evidence that bidders making an equity 
offer to a public target earn losses during the announcement period supports these 
informational signalling arguments (e.g., for U.S. Travlos, 1987; Travlos and Papaioannou, 
1991; for U.K. Draper and Paudyal, 1999; Franks et al., 1988). 
Despite its prediction of a drop in the bidder's share pnce upon the bid 
announcement, the market overvaluation theory has also been suggested as a plausible 
explanation for the extant evidence that bidders making an equity-financed takeover earn 
long-term post-acquisition losses (e.g., for U.S. Loughran and Vijh, 1997; for U.K. 
Gregory, 1997). Loughran and Vijh (1997) argue that if the market underreacts to the 
and negative-NPV projects. When firms face both positive- and negative-NPV projects, the firm's rejection 
of a project and its decision not to make a public issue of equity do not necessarily signify the managers' 
perception that the firm's equity is undervalued. In Cooney and Kalay's (1993) model, the market can 
therefore react positively to the firm's equity issue if it anticipates a new positive-NPV project. 
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information content of the announced payment method, a large part of the perceived 
overvaluation could materialise as negative post-acquisition abnormal return. Dong et al. 
(2002) find that overvalued bidders are significantly more likely to use equity financing 
and significantly underperform undervalued bidders both during the announcement period 
and up to five years following the deal completion8. 
If equity financing signals to the market that the bidder's equity is overvalued, it 
follows that cash financing signals undervaluation. As a result, the informational 
signalling theory implies that the market should react positively to a cash bid and cash 
bidders should earn positive abnormal gains either in the short or long run. However, the 
existence of a fully competitive market for corporate control implies that cash bidders earn 
a normal rate of return both shmi- and long-term. With reference to takeover gains to 
bidders in cash deals, the extant empirical literature supports the notion of a competitive 
corporate control market. 
The change in managerial ownership in the bidder brought about by an equity-
financed takeover has also been offered as an alternative explanation for the wealth losses 
to equity bidders. Assuming no changes in absolute managerial ownership, an equity offer 
to a public target increases the number of outstanding bidder shares held by small 
dispersed shareholders and thus decreases the proportionate managerial ownership 
(Travlos, 1987)9. If the fraction of insider or managerial ownership signals the quality of 
the firm's project, as in Leland and Pyle's (1977) signalling model, it follows that equity 
8 In their analyses, Dong et a!. (2002) use the BM ratio and the ratio of intrinsic value to price as proxies for 
market misvaluation. Dong et at. (2002) define intrinsic value for a firm as the sum of its book equity plus 
expected residual income (p. 9- 11). In their analyses, both ratios yield similar results. 
9 Here, an implicit assumption in the managerial ownership argument is that the fraction of managerial 
ownership in the bidder is greater than zero. 
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financing signals to the market that the true value of the firm has declined due to the 
takeover. 
Alternatively, a decrease in managerial ownership due to an equity offer can be 
viewed as the non-wealth-maximising behaviour of the bidder managers. If the costs of 
managerial divergence from shareholder wealth maximisation borne by the managers are 
positively related to the fraction of their ownership in the firm as in Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), the issue of bidder shares to diffuse shareholders in a public target reduces the 
divergence costs borne by the bidder managers. This divergence cost reduction serves to 
stimulate the bidder managers to pursue, or intensify the existing pursuit of, their own 
personal objectives during the post-acquisition period. Indeed, there is ample evidence of 
a negative relationship between the level managerial ownership in the bidder and the 
likelihood of an equity offer (e.g., Amihud et al., 1990; Faccio and Masulis, 2003; Martin, 
1996). Target managers also have incentives to agree to an equity offer. Since an equity-
financed takeover is usually a friendly transaction (e.g., Higson and Elliott, 1998), the 
retention of the target managers' employment following the deal completion is a likely 
scenario. Using a sample ofthe U.S. public-firm takeovers, Ghosh and Ruland (1998) find 
that target managers are more likely to retain their jobs following an equity-financed 
takeover than following a cash deal. To the extent that the true managerial motives of an 
equity-financed takeover are not sufficiently observable by the market at the bid 
announcement, the negative wealth effects of managerial motives will translate into post-
acquisition wealth losses as the wealth destruction materialises over time. 
Extending the notions of managerialism and market overvaluation of bidder equity, 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) contend that the bidder makes an equity-financed takeover in 
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order to alleviate the expected long-term decline in its share price10• In other words, the 
bidder uses its overvalued equity as the acquisition currency to buy the target's assets as a 
cushion against its long-term price decline. Even though such an equity-financed takeover 
destroys the wealth of the target's long-term shareholders, the control-ownership 
separation in and dispersed ownership of the target permits the target managers to agree to 
the takeover. As Shleifer and Vishny (2003) assert, the bidder managers can then 
personally compensate the target managers for agreeing to the takeover. Since Shleifer and 
Vishny's (2003) framework takes market inefficiency as given, their argument implies that 
bidders in an equity offer should be observed to earn post-acquisition losses. 
2.3) 'fheories of Takeovers: When 'fargets are Privately Held Companies 
The market for corporate control literature has recently seen several competing 
theoretical explanations for the documented positive market reaction to the announcement 
of bids for privately held targets vis-a-vis the negative market reaction to bids for public 
targets. These explanations include the diversification effect, liquidity discount, target-side 
agency conflict disparity, differences in the M&A process, and increased monitoring by 
large shareholders. As mentioned in Section 2.1, these explanations appear to fall short of 
the observed empirics. 
2.3.1) Diversification Effect 
In the absence of manager-shareholder agency conflicts, Hansen and Lott (1996) 
argue that the goal of managers of firms owned by well-diversified shareholders is to 
maximise the value of the shareholders' portfolio instead of the value of their individual 
10 While the use of bidder equity and the ensuing signalling in Myers and Majlufs (1984) model stems from 
the bidder's insufficient financial slack, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) assume that the bidder managers hold 
equity stakes in the in finn and hence personally benefit from buying the cushion against the long-term price 
decline. Therefore, such benefits are material when the bidder managers hold sizeable equity stakes and 
cannot easily get out. 
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firms. To the extent that a takeover of a publicly listed target by a publicly listed bidder 
creates positive total gains, diversified shareholders holding equity stakes in both the 
bidder and the target are indifferent to how the takeover gains are to be allocated. This is 
because the losses on their holdings in the bidder will be offset by the gains on their 
holdings in the target. However, this diversification effect is unlikely in a takeover of a 
privately held target by a publicly listed bidder. Since the bidder shareholders are unlikely 
to hold equity stakes in a privately held target, the bidder makes only a private-firm 
takeover that increases its own individual value. In the Hansen and Lott (1996) context, 
bidder shareholders thus always capture part of the takeover gains when the target is a 
privately held company. 
Using a sample of takeovers in the U.S., Hansen and Lott (1996) find that bidders 
of public targets earn significantly negative announcement-period abnormal return whereas 
the gains to bidders of private targets are significantly positive. Using a much larger 
sample of the U.S. bidders, however, Fuller et al. (2002) and Moeller et al. (2004) find that 
bidders of divested subsidiaries also experience significantly positive gains during the 
announcement period similar to bidders of private targets. To the extent that subsidiaries 
are effectively owned by well-diversified shareholders through their listed parent (see also 
Fuller et al., 2002), one would expect to observe similarity in announcement-period 
abnormal return between bidders of divested subsidiaries and bidders of public targets. As 
a result, Hansen and Lott' s ( 1996) diversification effect cannot explain the results reported 
by Fuller et al. (2002) and Moeller et al. (2004). 
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2.3.2) Liquidity Discount 
In relation to the market reactions to bidders of public targets, Fuller et al. (2002) 
argue that a liquidity discount on equity of privately held companies and subsidiaries 
partially explains the significantly positive market reactions to bidders acquiring unlisted 
targets. This liquidity discount hypothesis hinges on the premise that private companies 
and subsidiaries cannot be sold as easily as publicly traded companies. In other words, the 
market for unlisted corporate assets is likely to be uncompetitive whereas the market for 
listed assets is likely to be competitive. Using several valuation multiples, Koeplin eta!. 
(2000) find that private companies in and outside the U.S. are sold at a significant discount, 
both economically and statistically, relative to a comparable publicly listed company 11 • 
Nevertheless, Koeplin et a!. (2000) remark that the observed discount may well be more 
than just a liquidity discount since firms that are sold before going public may be 
fundamentally different from firms that go public first, and then, are subsequently sold. 
The extant empirical evidence that bidders earn positive announcement-period 
gains when acquiring either a private target or divested subsidiary but not a public target 
(see Ang and Kohers, 2001; Fuller et al., 2002; Moeller et al., 2004) appears consistent 
with the liquidity discount explanation. However, Chang (1998) finds that when cash 
financing is used, the announcement-period abnormal return is not significantly different 
from zero for bidders of private targets and bidders of public targets. As Chang (1998) 
suggests, this result indicates that the takeover market is competitive for both private 
targets and public targets. Moeller et al. (2004) observe that takeovers of private targets 
and divested subsidiaries take place in an industry with higher liquidity than takeovers of 
11 The sample in Koeplin et a!. (2000) consists of 84 ( 1 08) acquisitions of private and public companies in 
(outside) the U.S. between 1984 and 1998. The small number of observations in Koeplin et a!.' s (2000) 
sample is due to the requirements for availability of the necessary historical financial data for private 
companies. In identifying a comparable public company, the authors require that the qualifying candidate be 
in the same industry, sold in the same year and of similar size in terms of turnover. 
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public targets 12• This finding of Moeller et al. (2004) is direct evidence against the 
liquidity discount explanation offered in Fuller et al. (2002). Further, the increasing 
popularity of takeovers of unlisted targets observed in the 1980s and 1990s (see Ang and 
Kohers, 2001) and the far larger number of private deals observed in the existing studies 
(e.g., Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000; Draper and Paudyal, 2004) are in contradiction with the 
hypothesised liquidity discount. 
2.3.3) Exit Costs Hypothesis 
At variance with the liquidity discount explanation advocated by Fuller et al. 
(2002), the Exit Costs hypothesis proposed below does not require the takeover market for 
unlisted assets to be less competitive than the market for listed assets for bidders acquiring 
unlisted targets to earn positive announcement-period gains. 
A. The Assumptions 
To begin, the Exit Costs hypothesis relies on the following assumptions13 . First, it 
is assumed that the capital market is rational and informationally efficient. At variance 
with several recent takeover studies such as Loughran and Vijh (1997), Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998) and Shleifer and Vishny (2003), the argument put forwards below 
neither takes market inefficiency as given nor requires that the announcement of a takeover 
bid conveys complete information with respect to the profitability and true motives of the 
transaction. Based on the findings of Moeller et al. (2004) that takeovers of unlisted 
targets occur in an industry with relatively high liquidity, it is also assumed that a 
12 Moeller eta!. (2004) calculate the liquidity index as the value of all corporate control deals in a particular 
year and 2-digit SIC code divided by the book value of all assets in the corresponding year and 2-digit SIC 
code. Indeed, the recent study by Schlingemann et al. (2002) suggests that liquidity of corporate assets tends 
to vary according to industries or market segments. 
13 These assumptions are also common assumptions underlying the hypotheses or arguments proposed in this 
chapter. 
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competing bidder, for either listed targets or unlisted targets, exists if the competing bid is 
expected to be profitable 14• This assumption is also in line with the pre-emptive bidding 
models in Fishman (1988) and Cornu and Isakov (2000). 
Thirdly, it is assumed that there exists informational asymmetry between managers 
and outside investors. That is, the market participants outside the firm do not have all of 
the information possessed by the insiders and/or managers. This assumption is consistent 
with the signalling framework adopted in several theoretical studies of corporate events 
(e.g., Cooney and Kalay, 1993; Myers and Majluf, 1984) as well as in the empirical 
literature of corporate takeovers (e.g., Draper and Paudyal, 1999; Loughran and Vijh, 
1997). Because bidders in competition for the same target are by definition outsiders to 
one another, this assumption further implies that informational asymmetry also exists 
among rival bidders (see also Fishman, 1988, 1989). In other words, each rival bidder has 
only a probability distribution of one another's bidding behaviour or valuation of the 
target. If the bid price made by each rival bidder is commonly observable, however, this 
assumption does not rule out the learning by one bidder about its rival's valuation of the 
target through the observable bid price. 
B. The Proposition 
Among other things, there are two important differences between publicly listed 
companies and privately held companies. First, the former are usually owned by dispersed 
and diversified shareholders whereas the latter are characterised by closely held ownership 
(e.g., Hansen and Lott, 1996; Matsusaka, 1993). The second difference is that the latter is 
usually younger and operates in the much earlier stage of its life cycle than the former 
14 As discussed below, however, relaxing this assumption does not lead to the loss of generality of the 
hypotheses proposed in this chapter. 
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(e.g., Ward, 1993, Part Two). These differences imply that the motivation behind the 
decision to sell varies between public targets and private targets. The decision to sell by 
shareholders in a public target may be driven purely by a large premium whereas owners 
of a private target may want to sell their firm for more strategic and intricate reasons, such 
as to exit. 
Because the absence ofthe separation between the decision-making and risk-taking 
functions causes closed corporations to underinvest in risky projects, a venture may be best 
carried out under different organisational forms as it progresses through its life cycle 
(Fama and Jensen, 1985)15 . Due to the variations in consumption preferences and/or 
endowed wealth of individual incumbent claimants in a closed corporation, the firm's 
passage through its life cycle means that new capital providers and/or further capital need 
to be identified to finance the unexploited risky projects. 
One of the most popular means by which an entrepreneur gets rewarded for his/her 
efforts and/or gains access to new capital is to take the firm public or to make an initial 
public offering or IPO (e.g., Brealey and Myers, 2000, p. 410; Ritter, 1998). However, an 
IPO is known to entail substantial costs, both direct and indirect. These costs in total have 
been documented to average between 21% and 32% of the realised market value of the 
issued shares (see Ritter, 1987). A large component of the direct costs, which include 
legal, auditing, underwriting and other administrative fees, is fixed and prohibitively 
expensive for small firms (e.g., Pagano, 1993; Pagano et a!., 1998). The indirect costs 
include underpricing and the loss of business confidentiality (Pagano et al., 1998; Ritter, 
1987). In the U.K., underpricing alone is found to average around 12% of the initial issue 
15 Fama and Jensen (1985) refer to listed or publicly held companies as open corporations and to unlisted or 
privately held companies as closed corporations. 
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price (see Loughran et al., 1994). Further, an IPO is generally a lengthy process, which 
also depends on the market condition or sentiment of uninformed investors in the IPO 
market (Pagano, 1993; Rees, 1997)16• This means that if the value of investment 
opportunities diminishes over time, the lengthy process of an IPO can substantially reduce 
shareholder wealth 17 . 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) show that raising new capital via an IPO may 
simply be prohibitively expensive for a small and young firm since such a firm has little 
record and low visibility. There is always duplication of information attainment by 
individual investors in the IPO market and the inherent costs will be borne by the firm. 
The less the information about the firm already accumulated in the public domain, the 
larger these costs become 18. To the extent that the total value of the firm also includes 
private benefits of controlling the firm, moreover, the firm's owners may suffer a wealth 
loss in an equity sale to atomistic outside investors. Zingales (1995) argue that these 
private benefits can be enjoyed only by the party who has control over the firm's corporate 
resources 19• 
If the costs associated with an IPO are not outweighed by the benefits of going 
public, the firm will choose the next best alternative given the objective(s) of their 
16 As well as Joss of privacy, the time-consuming nature and the timing of an IPO are indeed a major 
consideration for practitioners (see PriceWaterhouseCoopers, "The Guide to Going Public", 1999). 
17 A classic example of the Joss of value arising from a delay is the first-mover advantage. Note that a delay 
in the context of this present discussion is different from the delay in investment decisions, which can be 
valued as the option to wait in the context of real options. 
18 Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) also show that a private firm can alternatively raise new capital by 
placing its equity privately with a venture capitalist and hence avoiding the costs of information production in 
an IPO. However, as Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) argue, the firm has to compensate the venture 
capitalist for bearing the non-diversifiable risk. Since a considerable portion of the venture capitalist's 
wealth is invested in the firm, the capitalist is no longer well diversified. The lower the visibility of the firm, 
the higher is the non-diversifiable risk perceived by the venture capitalist. 
19 As described in Zingales (1995), an example of private benefits of control rights is the value of synergy 
which can be realised only when the buyer controls the firm's resources. 
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owner(s). Either to exit or to gain access to the capital market, a takeover by a publicly 
listed bidder can be a cost-effective alternative to an IP020. As a takeover by a listed 
bidder is a private transaction, the direct transaction costs inherent in the takeover are 
likely to be substantially smaller than those known to be inherent in an IPO. Because both 
the private firm owners and bidder managers are well informed of the value of their firms, 
the timing of the takeover is much more independent of the sentiment of uninformed 
investors in the capital market (see Ang and Kohers, 2001). To the extent that the bidder 
managers act in the interests of their shareholders, the timing of the takeover thus depends 
on the recognition of investment opportunities and the state of production function and 
product market. In this view, a takeover by a listed bidder reduces the loss of privacy 
and/or the costs of unnecessary delay in investment decisions. 
Together with the parties to the transaction being informed traders, the private 
nature of a takeover by a listed bidder also implies that undervaluation or underpricing of 
the private firm (i.e., a private target) by the bidder is much less likely or less severe than 
would be the case in an IPO. When selling the firm privately to a listed bidder, the firm's 
owners avoid the duplication of information production even though the takeover is 
essentially a sale to individual investors (i.e., the bidder is owned by atomistic 
shareholders). In addition, the prospect of realising capital gains acts as an incentive for 
the owners of a private firm to disclose their private information to the bidder's 
management. Specifically, uncertainty about the target's true value perceived by the 
bidder would lead to a discount on the target price. At the same time, the private benefits 
of controlling the firm or target (i.e., potential synergies) generate competition for the 
target. In competition, the winning bidder is the highest-value bidder. In order to prevent 
20 In an independent study by Brau et a!. (2003), a takeover by a publicly listed bidder has also been 
suggested as an alternative to an IPO. 
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a bidding war, as illustrated by Fishman (1988), the bidder's best strategy is to place the 
first and final bid that reflects its highest valuation of the target. By disclosing the firm's 
true value, the target owners hence establish their bargaining position and mitigate 
underpricing by the bidder. In this bidding or negotiation mechanism, the bidders also 
benefit from the low level ofthe target-side asymmetry. 
Based on the discussion above, it is hypothesised that despite the existence of a 
competing bid(s), the winning bidder also stands to enjoy part of the savings on the costs 
of going public (or exit costs savings) available to the owners of its private target as long 
as the competition is not perfect. Since the exit costs signify a material amount of wealth 
losses to the owners of a private target, an economically material fraction of the savings is 
voluntarily offered at least in order to generate the initial interests among the potential 
bidders21 . As these exit costs are commonly observable, the highest acquisition price each 
rival bidder is willing to offer to the target at each bidding is the amount reflective of its 
own valuation of the target that also includes the discount for the savings on the exit costs. 
Hence, as long as the competition for a given private target is imperfect, the winning 
bidder will enjoy part of the exit costs savings. However, this does not mean that the 
bidder will always be able to reap the entire exit costs savings when there is zero or no 
competition. If the target receives zero savings on the exit costs (let alone the price less 
than its true value) for agreeing to the takeover, it no longer has incentives to choose the 
takeover route and can always opt for an IPO - especially if it is financially healthy. In 
this case, the bidder suffers the loss of expected synergies as well as its share of the exit 
costs savings. 
21 The size of this discount is then endogenous, among other things, to the negotiation skills of the target 
owners and each rival bidder. 
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From the perspective of bidder shareholders, the exit costs savings and the benefits 
of transacting only with informed investors are not available when the target is a publicly 
listed firm. The IPO or exit costs, both direct and indirect, have already been incurred and 
are borne by the pre-issue shareholders in a public target22 . Other things constant, bidders 
acquiring a public target therefore do not receive any reduction in the acquisition price, 
which would otherwise be available in the case of acquisition of private targets. To the 
extent that the bidder is willing to pay the acquisition price that fully reflects its valuation 
of its target and for a given level of imperfect competition, there is hence no guarantee that 
the bidder will gain from acquiring a public target ex ante whereas a fraction of the exit 
costs savings provides a source of ex ante gains if the bidder opts for a private target. This 
implication is an important deviation from the liquidity discount explanation advocated by 
Fuller et al. (2002), which requires that unlisted assets being less sellable than listed assets 
be a necessary condition for the positive market reaction to bidders announcing bids for 
unlisted targets vis-a-vis the negative market reaction to bidders announcing bids for public 
targets. When the target is listed, moreover, the timing of the takeover is likely to be less 
than optimal. Unlike a private target, a considerable portion of the equity in a public target 
is owned by atomistic shareholders possessing at best only asymmetric information. The 
timing of a takeover of a public target is thus also dependent not only on the recognition of 
investment opportunities, but also on the sentiment of uninformed investors. 
In addition to sub-optimal timing, the winning bidder of a public target may not 
necessarily be the most efficient bidder, i.e., the highest-value bidder. Due to the dispersed 
ownership of a public target and the visibility of the bid price, the most efficient bidder 
may be deterred from bidding for the target by the non-tendering target shareholders free-
22 As implied by the immediate post-issue price jump reported in many IPO studies, the post-issue price of an 
IPO fmn does not incorporate the costs associated with the issue incurred by the pre-issue shareholders (for a 
review, see Loughran eta/., 1994). 
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riding on the information reflected in the bid price as suggested by Grossman and Hart 
(1980). To the extent that the target price is directly influenced by competition among 
rival bidders, moreover, this free-rider problem becomes more severe when an inefficient 
bidder participates in the competition. For instance, an inefficient bidder can observe the 
bid made by an efficient bidder and use it as the basis on which to set its own bid in ways 
similar to the setting of an offering price for IPO shares by uninformed investors as pointed 
out by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999). 
The above analysis leads to the Exit Costs hypothesis which posits that when a bid 
is made for a private target, the market reaction to the bidder's share price is positive 
reflecting its portion of the exit costs savings and the benefits of by-passing uninformed 
investors as its immediate profits. Since such benefits are unavailable when the target is 
publicly listed, the hypothesis also implies that the market reaction to the bidder's share 
price is at best non-negative when acquiring a public target. This hypothesis will be 
empirically investigated in Chapter 3. 
2.3.4) Clientele Effect Hypothesis 
The extant literature on the market for corporate control suggests that informational 
asymmetry between the bidder and the target leads to the choice of one payment method 
over another. For instance, Hansen (1987) shows that due to the contingent-pricing 
attribute of equity, the bidder prefers equity financing to cash financing when there is 
target-side asymmetry or uncertainty about the target's true value. In competition, the 
bidder uses cash to pay for the target in order to pre-empt a competing bid by rival bidders 
(Cornu and Isakov, 2000; Eckbo et al., 1990; Fishman, 1989). Since the value of cash is 
independent of the ex post profitability of the acquisition, a cash payment signals the 
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bidder's high valuation of the target and its commitment in the bidding. On the other hand, 
the value of equity accepted by the target as the medium of exchange depends on the ex 
post acquisition profitability. The use of bidder equity hence signals the bidder's low 
valuation of the target. As a result, while cash pre-empts competition, equity does not. 
From the target's perspective, cash receipts are less risky and hence more desirable than an 
equity payment (Draper and Paudyal, 1999). 
As discussed in the analysis of the Exit Costs hypothesis, a private target has 
incentives to disclose its private information to the bidder in order to avoid underpricing by 
the bidder. This implies that the target-side asymmetry per se plays a trivial role in 
determining the medium of exchange in takeovers of private targets. Given that a takeover 
by a listed bidder is a cost-effective alternative to an IPO for a private firm, a bid or offer 
that is inconsistent with the consumption preference of the target owner would result in 
lower utility for him/her and would hence be rejected outright23 . In addition to an adequate 
takeover premium, a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for an equilibrium or trade 
is thus the consumption preference of the target owner being satisfied. It therefore follows 
that the medium of exchange is endogenous to the consumption preference or investment 
objective of the target owner. 
As with the owner of a private firm faced with the decision whether or not to take 
the firm public, the investment objective of the owner of a private target may well be to 
exit, to stay, or to partially exit. To the extent that meeting the consumption preference of 
the owner of a private target owner is a necessary condition for an equilibrium, a particular 
payment method used in the takeover may be viewed as reflective of the target owner's 
23 The assumed number of target owners does not affect the implication of the hypothesis put forwards in this 
section. 
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investment objective. In the discussion that follows, three means of payment are 
considered- namely, cash, bidder equity and mix of cash and bidder equity. Specifically, 
the medium of exchange is assumed to be either a cash offer or an equity offer or a mixed 
offer. This assumption is in line with many extant empirical studies that examine the 
wealth effects of payment methods on bidder shareholders24 . 
The target owner in a cash offer may be viewed as one who has the objective to exit 
and hence requires a cash payment. A cash offer by a listed bidder provides the target 
owner with the desired cash without suffering fully from the costs of the capital market 
frictions as would be in the case of an IPO. Since any offer other than cash offers will be 
rejected outright by the target owner, only bidders with the preference or ability to pay 
cash are attracted and compete to acquire the target. However, a problem can arise when 
the highest-value bidder perceives uncertainty about the target's true value. When there is 
target-side asymmetry, as illustrated by Hansen (1987), the bidder's best strategy is to use 
its equity as the payment method. 
Given the target owner's requirement for cash, an equity offer would result in no 
equilibrium or trade. To induce cash-financed trade, the target owner must give the bidder 
a discount to compensate for the downside risk of the acquisition profitability. The target 
owner would be worse off in this case. Alternatively, by disclosing its private information 
to each rival bidder, the target owner can ensure trade with the highest-value bidder 
without conceding the asymmetry discount. This solution still holds even when there is 
zero competition or there is only one bidder attempting to acquire the target. If a lack of 
24 See for example, Draper and Paudyal (1999), Fuller eta/. (2002), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Sudarsanam 
and Mahate (2003). In the examination of the determinants of payment methods, Martin (1996) also 
classifies the medium of exchange as cash financing, equity fmancing and the financing with a mix of cash 
and equity. 
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competition induces the bidder to make a bid such that the target owner is better off taking 
the target public, the bid will be abandoned and an IPO will be chosen over a cash offer. 
In this case, the bidder suffers the loss of expected synergies as well as its share of the exit 
costs savings. Even without competition, the bidder therefore has incentives to make an 
offer that allows the target owner to extract some of the private benefits of controlling the 
target's corporate resources and to enjoy the exit costs savings. With the exit costs savings 
being commonly observable among the rival bidders, the winning bidder still enjoys a 
fraction of the savings even though the value of the expected synergies is fully reflected in 
the acquisition price. 
As a cost-effective alternative to an IPO, a private firm owner searching for access 
to the capital market for the firm can agree to a takeover by a listed bidder. Specifically, 
the target owner in an equity offer can be viewed as having the objective to stay and hence 
preference to hold equity stakes in a listed bidder25 . Due to the private nature of an equity 
offer by a listed bidder, the target owner enjoys the benefits of retaining trade secrets and 
the first-mover advantage. Unlike an IPO, moreover, an equity offer allows the target 
owner to negotiate and extract more value of the private benefits from the buyer- i.e., the 
bidder (see Zingales, 1995). At the same time, an equity offer still allows the target owner 
to maintain his/her interests in the firm by holding equity stakes in the bidder. Given the 
target owner's objective to stay, the potential bids will be only those made by bidders with 
the preference to use their equity to pay for the target. 
It is conceivable that an overvalued-equity bidder could be the winning bidder by 
offering an inflated acquisition premium. However, such an offer would not result in an 
25 Indeed, an equity offer also caters for a target owner whose objective is to stay and subsequently exit in the 
long run. 
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exchange. This is because the inflated premium must be greater than or equal to the sum 
of the value of expected synergies plus the portion of the exit costs savings otherwise 
available to the bidder. Specifically, the risk of claim dilution borne by the target owners 
cannot be practically hedged, and the degree of dilution can be substantial depending on 
the degree of the ex post decline in the bidder's share price. If overvalued bidder equity 
were to be used as a payment, the point of indifference for the target owner with the 
objective to stay would thus always lie above the sum of the target's price that fully 
reflects the synergistic gains to the bidder plus the total amount of exit costs savings26 . If 
the target owners received a takeover premium that is less than the sum of the total exit 
costs savings plus the premium due to the synergistic gains from the combination in the 
face of the non-hedgeable risk of claim dilution, they would be ex ante better off with an 
IPO. To this extent, the target owner will always reject the offer by an overvalued bidder 
and opt for an IPO - whether or not the takeover market is fully competitive and/or all 
rival bidders are overvalued bidders27 . 
If an equity offer for a private target does not signal overvaluation of bidder shares, 
it is plausible that, in addition to the exit costs savings, the offer also signals positive 
information about the bidder's prospects similar to that pointed out by Hertzel and Smith 
(1993) in the context of private equity placements. Because the target owner rationally 
incurs costs in carefully assessing the bidder's prospects and value prior to accepting the 
bidder's equity, however, the bidder must compensate the target owner for the study costs. 
In equilibrium, the notion of rational pricing implies that the amount of compensation paid 
26 When accepting bidder equity as a means of payment, the target owner has incentives to carefully assess 
the information supplied by the bidder as well as its true value (Chang, 1998; see also Hertzel and Smith, 
1993). 
27 Since such an inflated premium would always more than fully offset the bidder's cut of the exit costs 
savings, a wealth-maximising bidder would not agree to pay the premium either. A non-wealth-maximising 
bidder would not make a winning bid since its inherent agency costs would deter the target owner in the first 
place (see the Wealth Maximisation hypothesis below). 
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to the target owner is no more or less than the value of the positive information, if any, that 
is signalled by equity financing. To this extent, the incremental benefits of equity 
financing are fully reflected in the target price so that an otherwise identical target would 
be identically priced. As in the case of the bidder of a private target preferring cash, the 
bidder in an equity offer thus gains only from the discount given by the target owner to 
reflect its fraction (the bidder's fraction) of the exit costs savings. 
Although one may argue that the exiting target owner can accept the bidder's 
shares and sell them following the deal completion in the secondary market to realise cash 
(e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 2003), this strategy would lead to unnecessary transaction costs 
which would be reflected in a higher target price (or borne by the bidder). There is also ex 
ante liquidity risk associated with the reselling of bidder shares. Since bidders of private 
targets are relatively small (e.g., Ang and Kohers, 2001; Fuller et al., 2002), it is unlikely 
that the target owner is able to offload his/her bidder shares in the secondary market as 
costlessly or conveniently as implicitly conjectured by Shleifer and Vishny (2003). 
Therefore, the target owner with the objective to exit is worse off in an equity offer ex ante 
and will rationally reject the offer outright. Moreover, the reselling of bidder shares by the 
target owner as an insider, as illustrated by Leland and Pyle (1977), signals negative 
information about the bidder's value. A bidder acquiring a private target is hence better off 
using the medium of exchange that satisfies the target owner's objective or consumption 
preference. 
In a mixed offer, i.e., an offer financed with a mix of cash and bidder equity, the 
target owner may be viewed as having the objective to partially exit. Alternatively, a 
mixed offer can also be viewed as an offer in which the bidder pays the multiple owners of 
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the target using cash as well as its equity in correspondence with the objectives of the 
individual target owners. For the target owner(s), a mixed offer therefore gives both the 
desired cash and/or access to the capital market without incurring the exit costs inherent in 
an IPO. As with an equity offer, the benefits of the equity portion in the offer, if any, are 
fully reflected in the target price. Thus, the bidder in a mixed offer gains from the discount 
due to the exit costs savings similar to a cash offer and an equity offer. 
The argument put forwards above constitutes the Clientele Effect hypothesis. In 
short, the hypothesis posits that the announced payment method in takeovers of private 
targets conveys no incremental valuable information about the bidder. Variation in the 
payment method in private-firm takeovers thus reflects the clientele effect similar to one 
originally pointed out by Miller and Modigliani (1961) in the context of dividend policy. 
Specifically, the hypothesis implies that the choice of payment methods has no incremental 
impact on the bidder's immediate takeover gains. 
2.3.5) Target-Side Agency Conflict Disparity 
Ang and Kohers (2001) propose that the differences in announcement-period 
abnormal return between bidders of private targets and bidders of public targets are, among 
other things, attributable to the difference in ownership structure between the two types of 
targets. While publicly held companies are characterised by dispersed ownership, 
privately held companies have a closely held ownership structure. Although there is still a 
certain degree of the control-ownership separation in private firms (see Ang et al., 2000), a 
closely held ownership structure implies that the level of agency conflicts is much lower in 
private targets than in public targets. The closely ownership of private targets further 
implies that, unlike takeovers of public targets, their takeovers are unlikely to be caused by 
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the disciplinary motives. To the extent that managers' and shareholders' interests are 
better aligned in private targets than in public targets, private-firm bidders can embark on 
implementing value-enhancing strategies without delay caused by agency conflicts, which 
would be likely in the case of public targets. As a result, bids for private targets signal 
good news relative to bids for public targets. 
The extant evidence that the market reacts positively to bids for private targets and 
negatively to bids for public targets supports this target-side agency conflict disparity 
explanation (see for U.S. Fuller et al., 2002; Moeller et al., 2004; for U.K. Draper and 
Paudyal, 2004). Because subsidiaries effectively have dispersed ownership through their 
listed parent, the level of agency conflicts should be higher in subsidiaries than in private 
targets. However, the literature has documented that the market also reacts positively to 
bids for divested subsidiaries (see Fuller et al., 2002; Moeller et al., 2004). In particular, 
Moeller et al. (2004) find that bidder share price reaction is most positive when targets are 
divested subsidiaries. Hence, it is doubtful that the target-side agency conflict disparity 
hypothesised by Ang and Kohers (200 1) is an adequate explanation for the positive 
announcement-period gains to private-firm bidders vis-a-vis the negative gains to public-
firm bidders. Indeed, the apparent deficiency of this agency-theoretic explanation is not 
completely surprising. A large degree of the information about the target-side agency 
conflicts may not be observable by the market at the bid announcement. For instance, if 
the bid for a public target is driven by the disciplinary motive, it is in the bidder's interests 
to divert the market's as well as analysts' attention from the extent of the potential 
entrenchment in the target to the expected profitability of the deal. Given that the 
diversion fends off or minimises the potential negative market reaction to the bid, its 
purpose is consistent with shareholder wealth maximisation. 
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2.3.6) Wealth Maximisation Hypothesis 
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, takeovers of public targets may well be the 
manifestation of managerialism or the agency problems in the bidders. Because takeovers 
increase firm size of the bidder and the ensuing managerial perquisites, the bidder 
managers have incentives to pursue their empire building interests. As pointed out by Ang 
and Kohers (200 1 ), however, private targets are substantially smaller and thus less 
attractive to empire-building managers than public targets. In particular, empire-building 
managers can increase their firm size and the ensuing personal benefits much more 
effectively by acquiring a public target than by acquiring a private target. In this view, 
bidders that choose to acquire private targets are therefore unlikely to be in the pursuit of 
managerial empire building. 
In addition to the difference in firm size, the difference in ownership structure 
between private targets and public targets is another reason for which to expect that bidders 
acquiring a private target are wealth-maximising bidders vis-a-vis those acquiring public 
targets. Private targets have closely held ownership whereas public targets are usually 
owned by atomistic shareholders (Ang and Kohers, 2001; Hansen and Lott, 1996). An 
important implication of this difference is that the shareholder-manager agency conflicts 
are much lower (if not negligible) in private targets than in public targets. 
The agency conflicts in public targets have great potential to make the post-
acquisition phase problematic and are hence likely to deter wealth-maximising bidders. As 
a consequence, wealth-maximising or efficient bidders would be more attracted to private 
targets than to public targets. To the contrary, the agency problems in public targets may 
not at all deter empire-building bidders. Indeed, takeovers of public targets may well be 
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the means by which the bidder and target managers can collude to further entrench 
themselves or co-operate in securing their employment and high levels of perquisites. 
The differences in firm size and ownership structure between private targets and 
public targets together imply that the likelihood of fully realising the expected synergies 
during the post-acquisition period is higher in takeovers of private targets than in takeovers 
of public targets. Accordingly, the Wealth Maximisation hypothesis states that bidders of 
private targets maximise the realisation of expected synergies even though private targets 
yield little or no personal utility for the bidder managers. If bidders of private targets are 
wealth-maximising bidders, it follows that their shareholders should earn at least a normal 
rate of return during the post-acquisition period even when the takeover market is fully 
competitive (see Halpern, 1983). 
While the small size and closely held ownership of private targets imply that their 
bidders are likely to be wealth-maximising bidders, the absence of market valuation for 
private targets can potentially be attractive to self-serving or empire-building managers. 
Unlike for public targets, it is difficult- if not impossible - for the market to determine 
whether the bidder is overpaying for a private target. As the monitoring by the corporate 
control market is less effective when the target is privately held, it becomes easier for self-
serving bidder managers to pursue their personal interests by overpaying for private 
targets. Conn et a!. (2002) note that self-serving bidder managers usually conceal their 
true motives at the bid announcement while exaggerating gains from the transaction. 
Consequently, the wealth destruction in takeovers of private targets resulting from the 
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convenient pursuit of the empire-building objective will materialise as losses to the bidder 
shareholders during the post-acquisition period28. 
2.3. 7) Differences in the M&A Process 
In addition to the target-side agency conflict disparity, Ang and Kohers (2001) also 
point out to the differences in the M&A process between private-firm and public-firm 
takeovers. When targets are publicly listed, the bidding process is open to competition and 
usually attracts a large degree of publicity and analyst following. Ang and Kohers (200 1) 
argue that the publicity and analyst coverage surrounding the bid can bring about to the 
bidder managers the feeling of the prestige of winning the bidding against their 
competitors or winning a recalcitrant target. The process of public-firm takeovers is thus 
prone to infect the bidder managers with hubris. In contrast, takeovers of unlisted targets 
are likely to attract much less publicity and analyst coverage. Bidder managers involved in 
bids for unlisted targets would therefore find it easier to walk away from the negotiation if, 
or when, it becomes strategic to do so. In other words, the bidding for unlisted targets, 
either private targets or subsidiaries, is unlikely to be driven by hubris. 
Unlisted targets are usually much smaller than their listed counterparts (e.g., Ang 
and Kohers, 2001; Fuller eta!., 2002). To the extent that analyst following increases with 
firm size (Bhushan, 1989), unlisted targets may thus attract less analyst coverage. Healy et 
a!. (1992) note that large takeovers are interesting even in their own rights because public 
concern about the consequences of the deals is triggered by large transaction size. Another 
possible reason that bids for unlisted targets attract much less analyst coverage is because 
28 As stated earlier in this section, one of the assumptions underlying the hypotheses proposed in this chapter 
is that the market is rational and informationally efficient. The implication of this assumption is that as the 
information about the wealth destruction of private-firm takeovers gradually reaches the market during the 
post-acquisition period, the market accordingly reassesses the bidder's value downwards. 
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the bidders themselves have been low-coverage firms even prior to the bid announcement. 
One pattern documented in the recent studies that examine takeovers of unlisted targets is 
that such deals involve bidders that are much smaller (in market capitalisation) than those 
in public-firm takeovers. 
The documented variations in the market reaction between bidders acquiring an 
unlisted target and those acquiring a listed target support the conjecture that the likelihood 
of hubris-driven bidding is much lower in private deals due to the differences in the M&A 
process. However, the existing studies have also observed that both bidder size and 
transaction size are much larger in deals involving divested subsidiaries than in deals 
involving private targets (see Fuller et al., 2002; Moeller et al., 2004). If publicity and 
hence hubris increase in bidder size and/or transaction size, the market should react more 
positively to bids for private targets than to bids for divested subsidiaries. In the opposite 
direction, both studies by Fuller et al. (2002) and by Moeller et al. (2004) report larger 
announcement-period abnormal gains for bidders acquiring divested subsidiaries. 
Given the extant empirical patterns, it is plausible that hubris in bidder managers 
varies between the bidding for listed and unlisted targets, but not between the bidding for 
private targets and divested subsidiaries. Alternatively, hubris may in fact vary between 
the bidding for the two types of unlisted targets due to either the competition among rival 
bidders or prestige cost of failing to acquire even a small target. When the bidding occurs 
off the market with little publicity, however, the information about hubris may not reach 
the market at the bid announcement. If this is the case, the variations in announcement-
period gains among bidders of private targets, divested subsidiaries and public targets may 
be attributable to factors other than the differences in the M&A process. 
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2.3.8) Ease of Integration Hypothesis 
Under the Wealth Maximisation hypothesis, it is implied that a bidder can freely 
choose to acquire a private target over a public target. This implication is consistent with 
the view that a bidder has the right, and not the obligation, to make an acquisition (see also 
Lambrecht, 2004). A takeover decision can be viewed as having the characteristics of a 
call option, and the bidder exercises the call (or make an acquisition) only if and when it is 
optimal to do so. Otherwise, it can let the call expire worthless or delay the exercising of 
the call. However, there exists a situation in which a wealth-maximising bidder may not 
be able to exploit this call feature. 
An acquisition or external expansion is often viewed by corporate managers as a 
quicker alternative to internal expansion for achieving growth (see Copeland et a!., 1996, 
Chapter 14; also Firth, 1980). The pressure to search for or maintain growth indicates not 
only the bidder's need to buy external growth in great haste, but also a large target as its 
choice. Consequently, the bidder's involuntary choice is likely to become a public target. 
To this extent, the differences between private targets and public targets in terms of 
ownership structure and firm size as well as the nature of the M&A process carry 
important implications on the success of the post-acquisition phase even when agency 
conflicts in the bidder can be assumed away. 
First, while the dispersed ownership of public targets implies the Shleifer and 
Vishny (1989) management entrenchment, owners of a private target have incentives to 
prove to their prospective bidder(s) that there are only minimal or no agency conflicts 
inherent in the target. This is simply because the target-side agency costs would suppress 
the acquisition price or even deter the highest-value wealth-maximising bidder in the first 
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place. Although the target owners may not be able to monitor their managers perfectly for 
reasons such as a lack of time or ability (see Ang et al., 2000), the prospect of capital gains 
act as an incentive for the owners to prepare the firm according to the highest-value 
bidder's requirements. 
If, for example, the bidder perceives managerial divergence in the target and 
conditions the offered premium on either the replacement of the incumbent target 
manager(s) or alteration of the existing managerial employment contracts, the premium 
acts as an incentive for the target owners to agree to the takeover conditions. When selling 
out their entire holdings, the owners of or venture capitalists in a private target therefore 
have incentives only to maximise the acquisition price, and not to nurture entrenchment. 
When opting for post-acquisition holdings in the bidder, the target owners have further 
incentives to maximise the ease at which the target is integrated into the bidder's corporate 
structure. This is because a material portion of their wealth is now dependent on the 
bidder's success during the post-acquisition phase. 
Secondly, the general wisdom in the M&A practice suggests that the smaller the 
physical size of the target for a given bidder, the more manageable is the post-acquisition 
phase (see Copeland et al., 1996, p. 452 - 455). As noted by Bhagat et al. (2002), it has 
been argued in the popular literature that mergers of equals are difficult to implement 
successfully possibly due to the clash of two strong corporate cultures and the intractable 
problems of leadership. As private targets are usually much smaller than public targets 
(e.g., Ang and Kohers, 2001; Fuller et al., 2002), target integration is hence likely to be 
more successful in takeovers of private targets than in takeovers of public targets. 
Although the higher success rate of target integration in private-firm takeovers may well be 
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commonly acknowledged among bidder managers, those that are infected with hubris may 
simply ignore this received wisdom and opt for a public target believing that they are able 
to successfully eliminate the target-side agency problems and maximise quick growth. 
When the target is publicly listed, the bid usually attracts considerable publicity 
(Ang and Kohers, 2001). Indeed, the large size of a public target relative to a private target 
is likely to attract higher analyst coverage for the bid (see Bhushan, 1989). To the extent 
that the bidder is faced with the need for a sizable growth improvement, such a high level 
of publicity surrounding the bid serves as further pressure on the bidder to consummate the 
deal even if new private information about the post-acquisition operations has surfaced to 
be negative29 . As a failed bid can potentially incur the costs of failing to meet the market 
analysts' expectations, i.e., declines in the bidder's share price, the bidder may essentially 
be obligated to complete the deal even though it is a suboptimal investment. In this view, 
bidders of large targets such as public targets, albeit wealth-maximising, are likely to 
experience a difficult post-acquisition period. Due to the off-market nature of private 
deals, on the other hand, private-firm bidders encounter very little or no analyst coverage 
(Ang and Kohers, 2001 ). This implies that bidders of private targets are much better able 
to exploit the call feature of a takeover decision, to acquire an optimal target with optimal 
timing, and as a result, enjoy much easier target integration during the post-acquisition 
period ex post. 
The arguments put forwards above together lead to the Ease of Integration 
hypothesis. Under this hypothesis, bidders acquiring private targets are likely to enjoy 
much easier target integration than those acquiring public targets, holding constant the 
29 The existence of new private information in this argument is consistent with informational asymmetry 
between managers of a public-firm bidder and outside investors who are relatively uninformed. 
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bidder-side agency conflicts. The greater ease of integration in private-firm takeovers 
stems from the closely held ownership and small physical size of private targets as well as 
the off-market nature of the private deals. 
2.3.9) Increased Monitoring (Monitoring Hypothesis) 
Due to the similarity between an equity-financed offer for a private target and a 
private equity placement, it has been suggested in the recent corporate control literature 
that the announcement of these transactions attracts a similar market reaction (see Chang, 
1998). In both equity offers for private targets and private equity placements, shares are 
issued to one or a small number of large investors. An increase in ownership concentration 
thus follows these two corporate events. This is an important variation from equity 
financing in public-firm takeovers and public equity issues. 
The studies exammmg private equity placements typically find that although 
private issues are made at a sizeable discount, the market reacts positively to the issue 
announcement (e.g., Wruck, 1989; Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Hertzel et al., 2002). Wruck 
(1989) finds that the positive announcement-period abnormal return to private placement 
firms can be partially explained by an increase in ownership concentration in the firms. 
The agency-theoretic literature suggests that an increase in ownership concentration and/or 
managerial holdings increases shareholder wealth if it better aligns the shareholder and 
manager interests and/or facilitates the more efficient monitoring of managerial 
performance (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). As suggested 
by Wruck ( 1989), the private equity placement discounts reflect compensation for the 
monitoring services provided by private investors. 
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In support of Wruck (1989), Chang (1998) finds that bidders of private targets earn 
positive announcement-period gains only when financing the offer with their equity and 
that the gains are significantly more positive when the offer results in the creation of a 
blockholder. Chang (1998) also reports a positive relationship between the announcement-
period gains and the post-acquisition ownership in the bidder held by target owners as a 
group. In the U.K., Draper and Paudyal (2004) report results which indicate a pattern that 
announcement-period gains are more positive for private-firm bidders in an equity offer 
than for those in a cash offer. Using a sample of only frequent bidders, Fuller et al. (2002) 
find that although bidders of private targets earn positive announcement-period gains 
regardless of payment methods, the gains are more positive when equity is used as the 
medium of exchange30. 
For a sample of takeovers by both frequent and infrequent bidders in the U.S. 
during 1980- 2001, however, Moeller et a!. (2004) document an insignificant difference in 
the positive announcement-period gain between private-firm bidders in an equity offer and 
in a cash offer. Also unsupportive of the increased monitoring conjecture, the U.S. study 
by Ang and Kohers (2001) reports that although private-firm bidders earn positive 
announcement-period gains regardless of the means of payment, the gains are significantly 
smaller in equity offers than in cash offers. Using a sample of the Australian bidders, Da 
Silva Rosa et al. (2001) find that while cash bidders of private targets earn significantly 
positive announcement-period gains, the equity bidders earn insignificant gains. The 
extant empirical evidence therefore suggests that private-firm bidders using equity to pay 
for their target on balance earn positive gains, but this positive announcement-period effect 
3° Fuller et a/. (2002) define "frequent" bidders as those acquiring five or more targets within any three-year 
window during their sample period, i.e., 1990 - 2000. 
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may be attributable to factors other than the increased monitoring arising from the creation 
of blockownership. 
At variance with Wruck (1989), Hertzel and Smith (1993) find that the positive 
market reaction to private placement announcements is more attributable to the positive 
signals of the issuer's prospects than to an increase in ownership concentration. Extending 
Myers and Majufs (1984) model by allowing firms to choose to raise funds under full 
information, Hertzel and Smith (1993) show that firms can reduce the claim dilution 
suffered by their existing shareholders and the underinvestment problem by issuing equity 
privately. Before accepting the issuer's equity, private investors incur costs in studying the 
issuer's prospects and determining its true value. The willingness of private investors to 
commit a large investment in the issuer under full information therefore signals to the 
market good news about the issuer. Under Hertzel and Smith's (1993) extension, the issue 
discounts then reflect the study costs incurred by private investors. 
In their empirical analysis, Hertzel and Smith (1993) find that the private placement 
discounts are higher for issuers that are difficult to value and where uncertainty about the 
true firm value is high. The authors also find that the market reaction becomes more 
positive as the potential for undervaluation of the issuers' equity becomes greater. 
However, the authors find no relationship between either the issue discounts or market 
reaction and changes in ownership concentration. Indeed, Hertzel and Smith (1993) also 
observe that private investors rarely join the issuer's board of directors either through 
agents or by themselves. To gain some additional insights, the authors contacted a number 
of private investors in their sample and investment bankers active in the private equity 
placement market. Although the conversations established by the authors may not be 
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empirically generalisable, it was indicated that private investors, especially financial 
institutions, frequently do not perform the monitoring role31 . In view of the findings of 
Hertzel and Smith (1993), it is likely that private equity placements may send, at best, only 
mixed signals with respect to the possibility of monitoring by private investors. 
In the light of Hertzel and Smith (1993), the more positive market reaction to 
equity-financed bids for private targets relative to cash deals, if in fact more positive, may 
well be more attributable to the information effects than to the monitoring effects. Fuller et 
a!. (2002) note that target owners in an equity offer may not always be capable of or even 
interested in performing the monitoring role following the takeover. More importantly, an 
increase in ownership concentration also gives managers or insiders more latitude to 
entrench themselves (e.g., Morek eta!., 1988; Stulz, 1988). As a result, the announcement 
of an equity-financed bid for a private target would, if at all, convey at best very 
ambiguous information about the monitoring services by the target owners. Even if the 
announcement of equity financing in bids for private targets sends only mixed signals of 
monitoring services or entrenchment by the target owners, this does not preclude the 
possibility that more information about these quantities becomes available during the post-
acquisition period. 
Using a sample of the U.S. firms conducting private equity placements, Hertzel et 
al. (2002) find that private issuers earn significantly negative abnormal return, in both 
calendar time and event time, over the three-year period following the placement 
announcement. Hertzel et al.' s (2002) findings hence suggest, among other things, that an 
31 It is conceivable that institutional private investors may not perform active monitoring simply because they 
are in fact well-diversified investors. Although the amount of private investment committed in a private 
placement firm may be substantial for individual investors, it may not necessarily be large enough to be 
worth an institutional private investor's while to devote its effort in performing constant monitoring. 
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increase in ownership concentration due to the issue serves to entrench management, as 
opposed to facilitating more efficient monitoring of managerial performance, during the 
post-issue period. Given the similarity between private equity placements and equity 
offers for private targets, an increase in ownership concentration in the equity bidders may 
carry a similar post-event implication. 
Following an equity offer, the owners of a private target are likely to have a 
substantial portion of their wealth invested in the bidder. Thus, to the extent that the target 
owners have the objective to stay, they have incentives to monitor the performance of the 
bidder managers, i.e., managers in the combined firm. Specifically, the cost of divergent 
behaviour of the bidder managers exceeds the cost of monitoring borne by the target 
owners as blockholders or large shareholders (see Fama, 1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). 
Hence, it is cost-effective for the target owners to monitor the bidder managers during the 
post-acquisition period. Even if incapable of effectively monitoring as noted by Fuller et 
a!. (2002), the risk of wealth losses due to the divergent behaviour of the managers in the 
combined firm acts as an incentive for the target owners to hire an agent(s) to perform the 
monitoring on their behalf (see also Ang et a!., 2000). Indeed, the target owners' 
substantial holdings and ensuing voting power in the bidder have the potential for deterring 
the bidder managers from diverging from shareholder wealth maximisation during the 
post-acquisition period. 
To the extent that target owners in an equity offer perform the monitoring services 
during the post-acquisition period, they will require compensation for their services from 
the bidder (see also Wruck, 1989). The target owners require compensation because the 
benefits of their services accrue not only to themselves as blockholders, but also to other 
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bidder shareholders. The compensation can arrive in several forms, such as large director 
fees or salary and the privilege to borrow from the firm at the below-market rates (e.g., 
Barclay and Holderness, 1989; Holderness and Sheehan, 1991; Zwiebel, 1995). The target 
owners are also compensated by means of the possibility of selling their stakes back to the 
firm (i.e., the bidder) at a material premium, especially if the bidder's shares are liquid (see 
Chang, 1998; also Peyer and Vermaelen, 2004). The notion of rational pricing suggests 
that this compensation, in whatever form, reflects the benefits accruing to other bidder 
shareholders. In other words, other bidder shareholders do not earn abnormal profit from, 
or cannot free-ride, the monitoring services performed by the target owners. In 
equilibrium, both the target owners and other bidder shareholders therefore earn during the 
post-acquisition period a normal rate of return on their equity investments in the bidder. 
By arbitrage, this normal-return outcome also obtains because shares of the same class in 
the same company cannot be treated differently. This analysis may be referred to as the 
Monitoring hypothesis. 
As pointed out by Morek et al. (1988) and Stulz (1988), an increase in ownership 
concentration also facilitates management entrenchment. In other words, the target 
owners, in collusion with the incumbent bidder managers, may exploit their 
blockownership and the ensuing voting power in order to pursue of their personal gains 
following the takeover, at the expense of other bidder shareholders. To this extent, other 
bidder shareholders will suffer from an increase in or emergence of agency conflicts. 
During the post-acquisition period, consequently, the bidder's shares will decline in value. 
However, the self-serving target owners are not worse off with the decline in the value of 
their holdings. As rational economic agents, the target owners would not diverge from the 
interests of other bidder shareholders if the costs of divergence borne by them (i.e., 
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reduction in the value of their holdings) were greater than the benefits of divergence 
accruing to them. 
It would seem conceivable that the target owners in equity offers may choose to 
become completely passive, i.e., neither monitor nor serve their own interest at the expense 
of the others. However, doing absolutely nothing to optimise a substantial portion of their 
wealth invested [at risk] in the bidder would simply imply irrationality on the target 
owners. As the target owners are, as they can be safely assumed to be so, rational utility-
maximising economic agents, they will take actions to optimise their wealth at risk one 
way or another. Since an equity offer for a private target is equivalent to a privately 
negotiated block purchase where the incumbent bidder managers agree to the deal, 
moreover, being passive investors would in all probability mean that the target owners are 
paid to be silent partners in the post-acquisition pursuit of management entrenchment (see 
Barclay eta!., 2003). However, Barclay et al. (2003) find that when purchasers in private 
placements of equity are active following the placement, the issuers earn insignificant 
abnormal return during the 6-month period following the announcement. Barclay et al. 
(2003) also observe that the placements in which the buyers are active are most commonly 
in the form of a joint venture with the issuer. 
Despite the monitoring services by the target owners and little bidder-target 
asymmetry, there exists possibility that shareholders in equity bidders of private targets 
may suffer losses during the post-acquisition phase. Fishman (1988) shows that in order to 
prevent a bidding war, a bidder's best strategy is to make the first and final bid that signals 
to its rivals its highest valuation of the targee2. Hirshleifer (1995) points out that bidding 
32 Recall that since rival bidders are by definition outsiders to one another, each rival bidder has only a 
probability distribution of one another's bidding behaviour or valuation of the target. 
54 
in takeover contests generally occurs in a few large jumps rather than in many small 
increments as in a costless English auction conventionally assumed. Since the use of 
equity does not deter competition (Cornu and Isakov, 2000; Fishman, 1989), the winning 
equity bid may therefore well exceed the bidder's valuation of the target. Due to the 
absence of market valuation for a private target, it is unlikely that the market can determine 
whether the winning bidder has overpaid for the target ex ante. If the bidder overpays, 
some realisation of unexpected positive synergies must occur during the post-acquisition 
phase such that it is sufficient to offset the overpayment, for otherwise shareholders in the 
overpaying equity bidder will suffer the post-acquisition losses. 
2.4) Summary 
The existing literature on the market for corporate control has documented 
evidence which by and large suggests that, both around the announcement-period and in 
the long run following the deal completion, bidder shareholders generally earn at best non-
positive gains and suffer wealth losses when takeovers are financed with bidder equity. 
Several theories have been advanced as explanations for these empirical patterns. The 
agency theory argues that takeovers are the manifestation of managerialism in the bidder. 
Alternatively, the takeover losses to bidder shareholders have also been attributed to 
excessive self-confidence or arrogance of the bidder managers. The negative wealth effect 
of equity financing has most commonly been explained in the context of Myers and Majluf 
(1984) as the market reaction, both instant and with delay, to the overvaluation of bidder 
shares at the bid announcement. 
While the existing literature has traditionally been focused on takeovers of targets 
that are publicly held or listed, takeovers of privately held targets form the vast majority of 
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the world's M&A activities. The recent, though sparse, evidence indicates that the 
announcement of bids for private targets leads to a positive share price reaction for the 
bidders. It has also been documented that the market reaction tends to be more positive 
when bids for private targets are financed with bidder equity. These recent empirical 
patterns suggest that the traditional theories of the market for corporate control may not be 
as generalisable as one might have once thought. 
In an attempt to explain the positive market reaction to bidders making an 
announcement of bids for private targets, several new hypotheses have been formulated in 
the recent studies that examine takeovers of private targets. These hypotheses include the 
diversification effect, liquidity discount, target-side agency conflict disparity, differences 
in the M&A process and increased monitoring. Yet, these new hypotheses appear 
inadequate given the observed empirics. As the more coherent alternatives to these 
hypotheses, the Exit Costs and Clientele Effect hypotheses are proposed in this chapter in 
an attempt to describe the wealth effects of bid announcements for private targets. The 
Exit Costs hypothesis posits that the market reacts positively to bids for private targets, 
reflecting the portion of the exit costs savings available to the bidders. In the framework of 
the Exit Costs hypothesis, the Clientele Effect hypothesis argues that the choice of 
payment methods in a private-firm takeover reflects the consumption preference or 
investment objective of the target owner and conveys no incremental valuable information 
about the bidder. 
In recognising that quantities such as managerialism, hubris and monitoring 
services by owners of private targets may not at all be sufficiently observable at the bid 
announcement, the Wealth Maximisation, Ease of Integration and Monitoring hypotheses 
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are advocated in this chapter as the descriptions of the long-term wealth effects of private-
firm takeovers on bidder shareholders. The Wealth Maximisation hypothesis argues that, 
unlike bidders acquiring public targets, bidders of private targets maximise shareholder 
wealth even though private targets yield little or no personal utility for the bidder 
managers. Under the Ease of Integration hypothesis, a private target is easier to integrate 
into the bidder's corporate structure than a public target owing to the closely held 
ownership and small physical size of the former as well as the off-market nature of the 
private bidding process. Finally, the Monitoring hypothesis states that if target owners in 
an equity offer perform monitoring services following the deal completion, they will 
require compensation for their services and the bidder shareholders should in aggregate 
earn a normal profit in the long run. 
In short, the hypotheses proposed in this chapter imply that takeovers of private 
targets and public targets lead to differing wealth consequences on bidder shareholders, 
both in the short run and in the long run. The implications of these hypotheses are 
empirically investigated in the next three chapters. 
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CHAPTER3 
ANALYSIS OF ANNOUNCEMENT -PERIOD BIDDER ABNORMAL RETURN 
3.1) Introduction 
Extensive empirical evidence has been documented to suggest that bidder 
shareholders generally earn zero gains or suffer moderate losses from the announcement of 
a takeover (for a review, see Bruner, 2002; Jarrell et al., 1988; Jensen and Ruback, 1983). 
Substantial evidence also suggests that announcement-period bidder abnormal return is 
dependent on the payment methods. Bidder shareholders breakeven in cash transactions, 
but suffer significant wealth losses when bidder equity is used as the medium of exchange, 
(e.g., for U.S. Travlos, 1987; Yook, 2003; for U.K. Draper and Paudyal, 1999; 2004; 
Franks et a!., 1988). These empirical patterns, however, are based on the experience of 
takeovers of publicly listed targets. 
While the main focus of the extant literature has been placed on takeovers of public 
targets, Ang and Kohers (2001) observe that the vast majority of the world's M&A 
activities involve private targets. Only recently has the literature seen the emergence of 
studies that empirically explore the wealth effects of the announcement of takeovers of 
private targets on bidder shareholders. Though limited, the evidence from these few 
studies consistently shows that the announcement of private-firm takeovers induces 
significant wealth gains for bidder shareholders irrespective of the payment method (see, 
for U.S. Ang and Kohers, 2001; Fuller eta!., 2002; Kohers and Ang, 2000; Moeller eta!., 
2004; for U.K. Draper and Paudyal, 2004). An important implication of this evidence is 
that the traditional theories of the market for corporate control, which have been advanced 
based on the experience of takeovers of public targets, may not be as generalisable as one 
might have once thought. For instance, the positive market reaction to private-firm bidders 
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which pay for their targets by cash or by their equity implies that the popular asymmetric 
information hypothesis by Myers and Majluf (1984) does not hold for the majority of the 
M&A activities. 
Several competing hypotheses have been offered in the recent literature as 
explanations for the positive announcement-period gains to bidders of private targets vis-a-
vis the negative gains to public-firm bidders. These hypotheses include Hansen and Lott's 
(1996) diversification effect, liquidity discount advocated by Fuller et al. (2002), target-
side agency conflict disparity and differences in the M&A process put forwards by Ang 
and Kohers (200 1 ), and Chang's ( 1998) increased monitoring. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
none of these hypotheses provides a coherent explanation for the observed empirics. 
In an attempt to provide more coherent explanations for the wealth effects of the 
announcement of private-firm takeovers on bidder shareholders, the Exit Costs and 
Clientele Effect hypotheses were put forwards in Chapter 2. The Exit Costs hypothesis 
posits that the market reacts positively to bids for private targets, reflecting the portion of 
the exit costs savings available to the bidders. Under the Clientele Effect hypothesis, the 
choice of payment methods in a private-firm takeover reflects the investment objective of 
the target owner and conveys no incremental valuable information about the bidder. The 
Clientele Effect hypothesis hence implies that payment methods have no incremental 
impact on announcement-period bidder abnormal return. 
In this chapter, the implications of the Exit Costs and Clientele Effect hypotheses 
are investigated by examining the market reaction to the share price of bidders making a 
takeover announcement for a private target vis-a-vis bidders acquiring public targets and 
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bidders acquiring divested subsidiaries. Though unlisted like private targets, subsidiaries 
are owned by a listed parent, which is in turn owned by dispersed shareholders (see also 
Fuller et al., 2002). Examination of abnormal return to bidders of divested subsidiaries 
vis-a-vis bidders of private targets therefore provides a more direct test for both the Exit 
Costs and Clientele Effect hypotheses. 
The empirical investigation in this chapter is conducted using the U.K. data, which 
provides an out-of-sample comparison for the evidence based on the U.S. data33 . This 
chapter also differs from the previous studies, particularly those in the U.S., in terms of the 
methodology. In this chapter, a longer event window is used in an attempt to address the 
problem of the true event date occurring before the event date recorded in the commonly 
used database. Moreover, the abnormal return estimation adopted in this chapter 
minimises the contamination caused by bidders making multiple acquisitions during the 
sample period. 
In the next section, the empirical implications of the Exit Costs and Clientele Effect 
hypotheses are summarised. Section 3.3 describes the data, sample selection criteria and 
sample characteristics. Section 3.4 discusses the empirical methodology to be adopted in 
this chapter. The empirical results are then reported and discussed in Section 3.5, and 
Section 3.6 concludes this chapter. 
3.2) Summary of Hypotheses and Testable Propositions 
In Section 2.4, the Exit Costs hypothesis is proposed as the description of the 
market reaction to the takeover announcement made by bidders acquiring a private target 
33 Thus far, the recent study by Draper and Paudyal (2004) appears to be the only U.K. study of private-firm 
takeovers. In their analysis, however, Draper and Paudyal (2004) appear not to separate bidders of private 
targets from bidders of divested subsidiaries. 
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in relation to the announcement of takeover of public targets. As the description of the 
effects of payment methods on the market reaction to the announcement of private-firm 
takeovers, the Clientele Effect hypothesis is advanced in Section 2.4. Below in this 
section, these hypotheses are summarised and their empirical implications given. 
A. Market Reaction to Bidders of Private Targets- Exit Costs Hypothesis 
As a closed corporation or privately held firm progresses from the start-up phase 
through its life cycle, the underinvestment problem arises due to the absence of the 
separation between the decision-making and risk-taking functions in the firm (Fama and 
Jensen, 1985). In response to the underinvestment problem, the firm needs to identify new 
capital providers and/or further capital to fund the unexploited risky projects. One of the 
most popular means by which an entrepreneur gets rewarded for his/her effort and/or gains 
access to new capital is to take the firm public or to make an IPO (e.g., Ritter, 1998). 
However, an IPO is known to entail substantial costs. A large component of the direct 
costs, such as underwriting and administrative fees, is fixed and can prohibit small firms 
from going public (e.g., Pagano et al., 1998). There are also indirect costs inherent in an 
IPO, namely underpricing and the loss of business confidentiality (Pagano et al., 1998; 
Ritter, 1987). Moreover, the success of an IPO also depends on the market condition or 
the sentiment of uninformed investors in the IPO market (Rees, 1997) 
While substantially less costly than an IPO, a takeover by a publicly listed bidder 
provides the owner(s) of a private firm with the desired cash and/or access to the capital 
market. As acquisition by a listed bidder is a private transaction, the direct transaction 
costs are smaller in the takeover than in an IPO. Because both the owners of the private 
firm and bidder managers are well informed of the value of their firms, the timing of the 
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takeover is independent of the sentiment of uninformed investors (see Ang and Kohers, 
2001). By opting for the takeover route, the private firm owners thus avoid the loss of 
privacy and the costs of unnecessary delay in investment decisions. Due to its private 
nature, the takeover also gives the private firm owners more leeway to avoid underpricing 
and to extract more value from the buyer (i.e., the bidder), which would be impossible in 
the case of an IPO. 
As long as the takeover market is imperfectly competitive, the bidder stands to 
enjoy a fraction of the savings on the costs of going public that are available to the owners 
of its private target (i.e., private firm) despite the presence of a competing bid(s). Since 
these exit costs are commonly observable at the time of the bid negotiation, the highest 
acquisition price each rival bidder is willing to pay is the amount reflective of its own 
valuation of the target that includes the discount for the savings on the exit costs. On the 
other hand, such a discount is not available when the target is already a publicly listed firm. 
When acquiring a private target, moreover, the bidder can by-pass the sentiment of 
uninformed investors. Since a public target has dispersed ownership, the target price and 
the timing of the takeover will be affected by the sentiment of uninformed investors. 
The above analysis can be referred to as the Exit Costs hypothesis. This hypothesis 
implies that when a bid is made for a private target, the market reaction to the bidder's 
share price is positive. Because there are neither exit costs savings nor benefits of by-
passing uninformed investors to be enjoyed by the bidder when the target is publicly listed, 
the hypothesis also implies that the market reaction to a public-firm bidder is at best non-
negative. The hypothesis can therefore be alternatively stated as follows: 
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HI: The announcement-period gams to bidders are positive when targets are 
privately held and non-positive when targets are publicly held. 
B. Effects of Payment Methods- Clientele Effect Hypothesis 
Within the framework of the Exit Costs hypothesis, a particular method of payment 
can be viewed as reflective of the target owner's consumption preference or investment 
objective. Given that a takeover by a listed bidder is an alternative to an IPO for a private 
firm, an offer that does not satisfy the owner's objective would lead to lower utility for 
him/her and would hence be rejected outright. To this extent, a necessary, though 
insufficient, (;ondition for an equilibrium is the target owner's objective being met. The 
target owner may well have the objective to exit, to stay or to partially exit. In a cash offer, 
the objective of the target owner is a mirror image of an entrepreneur wanting to cash out 
or exit. Since any payment other than cash payment would be rejected outright, only 
bidders with the preference or ability to pay cash are attracted to the target. With the exit 
costs savings being commonly observable, the bidder enjoys its fraction of the savings 
even when the value of expected synergies is fully reflected in the target price34. 
In an equity offer, the target owner may be viewed as having the objective to stay 
and to hold equity stakes in the bidder. Only bidders with the preference to use their equity 
as the payment method are thus attracted to the target with an owner wanting to stay. 
Before accepting the bidder's equity as the means of payment, the target owner rationally 
incur costs in studying the bidder's prospects and true value. If the target owner's 
acceptance of the bidder's equity has incremental benefits for the bidder, the target owner 
34 The bidder gains also include the benefits of by-passing the sentiment of uninformed traders. In the 
interest of parsimony, the exit costs savings are taken in this section as inclusive of these benefits. 
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will require compensation from the bidder35 . The notion of rational pricing dictates that, in 
equilibrium, the amount of compensation paid to the target reflects the value of the 
incremental benefits enjoyed by the bidder so that an otherwise identical target would be 
identically priced. Similar to a cash offer, the bidder in an equity offer thus profits only 
from its fraction of the exit costs savings. 
When the takeover is financed with a mix of cash and bidder equity, the target 
owner may be viewed as having the objective to partially exit. Alternatively, a mixed offer 
can also be viewed as an offer in which the bidder pays the multiple owners of the target in 
cash and/or equity according to their individual consumption preference. Again, if there is 
any benefit of the equity portion of the offer to be enjoyed by the bidder, it will be fully 
reflected in the target price. Similar to bidders in a cash offer or equity offer, the bidder in 
a mixed offer profits only from the discount due to the exit costs savings. 
The above analysis leads to the Clientele Effect hypothesis, which posits that a 
particular payment method in takeovers of private targets simply reflects the consumption 
preference of the target owner and conveys no incremental valuable information about the 
bidder. The hypothesis hence implies that the choice of payment methods has no 
incremental impact on the market reaction to the bidder's share price. Alternatively, the 
hypothesis can be empirically stated as follows: 
H2: The announcement-period gains to bidders of private targets are positive and 
identical across various payment methods. 
35 For instance, the target owner's acceptance of the bidder's equity potentially signals to the market positive 
information about the bidder's prospects (see Hertzel and Smith, 1993). 
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3.3) Data and Sample Characteristics 
A sample of takeovers employed in this chapter is drawn from the population of 
successful takeovers of U.K. targets completed during January 1995 and December 199836 . 
This sample period covers the period of the most intense M&A activity of the mid-1990s 
in the U.K. (see Cornu and Isakov, 2000). The necessary details, including key dates, of 
the transactions were hand-collected from various issues of Acquisitions Monthly 
published during this period. December 1998 is chosen as the end of the sample period as 
the analysis of long-term bidder return requires share price data up to December 2001. 
Due to the inevitable hand-collection of the essential transaction details, a sample period 
beginning before 1995 would have made the data collection process unmanageable. The 
initial count ofthe completed deals shows 4,054 takeovers. 
The sample criteria imposed on takeovers included in the initial count are described 
in Section 3.3.1. The sub-sampling procedure is then discussed in Section 3.3.2. Section 
3.3.3 describes the characteristics of the observations in the final sample. 
3.3.1) Sample Criteria 
To qualify as valid cases, the deals identified in the initial count must meet the 
following criteria: (a) the target must be completely independent of the bidder, i.e., zero 
pre-takeover holdings in the target held by the bidder; and (b) more than 50% of the 
holdings in the target must be acquired. These criteria ensure that the sample takeovers 
represent a transaction to gain control in the target, and not simply a clean-up offer to 
36 One apparent benefit of a large sample drawn from a short sample period is that the nature of the sample 
observations is relatively stable and the sample observations are under a similar market condition. Although 
the majority of takeover studies adopt a long sample period, e.g., ten or more years, a short sample period is 
not completely unheard of. For example, Amihud et al. (1990) and Campa and Hernando (2004) adopt a 
sample period of three years from 1981 to 1983 and from 1998 to 2000, respectively. 
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complete a hitherto existing transaction, or an investment offer which simply reflects an 
increase in the bidder's existing stake in the target. 
At variance with the existing studies investigating abnormal return to bidder 
shareholders in private-firm takeovers, there is no minimum imposed on the deal value of 
the sample takeovers in this thesis37 . To the extent that a small takeover represents a 
transaction between two relatively small firms, imposing minimum transaction value 
would be to deliberately ignore a section of the market for corporate control for which new 
insights are likely to be obtained. On the other hand, one potential drawback of imposing 
no minimum transaction value is that when a target is considerably small relative to its 
bidder, the wealth effects of the takeover on the bidder shareholders may be difficult to 
detect despite the true economic impact of the transaction. To the extent that a given 
sample consists of a large number of targets of small relative size, the abnormal return 
analysis could be tilted towards finding insignificant abnormal return. 
Having been subjected to the above screening criteria, the sample size is reduced to 
the total of 3, 783 valid cases38. For this set of takeovers, a change( s) in the bidders' name 
is traced using the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database, Disclosure, Extel 
Cards Database, Worldscope, and Datastream39. Only the takeovers for which bidder 
identity can be confirmed and in which the bidder is listed on the London Stock Exchange, 
37 For example, Chang (1998) requires the transaction value to be at least $US 10 million, and Fuller et a/. 
(2002) and Moeller eta!. (2004) require a minimum deal value of $US 1 million. 
38 Confounding announcements are not checked for in this sample. Since takeovers are economically large 
corporate events relative to other corporate events (e.g., Martin, 1996), however, concurrent events, such as 
dividend policy changes, may simply be part of the main restructuring project (i.e., the announced takeover 
bid). Moreover, a large portion of the sample bidders in this chapter includes repeating bidders which may 
well be bidders in an M&A programme. As commonly known, an M&A programme usually leads to 
changes in other corporate policies. To this extent, the effects of concurrent events on the observed bidder 
abnormal return are essentially attributable to the takeover event. 
39 Disclosure, Extel Cards Database and Worldscope databases are accessed via the LexisNexis data service. 
The Datastream programme numbers for information on name changes for listed U.S. companies and listed 
non-U.S. companies are 99NMUS and 99NAME, respectively. 
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Alternative Investment Market, or OFEX are included in the analysis in this chapter. The 
final sample consists of 2,004 takeovers by 899 different listed bidders40 . This final 
sample includes industrial, commercial, financial and property firms, but excludes 
investment trusts, building societies and venture capitalists acquiring a non-venture 
capitalist41 . In this chapter, the key date for the sample takeovers is the announcement 
date. 
In order to retrieve the necessary data from Datastream, the firms' SEDOL and/or 
ISIN number is first extracted from one of the following databases; FAME, Extel Cards 
Database, and Worldscope. Either the SEDOL or ISIN number is then used to confirm the 
identity of the firms as recorded in Datastream. This confirmation procedure is necessary 
since Datastream may not provide a full company name. Data on listed firms in the sample 
are retrieved from Datastream and data on unlisted firms are extracted from F AME42. 
3.3.2) Sub-Sampling Procedure- Target Status 
In this chapter and the remaining of this thesis, in addition to the distinction 
between takeovers involving unlisted targets and listed targets, distinction is also made 
between unlisted targets that were independent privately held companies and unlisted 
targets that were divested subsidiaries. Although privately held companies and 
subsidiaries both are unlisted entities, they differ substantially in several fundamental 
aspects. First, while private targets are characterised by closely held ownership (e.g., 
4
° From the 3,783 valid cases, 460 takeovers were completed by unlisted bidders registered in the U.K. 
41 Takeovers of a non-venture capitalist target by a venture capitalist are excluded because such takeovers are 
unlikely to reflect the consolidation of business operations of any form. Instead, they are likely to reflect a 
transaction whereby needed fmancial resources an: simply distributed lo lhe target, and the acquiring venture 
capitalist, which also provides some of the needed expertise, takes an equity position in the target as 
collateral. There were three of such takeovers in the initial sample. The bidders in these takeovers are 
unlisted firms registered in the U.K. 
42 When the data on listed firms are not available from Datastream, either FAME, Extel Cards Database or 
Disclosure is used as an alternative data source. Consistency is randomly checked for the data provided by 
these four sources, and the data are consistent. 
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Hansen and Lott, 1996), subsidiaries are not. Prior to the takeover, subsidiaries are owned 
by a listed parent. As such, they effectively have a dispersed ownership structure like 
listed companies. Secondly, unlike private targets, subsidiaries enjoy much better access 
to the capital market through their listed parent. Even if both private targets and 
subsidiaries were equally young and small, the going-public decision would be much 
cheaper for the latter. This is because a large portion of the exit costs to subsidiaries, such 
as information production and accounting disclosure, are already sunk and borne by their 
parent (see also Pagano et al., 1998). 
The final sample consists of 1,200 takeovers of privately held targets, 654 
takeovers of divested subsidiaries and 150 takeovers of publicly held during the sample 
period43 . To investigate the effects of payment methods on bidder abnormal return, the 
sample takeovers for each target status are further divided into cash, equity, and mixed 
offers. Cash offers include deals financed with cash and/or loan notes. Financing by loan 
notes (or debts) is classified as cash financing because cash offers are often financed with 
the bidder's additional borrowing (Franks et al., 1988; Travlos and Papaioannou, 1991). 
Equity offers include deals financed with the bidders' common equity and options and/or 
warrants. Mixed offers include deals financed with a combination of the financings used 
in a cash offer and equity offer, and/or convertibles. This classification is consistent with 
that adopted by several recent studies such as Fuller et al. (2002), Martin (1996) and 
Moeller et al. (2004). 
43 Unlike a number of U.S. studies, distinction is not made in this thesis between mergers and tender offers, 
particularly for the samples of takeovers of unlisted targets. For takeovers of publicly held targets, most 
offers taking place in the U.K. are tender offers (see Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003, note 2). For takeovers 
of unlisted targets, either privately held targets or divested subsidiaries, the nature of the deal would be one of 
mergers. While it is possible that the owner/manager of an unlisted target may in fact initially oppose to the 
offer, the bidder must nonetheless convince the owner/manager of the target one way or another to approve 
the bid in order to complete the deal. 
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3.3.3) Sample Characteristics 
Table 3.1 reports deal and bidder characteristics of the takeovers in the final sample 
sorted by target status. Looking across Panels B to D, the deal value is by far largest in 
public-firm takeovers and smallest in private-firm takeovers, consistent with the existing 
studies of private-firm takeovers44 . In the public-target comparison group, there are only 
150 takeovers, and yet, these deals result in the largest total deal value of £56 billion, 
representing 66% of the total deal value for the entire sample. There are 654 deals in the 
divested-subsidiary comparison group - still only half of the number of deals involving 
private targets. In the U.K., the popularity of privately held companies as a takeover target 
apparently outnumbers subsidiaries and publicly listed companies - the pattern that is also 
observed in the U.S. 
For each target status in Panels B to D, three measures of absolute size for targets 
are reported: namely total assets, total turnover and number of employees. Although the 
deal value also proxies for size, the measure is affected by the amount of takeover 
premium. Unlike deal value, the level of total assets is not affected by the premium. 
Because of accumulated depreciation, however, a size comparison across firms based on 
total assets can be biased by differences in asset age. Total turnover is thus also used in 
order to avoid the effect of historical cost accounting, i.e., accumulated depreciation. 
Unfortunately, total turnover is not a perfect measure of firm size. For instance, a firm 
may become involved in a takeover due to deterioration in its sales and marketing 
performance, leading to declines in its total turnover prior to the takeover. On the other 
hand, if the target had been successful in its internal restructuring attempt, e.g., laying off 
[some of] its employees in response to performance declines, it might not have become a 
44 See Ang and Kohers (200 1 ), Chang (1998), Fuller eta!. (2002) and Moeller eta!. (2004). 
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successful takeover target. For a successful takeover, the reallocation or redundancies of 
the target's employees usually takes place after the deal completion (see Copeland et al., 
1996, p. 452-5; Froud et al., 2000; Grinblatt and Titman, 1998, p. 675-6). Therefore, the 
number of employees is also used as an alternative measure of firm size. 
Across all measures of absolute size, private targets are by far smallest and public 
targets by far largest, corresponding to the pattern of deal value45 . In addition to the three 
measures of target absolute size, target relative size is also calculated using equity value, 
i.e., the deal value divided by the bidder's market capitalisation or market value of equity 
observed two months prior to the announcement date46 . Despite the influence of the 
takeover premium, deal value represents the size of the bidder's investment in the target. 
Relative to the size of their bidder, as would be expected, public targets are largest. 
However, private targets and divested subsidiaries are of comparable relative size. Among 
other things, this suggests that the market reaction to the bid announcement should be 
equally detectable (or undetectable) for private-firm bidders and bidders of divested 
subsidiaries. 
For each target status, the BV to Price (BVP) ratio, calculated as a target's total 
book shareholders' equity divided by the deal value, is also reported47 . Ang and Kohers 
(2001) and Kohers and Ang (2000) use the BVP ratio as a proxy for the premium on a 
target's book value of equity. Because of the less stringent financial reporting regulations 
enjoyed by unlisted companies, however, the likelihood of the book value of equity being 
45 For virtually all measures of characteristics, note that there is a large difference between the mean and 
corresponding median, indicating a non-normal distribution. As a consequence, the median values are also 
important in interpreting the descriptive statistics reported in Table 3.1. 
46 The choice of two months prior to the announcement date is partly arbitrary. Here, it is considered 
desirable to use the bidder's market capitalisation that is (i) unaffected by the trading activity leading up to, 
and (ii) not too long before the bid announcement. 
47 The BVP ratio for each deal is adjusted for the acquired proportion of the holdings in the target where less 
than 100% of the holdings is acquired. 
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understated or overstated is greater in the case of private targets and divested subsidiaries. 
If there is any relative under/overstatement in a systematic fashion, for whatever reasons, 
the BVP ratio is likely to be a biased proxy for the premium on book equity across firms of 
different status, i.e., listed and unlisted. 
As suggested by Ang and Kohers (200 1 ), one way of testing for the 
under/overstatement of book equity is to compare the ratio of book equity to total assets 
(BE-TA) across targets. The BE-TA ratio, both mean and median, is significantly (at the 
0.01 level) higher for public targets than for private targets and divested subsidiaries48 . 
The ratio does not differ significantly between the two groups of unlisted targets. Since a 
comparison in the BE-T A ratio between listed and unlisted firms is also affected by 
variations in the capital structure, however, the observed difference may not be entirely 
attributable to the under/overstatement of book equity. Pagano et a/. (1998) observe 
significant deleverageing following an IPO by Italian firms that were privately held and 
subsidiaries of a listed parent, and argue that an attempt to rebalance their balance sheets 
after large investments and growth is the likely motive behind the deleverageing. 
Overall, the BVP ratio does not appear to differ in any meaningful way between 
private targets and divested subsidiaries, indicating that owners of private targets and 
divested subsidiaries may well possess similar bargaining power against their bidder. 
Despite the potential incomparability in the book equity between listed targets and unlisted 
targets in the sample, it is interesting to note that the BVP ratio is hugely higher 
(particularly in the median- twice as high) when the target is listed than when the target is 
unlisted, either privately held or subsidiary. This pattern persists for all sub-samples, i.e., 
48 Differences in mean are tested using the independent-samples t-test allowing for unequal variances with 
the degrees of freedom approximated according to Satterthwaite (1946) and Welch (1938). Differences in 
median are tested using the Mann-Whitney U test as described in Hollander and Wolf (1999). 
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by payment method. Thus, the premium on a target's book equity is relatively large when 
the target is unlisted, implying that prima facie an unlisted target holds no less bargaining 
power than a listed target49. 
Irrespective of the payment method, the median BVP ratio is generally two-thirds 
of the median book-to-market (BM) ratio when targets are privately held and one half 
when targets are divested subsidiaries. On the other hand, the median BVP ratio appears 
higher than the bidder's BM ratio when targets are listed firms50. Though only suggestive, 
the pattern of this BVP-BM relationship does suggest that an unlisted target has the ability 
to make its bidder pay a premium that leads to its "pseudo" BM ratio being lower than its 
bidder's "real" BM ratio. However, this is not the case in public-firm takeovers. If a 
takeover premium increases with the ease at which the target's assets can be sold, as one 
would rationally expect, this BVP-BM pattern is not supportive of Fuller et a/.'s (2002) 
liquidity discount51 . 
As shown in Panels B to D, private-firm bidders are by far (statistically and 
economically) the smallest bidders for all size measures and in both mean and median, 
consistent with the trend documented in the existing U.S. studies (see Fuller et a/., 2002; 
49 If low book equity arises from financial distress due to high leverage, then the much lower BVP ratio for 
the sample unlisted targets implies that, though fmancially distressed, unlisted targets are more able to 
squeeze more premium from the bidder than listed targets are. To this extent, unlisted targets may indeed 
have more bargaining power than listed targets. 
50 Datastream defines book value of equity or Net Intangible Assets as total assets, excluding intangible 
assets, less total liabilities, minority interest and preference shares. Several recent U.K. takeover studies 
employ the reciprocal the BM ratio, i.e., the market-to-book (MTBV) ratio. For example, Conn eta/. (2002) 
and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) use the MTBV ratio. Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) use the MTBV 
ratio as readily published by Datastream. In this thesis, the BM ratio is preferred to the MTBV ratio simply 
because negative book value of equity gives a problematic MTBV ratio. A negative ratio is meaningless 
when it is caused by a negative denominator. 
51 Fuller eta/. (2002) argue that the positive announcement-period gains to bidders acquiring private targets 
or divested subsidiaries are partly due to the liquidity discount on the assets of unlisted targets. 
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Moeller et al., 2004)52 . Inconsistent with the U.S. studies, however, bidders acquiring a 
divested subsidiary and public-firm bidders do not significantly differ in market 
capitalisation. Nor do these two bidder groups differ in total assets, turnover or number of 
employees53 . Consistent with Moeller et al. (2004), the bidders of divested subsidiaries 
and bidders of public targets generally have a similar BM ratio and q proxy54 . The BM 
ratio (q proxy) is significantly lowest (highest) for private-firm bidders. 
When comparisons are made across payment methods for each target status in 
terms of the BVP ratio, BM ratio and q proxy, several interesting patterns emerge. First, 
no significant difference in any of these variables is observed among bidders of private 
targets using different payment methods. A lack of difference also persists among bidders 
of divested subsidiaries55 . The similarity in the BVP ratio across payment methods for the 
unlisted bidders indicates that equity financing, either in part or in full, does not lead to a 
higher takeover premium. As a result, it is plausible that equity financing is not expected 
to signal positive information about the bidder or there is no compensation paid to an 
unlisted target for the study costs it incurred prior to its acceptance of the bidder's equity. 
The observed similarity in the BM ratio and q proxy across payment methods 
suggests that bidders acquiring unlisted targets, either private-firm or subsidiary bidders, 
52Based on the sample consisting of 281 takeovers of private targets and 255 takeovers of public targets, 
Chang ( 1998) observes no significant difference in market capitalisation between the two bidder groups. 
This is possibly because Chang ( 1998) restricts his sample to deal value of $US I 0 million or greater. 
53 Only the mean total assets and turnover are significantly (at the 0.05 level) larger for subsidiary bidders 
than for public-firm bidders. No significant difference in median is observed across size measures. 
54 Among several applications, Tobin's q can be used as an estimate of the market's assessment of 
managerial perfonnance (Lang et al., 1989; Servaes, 1991) or growlh prospects (Lang et al., 1991) of firms 
in takeovers. In an empirical context, q may be viewed simply as a variable negatively related to the BM 
ratio (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998), and yet allows robustness in analysis involving the use ofBM ratios across 
firms. Alternatively, these two variables can also be viewed as proxies for the degree of market misvaluation 
of the firm's value (Dong et al., 2002). 
55 The results for bidders of divested subsidiaries should be read with some caution because the number of 
observations is notably small for equity offers, and to a less extent, mixed offers. 
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do not differ in terms of their growth prospects (see Lang eta/., 1991; Servaes, 1991). To 
the extent that these valuation ratios reflect the degree of market misvaluation (Dong eta/., 
2002), the use of equity financing in deals involving an unlisted target may well be 
motivated by factors other than overvaluation of the bidder's equity as implied by Myers 
and Majlufs (1984) asymmetric information hypothesis56. The similarity in the valuation 
ratios hence appears supportive of the conjecture that the level of informational asymmetry 
is negligible or much lower in privately transacted deals than in deals involving public 
targets. 
At variance with both groups of bidders of unlisted targets, bidders of public targets 
in a mixed offer pay a premium on their target's book equity that is significantly larger 
than what is paid by their counterparts in an equity offer. Since the target shareholders in a 
mixed offer in the U.K. are in most cases given the option to choose their own combination 
of cash and equity, the larger premium the mixed bidders pay for their target's book equity 
may plausibly reflect the bidder's desperation for the target as pointed out by Draper and 
Paudyal ( 1999)57. The mixed bidders also have the BM ratio ( q proxy) that is significantly 
lower (higher) than the equity bidders. In the light of Dong et a/. (2002), the mixed 
bidders may be overvalued relative to the equity bidders. In this view, the mixed bidders 
may use the cash portion and offer a larger premium on the target's book equity in an 
attempt to entice the target shareholders into accepting their overvalued equity (see also 
Limmack, 2003). However, no significant difference is observed when comparisons are 
made against the cash bidders. Nevertheless, the observation that equity bidders of public 
56 The observed lack of difference in the BM ratio and q proxy across payment methods for bidders acquiring 
unlisted targets also appears unsupportive of Shleifer and Vishny's (2003) model. The model argues that 
equity financing is motivated by the bidder's desire to exploit its temporarily overvalued equity as acquisition 
currency. 
57 Using a sample ofpublic-fmn takeovers in the U.K., Draper and Paudyal (1999) find that not only equity 
bidders, but also mixed bidders, earn significant announcement-period losses. 
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targets in the sample neither appear overvalued nor pay more for their target relative to 
their counterparts using other payment methods is unsupportive of the overvaluation 
arguments. 
Table 3.1 
Characteristics of Sample Takeovers and Bidders Sorted by Target Status 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 
1995 - December 1998. All bidders are U.K listed companies. Panel A reports 
descriptive statistics for the total sample. Panels B through D report deal and bidder 
characteristics for takeovers involving private targets, divested subsidiaries and public 
targets, respectively. Absolute Size is represented by Market Capitalisation two 
months prior to the announcement date (MV at t- 2) (bidders only), Total Assets, 
Total Turnover and Number of Employees. Target Relative Size is reported based on 
four measures, i.e., Equity Value, Total Assets, Total Turnover and Number of 
Employees, and calculated as a target's measure divided by its bidder's measure. 
Equity-value relative size is calculated as the deal value divided by the bidder's MV 
at t- 2. BY-Price (BVP) Ratio is calculated as a target's total [book] shareholders' 
equity divided by the deal value. A bidder's pre-announcement book-to-market (BM) 
ratio is determined using Net Tangible Assets as at the financial year end immediately 
preceding the announcement date and MV at t- 2. A proxy for a bidder's Tobin's q 
is determined where the numerator comprises MV at t- 2, the book value of total debt 
and preference shares, and the denominator comprises Total Assets - i.e., based on 
Chung and Pruitt's (1994) estimation. Deal value and bidders' absolute size based on 
MV at t- 2 are standardised by the price level of the FT All Share Index in January 
1995. Total assets, total turnover and number of employees are taken from the 
financial year ending before the announcement date. Total Assets and Total Turnover 
are deflated using the Producer Price Index with January 1995 as the base period. 
The use of the Consumer Price Index gives virtually identical statistics. All value-
based variables are reported in millions of British Pound Sterling. Both means and 
medians are reported. Medians are in brackets. 
Panel A: Total Sample 
Number of Deals 
Total Deal Value 






Cash Stock Mixed 
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Table 3.1 - Continued 
Panel B: Privately Held Targets 
ALL Cash Stock Mixed 
Number of Deals 1,200 413 61 359 
Total Deal Value 10,841 2,588 668 2,306 
Average Deal Value 10.2 6.3 10.9 6.5 
[2.5] [1.9] [2.3] [3.0] 
Target Absolute Size 
Total Assets 8.6 6.7 11.9 6.0 
[2.5] [2.5] [2.7] [2.5] 
Total Turnover 15.6 14.9 17.7 12.3 
[6.2] [6.3] [6.6] [5.6] 
No. of Employees 228 179 354 170 
[81] [76] [52] [83] 
Target Relative Size 
Equity Value 0.210 0.094 0.703 0.305 
[0.049] [0.031] [0.140] [0.085] 
Total Assets 0.163 0.079 0.583 0.238 
[0.036] [0.029] [0.127] [0.061] 
Total Turnover 0.441 0.117 0.721 0.389 
[0.064] [0.044] [0.293] [0.098] 
No. ofEmployees 0.349 0.142 0.853 0.390 
[0.070] [0.054] [0.212] [0.116] 
BVP Ratio 0.265 0.344 0.253 0.265 
[0.198] [0.220] [0.227] [0.181] 
Bidder Size 
Market Cap. 356.9 315.5 162.3 111.2 
[55.9] [74.4] [20.2] [34.9] 
Total Assets 1,438.2 430.9 212.0 137.5 
[66.4] [79.0] [34.7] [41.7] 
Total Turnover 427.3 350.7 321.1 185.5 
[79.9] [93.3] [26.0] [49.6] 
No. of Employees 5,278 4,664 4,361 2,510 
[973] [1,181] [301] [648] 
Bidder's BM Ratio 0.352 0.385 0.415 0.255 
[0.319] [0.331] [0.272] [0.297] 
Bidder's q Proxy 2.162 2.244 2.347 2.313 
[1.606] [1.596] [1. 716] [1.636] 
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Table 3.1 - Continued 
Panel C: Divested Subsidiaries 
ALL Cash Stock Mixed 
Number of Deals 654 367 14 31 
Total Deal Value 17,552 10,597 122 832 
Average Deal Value 30.8 29.1 10.2 26.8 
[4.5] [4.5] [3.3] [5.1] 
Target Absolute Size 
Total Assets 57.9 46.7 5.2 12.5 
[6.5] [6.4] [3.7] [6.2] 
Total Turnover 39.7 28.7 4.4 12.7 
[8.4] [8.2] [4.2] [9.3] 
No. of Employees 407 302 113 121 
[126] [118] [105] [25] 
Target Relative Size 
Equity Value 0.155 0.145 0.319 0.338 
[0.039] [0.036] [0.11 0] [0.232] 
Total Assets 0.141 0.163 0.146 0.220 
[0.033] [0.037] [0.140] [0.209] 
Total Turnover 0.178 0.187 0.180 0.455 
[0.059] [0.066] [0.187] [0.326] 
No. of Employees 0.264 0.248 0.188 0.492 
[0.055] [0.059] [0.149] [0.251] 
BVP Ratio 0.423 0.503 0.405 0.264 
[0.171] [0.156] [0.223] [0.134] 
Bidder Size 
Market Cap. 1,154.5 903.6 277.7 141.6 
[138.3] [120.6] [39.5] [24.7] 
Total Assets 8,127.4 5,672.4 558.2 210.2 
[185.1] [153.8] [32.0] [43.4] 
Total Turnover 1,540.6 1,251.0 432.3 340.6 
[197.0] [168.9] [29.0] [27.3] 
No. ofEmployees 14,489 11,622 4,500 1,431 
[2,332] [2,227] [743] [323] 
Bidder's BM Ratio 0.458 0.464 0.437 0.376 
[0.387] [0.393] [0.297] [0.288] 
Bidder's q Proxy 1.700 1.717 1.619 1.775 
[1.420] [1.473] [1.577] [1.539] 
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'fabne 3.1 - Continued 
Panel D: Publicly Held Targets 
ALL Cash Stock Mixed 
Number of Deals 150 40 36 74 
Total Deal Value 55,718 7,325 23,849 24,544 
Average Deal Value 371.5 183.1 662.5 331.7 
[32.3] [32.9] [32.1] [32.3] 
Target Absolute Size 
Total Assets 925.1 516.6 2,735.3 256.2 
[53.2] [52.6] [73.3] [46.7] 
Total Turnover 320.5 194.6 675.3 212.7 
[48.6] [51.8] [51.2] [41.3] 
No. of Employees 2,920 1,927 4,435 2,669 
[643] [630] [816] [608] 
Target Relative Size 
Equity Value 0.521 0.293 0.756 0.530 
[0.340] [0.1 09] [0.732] [0.329] 
Total Assets 0.516 0.343 0.890 0.423 
[0.288] [0.097] [0.594] [0.295] 
Total Turnover 0.762 0.389 1.393 0.634 
[0.361] [0.098] [0.702] [0.357] 
No. of Employees 0.738 0.400 1.255 0.664 
[0.372] [0.069] [0.600] [0.399] 
BVP Ratio 0.539 0.587 0.670 0.449 
[0.436] [0.429] [0.563] [0.378] 
Bidder Size 
Market Cap. 1,126.6 1,731.9 933.2 893.4 
[174.7] [525.8] [97.6] [177.2] 
Total Assets 4,399.0 7,248.1 7,318.3 1,438.7 
[272.2] [1,362.0] [258.8] [208.1] 
Total Turnover 1,044.9 1,625.0 1,079.7 717.7 
[263.5] [767.2] [70.6] [218.7] 
No. ofEmployees 11,556 18,424 10,266 8,376 
[2,786] [5,777] [1,563] [1,485] 
Bidder's BM Ratio 0.483 0.499 0.597 0.423 
[0.375] [0.481] [0.467] [0.301] 
Bidder's q Proxy 1.687 1.564 1.479 1.853 
[1.396] [1.362] [1.243] [1.581] 
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3.4) Methodology 
In this chapter, announcement-period bidder abnormal return is examined using 
several alternative windows beginning 40 days before and ending 20 days after the bid 
announcement. This choice of event windows is made as the possibility that the market 
starts reacting to bids for unlisted targets well before the publicised announcement date 
cannot be excluded. When bids are made for the U.K. public targets, Draper and Paudyal 
(1999) suggest that an event window of up to 20 days preceding and following the 
announcement date should be used. The U.K. takeover process permits a situation where 
bidders of U.K. publicly held targets may start building up their stake well before the bid 
announcement. Once the bid is formally announced, it must remain open for at least 14 
days of the announcement date58. However, the regulations governing public-firm 
takeovers do not apply to takeovers taking place off the market. 
Only the announcement date and not completion date is available in Acquisitions 
Monthly when targets are unlisted. The Securities Data Company' (SDC) Mergers and 
Acquisitions database provides both the announcement and completion dates for 
acquisitions of unlisted targets. For a large number of acquisitions of unlisted targets, 
these two key dates reported in the SDC are identical, suggesting that when the 
transactions are made off the market, bidders are unlikely to announce their bid until it 
becomes successfully negotiated59. To the extent that bids for unlisted targets may well be 
made sometime before they are formally announced or recorded in Acquisitions Monthly, 
the market may start reacting to news and rumours surrounding the bid well before the 
58 Draper and Paudyal (1999, p. 523 - 524) summarise the implications of the regulations governing the 
takeover process involving publicly listed targets in the U.K. These regulations include the City Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers, the non-statutory regulation issued by the City Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, and 
the Rules Governing Substantial Acquisition of Shares, and the Companies Act 1985 (Sections 198 and 199). 
59 This tendency is consistent with the practitioners' view that bidders should not publicise their takeover 
attempt until it is completed (see Copeland et al., 1996, p. 442). 
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recorded announcement date. For these reasons, the entire-event window starting from day 
-40 up to day + 20 surrounding the announcement date (day 0) is adopted in this chapter60. 
In addition to individual event days, bidder abnormal return is also estimated over 
several multi-day windows during the entire 61-day event period. These multi-day 
windows are: (-1, +1); (-5, +5); (-10, +10); (-20, +20); (-40, +20); (-20, -1); (-40, -1) and 
( + 1, + 20). While the window ( -40, + 20) represents the entire event period, its length may 
lead to inaccuracy in capturing new information induced by the actual event. In other 
words, a long window may be less accurate or powerful than a relatively short window 
surrounding the bid announcement. To the extent that the market reacts efficiently to new 
information - in whatever form and/or quantity - for example, the true abnormal return 
will be better detected using a shorter window than a longer window. This is because the 
longer the window becomes, the greater the noise in abnormal return estimation (Dong et 
al., 2002). 
In this chapter, pre-event windows are also employed. Although the actual bidding 
for both types of unlisted targets may start well before the formal bid announcement, the 
small size of private targets suggests that the takeover attempt may not attract much public 
interest at all until it is formally announced. On the other hand, the larger size of divested 
subsidiaries raises the possibility that information about the bid leaks to the market 
sometime prior to the formal bid announcement. Specifically, bids for divested 
subsidiaries are likely to attract relatively large analyst coverage. As pointed out by Healy 
eta!. (1992), larger transaction size tends to attract greater public interest. As discussed in 
60 The addition of 20 trading days during the pre-announcement date period is somewhat arbitrary. For a 
Canadian sample largely consisting of unlisted targets, Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) find positive and 
significant bidder abnormal return in both months -1 and -2 relatively to the announcement month (month 0), 
but not month -3. Note, however, that monthly returns are used in Eckbo and Thorburn's (2000) analysis. 
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Section 3.3.3, moreover, the sample bidders of divested subsidiaries are much larger than 
bidders of private targets and of comparable size to bidders of public targets in the sample. 
Due to their size, bidders of divested subsidiaries (at least for the sample in this thesis) 
therefore may already be high-coverage firms even prior to their takeover attempts (see 
also Bhushan, 1989). To this extent, the market may start reacting to bids for divested 
subsidiaries prior to the formal bid announcement. In the light of the deal and bidder 
characteristics for public-firm takeovers reported in Table 3.1, the pre-event market 
reaction is also likely in the case of bids for public targets. To the extent that the market 
reacts efficiently to new information conveyed by the bid announcement, there is no reason 
to suspect that it would be appropriate to extend the post-event window beyond 20 days 
following the formal announcement date. 
Several methodological issues in measuring event-induced abnormal return have 
been extensively documented in the event studies literature, an important one of which is 
the cross-sectional correlations among abnormal returns. The cross-sectional correlations 
can lead to systematic underestimation of the variance of the mean abnormal return and 
hence too many rejections of the null hypothesis of zero abnormal return when it is true 
(Brown and Warner, 1985). To account for the impact of the cross-sectional correlations 
when calculating abnormal return during a short event window, e.g., (-5, +5) days, Brown 
and Warner (1985) employ the Crude Dependence Adjustment (CDA) whereby the test 
statistic is computed as the ratio of the portfolio mean abnormal return to its time-series 
portfolio standard deviation. Because the estimation of the time-series portfolio standard 
deviation requires a long pre-event estimation period, such as 250 trading days, it can well 
be biased if sample firms generally are thinly traded firms and/or engaged in the event 
during the estimation period. Thin or infrequent trading induces positive serial correlation 
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in the calculated portfolio abnormal return series and hence an upward bias in the test 
statistic. 
Miller et al. (1994, Appendix A) show that if a share trades at least once every q 
interval (day), an MA(q)-type process may be used to capture the impact of non-trading 
days in order to reflect via the lag coefficient(s) the contemporaneous true innovation of 
the share price. For event studies, however, adjusting for the impact of thin trading using 
the approach proposed by Miller et al. (1994), or otherwise, is not without substantial cost. 
While the contemporaneous true share price innovation of sample firms may be estimated 
by making the adjustment, event-related information will be lost when calculating 
abnormal return. For instance, if its bid announcement conveys new and significant 
information, the bidder's shares are likely to trade even if the bidder is a thinly traded firm. 
Conversely, if the announcement does not convey such information, its shares are unlikely 
to trade. When adjustment for thin trading is made, the share price of an otherwise thinly 
traded bidder will change even though the bid conveys no information. When the takeover 
truly conveys significant information, the price changes generated by the thin-trading 
adjustment will obscure the true takeover-related information. This loss of event-related 
information also occurs for sample firms that trade everyday (or during every interval). 
For these reasons, no adjustment for the impact of thin trading is made in this thesis. 
For takeover studies, when a bidder appears more than once in the sample, it is 
likely that the bidder is engaged in a merger programme. It is hence clearly possible that 
such a bidder also makes bids during the estimation period for Brown and Warner's (1985) 
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CDA. This possibility is clear for the sample firms in this thesis (see Section 3.3.1)61 • To 
the extent that takeovers do induce bidder abnormal return one way or another, the 
portfolio time-series standard deviation used in the CDA for repeating bidders are highly 
likely to be contaminated. Whilst controlling for the cross-sectional correlations, Brown 
and Warner's (1980, 1985) CDA therefore gives rise to imprecision in the computation of 
event-induced abnormal return. 
Several recent takeover studies measure event-induced abnormal return as event-
window prediction errors of estimated asset pricing model parameters (e.g., Ang and 
Kohers, 2001; Chang, 1998; Draper and Paudyal, 1999; Gregory, 1997; Kohers and Ang, 
2000). When repeating bidders form a considerable part of the sample, however, there is a 
high probability that the estimation window for one sample deal covers the event window 
for another deal by the same bidder. The estimated parameters for repeating bidders are 
thus much less meaningful than and not comparable to those for non-repeating bidders. 
For this reason, Fuller et a!. (2002) calculate abnormal return as the market-adjusted 
abnormal return using Brown and Warner's (1985) CDA62 . Indeed, abnormal return 
measured for a repeating bidder can even be biased either upwards or downwards if 
multiple bids by the bidder truly induce abnormal return either positive or negative63 . 
Similarly, if a sample bidder makes a takeover bid(s) prior to the sample period, it is likely 
that the bidder's estimated model parameters and hence event-window prediction errors 
will be biased. 
61 The final sample in this thesis consists of 2,004 takeovers by 899 different listed bidders. Moreover, as 
reported in their Table I, Fuller eta/. (2002) observe takeovers of privately held targets in the vast majority of 
their sample of frequent bidders. 
62 The market-adjusted abnormal return model is one where the firm's beta is assumed to equal 1. 
63 Biases in the measured abnormal return caused by significant pre-event abnormal return have also been 
recognised in the literature. Chung and Weston (1985) point out that because bidder abnormal return 
generally is significantly positive during the pre-merger period, if data from this period is used for estimating 
the model parameters, the model's prediction errors during the event or test period will be biased downwards 
(see Roll, 1986, footnote 1 ). 
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To maximise the precision at which announcement-period bidder abnormal return 
is calculated, neither the Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) CDA is adopted nor the pre-
event market parameters are estimated in this chapter. Instead, bidder abnormal return on 
event day t (relative to the announcement date) is computed as the cross-sectional mean 
abnormal return in the theoretical framework of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
using the [OLS] regression model in the following equation: 
(3.1) 
where ru is return to bidder i, r ft is the risk-free return, r mt is the value-weighted market 
return on event day t, and &it is the regression error term. 
For estimation purposes, ru =1n(riu)-ln(riu_1), rmt =1n(rim1 )-1n(rimt-I), and 
r 
r ft = e ht riu and rimt are the Datastream Total Return Index observed on day t for firm i 
and the value-weighted FT All Share Index, respectively64 • rbt is the daily Bond 
Equivalent Yield on the 3-month T-Bill observed on event day t. The estimated intercept 
( a1 ) therefore provides a direct measure of the equally weighted (EW) percentage cross-
sectional mean abnormal return on event day t to the bidder portfolio (Jensen's alpha). The 
standard error for testing the significance of at is readily provided by the OLS regression. 
at is analogous to the average market-adjusted abnormal return calculated as in 
Brown and Warner (1985, equation 1), but using the cross-sectional standard deviation 
instead of the time-series portfolio standard deviation. Barber et al. (2001) employ this 
64 Datastream Total Return Index is adjusted for dividends and capital actions. Examples of capital actions 
include share splits, share repurchases and dividends in kind. The FT All Share Index is the Financial Times 
Actuaries All Share Index. 
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form of the market-adjusted abnormal return model in examining abnormal return over the 
three days surrounding the announcement of analyst recommendations65 . This approach is 
also employed in Mulherin and Boone (2000) in calculating announcement-period 
abnormal return to bidders and divestors. 
For an event window longer than one day, following Barber eta!. (2001), abnormal 
return to a bidder portfolio is calculated as buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR)66. 
Specifically, BHAR to a bidder portfolio over a r -day window is estimated using the 
following [OLS] regression model: 
r.bh _ rbh = abh + pbh (rbh _ bh )+ 8bh IT jT T T mT r jT IT ' (3.2) 
where the variables are defined similarly to equation (3 .1 ). Since rit is continuously 
compounded return, for the estimation purposes: r;~h = I;=l ru. rj; and r~~ can then be 
similarly calculated. Similar to equation (3.1), a~h provides a direct measure of EW 
percentage BHAR to a bidder portfolio over r event days67 • 
To calculate sterling bidder abnormal return on event day t, the terms ( rit - r ft) and 
( r mt - r ft) in equation (3 .1) are pre-multiplied with the market value of bidder i observed 
on day t -1 ( ~ t-I ). The regression model is then re-run to yield the estimated intercept 
, 
(a{) as the measure of EW average sterling abnormal return to a bidder portfolio on event 
65 See Barber eta!. (200 1, Table III). 
66 This methodology is also employed in the recent U.K. study by Draper and Paudyal (2004). 
67 A method alternative to equation (3.2) is to compound the estimated intercept ( a1 ) of the regression model 
in equation (3.1) over r event days. However, this method would yield BHAR in the following form: 
bhar; = [ n;=I (1 + aru )] -I, which is not the same as the definition of BHAR which is purported to 
represent investors' experience, i.e., difference between buy-and-hold returns to the sample firm and to the 
control firm or portfolio: bhar; = n;=I (1 + ru )- rr;=I (1 + E(ru )) ; where aru = ru - E(ru); ru and E(ru) 
are, respectively, return to and expected return for firm ion day t (see also Limmack, 2003). 
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d 68 s. '1 1 h ( bh bh ) d ( bh bh ) . . (3 2) ay t . 1m1 ar y, t e terms rir -rfr an rmr -rfr m equatiOn . are pre-
multiplied with ~ 0 - i.e., the market value of bidder i observed at the beginning of the , 
holding period. Again, the regression model is then re-run to yield the estimated intercept 
( a:bh) as the measure of EW average sterling BHAR to a bidder portfolio over r event 
days. To make ~.t-Is or ~.o s comparable across the sample period, each ~.t-I or 
~.o is standardised using the price level of the value-weighted FT All Share Index 
observed at each point in time69 . 
Since both a{ and a:bh take into account bidder size, they are equivalent to 
value-weighted percentage abnormal return. a{ and a:bh also offer a perspective on the 
takeover-induced change in the aggregate wealth. By capturing the actual size of abnormal 
return in total value, a{ and a:bh thus help to address the problem of attenuated estimate 
of the true economic value of takeovers documented in the literature (see Eckbo and 
Thorburn, 2000; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; Loderer and Martin, 1990). 
In the light of thin trading among the U.K. firms (e.g., Clare et al., 2002; Dimson 
and Marsh, 1983 ), it is argued here that equations (3 .1) and (3 .2) are most appropriate for 
computing bidder abnormal return and its standard deviation. While the use of 
characteristic-matched control firms or portfolios can account for the size and BM effects, 
the control firms themselves are also likely to be thinly traded. To this extent, the use of 
control firms or portfolios, as adopted in many recent studies such as Cowan and Sergeant 
(2001) and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003), is likely to yield relatively noisy results. 
68 This pre-multiplication is analogous to the procedure adopted by Eckbo and Thorburn (2000). 
69 This standardisation approach has also been employed in Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and Boehme and 
Sorescu (2002). 
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Although it is important to control for the size and BM effects when calculating 
long-term abnormal return (e.g., Fama and French, 1993; Lyon eta/., 1999; Mitchell and 
Stafford, 2000), short-term abnormal return is typically insensitive to the choice of an 
expected return model (e.g., Brown and Warner, 1985; Dong eta/., 2002; Fuller eta/., 
2002; Moeller et a/., 2004). The problem of the cross-sectional correlations is also 
unlikely to bias the significance of the measured short-term abnormal return. This is 
because the problem of overlapping return calculation periods is small when the window is 
short (see also Cowan and Sergeant, 2001). Further, Brown and Warner (1985) note that 
the adjustment for cross-sectional correlations is not always necessary and can even reduce 
power of the test if the degree of correlations is small as in a sample situation where event 
dates are not clustered70 . 
Despite their merits, the estimations of bidder abnormal return in equations (3 .1) 
and (3 .2) are not robust against extreme observations. This is because Least Square 
estimators are sensitive to outliers. Due to compounding, the presence of outliers can be 
potentially serious for abnormal return computed using equation (3.2). To minimise the 
impact of outliers, the Minimum Absolute Deviation (MAD) estimator is also employed in 
the estimation of a~h and a:bh. Because the MAD estimator minimises the absolute 
deviation from the predicted mean, it attaches less weight to ~xtreme observations. The 
MAD estimator can be computed using Huber's (1973) Robust Regression procedure. 
7° For the sample in this thesis, there is no apparent systematic trend to indicate the clustering of event dates. 
Even on a monthly basis, the sample event dates appear evenly distributed. In the interest of space, the 
graphs are unreported and available upon request from the author. 
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The MAD-based results tell us to assume that an investor's trading strategy should 
be one unaffected by outlier returns ex ante, or that investors' experience should be outlier-
free experience, or a corporate decision should be made based on information that is net of 
the impact of outliers. Clearly, this is not realistic. For this reason, the MAD estimator is 
used only to assess the robustness or sensitivity of the OLS-based results to the presence of 
outliers, and not as a substitute for the OLS estimator. 
3.5) Announcement-Period Bidder Abnormal Return 
The wealth effects of private-firm takeovers are measured as bidder abnormal 
return using several alternative windows around the announcement date. Section 3.5.1 
reports empirical results for bidders of private targets and bidders in the comparison 
samples, i.e., bidders of divested subsidiaries and bidders of publicly held targets. In 
Section 3.5.2, the effects of payment methods on bidder abnormal return are examined. 
3.5.1) Target Status and Bidder Abnormal Return 
Table 3.2 reports bidder abnormal return for the total sample. In Table 3.3, bidder 
abnormal return is reported according to target status, i.e., private-firm bidders, bidders of 
divested subsidiaries and public-firm bidders. 
A. Full Sample 
For the entire sample, Panel A of Table 3.2 documents significantly positive 
percentage bidder abnormal return (0.5% at the 0.01 level) on the announcement date. 
Over the 3-day period surrounding the announcement date, as reported in Panel B, an 
average bidder also earns significantly positive percentage BHAR. Both the OLS and 
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MAD estimators yield consistent results71 • These results are very similar to the findings of 
the U.S. studies that include bidders of listed targets and bidders of unlisted targets (see 
Asquith et al., 1983; Loderer and Martin, 1990; Moeller et al., 2004). These full-sample 
results are also broadly in line with the significantly positive announcement-month 
abnormal return to the Canadian bidders reported by Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) 72 . 
Over the entire event period, i.e. the ( -40, + 20) window, an average bidder earn a 
small but significantly negative BHAR of -0.9% (at the 0.05 level). When taking into 
account bidder size, however, there is no reliable evidence of significant sterling BHAR in 
any window although it is negative in almost all windows. For the full sample, the results 
hence suggest that smaller bidders tend to earn positive announcement-period gains 
whereas larger bidders tend to experience losses- in line with the U.S. findings of Moeller 
et al. (2004) that announcement-period gains are significantly more positive for small 
bidders than for large bidders. 
71 The OLS-estimated BHAR over the 11-day window is also significantly positive. However, the MAD 
estimator yields significantly negative BHAR of a similar magnitude. 
72 Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) use monthly returns. Their results therefore may not be directly comparable 
with the findings of this chapter which are based on daily returns. 
Table 3.2 
Announcement-Period Abnormal Return to Bidder Shareholders in Full Sample 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during 
January 1995 - December 1998. All bidders are U .K listed companies. Panel A 
reports abnormal return to a bidder portfolio on each event day t. Panel B reports 
buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) to a bidder portfolio over a r -day event 
window. Abnormal return in Panels A and B is calculated as equally weighted 
(EW) average percentage and sterling (£mil) return. For each event day t, 
abnormal return to a bidder portfolio is computed as the intercept (at) of the 
regression model: ru - r ft =at + f3t (r mt - r ft )+ t:il , where ril , r ft , and r mt are 
return to bidder i, risk-free return and market return on event day t, respectively. 
Over a r -day window, ril , r ft , and r mt are calculated as buy-and-hold return, 
and the regression re-run to yield an estimate of BHAR. To compute sterling 
abnormal return, the excess return and excess market return terms in the 
regression model are pre-multiplied with market value of bidder i at the beginning 
of the event window. Both the OLS and MAD estimators are used in Panel B. 
For the OLS estimator, the significance level is computed using White's (1980) 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. In brackets is sample size. •, band c 
denote significance at the 0.0 I, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Abnormal Return on Individual Event Days [2,004] 
Day EW% EW£ Day EW% EW£ 
-40 0.037 0.075 -10 -0.064 -1.099 
-39 -0.006 -0.575 -9 0.028 1.529 
-38 -0.080b -2.258a -8 0.051 -0.350 
-37 0.102a 1.006 -7 0.016 1.078 
-36 0.032 1.068 -6 0.006 -1.042 
-35 -0.042 -3.012 -5 0.055c -1.086 
-34 -0.007 0.634 -4 -0.022 -1.862 
-33 0.004 -0.396 -3 0.104b 1.754 
-32 -0.019 1.122 -2 0.035 1.158 
-31 0.029 -0.017 -1 0.231a -0.719 
-30 -0.021 0.002 0 0.497a 1.355 
-29 0.023 -0.335 + 1 0.276a -0.129 
-28 -0.022 -1.025 +2 0.132a 0.718 
-27 -0.002 -0.892 + 3 0.038 -2.576 
-26 0.056 -0.373 +4 0.045 -0.663 
-25 0.029 0.338 +5 -0.131 a -2.155a 
-24 -0.038 0.182 +6 -0.172 -1.055 
-23 -0.017 1.124 + 7 -0.011 1.022 
-22 0.018 2.210b +8 -0.007 0.229 
-21 0.041 -0.666 +9 -0.076c -1.4 70 
-20 -0.075c -4.038a + 10 -0.042 0.316 
-19 -0.031 0.020 +11 -0.024 -0.274 
-18 0.026 -0.280 +12 0.049 0.334 
-17 0.014 -0.625 + 13 -0.064 c -0.004 
-16 0.077c 0.775 + 14 0.031 -1.277 
-15 0.047 -0.441 +15 0.016 1.096 
-14 0.015 0.274 +16 0.036 0.499 
-13 -0.044 0.183 + 17 -0.054 -0.526 
-12 -0.108b -0.261 +18 -0.116 -0.313 
-11 0.036 -2.566 + 19 -O.llOb -2.326c 
+20 -0.006 -0.966 
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Table 3.2 - Continued 
Panel B: BHAR over Multi-Day Holding Periods [2,004] 
OLS Estimates MAD Estimates 
Window EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
(-1,+1) 1.001 a 0.634 0.654a 0.103 
(-5,+5) 1.093a -3.623 -0.835a -0.976 
(-10,+10) 0.474 -2.016 0.617a -1.215 
(-20,+20) -0.514 -0.521 -0.311 -1.073 
(-40,+20) -0.894b -3.315 -0.799b -3.238c 
( -20,-1) -0.002 -2.286 -0.117 -2.054c 
(-40,-1) -0.395 -5.746 -0.452c -5.141 c 
(+1,+20) -0.471 -3.504 -0.209 -1.485 
B. Sub-Samples by Target Status 
Upon the formal bid announcement (day 0) and days immediately surrounding the 
announcement, as shown in Panel A ofTable 3.3, bidders of private targets and bidders of 
divested subsidiaries earn significantly positive abnormal return. The sterling results are 
similar though not as striking. On the other hand, bidders of public targets earn negative 
percentage abnormal return on days -2 through +2 although the loss is significant (at the 
0.10 level) only on the day of announcement. On these days, as suggested by their 
insignificant sterling gains, shareholders in public-firm bidders appear to breakeven in 
terms of the aggregate wealth. 
Panel B of Table 3.3 reports BHAR for multi-day windows. During the entire-
event window, i.e., the (-40, +20) window, only bidders of public targets experience a 
significant percentage loss. For the 41- and 21-day windows surrounding the event, there 
is no reliable evidence of significant abnormal return for any group of bidders. As 
discussed in Section 3.4, a relatively long window may not yield an accurate estimate of 
abnormal return due to the degree of noise which increases with the length of a window. 
In the 3- and 11-day windows, private-firm bidders and subsidiary bidders both earn 
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significantly positive percentage gams. Both the OLS and MAD estimators yield 
consistent results. Similar to the pattern seen in Panel A, public-firm bidders earn negative 
though insignificant gains in these windows. Regardless of target status, there is no 
reliable evidence of corresponding significant sterling abnormal return. 
When looking at the post-, and especially, pre-event windows, interesting 
observations emerge. In the post-event window, i.e., (+1, +20), the percentage BHAR to 
private-firm bidders, both OLS- and MAD-estimated, is significantly negative. As shown 
in Panel A, this negative post-event BHAR appears to be caused by large and significant 
losses on days +5, +9, + 18 and + 19. It is difficult to think that this apparent gain reversion 
is due to the market systematically overestimating bidder gains in takeovers of private 
targets observable at the bid announcement. This is because the noticeable individual-day 
post-event losses appear to occur randomly as opposed to systematically. More 
importantly, the negative 20-day post-event BHAR is nevertheless far too small to offset 
the gains cumulated during the much shorter 3-day and 11-day windows surrounding day 0 
-this is especially so when the impact of outliers is accounted for. 
Due to the relatively large size of the deals and the bidders themselves and the 
ensuing analyst following, as discussed in Section 3.4, the market may well react to bids 
for divested subsidiaries and public targets before the formal bid announcement. In the 
( -40, -1) window, both the OLS and MAD estimators show significant percentage losses 
for public-firm bidders. Despite their positive gains in the 3-day and 11-day windows, 
bidders of divested subsidiaries also experience significant losses in both pre-event 
windows, i.e., the (-20, -1) and (-40, -1) windows. In the (-40, -1) window, both 
percentage and sterling losses are significant, either OLS- or MAD-estimated. It is 
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plausible that these negative price run-ups reflect the market's downward reassessment of 
the bidders' existing or internal growth prospects (see e.g., Grinblatt and Titman, 1998, p. 
681 ). Specifically, the bidders' takeover attempt signals to the market that they are 
running out of internal investment opportunities. Due to their comparatively large size and 
the ensuing analyst coverage (see Bhushan, 1989), news about subsidiary bidders making a 
takeover bid may well be leaked to the market well before the bid is formally publicised73 . 
Upon the formal bid announcement, which in almost all probability signifies a successful 
negotiation (see Section 3.4), the market bids up the bidders' share price to reflect the 
potential growth improvement brought about by the takeover. The comparable magnitude 
of the negative run-ups and the positive gains (percentage) in either the 3-day or 11-day 
window is supportive of this view. When considering the significantly negative price run-
ups, bidders of divested subsidiaries hence appear to after all breakeven around the period 
surrounding the bid announcement 74 . 
The recent U.S. study by Moeller eta!. (2004) measures bidder abnormal return as 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) using the window (-1, +1). Moeller et al. (2004) find 
that bidder gains are significantly positive when targets are either private firms or divested 
subsidiaries, but significantly negative when targets are listed firms. Moeller et al. (2004) 
also report that bidder gains are largest when targets are divested subsidiaries. With 
reference to private-firm and public-firm bidders, the evidence in Panel B is thus consistent 
with the findings of Moeller et al. (2004 ). When also considering the losses in the pre-
event windows, however, the Panel B results for subsidiary bidders are inconsistent with 
Moeller et al.'s (2004) findings. Given the off-market nature of bids for unlisted targets, 
73 As exhibited in Table 3.1, bidders of divested subsidiaries are as large as bidders of public targets. 
74 Since the only significant sterling BHAR to bidders of divested subsidiaries is the negative price run-up in 
the (-40, -1) window- £-16.5 (OLS) and £-12.4 (MAD) million, the aggregate announcement-period wealth 
effects on the bidder shareholders are negative. 
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the Panel B results thus confirm the concern raised in Section 3.4 that a longer event 
window, particularly into the pre-announcement period, is more appropriate when 
takeovers are made off the market. 
The evidence in both Panels of Table 3.3 for private-firm bidders vis-a-vis public-
firm bidders is generally consistent with the recent U.K. evidence reported by Draper and 
Paudyal (2004), the Australian evidence by Da Silva Rosa et al. (2001) and the U.S. 
evidence by Hansen and Lott ( 1996). Hansen and Lott (1996) attribute the positive 
announcement-period gains earned by private-firm bidders to the diversification effece5• 
Since subsidiaries have dispersed ownership via their listed parent just like public targets, 
the diversification effect implies that whether the target is a public firm or subsidiary, the 
bidder should receive similar market reaction. Indeed, this is also one of the implications 
of the target-side agency conflict disparity put forwards by Ang and Kohers (2001)76 • 
As documented in Panel B of Table 3.3, both subsidiary bidders and public-firm 
bidders experience negative price run-ups. On the date of the formal bid announcement, 
however, subsidiary bidders receive significantly positive market reaction in a fashion 
similar to private-firm bidders whereas the market reacts negatively to public-firm bidders. 
As a result, the positive announcement-period gains to private-firm bidders in Table 3.3 are 
unlikely to be attributable to the diversification effect. With reference to Ang and Kohers' 
(2001) target-side agency conflict disparity, the market still reacts positively on the 
announcement date to bids for divested subsidiaries even though subsidiaries are 
75 Hansen and Lott's ( 1996) diversification effect implies that bidder shareholders are indifferent to how 
takeover gains are to be allocated when the target is publicly listed but always capture part of the [positive] 
gains when the target is privately held. See also Section 2.3. 
76 Due to the closely held ownership of private targets, Ang and Kohers (200 l) argue that agency costs are 
much lower in private targets than in public targets which are characterised by dispersed ownership. As a 
result, bids for private targets signal good news relative to bids for public targets. 
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characterised by dispersed ownership and the inherent agency conflicts. In this view, the 
difference in abnormal return between private-firm bidders and public-firm bidders cannot 
be explained by the difference in ownership structure between private and public targets. 
In examining the market reaction to bids made by frequent bidders in the U.S., 
Fuller et al. (2002) employ the (-2, +2) window. Similar to Moeller et al. (2004), Fuller et 
al. (2002) find that bidder CAR is positive when targets are private firms or divested 
subsidiaries, but negative when targets are public firms. Fuller et al. (2002) maintain that 
the positive gains earned by private-firm bidders and subsidiary bidders are at least 
partially due to the liquidity discount on unlisted assets vis-a-vis listed assets. If this 
explanation were to hold, there should be no difference in the way the market reacts to bids 
for divested subsidiaries and to bids for private targets. As discussed above, Panel B of 
Table 3.3 reports strong evidence of negative market reactions to bids for divested 
subsidiaries during the period leading up to the bid announcement. These negative price 
run-ups are large enough to offset the 3- and 11-day gains such that bidders of divested 
subsidiaries overall appear to breakeven during the announcement period. As a 
consequence, the results in Panel B of Table 3.3 are further empirical evidence - in 
addition to the liquidity indices reported by Moeller et al. (2004) - inconsistent with the 
liquidity discount explanation. 
Since the ability to bargain down the target price can depend on the bidder's 
negotiation or acquisition skills, the sample bidders for each target status are further 
divided into repeating and non-repeating bidders. Repeating bidders are defined as those 
appearing in the sample more than once during the sample period, and non-repeating 
bidders appearing only once. Examining repeating bidders separately also gives the results 
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that are more comparable to the findings of Fuller et al. (2002). Irrespective of the target 
status, the sub-sample results for repeating and non-repeating bidders are qualitatively 
similar to those reported in Table 3.3 and hence relegated to Appendix I. Even for the 
samples including only repeating bidders, the evidence documented in this chapter does 
not support the liquidity discount explanation advocated by Fuller et al. (2002)77 . 
Although both private targets and subsidiaries are unlisted, the decision to go 
public is much cheaper for the latter ex ante. This is because subsidiaries enjoy a large 
portion of the exit costs, such as the costs of information production and accounting 
disclosure, which have already been incurred and borne by their listed parent (see Pagano 
et al., 1998). As a consequence, the amount of the exit costs savings arising from opting 
for the takeover route is much smaller for subsidiaries than for private targets. It then 
follows that the fraction of the exit costs savings available to bidders of divested 
subsidiaries is correspondingly smaller than the fraction to be enjoyed by bidders of private 
targets. Since public targets are listed firms, their bidders receive no discount due to the 
exit costs savings. Ceteris paribus, bidder shareholders should therefore gain more from 
bids for private targets than from bids for divested subsidiaries, and at best breakeven 
when the target is publicly listed. The evidence in Table 3.3 is supportive of this 
conjecture, i.e., the Exit Costs hypothesis. Although gains in the windows immediately 
surrounding the announcement date are positive and similar for both bidders of private 
targets and bidders of divested subsidiaries, the market reacts negatively during the period 
leading to the bid announcement only to bids for divested subsidiaries. For subsidiary 
bidders, their negative price run-ups appear large enough to offset their gains in the short 
77 However, it should be noted that because the sample period in this thesis covers only four years, bidders 
that appear in the sample only once may in fact be regular or frequent bidders. Therefore, the results for non-
repeating bidders reported in Appendix I should be interpreted with caution if inferences are to be drawn 
about the relationship between bidders' negotiation or acquisition skills and their acquisition frequency. 
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windows around the bid announcement. When targets are publicly listed, there is reliable 
evidence that bidder gains are negative. 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, the existing literature offers several competing 
explanations for variations in bidder abnormal return based on public-firm takeover 
experience. The bidder characteristics reported in Table 3.1 furnish the results in Table 3.3 
with perspectives on this comer of the existing literature. As shown in Table 3.1, the BM 
ratio (q proxy) is significantly lower (higher) for private-firm bidders than for bidders of 
divested subsidiaries. Subsidiary bidders are also much larger than bidders of private 
targets. If the market valuation ratios are interpreted as a measure of managerial 
performance (e.g., Servaes, 1991) and firm size as a measure of agency conflicts (e.g., 
Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Jensen, 1989), one might argue that bids by subsidiary bidders 
may be driven by managerialism vis-a-vis bids by private-firm bidders ex ante. However, 
the positive market reaction to bids for divested subsidiaries on and immediately around 
the announcement date in Table 3.3 does not support this managerialism explanation. 
Since subsidiary and public-firm bidders share similar market valuation and size 
characteristics (see Table 3.1), managerialism also appears to be an unlikely explanation 
for the negative announcement-period gains observed for public-firm bidders. 
The BM ratio and Tobin's q can also be viewed as reflective of the level ofRoll's 
(1986) managerial hubris in bidder managers (Rau and Vermaelen, 1998). In this view, 
one would expect bidders of private targets to underperform subsidiary bidders as well as 
public-firm bidders around the announcement period. The evidence in Table 3.3 indicates 
the contrary. Thus, hubris is an unlikely explanation for the difference in abnormal return 
between private-firm bidders and subsidiary as well as public-firm bidders. Given the 
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similarity in the pre-event market valuation between subsidiary and public-firm bidders, 
quantities other than hubris may well provide explanation for the negative gains observed 
for the latter. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, it is highly unlikely that managerialism and/or hubris in 
the bidder are sufficiently observable at the bid announcement such that the market can on 
average correctly anticipate their impacts on bidder shareholders ex ante. On the other 
hand, the quantities of the exit costs savings are readily and sufficiently observable at the 
bid announcement. Again, the positive gains to private-firm bidders in Table 3.3 are 
consistent with the hypothesised fraction of the exit costs savings available to them. The 
negative price run-ups for bidders of divested subsidiaries, which are large enough to offset 
the gains observed during the [short] windows immediately surrounding the event, imply 
that the fraction of the savings available to the bidders is economically trivial. This is 
reasonable since a large portion of the exit costs for subsidiaries have already been 
incurred and borne by their listed parent. 
For public targets, there are zero exit costs savings. In a competitive takeover 
market, bidders of public targets should therefore earn at best a normal rate of return. The 
negative gains observed for public-firm bidders may then be attributable to several 
quantities. Since bidding in a competitive takeover market occurs in a few large jumps 
(Hirshleifer, 1995), for instance, the bidder may offer the top price at once, and thus, 
overpay for the target in order to prevent a bidding war. To the extent that the transaction 
costs and opportunity costs of the bidder management time and efforts are not factored into 
the offer price, the drop in the bidder's share price may also be partially due to these costs. 
In addition, the negative market reaction may also in part reflect the market's perception 
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that the bid is made because the bidder is running out of its internal investment 
opportunities or the profitability of its existing operations is deteriorating. 
Dong et al. (2002) contend that the valuation ratios are also proxies for market 
misvaluation. Using a sample of the U.S. public-firm takeovers, Dong et al. (2002) find 
that announcement-period gains are significantly higher for bidders with low market 
valuation than for bidders with high market valuation78. The evidence in Table 3.3 hence 
suggests that despite their relatively low (high) BM ratio (q proxy), private-firm bidders 
are unlikely to be overvalued bidders vis-a-vis subsidiary and public-firm bidders. 
78 Dong et al. (2002) use the window (-1, +1) around the announcement date (day 0). 
Table 3.3 
Announcement-Period Bidder Abnormal Return by Target Status 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 -
December 1998. All bidders are U .K listed companies. The sample bidders are classified as 
bidders acquiring private targets, bidders acquiring divested subsidiaries, and bidders acquiring 
public targets. Panels A and B report abnormal return on event day t and buy-and-hold abnormal 
return (BHAR) over a r -day event window, respectively, to a bidder portfolio. Abnormal return 
in both panels is calculated as equally weighted (EW) average percentage and sterling (£mil) 
return. •, band c denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. In brackets is 
sample size. For details of abnormal return estimation, see Table 3.2. 
Panel A: Abnormal Return on Individual Event Days 
Private Targets Divested 
[1,200] Subsidiaries [654] 
Day EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
-40 0.036 0.294 0.078 -0.168 
-39 0.003 0.271 0.058 -2.107 
-38 -0.081 -0.412 -0.119 -5.047b 
-37 0.125 3 0.032 0.054 1.337 
-36 0.029 0.967 0.048 0.904 
-35 0.006 -0.447 -0.097 -7.148 
-34 0.017 0.354 -0.012 0.659 
-33 -0.025 -0.295 0.015 0.370 
-32 -0.021 0.128 -0.019 1.729 
-31 -0.043 -0.401 0.150b 1.245 
-30 -0.017 -0.215 0.014 0.024 
-29 0.049 -0.107 -0.005 -1.487 
-28 -0.027 -0.383 -0.010 -1.815 
-27 0.003 -0.600 -0.038 -1.313 
-26 0.010 0.093 0.099 0.302 
-25 -0.015 0.358 -0.002 -1.122 
-24 -0.056 0.162 0.004 -0.509 
-23 0.003 0.444 -0.033 1.828 
-22 0.029 0.384 0.022 5.790b 
-21 0.048 0.032 0.034 -1.161 
-20 -0.056 -0.990b -0.070 -8.583 3 
-19 -0.023 0.029 -0.046 0.436 
-18 0.027 -0.136 0.065 0.991 
-17 0.029 -1.104 0.000 0.851 
-16 0.122b 0.842 -0.019 0.651 
-15 0.097c 0.031 -0.019 -1.118 
-14 0.065 0.866c -0.112b -2.253c 
-13 -0.033 0.110 -0.085 0.686 
-12 -0.093c 0.089 -0.090 0.616 
-11 0.038 -0.099 0.059 -5.953 
-10 -0.027 -0.446 -0.093 -2.891 
-9 0.091 b 0.964c -0.054 0.593 
-8 0.122b 1.627c -0.048 -3.081 
-7 -0.022 0.160 0.140c 2.532 
-6 0.066 0.044 -0.123c -3.214 
-5 0.096b -0.335 -0.036 -2.233 











































Table 3.3 - Continued 
Panel A: Continued 
-3 0.170a -0.199 -0.019 5.119 0.132 2.237 
-2 -0.009 0.562 0.122 2.412 -0.007 3.275 
-1 0.289a 1.413b 0.177b -3.685c 
-0.008 -4.689 
0 0.650a -0.129 0.509a 5.085c -0.770c 1.396 
+1 0.260a 0.591 0.370a -0.586 -0.027 -1.523 
+2 0.127c -0.199 0.193b 3.811 c -0.098 -2.017 
+3 0.017 -0.485 0.071 -6.389 0.063 -0.303 
+4 -0.027 -0.818c 0.116 -1.671 0.315b 6.974b 
+5 -0.107b -0.950b -0.199b -4.740b 
-0.029 1.096 
+6 -0.302 -0.436 0.020 -3.634 0.009 0.405 
+7 -0.014 1.073 -0.029 0.501 0.111 2.769 
+8 -0.003 -0.367 0.001 -0.881 -0.096 5.353 
+9 -0.144a -1.177c 0.016 -4.014c 0.055 10.367c 
+10 -0.035 1.010 -0.059 -0.365 -0.025 -0.882 
+11 -0.017 0.259 -0.017 0.738 -0.127 -7.889b 
+12 0.095c 0.025 -0.007 0.165 -0.076 1.282 
+13 -0.042 0.294 -0.127c -0.743 0.027 -3.034 
+14 -0.020 -0.632 0.108 -2.927 0.096 1.155 
+15 -0.060 -0.636 0.079 0.642 0.338b 7.609c 
+16 0.034 -0.160 0.042 1.609 0.035 -0.330 
+17 -0.058 0.399 -0.076 -1.446 0.054 -2.629 
+18 -0.249b -0.102 0.102 0.970 0.000 -5.178 
+19 -0.221 a -0.485 0.077 -4.666 -0.036 0.094 
+20 -0.040 -1.105b 0.040 -1.302 0.078 0.611 
Panel B: BHAR over Multi-Day Holding Periods 
Private Targets Divested Public Targets 
[1,200] Subsidiaries [654] [150] 
Window EW% EW£ EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
OLS Estimates OLS Estimates OLS Estimates 
(-1,+ 1) 1.207a 1.974 1.011 a 1.183 -0.763 -12.531 
(-5,+5) 1.328a -0.411 0.945a -5.569 -0.197 -12.055 
(-10,+ 10) 0.654 0.488 0.418 -13.855 -0.764 22.002 
(-20,+20) -0.405 3.065 -0.510 -4.280 -1.583 -0.778 
(-40,+20) -0.710 3.495 -0.844 -11.437 -2.580c 27.279 
(-20,-1) 0.578b 2.485 -0.772b -8.910 -1.102 -22.736 
( -40,-1) 0.215 4.104 -1.090c -16.511c -1.996c 5.854 
(+1,+20) -1.072b -2.819 0.408 -8.403 0.575 7.858 
MAD Estimates MAD Estimates MAD Estimates 
(-1,+ 1) 0.835a 0.905a 0.574a -0.575 -0.843b -10.188 
(-5,+5) 1.023a 0.441 0.720a -2.684 -0.296 -0.361 
(-10,+10) 0.894a -0.083 0.421 -5.101 -0.731 6.004 
(-20,+20) -0.021 -0.816 -0.615 -0.530 -1.576 -4.340 
(-40,+20) -0.418 -1.239 -0.978c -3.997 -3.129b 3.496 
( -20,-1) 0.346 -0.631 -0.682b -4.428 -1.215c -14.054c 
( -40,-1) 0.111 0.172 -1.121 b -12.441 a -2.181 b -5.466 
(+ 1,+20) -0.609b -0.744 0.351 -3.405 0.268 2.366 
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3.5.2) Target Status and Effects of Payment Methods 
Table 3.4 reports the effects of payment methods on announcement-period 
abnormal return to bidders in the sample of main interest, i.e. bidders of private targets. 
The results for the comparison samples of bidders of divested subsidiaries and public-firm 
bidders are reported in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, respectively. 
A. Bidders Acquiring Privately Held Targets 
On the announcement date (day 0), as shown in Panel A of Table 3.4, private-firm 
bidders receive significantly positive percentage gains regardless of the medium of 
exchange. Although the magnitude of these day-0 gains do not significantly vary across 
payment methods in the statistical sense, the equity bidders earn 1. 76% whereas the cash 
and mixed bidders earn only 0.63% and 0.84%, respectivel/9. At variance with the cash 
and equity bidders, the mixed bidders receive significantly positive market reaction from 
days -3 through + 2. In sterling terms, only the mixed bidders earn significant gains. 
When bidder gains are measured over a multi-day window, Panel B shows a similar 
pattern. Both the OLS and MAD estimators provide consistent conclusions. Again, 
private-firm bidders earn positive announcement-period gains regardless of the means of 
payment. During the 3- and 11-day periods surrounding day 0, the percentage gains to the 
equity and mixed bidders are of comparable magnitude, but noticeably smaller for the cash 
bidders. In the (-5, +5) window, for instance, the equity and mixed bidders earn BHAR of 
2.31% and 2.05%, respectively, whereas the cash bidders receive only 0.96%. Although a 
79 The difference in mean abnormal return between two bidder groups is tested by adding a dummy indicator 
variable to equation (3 .I) or (3 .2). The coefficient of the dummy variable then provides a measure of the 
difference in abnormal return between the groups. This approach, however, assumes that the two bidder 
groups have similar systematic risk or the beta coefficient. An independent-samples t-test allowing for 
unequal variances does not rely on this assumption and is also used for testing the difference. The means, 
variances and degrees of freedom required for the t-test are readily available from running the regression 
models in equation (3 .I) or (3 .2). 
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significant difference is observed only between the cash and mixed bidders, the reduction 
in bidder gains when pure cash financing is used undoubtedly appears economically 
significant80 • While there is no reliable evidence of significant gains to the cash bidders in 
other windows in Panel B, the equity and mixed bidders both experience significantly 
positive price run-ups. In sterling terms, only the equity and mixed bidders reliably earn 
positive gains. 
Taken as a whole, the results documented in Table 3.4 suggest that the market 
reacts positively to bids for private targets regardless of the means of payment, but reacts 
more positively when equity financing is used, either in part or in ful1 81 . These results are 
consistent with the U.K. findings of Draper and Paudyal (2004) as well as the U.S. findings 
of Fuller et al. (2002), Kohers and Ang (2000) and Moeller et al. (2004). However, the 
evidence in Table 3.4 is only partially supportive of the U.S. findings of Chang (1998) that 
the (-1, 0) CAR to private-firm bidders is significantly positive for the equity bidders, but 
insignificant for the cash bidders. In sharp contrast with Chang (1998) and somewhat at 
variance with Table 3.4, Da Silva Rosa et al. (2001) find that the Australian private-firm 
bidders earn positive gains when paying by cash, but zero gains when using equity 
financing. The evidence in Table 3.4 also deviates somewhat from the U.S. study by Ang 
and Kohers (2001), which finds that bidders of private targets earn significantly positive 
gains regardless of payment methods, but earn significantly less in equity offers. 
Under the Clientele Effect hypothesis, a particular payment method in takeovers of 
private targets simply reflects the consumption preference or investment objective of the 
80 The difference is significant at the 0.10 level and only when using the t-test. The dummy-variable 
approach shows no significant difference at all. 
8 When the sample of private-firm bidders is further divided into repeating and non-repeating bidders, 
similar results are observed. For the sub-sample results, see Appendix I. 
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target owners, and any incremental value of the agreed means of payment is fully reflected 
in the target price. The announcement of a payment method thus conveys no incremental 
valuable information about the bidder. Empirically, the hypothesis therefore implies that 
that announcement-period abnormal return to bidders of private targets is positive and 
identical across payment methods. As is evident in Table 3.4, although the market reaction 
is positive across all payment methods, the market reacts more positively when equity 
financing is used, either in part or in full. Accordingly, the evidence in Table 3.4 does not 
fully support the Clientele Effect hypothesis. 
In the context of Wruck (1989), Chang (1998) proposes that an increase in 
ownership concentration in equity bidders of private targets enables more efficient 
monitoring of the bidder managers. On the other hand, a cash offer does not increase 
ownership concentration in the bidder. Therefore, announcement-period gains to private-
firm bidders should be larger in equity offers than in cash offers. The more positive 
market reaction to equity offers in Table 3.4. appears supportive of this conjecture. 
However, the increased monitoring argument proposed by Chang (1998) has a further 
implication. Assuming that a takeover announcement conveys complete information about 
the transaction, there should be a positive relation between the degree of ownership 
concentration created in the bidder and the size of bidder gains (see also Wruck, 1989). 
Holding constant target relative size, a proportional increase in blockownership in 
the bidder is always much larger in equity offers than in mixed offers. Thus, if Chang's 
(1998) monitoring effect is at work, gains to private-firm bidders should be larger in equity 
offers. The equity-value target relative size, both mean and median, for equity and mixed 
offers for private targets is exhibited in Panel B of Table 3.1. The relative size measure 
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does not significantly vary between the two payment methods82 . Looking across different 
event windows in both Panels in Table 3.4, it is far from conclusive that bidder gains are 
larger in equity offers than in mixed offers. For instance, while the percentage bidder 
gains in windows (-20, +20) and (-40, +20) are insignificant in both equity and mixed 
offers, the sterling gains are significantly positive only in equity offers. This pattern 
implies that, holding constant target absolute size, the larger the bidder, the more positively 
the market reacts to equity offers. In other words, bidder gains decrease with target 
relative size - the observation opposite to the implication of the monitoring effect. On 
balance, an increase in ownership concentration therefore cannot explain the positive effect 
of equity financing documented in Table 3.4. This is not surprising since an increase in 
blockownership could also give rise to management entrenchment ex ante (see Morek et 
al., 1988; Stulz, 1988). 
At variance with quantities such as monitoring or entrenchment, it is known to the 
market at the bid announcement that target owners in an equity offer have incentives to 
carefully assess the bidder's prospects and true value prior to their acceptance of the 
bidder's equity83 . In this view, the positive information effect pointed out by Hertzel and 
Smith (1993) in the context of private equity placements provides an alternative 
explanation for the positive impact of equity financing (either in part or in full) evident in 
Table 3.4. Specifically, the market interprets the acceptance of the bidder's shares by the 
target owners in an equity or mixed offer as good news about the bidder's prospects. 
82 The mean equity-value target relative size is significantly larger in equity offers than in mixed offers. 
However, the distribution of the variable is highly skewed. When the variable is log-transformed, the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z test does not reject normality and the difference becomes insignificant. The 
difference in median is insignificant. The target relative size measures based on total assets, turnover and 
number of employees are not used because they are at best coarse proxies, relative to the equity-value 
measure, for an increase in ownership concentration. 
83 Since the target owners in an equity offer commit a substantial portion of their wealth in the bidder, 
rationality dictates that they, as they also have incentives to do so, carefully assess the bidder's prospects and 
true value prior to accepting the bidder's equity as the means.ofpayment. 
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Because the target owners incur costs in studying the bidder's true value which also 
benefit the bidder, they will require compensation from the bidder. In equilibrium, the 
amount of this compensation should be fully reflected in the target price. Hertzel and 
Smith's (1993) positive information effect hence implies that on average a target premium 
should be higher when equity financing forms part of the offer84. As discussed in Section 
3.3.3, the BVP ratio does not significantly vary across payment methods in private-firm 
takeovers. To the extent that the BVP ratio is a proxy for a target premium in private-firm 
takeovers, the positive effect of equity financing evident in Table 3.4 points towards the 
possibility that, unlike private investors in a private equity placement, the target owners are 
not compensated for their study costs85 . 
If the study costs incurred by the target owners in offers involving equity financing 
are "somehow" not factored into the target price, it is conceivable that equity financing is 
used when the bidding is less than fully competitive. However, it is also possible that the 
target's study costs are not priced simply because the incremental value of equity financing 
is difficult, if not infeasible, for both the bidder and target to quantify ex ante. Indeed, the 
target owners may well be indifferent to whether or not the compensation for their study 
costs is reflected in the acquisition price. Specifically, as long as the exchange ratio is 
determined using the bidder's share price observed before the announcement period, the 
target owners will also profit from the positive effect of equity financing seen in Table 3.4. 
84 Private equity issues are usually made at a sizeable discount (e.g., Hertzel and Smith, 1993; Hertzel eta!., 
2002). Hertzel and Smith (1993) contend that the issue discount reflects compensation for the costs incurred 
bl private investors in assessing the issuer's prospects and true value. 
8 Note again that the BVP ratio is a proxy for the premium on a target's book equity and not necessarily for 
the pre-event value of a target's equity. Moreover, the BVP ratio is also likely to reflect several other factors 
such as industry effects as well as the operational profitability of the target. As a result, merely comparing 
the BVP ratio across deals may well give relatively noisy inferences about in the amount of compensation 
conceded by the bidder for the study costs incurred by target owners in offers involving equity financing. 
Table 3.4 
Announcement-Period! Abnormal Return to Bidders of Private Targets 
by Payment Method 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 -
December 1998. All bidders are U.K listed companies. The sample bidders of private targets 
are divided into cash, equity and mixed bidders. Panels A and B report abnormal return on event 
day t and buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) over a r -day event window, respectively, to a 
bidder portfolio. Abnormal return in both panels is calculated as equally weighted (EW) average 
percentage and sterling (£mil) return. •, band c denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
levels, respectively. In brackets is sample size. For details of abnormal return estimation, see 
Table 3.2. 
Panel A: Abnormal Return on Individual Event Days 
Cash [413] Equity [61] 
Day EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
-40 -0.040 0.773 0.206 -1.093 
-39 -0.043 -0.452 0.179 0.486 
-38 -0.108 0.053 0.196 -0.313 
-37 0.090 -0.180 0.239 0.507 
-36 0.078 0.746 0.153 0.032 
-35 0.059 -1.387 -0.073 -0.013 
-34 -0.049 1.054 0.014 0.548 
-33 0.031 0.923 0.199 -1.092 
-32 -0.040 0.244 0.135 -0.270 
-31 -0.038 0.144 -0.469 0.184 
-30 0.005 1.453 -0.130 -0.591 
-29 0.027 -0.800 0.329c 1.366 
-28 -0.106 -1.474 -0.050 0.018 
-27 -0.068 -1.938a 0.190 0.390b 
-26 0.087 0.776 0.253 -0.768 
-25 -0.020 0.100 0.096 1.006 
-24 -0.129 -0.881 -0.097 0.532 
-23 0.022 -0.051 0.027 -0.386 
-22 0.112 1.154 0.137 -0.113 
-21 0.165c 0.134 0.045 -1.015 
-20 -0.080 -0.820 0.070 -0.160 
-19 0.074 0.035 0.377 0.117 
-18 -0.067 -0.322 0.157 0.752 
-17 0.082 -0.686 0.086 1.228 
-16 0.010 0.656 0.456c 0.627b 
-15 0.177b 1.093 -0.135 -0.075 
-14 0.105 1.265 0.151 -0.467 
-13 -0.152 -0.428 0.325 1.011 
-12 -0.100 0.128 -0.413 0.412b 
-11 -0.032 -0.250 0.033 -0.432 
-10 -0.081 0.242 0.641c -3.232 
-9 0.007 0.931 0.408 -0.059 
-8 -0.010 0.520 0.972c -1.706 
-7 -0.041 -0.204 -0.303 0.002 
-6 0.011 -0.392 0.133 -0.855 
-5 0.011 0.029 0.051 -1.567 










































Table 3.4 - Continued 
Panel A: Continued 
-3 0.047 1.069 0.702c -0.555 0.2726 0.270 
-2 -0.037 -0.154 -0.351 0.260 0.227b 0.508b 
-1 0.103 0.199 0.061 0.987 0.295b 1.004b 
0 0.630a 1.228 1.746b 1.570 0.844a 0.534 
+1 0.199c -0.259 0.185 0.142 0.443a 0.055 
+2 0.090 0.197 0.557 -0.025 0.285b 0.673c 
+3 0.066 0.232 -0.178 -0.431 -0.002 0.401 c 
+4 0.037 -1.061 0.172 -0.221 -0.091 0.267 
+5 0.016 -0.880 -0.044 0.165 -0.322a -0.412 
+6 0.144c 0.338 -0.162 2.367 -1.208 -5.174 
+7 0.012 0.024 -0.322 0.246 0.061 0.052 
+8 0.023 0.053 -0.162 -0.050 -0.120 -0.053 
+9 -0.117 -0.741 -0.058 0.210 -0.225b -0.511 b 
+10 -0.048 1.192 0.092 0.602 -0.079 -0.352 
+11 0.054 0.062 0.096 0.461 -0.132 -0.064 
+12 0.002 -0.608 0.230 -0.276 0.207c 0.034 
+13 0.039 0.066 0.212 0.894c -0.042 0.286c 
+14 -0.094 -1.684c 0.137 -0.441 0.033 0.286 
+15 -0.058 -0.478 -0.146 -0.072 -0.072 -0.265 
+16 -0.018 -0.163 0.240c 0.170 0.005 0.157 
+17 0.016 -1.108 -0.502 1.006 -0.008 0.254 
+18 0.039 0.189 0.009 0.187 -0.322 -0.005 
+19 -0.128c -0.523 -1.273c 0.007 -0.287b -0.409 
+20 0.044 -0.566 0.019 -0.439 0.139 -0.042 
Panel B: BHAR over Multi-Day Holding Periods 
Cash [413] Equity [61] Mixed [359] 
Window EW% EW£ EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
OLS Estimates OLS Estimates OLS Estimates 
(-1,+1) 0.931 a 1.816 1.9576 1.782 1.583a 1.668c 
(-5,+5) 0.962a -0.634 2.311 b 0.337 2.053a 2.720b 
(-10,+ 10) 0.484 1.221 3.440b 0.566 0.227 1.823 
(-20,+20) -0.687 -6.775 2.548 13.409b -0.243 0.890 
(-40,+20) -0.707 -7.386 3.575 11.894c -0.480 0.579 
(-20,-1) -0.457 0.151 3.112c 0.507 1.156a 0.785 
( -40,-1) -0.420 1.231 3.894c 4.864 0.611 0.658 
(+1,+20) -0.253 -6.738c -1.061 3.039 -1.799 -0.611 
MAD Estimates MAD Estimates MAD Estimates 
(-1,+1) 0.702a 1.865a 1.421 a 0.807c 1.177a 1.081 a 
(-5,+5) 0.744b 0.344 1.752c 0.446 1. 741 a 1.527a 
(-10,+10) 0.145 -0.672 2.550b 0.872 1.670a 1.020 
(-20,+20) -0.703 -3.75lb 1.949 8.364b 1.011 0.008 
(-40,+20) -0.912 -4.534b 2.148 10.467a 0.674 -1.422 
( -20,-1) -0.418 -1.632 2.637b 0.881 0.729b 1.116c 
( -40,-1) -0.445 -0.739 3.857b 1.621 0.353 -0.192 
(+1,+20) -0.420 -1.653 -0.439 0.372 -0.633 -1.063c 
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B. Bidders Acquiring Divested Subsidiaries 
On the date of and days immediately surrounding the bid announcement, as shown 
m Panel A of Table 3.5, bidders of divested subsidiaries earn significantly positive 
percentage gains when the offer is financed entirely with cash and with a mix of cash and 
equity. In an equity offer, the gains are insignificantly different from zero on day 0, but 
significantly negative on days +3 and +486. In sterling terms, there is no reliable evidence 
of abnormal gains to either cash or mixed bidders. The equity bidders experience 
significantly negative sterling gains on days + 2 and +4. 
When bidder gains are measured over a multi-day window, as reported in Panel B, 
an abnormal return pattern similar to that in Panel A is observed for the 3- and 11-day 
windows. That is, the market reacts negatively only to the equity bidders. Both the OLS 
and MAD estimators yield similar results. When looking across the longer windows, Panel 
B shows no significant gains for the mixed bidders. On the other hand, the cash bidders 
experience an abnormal return pattern similar to that observed for the entire sample of 
subsidiary bidders in Panel B of Table 3.3. The cash bidders earn a significantly negative 
price run-up in both of the pre-event windows. The magnitude of this negative run-up 
(between -1.32% and -1.71 %) also appears large enough to offset the gains observed in the 
3- and 11-day windows (between 0.67% and 1.17% ). The equity bidders earn significant 
sterling losses in the ( -10, + 1 0) and entire-event windows. 
Given the evidence in Table 3.5, the market reacts positively to the announcement 
of bids for divested subsidiaries only when a mix of cash and bidder equity is used as the 
means of payment. As their negative price run-up offsets their gains realised immediately 
86 It should be noted that there are only 14 equity and 31 mixed offers for divested subsidiaries. The results 
for these subsidiary bidders should therefore be interpreted with caution. 
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around the announcement date, subsidiary bidders in a cash offer at best breakeven during 
the announcement period. With small sample size in mind, the market reacts negatively to 
equity offers for divested subsidiaries. When the sample bidders are divided into repeating 
and non-repeating bidders, qualitatively similar results are observed87• These findings 
suggest that takeovers of divested subsidiaries are in all probability different from 
takeovers of private targets. These findings are also in contrast with the recent U.S. studies 
by Fuller et al. (2002), Kohers and Ang (2000) and Moeller et al. (2004), which all 
conclude that bidders of divested subsidiaries earn significantly positive announcement-
period gains regardless of the medium of exchange. 
The results in Table 3.5 that subsidiary bidders in a cash offer at best breakeven 
during the announcement period serves as further evidence indicating that in the U.K. the 
takeover market for unlisted targets is no less competitive, if not more competitive, than 
that for listed targets. Accordingly, this evidence does not support the liquidity discount 
explanation for positive gains to bidders acquiring unlisted targets proposed by Fuller et al. 
(2002). Because bids for divested subsidiaries are privately negotiated and transacted, the 
level of informational asymmetry in these deals is likely to be low. From this standpoint, 
the positive gains observed for subsidiary bidders in a mixed offer allude to Hertzel and 
Smith's (1993) positive information effect. On the other hand, the negative gains to the 
equity bidders seem to suggest that pure equity financing in takeovers of divested 
subsidiaries resembles public equity issues rather than private equity placements. Since 
there are only 14 equity offers for divested subsidiaries in the sample, the result for the 
offers is difficult to read into and may be sample-specific. 
87 The sub-sample results are provided in Appendix I. It is noted again that because the sample period in this 
thesis covers only four years, bidders that appear in the sample only once may in fact be regular or frequent 
bidders. For the sub-sample of non-repeating subsidiary bidders, the numbers of observations are 77, 3, and 
8 for cash, equity and mixed offers, respectively. For this sub-sample, results are therefore available only for 
the cash and mixed offers. 
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Table 3.5 
Announcement-Period Abnormal Return to Bidders of Divested Subsidiaries 
by Payment Method 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 -
December 1998. All bidders are U.K listed companies. The sample bidders of divested subsidiaries 
are divided into cash, equity and mixed bidders. Panels A and B report abnormal return on event day 
t and buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) over a r -day event window, respectively, to a bidder 
portfolio. Abnormal return in both ~anels is calculated as equally weighted (EW) average 
percentage and sterling (£mil) return. •, and c denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
resEectivel~. In brackets is samEie size. For details of abnormal return estimation, see Table 3.2. 
Panel A: Abnormal Return on Individual Event Days 
Cash [367] Eguity [14] Mixed [31] 
Day EW% EW£ EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
-40 0.029 -2.602 -1.226c -0.577 0.896 0.011 
-39 0.019 -2.462 -0.246 -0.023 -0.238 -2.414 
-38 -0.047 -2.266 0.084 0.139 -0.294 -0.701 
-37 0.063 5.308 2.348 0.232 0.296 0.249 
-36 0.160 0.371 -0.769 -0.350 -0.246 -0.088 
-35 -0.013 -10.670 -1.105 -0.153c -0.311 -0.285c 
-34 0.123 2.812 -0.538c -0.360c -0.512b -0.580c 
-33 0.007 -1.934 -0.596c -0.250 0.249 -0.622 
-32 -0.088 3.506 -0.173 -2.643 0.471 1.618 
-31 0.143c 0.111 -0.246 0.451 1.317 0.323 
-30 0.079 2.290 0.092 0.085 -0.194 -1.338b 
-29 -0.042 -0.838 0.262 -0.396 -0.390 -0.206 
-28 -0.021 -2.231 0.755 0.308 0.185 0.407 
-27 -0.117 -1.540 -0.047 0.446 0.484 0.027 
-26 0.043 -0.156 0.347 0.189 0.342 -0.234 
-25 -0.001 -5.495c 0.369 0.444 0.029 -0.265 
-24 0.008 -1.750 -0.256 -0.177 -0.252 -0.883 
-23 -0.099 0.043 -0.066 -0.223 0.201 -0.086 
-22 -0.013 3.685 -0.912c 0.174 0.382c 0.336 
-21 0.086 -0.355 0.057 -0.039 -0.034 0.417 
-20 -0.079 -5.298 -0.028 0.080 -0.285 -0.403c 
-19 -0.059 -1.955 0.144 -1.664 -0.077 -0.316 
-18 0.084 1.671 -0.525 -0.424 0.163 0.080 
-17 0.064 5.382a 0.057 0.156 0.176 0.796 
-16 -0.019 0.037 0.376 0.218 -0.204 -0.304 
-15 -0.111 -1.160 -0.569 0.033 -0.213 0.021 
-14 -0.172b -1.561 -0.646 -0.204 0.185 -0.042 
-13 -0.109 1.435 0.171 -0.247 -0.624 0.302 
-12 -0.092 0.699 -0.078 -0.041 -0.227 0.071 
-11 0.026 -6.785 -0.720b -0.378 0.611 1.771 
-10 -0.084 0.845 -0.614 -0.258c -0.116 -0.754b 
-9 -0.112 1.897 -1.098b -0.202 -0.185 -0.126 
-8 -0.081 -0.464 -0.101 -0.027 -0.105 -0.426c 
-7 0.140 3.138 0.057 0.101 -0.077 -0.166 
-6 -0.148 -3.177 -0.216 -0.066 0.079 0.179 
-5 -0.109 -8.003 -0.448 -0.122 -0.235 -0.292 
-4 -0.179b -0.628 0.913 0.244 -0.475 -0.072 
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Table 3.5- Continued 
Panel A: Continued 
-3 -0.144 -1.269 0.381 -0.118 -0.309 0.237 
-2 0.112 6.250 -0.344 0.073 0.607 0.305 
-1 0.193c -1.747 0.345 -0.062 1.422a -5.132c 
0 0.596a 4.895 1.282 0.369 1.130c 0.049 
+1 0.399a -1.466 2.324 0.518 0.361 4.378b 
+2 0.259b 3.288 -0.595 -0.394b 0.044 0.011 
+3 0.089 -0.875 -0.946c -0.214 -0.106 0.313 
+4 0.091 -3.861 -1.317a -0.363b 1.462c 5.150c 
+5 -0.281 b -4.784c -0.630 -0.386 -0.122 1.293b 
+6 0.076 -5.570c -0.342 -0.389 0.148 0.738 
+7 -0.050 1.504 0.235 -0.043 -0.123 -0.601c 
+8 -0.068 -2.040 0.067 0.062 0.167 0.168 
+9 -0.066 -2.894 -0.075c -0.111 0.192 -0.165 
+10 -0.085 -0.765 0.228 0.104 -0.221 -0.251 
+ 11 -0.040 0.244 -0.524 -1.974 -0.134 -0.072 
+12 -0.008 0.707 0.431 0.414c 0.775 -0.030 
+13 -0.048 -0.932 0.612 2.588 -0.346 0.018 
+14 0.127 -0.872 0.558 0.303 -0.537 0.260 
+15 0.041 -1.397 -0.285 -0.506 0.235 0.494 
+16 0.170b 2.886 0.246 -0.122 -0.117 0.020 
+17 -0.133 -0.466 -0.158 -0.625 -0.622c -0.241 
+18 0.140 1.678 0.043 -2.037 -0.136 0.183 
+19 0.131 -1.658 -3.070 -1.729 0.605b -0.615 
+20 0.073 -0.203 -0.173 0.176 -0.075 -6.643 
Panel B: BHAR over Multi-Day Holding Periods 
Cash [367] Equity [14] Mixed [31] 
Window EW% EW£ EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
OLS Estimates OLS Estimates OLS Estimates 
(-1,+1) 1.167a 2.199 3.120 1.062 3.309a 10.322a 
(-5,+5) 0.777c -4.283 -7.090a -0.129 4.314b 0.313 
(-10,+ 10) -0.234 -7.065 -9.287 -4.990b 3.180 -0.701 
(-20,+20) -0.928 9.889 -7.756 -4.071 0.567 -1.340 
(-40,+20) -1.121 5.969 -17.377c -10.909b 1.757 -1.550 
( -20,-1) -1.447a -9.169 -3.087 -0.899 0.034 0.222 
( -40,-1) -1.656b -11.405 -7.008c -3.083 1.159 -0.820 
(+1,+20) 0.422 0.171 -3.195 -0.550 0.120 -0.660 
MAD Estimates MAD Estimates MAD Estimates 
(-1,+1) 0.666a 0.328 1.643 0.380 2.856a 7.593a 
(-5,+5) 0.660b -1.253 -7.704c 0.746 4.762b 1.067 
(-10,+10) -0.065 -3.303 -4.200 -3.586c 2.337 0.154 
(-20,+20) -1.074c 2.299 -3.668 -2.058 0.003 -0.085 
(-40,+20) -1.342c 0.671 -13.257 -8.400b -0.573 -1.036 
( -20,-1) -1.320a -4.334 -1.897 -0.756 0.111 0.336 
( -40,-1) -1.714a -10.814a -6.858 -1.905 -0.467 -0.119 
(+ 1,+20) 0.418 2.729 -0.065 0.364 -0.080 -0.651 
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C. Bidders Acquiring Publicly Held Targets 
For the comparison sample of bidders of public targets, as reported in Panel A of 
Table 3.6, there appears to be no significant market reaction to the cash bidders on the 
announcement date and the immediately surrounding days. However, the cash bidders 
receive significantly negative market reaction on days -28 and -30 in both percentage and 
sterling terms. When bids are financed with a mix of cash and bidder equity, the market 
reaction to the bidders is significantly negative on the announcement date in both 
percentage and sterling terms. At variance with the cash and mixed offers, the market 
reaction to the equity bidders on the announcement date is positive, and significantly 
positive in sterling terms. 
The multi-day results in Panel B confirm the pattern observed in Panel A, and the 
OLS and MAD estimators provide generally consistent results88 . Over the 41- and 61-day 
periods surrounding the event, the cash bidders experience significant percentage losses. 
These losses appear to be caused by negative price run-ups starting as earlier as one month 
before the announcement date. The mixed bidders experience significantly negative gains 
in the 3-day window, in both percentage and sterling terms. With one trivial exception, 
there is virtually no trace of losses to the equity bidders whether significant or 
insignificant. In fact, the equity bidders earn significantly positive sterling gains during the 
21-day period surrounding the event. 
The evidence in Table 3.6 shows that the effects of payment methods in public-firm 
takeovers differ from those in private-firm takeovers. The losses to the cash bidders of 
public targets in Table 3.6 do not suggest that there are exit costs savings to be garnered by 
88 The sub-samples ofrepeating and non-repeating bidders of public targets yield qualitatively similar results. 
However, the sub-sampling leads to considerably small sample size for each sub-sample. The sub-sample 
results, as reported in Appendix I, should therefore be interpreted with caution. 
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public-firm bidders. Despite the apparently small positive gains to the equity bidders, it 
cannot be inferred that equity financing has a positive effect on gains to public-firm 
bidders in the same fashion as bidders of private targets. This is because the market 
reaction to the mixed bidders in Table 3.6 is significantly negative. Moreover, an equity 
offer for a public target resembles a public equity issue as opposed to a private equity 
placement. Thus, it is unlikely that Hertzel and Smith's (1993) positive information effect 
is a plausible explanation for the results for the equity bidders in Table 3.6. 
The abnormal return pattern for the cash and equity bidders in Table 3.6 also 
markedly differs from the extant empirical evidence both in the U.S. and U.K. that cash 
financing leads to negligible announcement-period gains to bidders of public targets 
whereas equity bidders earn significant losses (for a review see, Bruner, 2002; also for U.S. 
Y ook, 2003; for U.K. Draper and Paudyal, 1999; Franks et a/., 1988). Since the level of 
excess cash in a firm is observable, the negative gains to the cash bidders in Table 3.6 may 
plausibly be the symptom of Jensen's (1986) Free Cash Flow (FCF) problem89. Instead of 
distributing the excess cash back to their shareholders, the bidder managers reinvest the 
cash in acquiring other firms. In the light of the FCF problem, the market may perceive 
the cash offers in Table 3.6 as an attempt by the bidder managers to entrench themselves as 
suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1989). This explanation is in line with the U.S. study 
by Lang et al. (1991). Lang et al. (1991) document a significantly negative relationship 
between announcement-period abnormal return to bidders in a tender offer and the level of 
the bidders' excess cash90. 
89 Using a sample of public-firm takeovers in the U.S., Harford (1999) finds a significantly negative 
relationship between announcement-period bidder gains and the level of the bidder's excess cash, and that 
this relationship holds in either cash or equity offers. 
90 The sample tender offers in Lang et al. (1991) are mostly (90%) cash offers. It should be noted, however, 
that the effect of excess cash on bidder abnormal return is outside the scope of this thesis and thus not tested 
in this chapter. Jensen's ( 1986) FCF problem is suggested only as a plausible explanation. 
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Apparently, the results for the equity bidders in Table 3.6 contradicts Myers and 
Majlufs (1984) asymmetric information model, which predicts a drop in share price for 
equity bidders of public targets91 . Cooney and Kalay (1993) extend Myers and Majlufs 
(1984) model by allowing firms to face both positive- and negative-NPV projects92 . 
Cooney and Kalay (1993) then show that, when this is the case, the firm's rejection of a 
project and its decision not to raise funds via a public equity issue do not necessarily imply 
that the managers perceive the firm's equity as being currently undervalued. As a 
consequence, the market can react positively to a public equity issue if it anticipates a new 
positive-NPV project to be exploited by the firm. In the Cooney and Kalay (1993) 
framework, it is therefore plausible that the market is convinced that the equity offers in 
Table 3.6 are positive-NPV projects the bidders have chosen over the negative-NPV 
projects. The weakness of the evidence of positive gains to the equity bidders may well be 
attributable to the competitiveness of the takeover market in the U.K. 
The finding that the market reacts negatively to the mixed bidders in Table 3.6 is 
generally consistent with the extant evidence (e.g., for U.S. Moeller et al., 2004; for U.K. 
Draper and Paudyal, 1999). Since a mixed offer consists of cash as well as bidder equity, 
the negative market reaction to public-firm bidders in a mixed offer may generally be 
explained by Myers and Majlufs (1984) asymmetric information hypothesis. In the U.K., 
however, the negative market reaction to mixed bidders may well be attributable more to 
the bid mechanism. Mixed offers for public targets in the U.K. mostly allow the target 
shareholders to choose the form of payment or the combination they prefer (see Draper and 
91 The Myers and Majluf (1984) model argues that a public equity issue signals to the market that the firm's 
equity is currently overvalued. 
92 In their model, Myers and Majluf (1984) assume that all projects facing the firm are positive-NPV projects. 
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Paudyal, 1999; Franks et al., 1988)93 . The negative gains to the mixed bidders in Table 3.6 
therefore support the possibility pointed out by Draper and Paudyal (1999) that managers 
of these bidders are desperate to acquire the targets. 
93 Mixed offers for a public target that give the target shareholders the option to choose the form(s) of 
payment are rare in the U.S. (Franks et al., 1988). 
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Table 3.6 
Announcement-Period Abnormal Return to Bidders of Public Targets 
by Payment Method 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995- December 
1998. All bidders are U.K listed companies. The sample bidders of public targets are divided into 
cash, equity and mixed bidders. Panels A and B report abnormal return on event day t and buy-and-
hold abnormal return (BHAR) over a • -day event window, respectively, to a bidder portfolio. 
Abnormal return in both panels is calculated as equally weighted (EW) average percentage and 
sterling (£mil) return. •, b and c denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. In 
brackets is sam~le size. For details of abnormal return estimation, see Table 3.2. 
Panel A: Abnormal Return on Individual Event Days 
Cash [40] Equity [36] Mixed [74] 
EW% EW£ EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
-40 -0.046 -8.506 -0.183 3.257 0.011 -0.572 
-39 -0.613b -4.939 -0.618c -6.418 -0.032 2.954 
-38 -0.146 -7.093 0.474 4.256 0.013 -3.085 
-37 -0.138 1.818 0.273 16.212 0.215 0.780 
-36 -0.225 -3.300 0.188 4.678 0.140 5.564c 
-35 -0.397 -1.900 -0.349a -2.377 0.072 0.426 
-34 -0.626 -9.258 -0.259 -2.108 0.099 2.827 
-33 0.065 2.758 0.205 -1.212 0.264 -0.100 
-32 0.178 25.310 -0.106 -4.438 0.090 4.417 
-31 -0.213 -12.747 0.114 -0.177 0.197 0.551 
-30 -0.490a -7.703b 0.133 4.086 -0.192 -0.005 
-29 0.033 15.628 -0.290 -2.109 -0.063 -1.509 
-28 -0.489b -12.873b 0.527 2.805 -0.029 -0.332 
-27 0.278 -8.989 0.071 3.782 0.025 0.699 
-26 -0.268 -13.871 0.342c 3.088 0.450b -0.258 
-25 1.001 14.666 0.480c 3.313 0.149 -5.347a 
-24 -0.445 -3.517 0.272 -4.634 0.004 -7.199c 
-23 -0.005 1.942 -0.278 4.210 -0.085 2.964 
-22 0.033 -4.104 0.060 6.148c -0.046 -1.386 
-21 0.248 -1.726 0.128 -2.665 -0.142 -3.198 
-20 -0.242 -5.511 -0.115 1.418 -0.236 -2.791 
-19 0.030 2.755 -0.009 2.141 0.003 -1.691 
-18 -0.135 -9.104 -0.487b -2.925 0.000 -5.810 
-17 0.026 -2.371 -0.263 -6.366 0.018 -2.301 
-16 0.299 0.596 0.402 6.446 -0.097 -2.971 
-15 -0.462a -11.480 0.594 1.055 -0.184 -0.312 
-14 0.009 7.477 0.080 5.948c 0.198 2.146 
-13 -0.131 -7.978 0.529c 0.507 0.064 -0.014 
-12 -0.225 0.869 -0.717 -7.195 -0.194c -8.435b 
-11 -0.043 -3.990 -0.020 -5.309b -0.132 -4.867c 
-10 -0.598c -0.960 -0.109 -5.841 -0.260 -2.272 
-9 -0.174 0.511 0.214 -4.662b -0.239c 1.569 
-8 -0.227 3.177 -0.007 -2.168 0.003 -5.509 
-7 -0.981b -2.888 0.139 -1.135 0.047 3.014 
-6 0.147 -6.592 0.176 -4.679 -0.004 6.881 
-5 -0.129 -1.766 0.323 4.162 0.222c 2.058 
-4 -0.296 -11.601 0.357 0.342 0.066 -0.796 
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Table 3.6 - Continued 
Panel A: Continued 
-3 0.203 -2.152 -0.203 3.267 0.2625 4.409 
-2 -0.168 -2.776 0.078 9.908 0.039 4.470 
-1 0.151 -10.715 0.328 4.316 -0.256b -3.119 
0 0.077 -6.566 0.981 72.267b -1.954a -25.968a 
+1 0.352 0.556 0.178 -3.865 -0.310 -2.396 
+2 0.078 1.898 -0.670b -5.322 0.114 -0.700 
+3 -0.003 4.875 -0.387 -9.893 0.310c 1.855 
+4 0.198 7.882 0.473b 8.675 0.307 1.852 
+5 0.023 -1 0.443b -0.072 10.754 -0.056 -4.358b 
+6 0.160 6.222 -0.600 1.415 0.197c -0.299 
+7 0.198 -1.967 0.435 4.453 -0.091 3.538 
+8 -0.068 -4.629 -0.818 3.212 0.180 6.945 
+9 0.177 2.432 -0.038 18.272 0.047 3.534 
+10 0.051 7.245 0.088 -2.372 -0.111 -5.994 
+ 11 -0.294 -9.504 -0.098 -1.732 -0.058 -9.529 
+12 -0.089 2.954 -0.240 -7.761 -0.026 0.363 
+13 -0.226 -8.110 0.178 -2.868 0.122 1.151 
+14 0.038 2.603 0.233 6.033b 0.016 -2.407 
+15 0.135 14.630 0.920b 8.859 0.193c 2.079 
+16 -0.436b -12.266c 0.134 6.759 0.176 3.745c 
+17 -0.175 -7.979 0.183 -2.602 0.143 -0.835 
+18 -0.311 -9.694 0.127 -1.389 0.107 1.679 
+19 -0.189 -5.098 -0.306 4.882 0.210 0.848 
+20 0.057 10.424b -0.269 -2.697 0.188b -2.921b 
Panel B: BHAR over Multi-Day Holding Periods 
Cash [40] Equity [36] Mixed [74] 
Window EW% EW£ EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
OLS Estimates OLS Estimates OLS Estimates 
(-1,+1) 0.592 -23.800 1.390 65.116c -2.494a -38.193a 
(-5,+5) 0.744 18.453 0.839 91.120c -1.236 -56.802b 
(-10,+10) -0.915 -0.872 1.111 117.211b -1.521 -16.348 
(-20,+20) -3.917b -24.720 2.120 103.172c -1.484 -38.865 
(-40,+20) -6.509a -28.968 1.657 124.085c -1.651 5.146 
(-20,-1) -3.258b -64.849 1.267 24.666 -0.874 -15.914 
(-40,-1) -5.692a -53.682b 1.470 35.899 -0.680 13.221 
(+1,+20) -0.654 5.963 0.249 26.047 1.779b -2.411 
MAD Estimates MAD Estimates MAD Estimates 
(-1,+1) 0.371 -7.416 0.892 27.323 -2.233a -19.482a 
(-5,+5) 1.044 4.197 0.585 34.357 -1.413c -20.698 
(-10,+ 10) -1.230 -1.349 1.792 47.576c -1.3 73 -8.787 
(-20,+20) -3.276c -10.805 2.680 36.431 -1.816 -21.465c 
(-40,+20) -6.154a -18.762 1.279 40.986 -2.331 -5.333 
(-20,-1) -3.363a -33.452 1.038 7.656 -0.923 -14.254b 
( -40,-1) -5.932a -41.030b 1.789 14.727 -1.227 -1.528 
(+ 1,+20) -0.767 -0.019 -0.314 4.795 1.210 0.634 
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3.6) Conclusions 
In this chapter, the implications of the Exit Costs and Clientele Effect hypotheses 
are investigated. Under the Exit Costs hypothesis, a takeover by a listed bidder is a cost-
effective alternative for a privately held company facing the decision to go public. Since 
the savings on the exit costs arising from a private firm's decision to opt for the takeover 
route are observable at the bid negotiation, the highest possible acquisition price each rival 
bidder is willing to pay is the amount that includes the discount due to the savings. In 
other words, a fraction of the exit costs savings available to a private target is garnered by 
the bidder. Accordingly, the Exit Costs hypothesis implies that the market always reacts 
positively to bids for a private target. Because the savings are not available when the 
target is a publicly listed firm, on the other hand, the hypothesis implies that the market 
reaction to bidders acquiring a public target is at best non-negative. 
In the framework of the Exit Costs hypothesis, the Clientele Effect hypothesis 
argues that a particular payment method used in takeovers of private targets simply reflects 
the consumption preference or objective of the target owner(s). In equilibrium, the notion 
of rational pricing then suggests that the incremental effect of a particular payment method, 
if any, will be fully reflected in the target price so that an otherwise identical target would 
be identically priced. Consequently, the announcement of payment methods in takeovers 
of private targets conveys no incremental valuable information about the bidder that is 
observable at the bid announcement. The Clientele Effect hypothesis hence implies that 
the market reaction to bidders of private targets is positive and identical irrespective of the 
means of payment. 
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To investigate the implications of the Exit Costs and Clientele Effect hypotheses, 
announcement-period abnormal return to bidders acquiring private targets are examined in 
relation to bidders acquiring public targets and bidders acquiring divested subsidiaries. 
The use of a comparison sample of bidders of divested subsidiaries enables a more direct 
test of the implications of these hypotheses in the light of the competing hypotheses 
offered in the existing literature. Though unlisted like private targets, subsidiaries have 
dispersed ownership through their listed parent. Being affiliated to a listed entity also 
means that subsidiaries enjoy a much cheaper going-public decision than private targets. 
Thus, the exit costs savings are much smaller for subsidiaries than for private targets. 
The empirical results documented in this chapter support the Exit Costs hypothesis. 
Bidders of private targets earn significantly positive announcement-period gains. 
Although bidders acquiring divested subsidiaries earn positive gains in the windows 
immediately surrounding the announcement date, they experience negative price run-ups 
that are large enough to offset the gains. Bidders acquiring public targets receive 
significantly negative market reaction. Since subsidiaries are effectively owned by 
atomistic shareholders via their listed parent, the evidence that the market reacts positively 
to subsidiary bidders on the announcement date and in the windows immediately 
surrounding the bid announcement does not support Hansen and Lott's (1996) 
diversification effect. As subsidiaries are unlisted like private targets, the evidence that 
bidders of divested subsidiaries experience negative price run-ups that are large enough to 
offset their gains observed immediately around the announcement date is unsupportive of 
the liquidity discount explanation advocated by Fuller et al. (2002). Since there are no exit 
costs savings when the target is a listed firm, the negative gains to public-firm bidders 
plausibly reflect a combination of several quantities such as the transaction costs, 
120 
opportunity costs of bidder-side management time and efforts, and the market's perception 
that the bidders are running out of internal investment opportunities. 
For each target status, the sample takeovers are classified into cash, equity and 
mixed offers. The results show that although private-firm bidders earn positive gains 
regardless of the payment methods, the bidder gains are larger when equity financing is 
used, either in part or in full. The results are therefore only partially supportive of the 
Clientele Effect hypothesis. When viewed together with the deal characteristics, the 
observed abnormal return pattern suggests that Chang's (1998) increased monitoring 
argument is an unlikely explanation for the documented positive effect of equity financing 
in private-firm takeovers. This is not surprising since an increase in blockownership in 
private-firm bidders using equity financing could also serve to entrench management ex 
ante. On the other hand, it is known to the market at the bid announcement that the target 
owners have incentives to carefully assess the bidder's prospects and value prior to 
accepting the bidder's equity as the medium of exchange. In this view, the positive 
information effect pointed out by Hertzel and Smith (1993) in the context of private equity 
placements provides a plausible explanation for the positive impact of equity financing in 
private-firm takeovers observed in this chapter. 
For the comparison sample of bidders of divested subsidiaries, the evidence of the 
effects of payment methods is inconclusive. Subsidiary bidders in a cash offer at best 
breakeven during the announcement period - the observation similar to the results for the 
entire sample of subsidiary takeovers. When equity financing forms part of the offer, the 
results show that the market reacts negatively to the equity offers while positively to the 
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mixed offers. Unfortunately, the notably small sample size for the equity offers prevents 
meaningful interpretations of these results. 
The results for the sample bidders of public targets show that the effects of payment 
methods differ between public-firm takeovers and private-firm takeovers. The results for 
these comparison bidders are also interesting from the standpoint of the existing literature. 
In stark contrast with the evidence reported by many existing U.S. and U.K. studies, the 
sample equity bidders of public targets appear to earn some small announcement-period 
gains. This finding cannot be explained by Myers and Majlufs (1984) asymmetric 
information hypothesis. However, the finding can be explained by Cooney and Kalay's 
(1993) model, which posits that when firms face positive- as well as negative-NPV 
projects, the market can react positively to a public equity issue by the firm if it anticipates 
a new positive-NPV project. 
CHAPTER4 
ANALYSIS OF LONG-TERM POST -ACQUISITION 
BIDDER ABNORMAL RETURN 
4.1) Introduction 
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Examination of announcement-period abnormal return has been the main focus of 
the earlier takeover studies. Tests of long-term bidder abnormal return have become the 
emphasis of the more recent studies. Such a lack of academic interest in long-term 
abnormal return seen in the earlier studies is primarily due to the strong belief in market 
efficiency which dictated what the results ought to be (Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000)94. 
However, the expectation of no systematic changes in the bidder's share price during the 
post-acquisition period implicitly assumes that the bid announcement conveys complete 
information about the true underlying motives, qualities of the parties involved and hence 
profitability of the transaction even though a takeover is fundamentally a long-term 
investment project. 
Because a corporate takeover is a long-term investment project, its effects on the 
wealth of the investors (i.e., bidder shareholders) is dependent not only on the 
announcement of the agreed terms and conditions of the transaction, but also on the extent 
to which the advertised profitability of the transaction actually materialises ex post. Since 
the value creation (or usually destruction) brought about by a takeover is mostly 
determined during the post-acquisition phase, which is by and large the most difficult stage 
of the project (see Copeland et a!., 1996, p. 452 - 456), considerable uncertainty remains 
for every market participant, including the managers themselves, until long after the deal 
completion. From the practitioners' standpoint, as Limmack (2003, p. 349) notes, "the 
94 To illustrate: Jensen and Ruback (1983, p. 20) remark that negative post-acquisition abnormal returns are 
unsettling because "they are inconsistent with market efficiency and suggest that changes in stock prices 
overestimate the future efficiency gains from mergers". 
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reason that many acquisitions under-performed is that managers fail to adhere to pre-
determined plans". For these reasons, examination of long-term bidder abnormal return 
forms vital part of the ultimate wealth effect test for corporate takeovers even when market 
efficiency is taken as given. 
The existing academic research is by and large based on the takeover experience of 
publicly held targets. One of the most, if not the most, celebrated views regarding the 
wealth effects on bidder shareholders holds that corporate takeovers are the manifestation 
of managerialism or agency conflicts in the bidder (e.g., Mueller, 1969; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1988). In this view, takeovers are the means by which the bidder managers pursue 
their empire-building interests. Moreover, recent evidence suggests that bidder managers 
receive lucrative bonuses for making acquisitions and these bonuses are positively related 
to the size and complexity of the deals (see Grinstein and Hribar, 2004). 
Because private targets are closely held and considerably smaller than public 
targets, however, acquisition of the former is unlikely to serve personal interests of the 
bidder managers. In the context of managerialism, the Wealth Maximisation hypothesis 
proposed in Chapter 2 posits that, unlike public-firm bidders, bidders of privately held 
targets maximise the realisation of expected synergies even when the acquisitions yield 
little or no personal utility for the bidder managers. In the absence, or for a given level, of 
the bidder-side agency conflicts, the Ease of Integration hypothesis posits that the 
characteristics of private targets and the nature of the bidding process involved make it 
much easier to integrate private targets into the bidder's corporate structure than public 
targets. While private targets are closely held and considerably small, public targets are 
large firms with dispersed ownership. Therefore, these hypotheses both imply that the 
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wealth effects on bidder shareholders differ between takeovers of private targets and 
takeovers of public targets. 
Thus far, there appear to be only a few studies that include examination of long-
term abnormal return to bidder shareholders in private-firm takeovers (see Ang and 
Kohers, 2001; Kohers and Ang, 2000; Moeller et al., 2004). Yet, the long-term analysis in 
these studies is only a supplement to the short-term analysis and receives relatively little 
attention95 . Coupled with the theoretical indication of the differing wealth effects of 
private-firm takeovers, providing a thorough empirical examination of post-acquisition 
abnormal return to private-firm bidders is the objective of this chapter. This chapter also 
provides empirical evidence important to the existing body of the U.K. takeover studies as 
there appears to be no study that examines the long-term wealth effects of private-firm 
takeovers in the U.K. In order to gain further insights into the wealth effects of private-
firm takeovers, this chapter also empirically investigates the largely unexplored factors 
influencing the decision to acquire a private target. 
In a long-term return study that examines several sub-samples, it is important to 
control for the bias caused by the same event firm appearing in two or more sub-samples 
and in overlapping event windows. To minimise the noise, this chapter employs a sub-
sampling procedure that differs from those employed in the previous studies that also 
examine private-firm takeovers. In this chapter, bidders acquiring more than one type of 
targets are isolated from those acquiring only one type of targets. This sub-sampling 
procedure gives much cleaner sub-samples and empirical results, and hence represents an 
95 Stegemoller (200 I) appears to be the only study in which three different methodologies are used in 
examining long-term abnormal return to bidders in takeovers of privately held targets. However, the main 
objective of Stegemoller (200 1) is to examine performance of frequent acquirers, not bidders in takeovers of 
private targets as such. 
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important improvement on the prevwus studies such as Moeller et a!. (2004) and 
Stegemoller (200 1 ). 
Because any evidence of significant long-term abnormal return following the 
takeover completion can be viewed as mispricing by the expected return model, one of the 
issues central to long-term abnormal return examination is adequacy of the adopted 
methodology. The choice of an appropriate [expected] return generating process assumed 
in a long-term event study has long been an ongoing debate and is still largely unsettled 
(see Fama, 1998; Loughran and Ritter, 2000; Lyon et a!., 1999; Mitchell and Stafford, 
2000). In an attempt to achieve robustness of the results, four alternative methodologies 
are adopted in this chapter. Moreover, this chapter also contributes to the existing event 
study literature by using a methodological procedure that reduces noises in the estimation 
of the book-to-market ratio, particularly when the U.K. data is used. 
The remainder ofthis chapter proceeds as follows: the empirical implications of the 
Wealth Maximisation and Ease of Integration hypotheses are summarised in the next 
section. Section 4.3 describes the data, sub-sampling procedure and sample characteristics. 
In Section 4.4, the adopted tests of long-term abnormal return are detailed. The abnormal 
return results are then presented and discussed in Section 4.5. In Section 4.6, the potential 
factors influencing the decision to acquire a private target are analysed. Section 4. 7 then 
concludes this chapter. 
4.2) Summary of Hypotheses and Testable Propositions 
Despite the benefits of the specialisation of decision making and risk bearing 
functions, the separation of control and ownership in an organisation gives rise to 
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shareholder-manager agency conflicts (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983a, 1983b, 1985). With 
reference to corporate takeovers, the closely held ownership of privately held companies 
makes them different from publicly held companies as takeover targets. An important 
implication of this difference is that the level of agency conflicts is likely to be trivial or 
much lower in private targets than in public targets. As a result, it is unlikely that wealth-
maximising or efficient bidders would be attracted to public targets vis-a-vis private 
targets. Wealth-maximising bidders prefer private targets as the agency conflicts in public 
targets have great potential to make the post-acquisition phase problematic96 . 
When the bidder managers' objectives are inconsistent with shareholder wealth 
maximisation, on the other hand, the agency problems in a public target do not necessarily 
deter the bidder's decision to acquire the target. For instance, the dispersed ownership 
structure of a public target allows the bidder and target managers to collude or co-operate 
in securing their employment and high levels of personal compensation. Because 
managerial perquisites increase with firm size (e.g., Jensen, 1988; 1989), non-wealth-
maximising bidder managers also have incentives to opt for a public target. As pointed out 
by Ang and Kohers (2001), empire-building managers can increase their firm size much 
more effectively by acquiring public targets than by acquiring private targets, which are 
much smaller in size. 
The differences in ownership structure and firm size between private and public 
targets lead to the Wealth Maximisation hypothesis. The hypothesis posits that private-
firm bidders are bidders that choose a target that maximises the likelihood of fully realising 
the expected synergies during the post-acquisition period even though the target yields 
96 In an attempt to preserve their employment and high level of compensation in an event of a takeover, target 
managers have incentives to entrench themselves by investing in projects which require their specific skills 
(see Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). 
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little or no personal utility for the bidder managers. Even when the corporate control 
market is fully competitive, shareholders in a wealth-maximising bidder should earn at 
least a normal rate of return (Halpern, 1983). The empirical implication of the Wealth 
Maximisation hypothesis can therefore be stated as follows: 
H3: Post-acquisition abnormal return to bidders acquiring privately held targets is 
non-negative in the long run. 
The closely held ownership and much smaller size of private targets also carry an 
important implication on the success of the post-acquisition phase even when the bidder-
side agency conflicts can be assumed away. Although an acquisition is an option rather 
than an obligation to the bidder (see Lambrecht, 2004), there exists a situation in which a 
wealth-maximising bidder may not be able to exploit the option. When faced with the 
pressure to buy external growth, it is likely that the bidder will opt for a large target rather 
than a comparable small target. This is because a large target generates a large 
improvement in growth relative to a small target. Other things constant, the bidder's 
involuntary choice is likely to become a public target vis-a-vis a private target. 
While the control-ownership separation m and dispersed ownership of public 
targets imply the likelihood of the Shleifer and Vishny (1989) management entrenchment, 
owners of a private target have incentives to prove to their prospective bidder(s) that there 
is only minimal or no agency conflict inherent in the target. This is because the target-side 
agency costs would suppress the acquisition price to be received by the target owners. The 
difference in ownership structure between public and private targets hence indicates that 
bidders acquiring public targets are likely to experience the post-acquisition phase that is 
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more difficult than one facing bidders acquiring private targets ex post. Further, the 
general wisdom in the M&A practice suggests that the smaller the target for a given bidder, 
the more manageable is the post-acquisition integration of the target (see Copeland et al., 
1996, p. 452- 455). 
When the target is publicly listed, the bid usually attracts considerable publicity 
(Ang and Kohers, 2001 ). Such a high level of publicity surrounding the bid serves as 
additional pressure on the bidder already under pressure to search for a sizeable growth 
improvement to consummate the deal even if new information about the post-acquisition 
operations has surfaced to be negative. To the extent that a failed bid incurs the costs of 
not meeting the market analysts' expectation (i.e., declines in the bidder's share price), the 
bidder is essentially obligated to complete the deal even though the deal may be a 
suboptimal investment. On the other hand, the off-market nature of private deals implies 
that private-firm bidders are much better able to treat a takeover decision as an option than 
bidders acquiring public targets are. In this view, bidders acquiring private targets are also 
much better able to acquire an optimal target with optimal timing and enjoy easier post-
acquisition target integration than public-firm bidders ex post. 
The above arguments lead to the Ease of Integration hypothesis. Due to the closely 
held ownership and small physical size of private targets as well as the off-market nature 
of private deals, the post-acquisition target integration is much easier for bidders acquiring 
private targets than for those acquiring public targets, holding constant the bidder-side 
agency conflicts. The empirical implication of this hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
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H4: Post-acquisition abnormal return to bidders of private targets is less negative 
(or more positive) than post-acquisition abnormal return to bidders of public 
targets. 
4.3) Data and Sample Characteristics 
The sample to be used in this chapter is drawn from the final sample described in 
Section 3.3.1. However, the key date to be adopted in this chapter is the completion 
month97• While Acquisitions Monthly records both the announcement and completion 
dates for takeovers of publicly held targets, it records only the announcement date for 
takeovers of private targets and divested subsidiaries. For the latter two classes of 
takeovers, only the month of completion is recorded in Acquisitions Monthly. For these 
reasons and in the interest of consistency, the abnormal return analysis in this chapter is 
based on the completion month irrespective of target status98 . Section 4.3.1 discusses the 
sub-sampling procedure necessary for the analysis of long-term bidder abnormal return. In 
section 4.3.2, the characteristics of the resulting sub-samples are described. 
4.3.1) Sub-Sampling Procedure- Target Status and Classes of Bidders 
Unlike the sub-sampling based solely on target status as adopted in Chapter 3, the 
sample bidders are classified in this chapter according to the type(s) of targets they 
acquired during the sample period. These bidder classes are: (i) bidders acquiring only 
private targets (private-firm bidders); (ii) bidders acquiring only divested subsidiaries 
97 Analysis of long-term abnormal return is based on the completion of a takeover because it is logical to 
measure the success of a long-term corporate decision once the decision is definite and effective. 
98 It is also observed that almost all of the sample takeovers completed in any given month during the sample 
period, as recorded in Acquisitions Monthly, were announced in the preceding month. As pointed out in 
Section 3.4, when acquisitions are made privately, many bidders do not announce their bids until the bids 
become effective. To the extent that the announcement of bids for private targets and divested subsidiaries 
recorded in Acquisitions Monthly signifies either the actual announcement as in the case of public-firm 
takeovers or completion of the deal, the use of the completion month helps to ensure that the event window 
for all sample takeovers commences following the deal completion. 
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(subsidiary bidders); (iii) bidders acquiring only public targets (public-firm bidders); (iv) 
bidders acquiring both private targets and divested subsidiaries (private-subsidiary 
bidders); (v) bidders acquiring both private targets and public targets (private-public 
bidders); (vi) bidders acquiring both divested subsidiaries and public targets (subsidiary-
public bidders); and (vii) bidders acquiring private targets, divested subsidiaries and public 
targets (all-targets bidders) - i.e., must have acquired at least one private target, one 
divested subsidiary and one public target. These bidder classes are therefore mutually 
exclusive. Bidders in classes (iv) to (vii) can be referred to as cross-class bidders. 
When bidders complete multiple acquisitions over some not-too-long time interval, 
the market's reaction is unlikely to be deal-specific as implicitly assumed in prior studies 
such as Moeller et al. (2004) and Stegemoller (2001). Instead, the market's long-term 
reaction is highly likely to be bidder-specific simply because a series of completed 
acquisitions is bound to be perceived [by the market] as an M&A programme. As 
remarked by Asquith et al. (1983, p. 124), "if bidding firms make more than one 
acquisition as part of a planned program, then it is important to consider these acquisitions 
together and not separately". A classic example is when bidders acquire two or more types 
of targets, e.g., bidders acquiring both private targets and public targets99. In this case, it is 
vital to isolate these private-public bidders from those that acquire targets of only one 
99 This sampling situation has also been acknowledged in the recent literature. In describing the summary 
statistics given in their Table I, Fuller et a!. (2002, p. 1772) note that "a firm that bids for public, private, 
and/or subsidiary targets will be included in the bidder data in several panels". Because their study examines 
announcement-period abnormal return, the non-isolation of cross-class bidders may not pose a serious 
problem in terms of spurious results. Over a short event window, there are unlikely to be overlapping returns 
by the same bidder acquiring two or more different types of targets. The announcement-period abnormal 
return is therefore likely to reflect the market's reaction to whatever information conveyed or signalled by the 
deal. Put differently, the market reaction to a bid announcement is more likely to be deal-specific than 
bidder-specific. To emphasise the importance of correctly pinpointing the subject to which the market reacts, 
Fuller eta!. (2002, p. 1771) reason: "we exclude from the main analysis clustered takeovers where the bidder 
acquires two or more firms within five days, since we cannot isolate the bidder's return for a particular 
target". 
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particular status, e.g., only private targets. Failure to make such distinction may well 
produce cloudy findings or even misleading conclusions. 
Consider a sample which includes bidders which acquired both private targets and 
public targets. Suppose the true wealth effects of private-firm and public-firm takeovers 
are positive and negative, respectively. If private-public bidders are motivated to make 
acquisitions by the same reasons as bidders acquiring only public targets, the failure to 
purge private-public bidders from the sub-sample of bidders acquiring only private targets 
will bias the results towards finding zero or negative abnormal return. The extent of the 
bias increases with the fraction of private-public bidders in the entire sample. When 
analysis employs a value-weighting scheme, the extent of the bias is further exacerbated if 
private-public bidders are systematically larger than those acquiring only private targets. 
While the long-term return findings of Moeller et al. (2004) and Stegemoller (2001) are 
not disputed here, a more correct sub-sampling approach like one described above in this 
section may well lead to different findings which are, at least in principle, more reliable. 
Isolating cross-class bidders offers another potential benefit. To the extent that 
acquisition of targets of different status yields different wealth effects, the sub-sampling of 
bidders adopted in this chapter potentially enables a more direct examination of the 
marginal effect of acquiring targets of particular status. For instance, the incremental 
wealth effect arising from acquiring an additional type of targets, e.g., a private target or 
divested subsidiary or public target, can be examined using this sub-sampling approach. 
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4.3.2) §ample Characteristics 
Table 4.1 provides details of characteristics of the deals and bidders in the final 
sample. Panel A shows that both deal value and target absolute size is smallest when the 
target is privately held and largest for the comparison sample of public targets. In terms of 
relative size, however, private targets and divested subsidiaries are of comparable 
substance to their respective bidder although the former appear marginally larger than the 
latter. As expected, target relative size is by far largest across all measures when targets 
are publicly listed. Among other things, the long-term wealth effect of a private target 
should hence be at least equally detectable/undetectable to that of a divested subsidiary. 
Under the Ease of Integration hypothesis, this relative size pattern suggests that while a 
public target is most difficult to manage during the post-acquisition phase, integrating a 
private target may not be any easier than integrating a divested subsidiary. 
The size characteristics of the sample bidders in each bidder class are presented in 
Panel B. Across all size measures, bidders that acquire only private targets are by far and 
significantly smaller, in both mean and median, than those acquiring either only divested 
subsidiaries or only public targets. Private-firm bidders are also significantly smaller than 
all of the sample cross-class bidders- i.e., bidders acquiring two or more types of targets. 
The size statistics hence show that a target that is privately held or has closely held 
ownership tends to attract a smaller bidder. Further, when a target has dispersed 
ownership, either a divested subsidiary or a public target, the bidder is apparently a larger 
firm. To the extent that (i) agency costs to shareholders increase with firm size (Demsetz 
and Lehn, 1985; Jensen, 1989) and (ii) ownership dispersion gives rise to managerial 
entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), the bidder size pattern implies that private-firm 
bidders are likely to be low-agency-cost firms that choose to acquire targets that have little 
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or no entrenchment. Zero entrenchment in a private target in tum implies relative ease of 
integration. 
To the extent that private-firm bidders carry relatively low agency costs, the BM 
ratio and q characteristics reported in Panel C are not surprising. Among bidders that 
acquire only targets of the same status, private-firm bidders receive significantly highest 
pre-takeover market valuation in terms of both the BM ratio and q proxy, and in both mean 
and median. When a target has dispersed ownership, either a subsidiary or public target, 
the bidder hence appears to be associated with significantly lower pre-takeover market 
valuation. This observation is in line with the U.S. findings of Moeller eta/. (2004). 
In relation to cross-class bidders, private-firm bidders exhibit BM and q 
performance that is, with one trivial exception, significantly (at the 0.01 level) superior to 
that of private-subsidiary and subsidiary-public bidders100. However, there is no reliable 
evidence to indicate that private-firm bidders receive higher pre-takeover market valuation 
than any other cross-class bidders. In contrast, subsidiary bidders receive significantly 
lower pre-takeover market valuation than all of the cross-class bidders that acquired at 
least one private target during the sample period. Thus, bidders that include a privately 
held target in their takeover attempt on balance tend to be those with superior pre-takeover 
market valuation. Not surprisingly, subsidiary-public bidders have the significantly lowest 
pre-takeover market valuation among the cross-class bidders. 
100 Again, private-subsidiary bidders are bidders that acquired at least one private target and one divested 
subsidiary during the sample period. Similarly, subsidiary-public bidders are bidders that acquired at least 
one divested subsidiary and one public target. 
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Panel C also shows that the BY-Price (BVP) ratio is generally lower for private-
firm bidders than for subsidiary bidders 101 • However, the difference is not significant, 
either in mean or median. Assuming zero overpayment, this insignificant difference on its 
own suggests that private targets and divested subsidiaries are possibly expected to 
contribute proportionally equally to the value of their respective bidders despite the 
dispersed ownership of the latter. On the other hand, if the dispersed ownership of 
subsidiaries denotes agency costs, the insignificant difference implies that subsidiary 
bidders may overpay for their targets. These bidders may be under pressure to buy 
external growth and thus prefer a divested subsidiary to a private target as the larger 
absolute size of the former has a larger impact on their growth ex ante. Because divested 
subsidiaries are unlisted and receive market valuation at best only indirectly via their listed 
parent, the bidders have more leeway to make a quick purchase of external growth by 
overpaymg. 
101 As noted in Section 3.3.3, the BVP ratio for public targets is not comparable either to that for private 
targets or to that for divested subsidiaries. This is because public targets differ significantly from private 
targets and divested subsidiaries in terms of the book equity to total assets ratio. The BVP ratio for private-
firm bidders, subsidiary bidders and private-subsidiary bidders is therefore incomparable to that for bidders 
of public targets and for cross-class bidders that acquire at least one public target. Similarly, the BVP ratio 
statistics for private-public bidders, subsidiary-public bidders and all-targets bidders should be interpreted 
with caution. 
Table 4.1 
Characteristics of Sample Takeovers by Target Status 
and Bidder Characteristics by Types of Targets Acquired 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 -
December 1998. All bidders are U.K.-listed companies. Panel A reports characteristics of 
deals sorted by target status, i.e., private targets, divested subsidiaries and public targets. 
Panels B and C report characteristics of bidders sorted by the type(s) of targets they acquire. 
The sample bidders are classified into: (i) bidders acquiring only private targets; (ii) bidders 
acquiring only divested subsidiaries; (iii) bidders acquiring only public targets; (iv) bidders 
acquiring both private targets and divested subsidiaries; (v) bidders acquiring both private 
targets and public targets; (vi) bidders acquiring both divested subsidiaries and public targets; 
and (vii) bidders acquiring private targets, divested subsidiaries and public targets. All 
bidder classes are mutually exclusive. All value-based variables are reported in millions of 
British Pound Sterling. Both means and medians are reported. Medians are in brackets. For 
details of variables, see Table 3 .1. 
Panel A: Deal Characteristics 
Private Divested Public 
All Targets Subsidiaries Targets 
Total Number of Deals 2,004 1,200 654 150 
Total Deal Value 84,110 10,841 17,552 55,718 
Average Deal Value 47.17 10.19 30.85 371.45 
[3.73] [2.55] [4.49] [32.32] 
Target Absolute Size 
Total Assets 117.64 8.62 57.87 925.06 
[3.79] [2.54] [6.48] [53.20] 
Total Turnover 63.44 15.59 39.75 320.45 
[7.85] [6.17] [8.39] [48.62] 
No. of Employees 617 229 408 2,920 
[1 03] [81] [126] [643] 
Target Relative Size 
Equity Value 0.219 0.210 0.155 0.521 
[0.052] [0.049] [0.039] [0.340] 
Total Assets 0.199 0.163 0.141 0.516 
[0.045] [0.036] [0.033] [0.288] 
Total Turnover 0.432 0.441 0.178 0.762 
[0.079] [0.064] [0.059] [0.361] 
No. ofEmployees 0.382 0.349 0.264 0.738 
[0.080] [0.070] [0.055] [0.372] 
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Table 4.1 - Continued 
Panel B: Bidder Size 
Market Total Total No. of 
Cap. Assets Turnover EMPs* 
Total Sample 676.1 3,861.1 840.7 8,789 
[78.2] [99.1] [111.4] [1,422] 
Private Targets Only (All) 155.2 209.8 213.4 2,855 
[36.3] [41.1] [54.1] [677] 
Divested Subsidiaries Only (All) 1,140.6 4,341.5 1,815.3 15,663 
[108.6] [149.0] [172.1] [1 ,868] 
Public Targets Only (All) 875.4 1,922.5 675.8 6,687 
[126.7] [218.5] [96.6] [1,203] 
Private Target & Divested 659.7 5,257.8 859.5 9,796 
Subsidiary [80.2] [118.3] [138.1] [1,599] 
Private Target & Public Target 369.6 470.1 502.8 7,782 
[94.7] [107.2] [1 05.8] [1,478] 
Divested Subsidiary & Public 2,756.4 17,991.1 2,930.0 23,898 
Target [920.5] [945.7] [708.1] [10,796] 
Private Target & Divested 1,301.1 7,888.4 1,160.8 12,575 
Subsidiary & Public Target [195.2] [241.8] [341.8] [3,757] 
Number of Employees. 
Panel C: Other Bidder Characteristics 
No. of No. of BM q BVP 
Deals Bidders Ratio Proxy Ratio 
Total Sample 2,004 899 0.308 1.973 0.328 
[0.348] [1.547] [0.217] 
Private Targets Only (All) 678 396 0.383 2.207 0.316 
[0.313] [1.587] [0.208] 
Divested Subsidiaries Only (All) 257 184 0.525 1.575 0.518 
[0.445] [1.390] [0.250] 
Public Targets Only (All) 56 53 0.560 1.616 0.571 
[0.507] [1.301] [0.444] 
Private Target & Divested 661 182 0.365 1.961 0.313 
Subsidiary [0.366] [1.556] [0.175] 
Private Target & Public Target 69 26 0.430 1.952 0.325 
[0.238] [1.681] [0.241] 
Divested Subsidiary & Public 50 20 0.500 1.409 0.442 
Target [0.380] [1.177] [0.379] 
Private Target & Divested 233 38 0.323 1.998 0.154 
Subsidiary & Public Target [0.271] [1. 721] [0.244] 
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4.4) Methodology- Detecting Long-Term Abnormal Return 
The dispute over the choice of an appropriate return generating process is still 
largely unsettled (see Fama, 1998; Loughran and Ritter, 2000; Mitchell and Stafford, 
2000). Nevertheless, the findings of Fama and French (1992, 1993, 1996) have led most 
recent studies of corporate events to explicitly control for the size and book-to-market 
(BM) effects when formulating an expected-return benchmark for measuring event-
induced abnormal return 102• Fama and French (1992) find that firm size and the BM ratio 
are important and the most robust factors in explaining the cross-section of expected stock 
returns for the U.S non-financial firms. 
Fama and French (1993, 1996) find that the market premium, size premium, and 
BM premium best describe excess stock returns- i.e., stock return minus risk-free rate- in 
the U.S., and incorporate these three priced equilibrium risk factors in a k-factor asset 
pricing model known as the Fama-French three-factor (FF 3-Factor) model. The later 
study by Barber and Lyon (1997b) documents that the relation between firm size, BM ratio 
and expected stock returns also holds for financial firms in the U.S. As an alternative to 
using the FF 3-Factor model, a number of recent studies have also adopted characteristic-
based control return, i.e., size and BM characteristics, in measuring abnormal return (e.g., 
Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Spiess and Affleck-Graves, 1999; Vijh, 1999). 
Despite extensive literature indicating the merits of the size and BM factors, Fama 
and French (1993) note that the FF 3-Factor model is still not a full description of expected 
stock returns [in the U.S.] as it tends to consistently overestimate expected returns for 
smalllow-BM firms: the characteristics on which the model is based. As pointed out by 
102 See for example, for the U.S., Boehme and Sorescu (2002), Desai and Jain (1999), Dong et a/. (2002), 
Hertzel et a/. (2002), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Moeller et a/. (2004); for the U.K., Baker and Limmack 
(2001), Espenlaub eta/. (2000), Gregory (1997), and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003). 
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Fama (1998), the size-BM control return commonly employed in the recent event studies 
does not solve this bad-model problem because the size and BM characteristics do not 
capture all of the relevant cross-firm variations in average stock returns. Moreover, a bad-
model problem is also connected with the way in which the portfolio of event firms is 
formed and weighted. Fama (1998) further notes that, unlike in short-term return analysis, 
bad-model problems are serious in tests of long-term abnormal return. 
In the U.K. market, the size and BM factors have also been found as important risk 
factors. Strong and Xu (1997) find that the BM effects are important factors in explaining 
the cross-section of expected return to the U.K. non-financial firms. Davies et al. ( 1999) 
document a considerable improvement by the FF 3-Factor model on the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) in describing required return for 1,395 U.K. firms, both financial 
and non-financial, over the period 1976- 1995. Specifically, Davies et al. (1999) find 
that, during this period, excess returns on 69% and 18% of these stocks were influenced by 
the size premium and BM premium, respectively, after controlling for the effect of market 
premium. Despite ample evidence in the literature that the FF 3-Factor model is unable to 
explain abnormal return due to past performance (e.g., for U.S. Fama and French, 1996; 
Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001; for U.K. Gregory et al., 2001; Liu et al., 1999), Baker and 
Limmack (200 1) find that controlling for prior performance does not affect their findings 
that the U.K. bidders earn significantly negative post-acquisition abnormal retum103 . 
In order to achieve robustness of the results, four different expected return models 
are adopted in this chapter. These are: (i) the control-firm buy-and-hold return model; (ii) 
the event-time Fama-French Three-Factor model; (iii) the calendar-time rolling portfolio 
103 Baker and Limmack's (2001) sample consists of the U.K. bidders that acquired a target listed in the U.K. 
during the period 1977 - 1990. 
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approach; and (iv) the calendar-time Fama-French Three-Factor model. Abnormal return 
is estimated in event time and calendar time in the first two and last two models, 
respectively. The event-time models are adopted due to their intuitive appeal in that they 
capture investors' experience (e.g., Lyon et a/., 1999; also Loughran and Vijh, 1997). 
Specifically, the event-time models do not assume regular rebalancing which can be 
prohibitively expensive, particularly for individual investors. Though based on regular 
rebalancing, the calendar-time models are statistically appealing in that returns in these 
models are calculated as short-interval returns for which normality is a better 
approximation (see Fama, 1998). Moreover, the calendar-time models control for the 
cross-sectional correlations among abnormal returns whereas the event-time models do 
not. Since the empirical investigation in this chapter essentially rests upon formal tests of 
abnormal return, it is appropriate to draw inferences from the results derived from the 
models that are intuitively appealing and from the results based on the models that are 
statistically appealing. 
For each of the four approaches, three alternative event windows are employed; 
namely 12, 24 and 36 months following the completion month. The use of several 
alternative windows avoids the requirement for a strict assumption on the amount of time it 
takes the anticipated effect of a takeover to materialise. Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 discuss 
two event-time approaches based on the size-BM control-firm return metric and the FF 3-
Factor model, respectively. The corresponding calendar-time approaches are then 
described in Sections 4.4.3 and 4.4.4. 
140 
4.4.1) Control-Firm Buy-and-Hold Return Model 
The first benchmark return adopted in this chapter is return to the control firm 
matched on size and BM ratio. An alternative to the use of a control firm is a control 
portfolio. Unlike control firm return, however, using control-portfolio return is associated 
with three known biases; namely the new listing bias, rebalancing bias and skewness bias 
(Barber and Lyon, 1997a). The new listing bias arises because the control portfolio or 
benchmark market index typically includes firms listed after the beginning of the event 
window while the sample event firm has a continuous series of return starting from the first 
event interval, e.g., first event month. Since newly listed firms generally underperform 
market averages, their underperformance biases return to the control portfolio downwards 
and hence biases the mean abnormal return upwards 104 . The new listing bias therefore 
affects portfolio return calculated based on either cumulating or compounding. 
Affecting only compounded return is the rebalancing bias, which occurs when 
constituent returns in the control portfolio reverse. Barber and Lyon (1997a) point out that 
when the control portfolio is rebalanced periodically in order to maintain equal weights, 
there is no rebalancing for the sample firm. With return reversal, periodic rebalancing of 
the control portfolio effectively translates into the purchase (sale) of stocks that perform 
well (badly) in the next period, inflating the long-term return to the portfolio105 . Finally, 
the use of a control portfolio is affected by the skewness bias, which is caused by the 
dissimilarity in distribution between long-term return to a sample firm and long-term return 
to the control portfolio. As noted by Barber and Lyon (1997a), while it is common to 
observe individual stock return of extreme magnitude, it is uncommon to observe extreme 
104 Underperfonnance of IPO firms has also been documented in the U.K. market (see Espenlaub et a!., 
2000). 
105 If the control portfolio is value-weighted, the periodic rebalancing does not lead to the rebalancing bias. 
Barber and Lyon (1997a) note that the observed return reversals in the control portfolio are not necessarily 
sufficient for profit making since these reversals may well be the outcome of a bid-ask bounce. 
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return for a stock portfolio. Since abnormal return is measured as the difference between 
return to a sample firm and return to the control portfolio, the resulting abnormal return is 
skewed. 
To avoid the new listing and rebalancing biases, Lyon et al. (1999) calculate long-
term return to a control portfolio by first compounding over the event window return to the 
constituent firms in the portfolio and then averaging across firms. In order to alleviate the 
skewness bias so that the resulting statistical tests are well specified, Lyon et al. (1999) 
advocate the use of an empirical distribution of abnormal return and skewness-adjusted t-
statistics via bootstrapping. However, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) note that the use of an 
empirical distribution of abnormal return can well violate one implicit assumption made by 
the bootstrapping procedure, namely the randomly selected firms used to construct the 
empirical distribution share the same covariance structure as the sample firms. 
Because corporate events are non-random events, event firms are clearly different 
from randomly selected non-event firms. To the extent that return to sample firms is more 
or less volatile than return to randomly selected firms in the pseudo-portfolio, an 
overstatement of statistical significance can follow (Brav, 2000; Mitchell and Stafford, 
2000). Moreover, control-portfolio return is much less precise as an expected return model 
than control-firm return106. Despite their findings that the use of control-firm return offers 
a less powerful test, Lyon et al. (1999) also report that when a sample contains a BM-based 
bias, the only expected return model that yields well-specified test statistics is control-firm 
return107 . 
106 The less precision associated with control-portfolio return arises because a control portfolio contains not 
only the best-matched firm, but also firms that are less well matched. 
107 It is well documented in the literature that M&A activity intensifies in times of a stock market boom or 
high valuation (e.g., Brealey and Myers, 2000, p. 967; Rhodes-Kropf eta/., 2003). Thus, bidders in general 
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For the above reasons, return to a control firm matched on size and BM 
characteristics is used as benchmark return in this chapter. This expected return metric has 
also been employed in a number of recent event studies 108• A control firm for each sample 
bidder is identified using the sequential-sorting procedure in Barber and Lyon (1997a) and 
Lyon et al. (1999). To qualify as potential control firms, firms must make no control-
securing acquisition - i.e., as defined in the sample criteria set out in Section 3.3.1 - of 
either a U.K. target or otherwise within r months preceding the end of the bidder's 
completion month, where r = 12, 24 or 36 months. At the end of the completion month 
plus one day, all firms in the universe of potential control firms are ranked according to 
their market value (MV) and BM ratio109• Firms with their MV between 70% and 130% of 
a sample bidder's MV are selected. From this set, the firm with the BM ratio closest to 
that of the bidder is chosen as the control firm. 
In the U.S. studies that control for the size and BM effects in measuring long-term 
abnormal return, firms are ranked on MV in June of year T and on the BM ratio in 
December of year T- 1110. Ranking the U.S. firms on the BM ratio in December may be 
feasible since their financial yearend falls mostly at a calendar yearend 111 • Because a 
financial yearend in the U.K. varies considerably across firms, simply calculating the BM 
may well be fmns that have a relatively low BM ratio. Conn et a/. (2002) also observe a significant 
difference in the BM ratio between their sample U.K. bidders and a randomly selected sample of non-bidders 
during the period 1984 - 1998. 
108 For example, Desai and Jain (1999), Dong et a/. (2002), Hertzel et a/. (2002), Loughran and Vijh (1997), 
Spiess and Affleck -Graves ( 1999), Vijh ( 1999). 
109 This ranking procedure is comparable to Loughran and Vijh (1997) where firms are ranked on the 
effective day plus one day. 
110 For example: for the U.S., Barber and Lyon ( 1997a), Fama and French (1993 ), Loughran and Vijh (1997), 
Lyon eta/. (1999); for the U.K., Conn eta/. (2002), Gregory (1997) and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003). In 
Conn eta/. (2002), all rankings occur at the beginning of each year and a control firm is re-matched annually. 
In Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003), the rankings take place and a control portfolio is re-matched on a 
quarterly basis. 
111 Not all U.S. firms have a fmancial yearend at the end of December (see Barber and Lyon, 1996) although 
the majority of them do. 
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ratio in any chosen calendar month, e.g., in December, would mismatch book value of 
equity (BV) and MV for a large number of U.K. firms 112. In other words, the resulting BM 
ratio for many U.K. firms would comprise BV and MV observed at different points in 
time, making the ratio inaccurate or noisy. As a consequence, some adjustments are 
necessary when the U.K. data is used. 
In this section, BV for all firms is estimated at the end of the completion month 
plus one day as a weighted average of the BVs observed at the immediately preceding 
financial yearend and at the immediately following financial yearend, with the weight 
being the number of months from the ranking month to each of the bounding financial 
yearends 113•114• Firms with a financial yearend falling at the beginning of month t are 
treated as if having their financial yearend at the end of month t- 1. For firms with a 
financial yearend falling before the 1 ih day of month t, Datastream treats them as if having 
their financial yearend falling at the end of month t- 1115. To ensure that the correct BV is 
captured for each firm, the estimation of weighted average BV in this chapter tracks 
Datastream's treatment. For firms that become delisted before the financial yearend 
following the ranking month, only the BV from the immediately preceding financial 
112 The BM ratio is defined as net book value of equity (BY) divided by MY. Datastream calculates BY- or 
Net Tangible Assets (NTA) - as total assets, excluding intangible assets, less total liabilities, minority 
interest and preference shares. 
113 For example, a firm with BY of£100 million at the of end September ofyear T- I and £120 million at 
the end of September of year T will have a weighted average book value of £105 million 
[(100 x 0.75)+ (120 x 0.25)] at the end of December of year T- I. 
114 Implicit in this estimation of BY is the assumption that BY changes from one financial yearend to the next 
at a constant monthly rate. Some would argue that the weighted-average BY may be infeasible for 
practitioners to estimate since it may require accounting information before an annual report becomes 
publicly available. Thus, this estimation technique could be subject to the look-ahead bias. However, listed 
firms are required to produce their interim results. In addition, there exist in the public domain various forms 
of information about firms other than an annual report. As Bhide (1990) points out, research departments 
and in-depth monitoring skills have long been developed among market analysts. For these reasons, it is 
argued here that the estimation of BY adopted in this thesis is feasible to market participants who are 
reasonably well-informed, and is therefore largely free from the look-ahead bias. 
115 For example, firms with a fmancial yearend on the II th day of month t will have their BY recorded in 
Datastream from month t- I backwards whereas firms with a financial yearend on the 12th day of month t 
will have their BY recorded from month t backwards. 
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yearend is used. The return calculation then starts at the beginning of month 1, with month 
0 being the completion month. 
If the chosen control firm either announces any control-securing acquisition or 
becomes delisted before the end of the window or the delisting date of the bidder, 
following Loughran and Vijh (1997), it is dropped and return to the control firm with the 
next-closest BM ratio is spliced in on a point-forward basis. This splicing process repeats 
until the control-firm return series has the same length as the corresponding bidder return 
senes. If the bidder itself becomes delisted before the end of the window, following 
Hertzel et al. (2002), Loughran and Vijh (1997) and Vijh (1999), the return calculation 
stops at the point of the bidder's de listing and is therefore truncated at the beginning of the 
delisting month 116• 
116 The truncation implicitly assumes that investors in an early-delisted bidder reinvest the proceeds in the 
remaining bidders in the portfolio. While there appears to be no theoretical construct or empirical evidence 
to suggest whether reinvestment among the continuing bidders in the portfolio is more realistic an 
assumption than reinvestment in control firms/portfolio as in Desai and Jain (1999), Gregory (1997) and 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000), reinvestment among firms of similar attributes (i.e., continuing bidders in the 
portfolio) would clearly seem much less far-fetched. Unlike filling the missing bidder return with return on a 
control firm or portfolio, moreover, truncating the calculation at the point of the bidder's delisting does not 
exacerbate the problem, pointed out by Mitchell and Stafford (2000), of artificial abnormal return problem 
associated with compounding. 
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Table 4.2 
Distribution of Number of Control Firms per Takeover 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 -December 
1998. All bidders are U.K.-Iisted companies. For each bidder, a control finn is chosen on size and BM 
ratio using the sequential-sorting procedure in Barber and Lyon (I 997a). For each of the r-month 
window, where r = 12, 24 or 36, control finns are sorted at the end of the completion month plus one 
day. Potential control firms must make no acquisition within r months before the completion month. 
When the chosen control finn announces an acquisition or becomes delisted before the end of the r-
month window or the delisting date of the bidder, it is dropped and return to the control finn with the 
next-closest BM ratio is spliced in on a point-forward basis. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 Total 
Panel A: 12-Month Window 
Number of Takeovers 1,435 455 83 5 1,978 
% 72.5 23.0 4.2 0.3 100 
Cumulative% 72.5 95.5 99.7 100.0 
Panel B: 24-Month window 
Number of Takeovers 1,144 631 167 35 1 1,978 
% 57.8 31.9 8.4 1.8 0.1 100 
Cumulative% 57.8 89.7 98.1 99.9 100.0 
Panel C: 36-Month Window 
Number of Takeovers 913 743 231 71 18 2 1,978 
% 46.2 37.5 11.7 3.6 0.9 0.1 100 
Cumulative % 46.2 83.7 95.4 99.0 99.9 100.0 
Table 4.2 shows the distribution of the number of control firms per sample 
takeover. For each window, columns two through seven display a proportion of the sample 
deals that require a given number of control firms. From column two, only one control 
firm is required for bidders in 1,435, 1,144 and 913 deals, or 72.5%, 57.8% and 46.2% of 
the total usable deals, for the 12-, 24- and 36-month windows, respectively. As shown in 
Panel C, bidders in only 2 deals require up to 6 control firms. Apparent from column four 
is that, for all event windows, bidders in more than 95% of the usable deals require only 
three or fewer control firms. 
For both the sample bidders and control firms, return is calculated as buy-and-hold 
return. Barber and Lyon (1997a) argue that because buy-and-hold return incorporates the 
effect of compounding, it precisely measures investors' experience. In this section, 
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abnormal return to bidder i is therefore estimated as buy-and-hold abnormal return over a 
r -month window ( BHAR;r) as follows: 
T T 
BHAR;r = f1[1+Ru]- f1[1+E(Ru)], (4.1) 
1=1 1=1 
where r = 12, 24 or 36 months following the completion month. Rit and E(Rit ), 
respectively, are return to bidder i and to its control firm in month t 117 . For estimation 
purposes, LRu = ln(Rlu )-1n(Rlu_1) and BHAR;r can then be calculated as 
L.;=1 LRit - L.;=1 E(LRit) which is equivalent to the use of simple return in equation ( 4.1 ). 
Rlu is the Datastream Total Return Index, which is adjusted for dividends and capital 
actions, for firm i in month t 118 • 
For reasons discussed in Section 3.4, both equally weighted (EW) average 
percentage BHAR ( BHARr) and EW average sterling BHAR ( PBHARr) are calculated 
for each bidder portfolio as follows: 
BHARr = t7=1 BHAR;r )/n, and 
PBHARr = t7=1 ~,o · BHAR;r )/n; 
where MV;,o is MV (in millions of British Pound Sterling) of bidder i at the beginning of 
the event window, and n is the number of bidders in the portfolio. The use of sterling 
return also offers a meaningful economic interpretation of a median sterling return whereas 
117 Monthly return is used in this chapter because the use of daily prices can cause an upward bias in return 
calculation in a long-term event window, particularly when a portfolio is rebalanced periodically (see Blume 
and Stambaugh, 1983). In the expected return models in Sections 4.4.2 through 4.4.4, periodic rebalancing is 
assumed. 
118 Examples of capital actions are share splits and share repurchases. 
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a value-weighted (VW) median percentage return carnes no meaningful economic 
interpretation 119• 
To make MVi,o s comparable across the sample period, following Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000) and Boehme and Sorescu (2002), each MV;,o is standardised using the 
price level of the [value-weighted] FT All Share Index observed at each point in time120. 
January 1995 is then used as the base period. In addition to BHARr and PBHARr, the 
non-parametric equivalent (i.e., median) of these averages is also computed in order to 
assess the impact of outliers in the sample. 
Following Barber and Lyon (1997a), the test statistic for BHARr is computed as: 
(4.2) 
where G-BHARr is the cross-sectional sample standard deviation. The test statistic for 
PBHARr is similarly computed as 121 : 
PBHARr 





To test the null hypothesis of zero median BHAR, either percentage or sterling, the 
Wilcoxon sign-rank test statistic described in Hollander and Wolfe (1999) is used. The 
sign-rank test is preferred to the Fisher sign test because the former takes into account both 
sign and [absolute] magnitude of abnormal return. 
119 This is because VW median percentage return is smaller than the actually observed percentage return and 
araproaches zero as the sample size increases indefinitely. 
1 0 The Financial Times Actuaries All Share Index. 
121 The adjustment made to allow for differing weights uses the following property: 
L7=1w;z; ~NID(L7=1 w;z; ·L~1 w1a1 )for z; ~N(E[z;],a(). 
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4.4.2) Event-Time Fama-French Three-Factor Model 
As an alternative to the use of control firm return, an event-time FF 3-Factor model 
is also adopted in this chapter. Although the size and BM characteristics are important 
factors in explaining the cross-section of expected stock returns, Fama and French (1993) 
observe that the market factor still plays an important role in explaining excess stock return 
over the risk-free rate. More importantly, extant empirical evidence indicates that the role 
of the market factor in explaining the cross-section of the U.K. expected stock returns is 
still debatable (see Clare et al., 1998; Davies et al., 1999)122. 
Since the three alternative event windows employed in this chapter compnse 
multiple monthly intervals, similar to Barber et al. (200 1 ), abnormal return to a bidder 
portfolio is computed as BHAR over a r -month window. Specifically, the FF 3-Factor 
model is estimated in event time as the following [OLS] regression model: 
(4.4) 
where Rfrh, RJ~ and R~hr are calculated as buy-and-hold return over a r -month window. 
Similar to Section 4.4.1, LRit =ln(Rlu)-ln(Rlit-J) and Rfrh is calculated as L.;=1LRit. 
R~hr is calculated in the same way. RI mt is the Datastream Total Return Index, which is 
adjusted for dividends and capital actions, for the value-weighted FT All Share Index in 
month t. Also for estimation purposes, RJ~ is calculated as L.;=l (eR61 ) where Rb1 1s 
return (Bond Equivalent Yield) on the 3-month T -Bill observed in month t. SMB~h is 
return to small firms minus return to large firms, and HML~h is return to high-BM firms 
minus return to low-BM firms calculated as continuously compounded return on a buy-
122 Because the use of the market, size and BM factors is essentially the use of control portfolios, the 
resulting abnormal return may be affected one way or another by the three biases identified by Barber and 
Lyon (1997a). 
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and-hold strategy. sfrh is the regression error term. a;h therefore measures the EW 
average percentage BHAR to a bidder portfolio (i.e., Jensen's alpha), and the standard 
error for testing the significance of a;h is readily provided by the regression. 
To compute sterling BHAR to a bidder portfolio, the terms (Rf;- Rj~ ), 
(R~~- Rj~ ), (sMB;h) and (HML~h) in equation (4.4) are pre-multiplied by standardised 
~ 0 . The regression model is then re-run to yield the estimated intercept, a:bh, as the , 
measure of EW average sterling BHAR to a bidder portfolio 123 • Similar to equation (3 .2), 
the presence of outliers in the estimation of BHAR using equation (4.4) can be potentially 
serious. To assess the impact of outliers in the sample, the MAD estimator is also used in 
the estimation of both a;h and a:bh. 
The SMB and HML risk factors are obtained, following Fama and French (1993), 
by constructing six portfolios (S/L, SIM, S/H, BIL, BIM, BIH) from the intersections of 
firms independently sorted into two MY and three BM groups. The breakpoint for sorting 
the two size groups is the median MY of all firms listed on the LSE. To form the three 
BM groups, all LSE-listed firms are separated as follows: bottom 30 (Low), middle 40 
(Medium), and top 30 (High) 124. For example, the S/Hportfolio consists offirms from the 
small-MY group that are also in the high-BM group. Similarly, the BIL portfolio contains 
firms from the large-MY group that are also in the low-BM group. SMB is then calculated 
as the difference in each month between the EW average of returns to the three small-firm 
123 As with the methodology adopted in Section 3.4, this pre-multiplication is analogous to the procedure 
used by Eckbo and Thorburn (2000). 
124 Note that BV for firms listed on AIM and OFEX is not available from Datastream. Because the six 
portfolios are constructed based on the intersections of both MV and BM groups, returns to AIM-listed and 
OFEX-listed firms do not form part of the risk factors SMB and HML. It is acknowledged here that returns to 
firms listed on these two secondary markets should ideally form part of SMB and HML. 
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portfolios (SIL, SIM, and Sill) and the EW average of returns to the three large-firm 
portfolios (BIL, BIM, and Bill). Similarly, HML is then calculated as the difference in each 
month between the EW average of returns to the two high-BM portfolios (SIH and Bill) 
and the EW average of returns to the two low-BM portfolios (SIL and BIL). In the interest 
of consistency and comparability, return to the individual six portfolios is calculated as EW 
(VW) return when BHAR to a bidder portfolio is computed as a:h (a:bh) 125. 
BV used to calculate the BM ratio for firms in the SIL, SIM, SIH, BIL, BIM, BIH 
portfolios is estimated as the weighted-average BV described in Section 4.4.1. However, 
firms constituting the six portfolios are ranked at the end of December of year T- 1. The 
month of December is chosen for estimating BV because a noticeably large number of the 
U.K. firms have a financial yearend falling at the end of this calendar month. For these 
firms, their BM ratio is based directly on their actual BV, not the estimated BV. Therefore, 
ranking firms on the BM ratio at the end of December of year T - 1 helps to restrict the 
degree of random noise, if any, which could stem from use of the estimated BV. In the 
interest of the synchronisation of the size and BM risk factors, firms are also ranked on 
MV at the end of December of year T- 1. To preserve the most up-to-date information 
about the size and BM factors, the monthly return calculation starts from the beginning of 
January of year Tand stops at the end ofDecember ofyear T. Following Fama and French 
125 The choice of the equal-weighting scheme for the six individual portfolios- SIL, SIM, SIH, BIL, BIM, BIH 
-in the estimation of a~h is based on the findings of Fama and French (1993) that the FF 3-Factor model 
tends to consistently misprice small, low-BM firms. In their original form, the SMB and HML factors are 
formed based on the six portfolios constructed as VW portfolios. Equally weighting an event portfolio 
effectively gives more weight to small firms. To the extent that small firms tend to be young and high-
growth firms, mispricing is likely to be observed when the event portfolio is equally weighted with the SMB 
and HML factors being formed using value-weighted return (see also Fama, 1998). In an attempt to alleviate 
this bad-model problem, the six individual portfolios are therefore constructed as EW portfolios in the 
estimation of a~h. It is recognised that the choice of equal weighting adopted here is ad hoc in nature. 
Whether consistency between the weighting schemes of the event portfolio and the six individual portfolios 
comprising the SMB and HML factors helps to alleviate a bad-model problem is in itself an empirical 
question beyond the scope of this thesis and hence left to the future research. 
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(1993), the six portfolios comprising the size and BM factors are then reformed at the end 
of December of year T. 
An alternative methodology for estimating long-term abnormal return in event time 
based on the FF 3-Factor model is to estimate the FF 3-Factor regression model for each 
sample firm or bidder as described in Barber and Lyon (1997a). The model's intercept or 
alpha then measures average monthly abnormal return during the event window to an 
individual sample bidder. Average abnormal return, both percentage and sterling, to a 
bidder portfolio can then be calculated by averaging the individual alphas across bidders in 
the portfolio. The calculation and test of median abnormal return can then be performed 
. . d 126 usmg a nonparametnc proce ure . 
Though equivalent to equation (4.4), the methodology proposed in Barber and 
Lyon (1997a) requires a minimum number of valid monthly returns of usually 24 months 
during the event window (e.g., Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000; Gregory, 1997)127• This 
requirement causes a survivorship bias in an event-firm portfolio as only the event firms 
that have survived the required minimum period following the event are included in the 
portfolio. On the other hand, abnormal return computed using equation ( 4.4) above is free 
from this survivorship bias. The use of equation ( 4.4) also enjoys much greater efficiency 
from the larger degrees of freedom in estimating the regression even when the event 
window is short, e.g., 12 months. While the degrees of freedom for equation (4.4) in the 
12-month window is n - 4 (n is the number of bidders in the portfolio), the degrees of 
freedom for a firm-specific regression would be only 8 (i.e., 12- 4) making the estimated 
126 See Appendix II for a discussion on the test of significance of average and median abnormal return to a 
bidder portfolio. 
127 The required minimum number of valid monthly returns also depends on the length of the adopted event 
window. 
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individual alphas considerably inefficient and sensitive to return that 1s large m 
magnitude 128• 
4.4.3) Calendar-Time Rolling Portfolio Approach 
The return metric adopted in Section 4.4.1, i.e., control-firm BHAR, does not 
control for the cross-sectional correlations among abnormal returns. Corporate events are 
not random events and such non-randomness or clustering of the events gives rise to the 
cross-sectional correlations (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). In particular, takeover activities 
have been observed to take place in waves (e.g., Andrade and Stafford, 2004; Brealey and 
Myers, 2000, p. 967; Weston and Jawien, 1999). It is well documented in the long-term 
abnormal return literature that the cross-sectional correlations overstate the number of 
independent observations. 
If not controlled for, the cross dependence can lead to systematic underestimation 
of the variance of the mean abnormal return with the end result being too many rejections 
of the null hypothesis of zero abnormal return when it is true (e.g., Brown and Warner, 
1980; Fama, 1998; Lyon et al., 1999; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). The most severe 
situation of the cross-sectional correlations is when there are overlapping periods of return 
calculation for the same sample firm (Lyon et a!., 1999). As reported in Panel C of Table 
4.1, a large number of the sample bidders appear in the sample more than once. The return 
calculation periods for these bidders are therefore highly likely to overlap. 
128 The FF 3-Factor model results based on Barber and Lyon's (1997a) methodology, which are presented in 
Appendix II, are qualitatively similar to those based on equation (4.4). However, the statistical significance 
of the former is somewhat lower. This is not surprising given the substantially less efficiency associated with 
the smaller degrees of freedom. 
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To control for the effect ofthe cross-sectional correlations, Fama (1998) advocates 
the method of calculating mean portfolio abnormal return in calendar time. This method is 
commonly known as the Calendar-Time Rolling Portfolio approach and was first adopted 
by Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker (1974). Although it has been argued that the approach may 
have relatively low power to detect abnormal return as it assigns equal weights to both hot 
and cold months (Loughran and Ritter, 2000), it eliminates the cross-sectional correlations. 
As reported by Lyon et al. (1999), moreover, the approach also yields test statistics that are 
more robust than those calculated in event time. 
For the above reasons, the calendar-time calculation is also adopted in this chapter. 
Similar to Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999), abnormal return is calculated in each 
calendar month t for bidders that made an acquisition within the previous r months as: 
ARu = Ru - E(Ru). Following Lyon et al. (1999), monthly abnormal return (MARt) is 
then calculated for a portfolio of bidders as: 
n 
MARt = L wu · ARu , 
i=l 
(4.5) 
where n is the number of bidders in a monthly portfolio and Ru = ln(Rlu )-ln(Rlu-I ). 
When return is equally weighted, wu = 1/n, and wu = ~tj(L7=l ~t) when return is 
value-weighted, where ~t is MV of bidder i at the beginning of month t. The Mean 
Monthly Abnormal Return (MMAR), either EW or VW, to a bidder portfolio is then 
calculated as: 
1 m 
MMARP =-L;MAR1 , 
mt=l 
(4.6) 
where m is the number of months in the time series of MAR1 • The test statistic for 
MMAR P is then computed as: 
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(4.7) 
where cT MARt is the intertemporal sample standard deviation of MAR1 129• The significance 
of either EW or VW MMAR is tested for using equation (4.7) because MMAR is weighted 
in the formation ofthe monthly portfolios. 
Similar to BHAR, EW and VW median MAR's are also computed, and the 
Wilcoxon sign-rank test statistic described in Hollander and Wolfe (1999) is used to test 
the null hypothesis of zero median MAR. Tests of long-term abnormal return based on 
equations ( 4.5) to ( 4. 7) completely eliminate the cross-sectional correlations since there is 
only one portfolio in each calendar month (see also Salinger, 1992). Although this 
approach is based on averaging monthly abnormal returns and has come under the 
criticism that it does not capture long-term investors' experience (Loughran and Vijh, 
1997; Barber and Lyon, 1997a), Fama (1998) contends that formal tests of abnormal return 
should be based on short-interval returns for which normality is a better approximation130. 
4.4.4) Calendar-Time Fama and French Three-Factor Model 
The final alternative methodology adopted in this chapter is the calendar-time FF 3-
Factor (henceforth CT FF 3-Factor) model. In addition to an attempt to assess robustness 
of the empirical results, the CT FF 3-Factor model is employed following Lyon et al. 's 
129 At variance with equation (4.7), Fama (1998) advocates the method of standardising MAR1 by its time-
series standard deviation. This standard deviation of MAR1 is normally calculated using a series of 
MAR1_m where m ranges between 50 and 60 (e.g., Jaffe, 1974; Mandelker, 1974; Spiess and Affleck-
Graves, 1999). However, this standardisation naturally imposes a sizeable loss of observations in the early 
part of the sample period, and therefore introduces an inadvertent selection bias in the sample. In a study that 
employs several alternative methodologies, such as this thesis, the use of standardisation would make the 
results incomparable across methodologies, in tum making the assessment of robustness of the results 
problematic. 
130 See Fama (1998, p. 294) for a detailed discussion on this debateable point. 
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(1999) findings that tests based on the rolling portfolio approach are generally less 
powerful than tests based on the CT FF 3-Factor model. 
For each calendar month, return (EW or VW) is calculated for a portfolio of 
bidders that made an acquisition within the previous T months, for T = 12, 24 or 36 
months. The portfolio is rebalanced monthly to drop all bidders that reach the end of their 
period of T months and to add all bidders that have just made a takeover. Bidders that 
become delisted before the end of the window are automatically dropped out of the 
portfolio at the beginning of the month of delisting. For each bidder portfolio, the CT FF 
3-Factor model is then estimated as the [OLS] regression model in the following equation: 
where R pi is the return (EW or VW) on the portfolio of sample bidders in month t, and 
£pi is the regression error term. 
For equation (4.8), Rit = ln(R!,J-ln(Rlil-! ), Rmt = ln(RI ml )-ln(RI mi-d and 
The SMB and HML risk factors are then formed similarly to those in equation 
(4.4). aP therefore provides a direct measure of average monthly abnormal return to a 
bidder portfolio during the T -month window following the completion month. Similar to 
equation (4.4), the individual six portfolios underlying the SMB and HML factors are 
formed as EW (VW) portfolios when the monthly bidder portfolios are formed as EW 
(VW) portfolios131 . For the reasons mentioned in Section 4.4.2, the MAD estimator is also 
used in the estimation of a p . 
131 These individual six portfolios are the SIL, SIM, S/H, BIL, B/M, BIH portfolios. 
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4.5) Long-Term lPost-Acquisitim:n Abnorman Return- Results 
This section presents and discusses the empirical results based on the four 
alternative methodologies described in Section 4.4. Section 4.5.1 compares the results and 
assesses their sensitivity. Interpretations ofthe results are then given in Section 4.5.2. 
4.5.1) Alternative Results and Result Sensitivity 
A. Control-Firm Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return 
For the entire sample, as reported in Panel A of Table 4.3, there is virtually no trace 
of abnormal return. This result is consistent with what would be expected in an efficient 
market where a takeover announcement conveys complete information about the 
transaction. The only significant BHAR is the 36-month mean BHAR of -5.09%, and it is 
only weakly significant (at the 0.10 level). lfthe 36-month window was the only window 
used in this chapter, the conclusion on post-acquisition performance of the U.K. bidders 
drawn from Panel A would lend support to the 36-month size-BM control-firm BHAR of 
-6.79% to the U.K. bidders of domestic targets documented by Conn et al. (2002)132• The 
Panel A results are also inconsistent with the significantly negative percentage size-BM 
control-portfolio CAR to the U.S. bidders in the merger sample in Rau and Vermaelen 
For the principal sample in this chapter, as shown in Panel B, the only significant 
abnormal return is the negative EW percentage BHAR in the 36-month window. Yet, the 
132 In Conn et al.'s (2002) study of long-term abnormal return to the U.K. bidders in cross-boarder 
acquisitions, both of their domestic- and foreign-acquisition samples include takeovers of unlisted targets. 
133 Rau and Vermaelen ( 1998) split their initial sample into the merger and tender offer samples. Their entire 
sample (2,823 acquisitions) includes 2,180 takeovers of privately held targets. Throughout 36 months 
following the acquisition, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) find significantly negative and positive CARs for 
bidders in their merger sample and tender offer sample, respectively. 
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corresponding median does not confirm the result134. At variance with private-firm 
bidders, Panel C reports strong evidence of negative EW percentage BHAR to bidders 
acquiring only divested subsidiaries in the 24- and 36-month windows. These negative 
gains are significant in both mean and median. Given the similarity in relative size 
between private targets and divested subsidiaries revealed in Panel A of Table 4.1, it is 
unlikely that the insignificant gains to private-firm bidders are attributable to the relative 
size effects documented elsewhere in the literature (e.g., Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000; Jarrell 
and Poulsen, 1989). 
Panel D of Table 4.3 documents interesting results for the comparison sample of 
bidders acquiring only publicly listed targets. The results indicate no reliable evidence of 
significant abnormal to public-firm bidders, suggesting that shareholders in public-firm 
bidders breakeven in the long run. These results are consistent with the insignificant size-
adjusted control-portfolio BHAR to the U.K. bidders in public-firm takeovers reported by 
Higson and Elliott (1998), and with the insignificant size-BM control-firm BHAR to 
bidders in public-firm takeovers in the U.S. reported by Dong et al. (2002). To the extent 
that public-firm takeovers in the U.K. are mostly tender offers (see Sudarsanam and 
Mahate, 2003), the lack of significant BHAR in Panel D is also consistent with the 
insignificantly positive CAR during the second and third post-acquisition years to the U.S. 
bidders in tender offers reported by Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and the insignificantly 
positive five-year control-firm BHAR for the tender offer sample in Loughran and Vijh 
(1997). However, the Panel D results are inconsistent with the findings of several recent 
134 When the non-repeating private-firm bidders are examined separately, there is evidence of significantly 
negative BHAR in the 24-month. For the repeating bidders, the evidence of bidder gains is mixed. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted again that the sample period in this thesis covers only four years. Thus, the 
sample bidders may well be regular bidders or engaged in an M&A programme even though they appear in 
the sample only once. The results for the sub-samples of repeating and non-repeating bidders are reported in 
Appendix II. 
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U.K. studies such as Baker and Limmack (2001), Gregory (1997) and Sudarsanam and 
Mahate (2003) which all confirm significantly negative long-term BHAR to the U.K. 
bidders measured using various portfolio return benchmarks. 
Similar to Panel D, Panels E through H display no evidence of significant BHAR to 
any of the sample cross-class bidders, with one exception of bidders that acquired only 
private targets and divested subsidiaries135• Though consistent with Higson and Elliott 
(1998) and several recent U.S. studies, the lack of significance of BHAR in Panels D 
through H in itself still raises concern about the power of tests based on control-firm return 
such as ones from which the results in Table 4.3 are derived (see Lyon et al., 1999; also 
Dong et al., 2002). 
135 Private-subsidiary bidders earn positive median sterling BHAR that is significant in the 24- and 36-month 
windows (at the 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively). 
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Table 4.3 
Long-Term Post-Acquisition Bidder Abnormal Return: 
Control-Firm Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 -December 
1998. All bidders are U.K.-listed companies. The bidder classes or portfolios are mutually exclusive. 
For each r-month window, where r = 12, 24 or 36, control firms are chosen on size and BM ratio using 
the sequential-sorting procedure in Barber and Lyon (1997a). Control firms are sorted at the end of the 
completion month plus one day. Potential control firms must make no acquisition within r months 
before the completion month. When the chosen control fmn announces an acquisition or becomes 
delisted before the end of the window or the delisting date of the bidder, it is dropped and return to the 
control firm with the next-closest BM ratio is spliced in on a point-forward basis. If the bidder becomes 
delisted before the window ends, the return calculation is truncated at the beginning of the bidder's 
delisting month. BHAR over a r-month window is calculated for each bidder as: 
BHAR;r = f};=l [I+ Ril ]- n;=l [l + E(Ru )], where Ril and E(Ru) are monthly return to bidder i and its 
control firm, respectively. Abnormal percentage BHAR to a bidder portfolio, BHARr, is calculated by 
averaging BHAR;r s with equal weighting. Abnormal sterling BHAR to a bidder portfolio, PBHARr, is 
calculated by averaging the terms [ MV;,o · BHAR;r ] with equal weighting. MV;,o is MV (£mil) of 
bidder i at the beginning of the window. MV;,o is standardised using the price level of theFT All Share 
Index observed at each point in time. January I995 is used as the base period. The significance level for 
BHARr and PBHARr is determined using the t-statistJcs computed as: 
t BHAR = BHARr ;a-BHARr · .j;;, and t PBHAR = PBHARr/( 13-BHAR, ~L7=l MV;:o) · n, respectively. 
13- BHARr is the cross-sectional sample standard deviation. The significance level for median BHAR, 
both percentage and sterling, is computed using the Wilcoxon sign-rank test. In brackets is the number 
of takeovers in each bidder portfolio. VW average percentage abnormal return is equivalent to and has 
the same /-statistic value as EW average sterling abnormal return. VW median percentage BHAR is 
detennined as median sterling BHAR divided by the corresponding MV;,o, and therefore has no 
applicable test statistic. •. band c denote significance at the 0.0 I, 0.05 and O.I 0 levels, respectively. 
12 Months 24 Months 36 Months 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A: ALL [1,978] 
EW 1.35% 0.28% -3.08% -2.23% -5.09%c -0.31% 
Sterling -9.115 0.070 -44.063 -0.587 -31.395 -0.160 
vw -1.31% 0.22% -6.35% -6.36% -4.53% -3.64% 
Panel B: Private-Firm Bidders [667] 
EW 1.55% 1.15% -6.14% -3.90% -12.52%b -2.76% 
Sterling 10.178 0.160 14.007 -0.773 17.614 -0.505 
vw 2.34% 2.34% -17.28% -17.28% -0.26% -0.26% 
Panel C: Subsidiary Bidders [251] 
EW -4.59% -4.10% -17.03%a -13.01%a -16.40%a -10.69%b 
Sterling 24.313 -0.338 -136.158 -9.239a -205.900 -4.989 
vw 2.12% -9.97% -11.88% -8.35% -17.96% -2.63% 
Panel D: Public-Firm Bidders [55] 
EW -5.28% 1.14% -20.25%c -11.47% -10.74% 2.80% 
Sterling -26.689 1.648 -181.435 -10.760 -49.623 2.089 
vw -2.34% 7.19% -15.88% -34.51% -4.34% 16.77% 
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Table 4.3 -continued 
12 Months 24 Months 36 Months 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel E: Private-Subsidiary Bidders [655] 
EW 3.74% 0.92% 4.46% 7.33% 2.44% 5.86% 
Sterling -5.844 0.370 -37.414 3.704b 14.000 4.125c 
vw -0.88% 5.37% -5.61% 5.45% 2.10% 11.32% 
Panel F: Private-Public Bidders [69] 
EW -2.06% -10.51% -4.74% -6.13% -3.07% -10.20% 
Sterling -25.288 -5.068 -61.033 -2.158 -82.795 -3.041 
vw -6.70% -2.79% -16.18% -41.38% -21.95% -54.18% 
Panel G: Subsidiary-Public Bidders [50] 
EW -3.69% -1.21% -6.85% -8.21% 3.30% -6.04% 
Sterling -28.046 0.272 -0.171 -7.104 481.504 -6.004 
vw -1.00% 0.29% -0.01% -70.12% 17.12% -11.37% 
Panel H: All-Targets Bidders [231] 
EW 4.15% -3.48% 4.89% -7.47% 6.20% -0.92% 
Sterling -97.305 -4.933 -102.247 -9.304 -203.334 -1.394 
vw -7.30% -12.95% -7.67% -12.76% -15.25% -20.29% 
B. Event-Time Fama-French Three-Factor Model Abnormal Return 
In order to assess robustness of long-term bidder abnormal return measured in 
event time, Table 4.4 reports BHAR computed using the FF 3-Factor model. Unlike 
control-firm BHAR, Panel A of Table 4.4 reports strong evidence of significantly negative 
BHAR to bidders in the full sample. The OLS and MAD estimators both yield 
significantly negative BHAR, whether measured in percentage or sterling, to the sample 
bidders. These results are in line with the significantly negative daily abnormal return to 
the U.S. bidders during the second and third years post-acquisition reported by Loderer and 
Martin (1992). The Panel A results are also consistent with the significant 12-month CAR 
of -3.72% to the U.S. bidders of Canadian targets, but inconsistent with the insignificant 
CAR of -0.63% to the Canadian bidders in Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) 136. 
136 Loderer and Martin ( 1992, p. 71) estimate post-acquisition daily abnormal return as the intercept term of a 
market model modified to control for the size effect. Loderer and Martin's ( 1992) sample includes bidders of 
privately held targets. Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) compute monthly abnormal return as the prediction error 
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In comparison to the control-firm-based results, Panel B of Table 4.4 documents 
much stronger evidence of significant losses to bidders acquiring only private targets. The 
OLS and MAD estimators both confirm significantly negative percentage BHAR in the 24-
and 36-month windows. Evidence of wealth losses is qualitatively similar when the 
repeating and non-repeating bidders of private targets are separately examined. As 
reported in Panel C, the FF 3-Factor model (in comparison to the control-firm benchmark) 
also produces stronger evidence of negative BHAR to bidders acquiring only divested 
subsidiaries. The percentage BHAR to subsidiary bidders is similar to that earned by 
private-firm bidders in Panel B, but the sterling BHAR to subsidiary bidders is 
significantly negative in all windows. The OLS and MAD estimators give consistent 
results. 
As with the results in Panels B and C, the FF 3-Factor model again generally gives 
stronger evidence of BHAR for public-firm bidders in Panel D. The sample bidders that 
acquired only listed targets during the sample period experience significantly negative 
percentage BHAR, either OLS- or MAD- estimated, particularly over the 24- and 36-
month period following the acquisition. However, the corresponding sterling BHAR, 
either OLS- or MAD-estimated, is insignificant in all windows, indicating that it is the 
smaller bidders that underperform. Although the percentage results are inconsistent with 
the insignificant abnormal return to the U.S. tender offer sample in Loderer and Martin 
(1992), they are in line with the existing U.K. studies that measure abnormal return using 
an asset pricing model (e.g., Greogry, 1997; Limmack, 1991). 
of the CAPM regression model. Eckbo and Thorburn's (2000) sample also includes takeovers of privately 
held targets. 
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When the results in Panels B through D are viewed together, it is observed that 
there is no systematic pattern of differences in percentage BHAR between private-firm and 
subsidiary bidders. On the other hand, percentage BHAR to private-firm bidders appears 
to be less negative than that to public-firm bidders137. An independent-samples t-test 
allowing for unequal variances shows that BHAR significantly (at the 0.01 level) differs 
between these two bidder classes in the 24- and 36-month windows when the OLS 
estimator is used, and in the 36-month window when the MAD estimator is used 138• 
Although this difference in BHAR may be attributable to the relative size effects, it does 
not change the event-time FF 3-Factor model findings that shareholders in public-firm 
bidders suffer larger losses than those in private-firm bidders do. 
Strong evidence of negative BHAR continues to be observed among the sample 
cross-class bidders. Together with the BM and q characteristics of the cross-class bidders 
exhibited in Panel C of Table 4.1, the results in Panels E through H of Table 4.4 show that 
these bidders typically perform poorly in the long run after making acquisitions 
irrespective of their pre-takeover market valuation. As shown in Panels E and F, BHAR to 
private-subsidiary and private-public bidders is significantly negative only in a percentage 
term. On the other hand, Panels G and H report significantly negative percentage and 
137 Comparisons of sterling BHAR are not made since private-firm bidders are significantly smaller than 
subsidiary and public-firm bidders (see Section 4.3.2). 
138 It is also possible to test the difference(s) in a~h among j bidder portfolios simultaneously by adding 
j -1 dummy variables to equation (4.4). The coefficient of the dummy variables then provides a measure of 
the difference in a~h among j bidder portfolios. For either the OLS or MAD estimator, however, this 
dummy regression approach assumes that all bidder portfolios have identical or very similar loadings for the 
market, SMB and HML factors, and the portfolios differ from each other only in the level of abnormal return, 
i.e., their intercept. Given the pre-takeover size and BM characteristics of the sample bidders reported in 
Panels 8 and C of Table 4.1, it is almost certain that this assumption does not hold. Consequently, the use of 
regression dummies would give problematic results. An independent-samples t-test is not affected by this 
assumption although it does not allow for possible dependence between bidder portfolios. To the extent that 
equation (4.4) is by construction an event-time model of expected return, the assumption of cross-sectional 
independence is consistent with the model. The t-test only requires mean, standard deviation and sample 
size, all of which are readily available from running either OLS or MAD regression models. 
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sterling BHAR to subsidiary-public bidders and bidders acquiring targets of all types, 
suggesting that underperformance exists among both large and small bidders in these two 
final bidder classes. Based on the FF 3-Factor model, the evidence of negative BHAR to 
cross-class bidders is thus strongest for subsidiary-public and all-targets bidders. 
Table 4.4 
Long-Term Post-Acquisition Bidder Abnormal Return: 
Event-Time Fama-French Three-Factor Model Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995- December 
1998. All bidders are U.K.-listed companies. The bidder classes or portfolios are mutually exclusive. 
Over each r-month window, where= 12, 24 and 36, BHAR to a bidder portfolio is computed using the 
event Fama-French Three-Factor model estimated as the regression model: 
Rbh -Rbh =abh +f3bh(Rbh -Rbh)+sbhiSMBbh)+hbh(HMLbh)+ebh 
IT jr T T mT jr T ~ T T T IT ' 
Rf; is buy-and-hold return over a r-month window to bidder i. R}~ is buy-and-hold risk-free return. 
R!~ is buy-and-hold return on the value-weighted market index. SMB~h and HML~h are buy-and-
hold return on portfolios mimicking the size and BM risk factors, respectively. a~h thus measures 
EW percentage BHAR over a r-month window to a bidder portfolio. Sterling BHAR to a bidder 
portfolio is computed by pre-multiplying the terms (Rf,h - R}~), (R!h, - R}~ ), (sMB~h) and (HML~h) 
with MV (£mil) of bidder i at the beginning of the event window (MV;,o). The regression model is 
then re-run to yield a;bh as the measure of EW sterling BHAR to a bidder portfolio over a r-month 
window. MV;,o is standardised using the price level of the FT All Share Index observed at each point 
in time. January 1995 is used as the base period. Both the ordinary least square (OLS) and minimum 
absolute deviation (MAD) estimators are computed. For the OLS estimators, the significance level is 
computed using White's (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. In brackets is the number 
of takeovers in each bidder portfolio. a, h and c denote significance at the 0.0 I, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. 
Ordinar~ Least Sguare Minimum Absolute Deviation 
12 24 36 12 24 36 
Months Months Months Months Months Months 
Panel A: ALL [2,004] 
EW -7.26%a -29.19%a -30.91 %a -4.73%a -23.13%a -19.85%a 
Sterling -33.580a -51.684b -61.383a -18.361a -38.911 a -59.225a 
Panel B: Private-Firm Bidders [678] 
EW -4.15% -28.04%a -26.98%a -0.88% -23.32%a -14.44%b 
Sterling -14.180b -41.203c -37.293 -6.597 -21.231 -18.162b 
Panel C: Subsidiary Bidders [257] 
EW -11.73%b -26.67%a -29.38%a -7.48% -17.38%b -27.22%b 
Sterling -143.165a -190.466a -156.834a -55.959a -86.911 b -113.487a 
Panel D: Public-Firm Bidders [56] 
EW -13.18%c -41.25%b -76.98%a -6.70% -22.85%b -60.37%c 
Sterling -27.258 64.682 3.994 -13.612 13.822 -6.619 
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Table 4.4- continued 
Ordinary Least Sguare Minimum Absolute Deviation 
12 24 36 12 24 36 
Months Months Months Months Months Months 
Panel E: Private-Subsidiary Bidders [ 661] 
EW -5.05% -30.31%3 -30.76%3 -4.56% -22.37%3 -16.83%b 
Sterling -24.023 6.202 -4.942 -11.259 -16.614 -47.030c 
Panel F: Private-Public Bidders [69] 
EW -19.00%3 -32.90%3 -58.37%b -18.14%3 -29.49%3 -45.74%b 
Sterling -32.380 -27.038 -26.130 -13.536 -5.925 2.858 
Panel G: Subsidiary-Public Bidders [50] 
EW -31.47%b -14.96% -29.62% -28.09%c -18.58% -31.98% 
Sterling -26.180 -313.082b -424.8823 -32.433 -263.795c -324.6773 
Panel H: All-Targets Bidders [233] 
EW -9.75%c -24.64%3 -21.84%b -4.13% -22.38%b -17.48% 
Sterling -10.652 -141.3923 -166.0563 -33.541 c -122.7943 -128.253a 
C. Calendar-Time Rolling Portfolio Abnormal Return 
The results reported in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 are not free from the effect of cross-
sectional correlations among abnormal returns, and their significance may be overstated. 
Table 4.5 reports long-term abnormal return to the sample bidders calculated as an average 
or median of calendar-time rolling portfolio monthly returns. For the full sample, Panel A 
shows that bidder shareholders start suffering significant wealth losses in the second year 
following the takeover. The mean monthly abnormal return, either EW or VW, is 
significantly (at the 0.05 level) negative in the 24-month window. Though weaker (at the 
0.10 level), both EW and VW median abnormal returns confirm the 24-month parametric 
results. Although only the mean abnormal return, either EW or VW, is significantly 
negative in the 36-month window, the Panel A results are generally consistent with the 
significantly negative mean monthly abnormal return to the U.K. bidders of domestic 
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targets in Conn et al. 's (2002) sample, and with the significantly negative CAR to the U.S. 
bidders in the full merger sample in Rau and Vermaelen (1998) 139. 
The evidence of abnormal return to private-firm bidders, as exhibited in Panel B of 
Table 4.5, is mixed. The VW gains are significantly positive in both mean and median in 
the 12-month window (at the 0.10 level), and in median in the 36-month window (at the 
0.05 level). However, the 24-month EW mean and 36-month EW median gains are also 
significantly (at the 0.10 level) negative. The Panel B results therefore indicate that, once 
the effect of the cross-sectional correlations is controlled for, private-firm bidders on 
balance earn a normal rate of return in the long run following the deal completion. 
As shown in Panel C of Table 4.5, abnormal return to subsidiary bidders is 
significantly negative when calculated as EW return, and in both mean and median. These 
significant wealth losses start in the second year following the completion month and 
persist through the third post-acquisition year. At variance with private-firm bidders, Panel 
C of Table 4.5 hence suggests that the significantly negative post-acquisition abnormal 
return to subsidiary bidders observed in event time in Table 4.3 prevails even after the 
effect of the cross-sectional correlations has been removed. 
Similarity between the results in Tables 4.3 and 4.5 is observed for the comparison 
sample of public-firm bidders. In none of the three windows is there any reliable trace of 
significant abnormal return observed in Panel D of Table 4.5. These findings are in line 
with the insignificant long-term bidder abnormal return reported in the earlier U.K. and 
U.S. studies of public-firm takeovers by Firth (1980) and Mandelker (1974), 
139 Rau and Vermaelen (1998) also report a test statistic for their CAR calculated allowing for the cross-
sectional correlations using Brown and Warner's (1980) Crude Dependence Adjustment (CDA) procedure. 
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respectively 140• The Panel D results are also consistent with the insignificant CDA-based 
CAR, which allows for the cross-sectional correlations, to the U.S. public-firm bidders in 
each of the three post-acquisition years in the tender offer sample in Rau and Vermaelen 
(1998). The findings documented in Panel D of Table 4.5 thus add to the existing body of 
evidence of insignificant calendar-time abnormal return to the U.K. public-firm bidders 
and the U.S. bidders in tender offers. 
With an exception of the large and significant 24-month VW abnormal return to 
private-public bidders, there is no evidence of significant abnormal return to any of the 
sample cross-class bidders in Panels E through H of Table 4.5. The significant VW 
abnormal return to private-public bidders suggests that it is the larger bidders in this bidder 
class that significantly underperform. Nevertheless, the results for the cross-class bidders 
in Table 4.5 are generally similar to their event-time counterparts reported in Table 4.3. 
Interestingly, the significance of the results for the full sample in Panel A of Table 
4.5 is generally notably higher and more frequent than that of the even-time results in 
Panel A of Table 4.3. For other panels of these two tables, there exists no discernable 
pattern that the number of significant abnormal returns is greater under the event-time 
approach than the calendar-time approach. Measuring abnormal return in calendar time for 
the sample bidders in this chapter is therefore apparently unaffected in any identifiable 
fashion by the loss of power to detect abnormal return caused by assigning equal weights 
to hot and cold months as pointed out by Loughran and Ritter (2000). 
140 Mandelker (1974) calculates portfolio abnormal return in each calendar month as an EW average 
prediction error of an asset pricing model in Fama and MacBeth (1973). For the 10- and 20-month post-
acquisition windows, which are the only windows in which statistical significance is reported, Mandelker 
(1974) fmds insignificant bidder abnormal return of 0.06% and 0.03% per month, respectively. Employing 
the calendar-time methodology similar to Mandelker (1974), Firth (1980) finds 36-month CAR of only 
0.0 l %, which is both economically and statistically insignificant, to successful bidders. 
Table 4.5 
Long-Term Post-Acquisition Bidder Abnormal Return: 
Calendar-Time Rolling Portfolio Monthly Abnormal Return 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 -
December 1998. All bidders are U.K.-listed companies. The bidder classes or portfolios are 
mutually exclusive. In each calendar month, abnormal return is calculated for each bidder as the 
difference between return to the bidder and return to its size-BM-matched control firm. EW or 
VW average abnormal return in month t (MARt) is then calculated for a portfolio of bidders that 
made an acquisition within the previous r calendar months. The mean monthly abnormal return is 
then calculated for a bidder portfolio as: MMARP = 1/m{L;:1MARt ), where m is the number of 
months in the time series of MARt. The significance level for MMARP is computed based on 
the following !-statistic: t MMAR = MMARP I cT MAR, . rm' where cT MARt is the intertemporal 
standard deviation of MARt . The significance level for the median monthly abnormal return is 
computed using the Wilcoxon sign-rank test. In brackets is the number of takeovers in each 
bidder portfolio. For the details of control firm selection, see Table 4.3. a, b and c denote 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, resEectivel~. 
12 Months 24 Months 36 Months 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A: ALL [1 ,978] 
EW -0.13% 0.23% -0.65%b -0.29%c -0.58%b -0.23% 
vw -0.63% -0.17% -0.80%b -0.53%c -0.68%c -0.13% 
Panel B: Private-Firm Bidders [667] 
EW 0.30% 0.09% -0.53%c -0.20% -0.55% -0.24%c 
vw 0.62%c 0.79%c -1.13% 0.46% 0.16% 0.95%b 
Panel C: Subsidiary Bidders [251] 
EW -0.29% -0.08% -0.83%b -0.59%b -0.57%b -0.61 %b 
vw 0.07% 0.47% -0.38% -0.36% -0.44% 0.01% 
Panel D: Public-Firm Bidders [55] 
EW -0.84% -1.03% -0.71% -0.70%c -0.35% -0.70% 
vw -0.58% -0.14% -0.85% -0.58% -0.21% -0.78% 
Panel E: Private-Subsidiary Bidders [655] 
EW 0.13% 0.03% -0.05% 0.22% -0.26% -0.01% 
vw 0.06% 0.06% -0.39% -0.67% -0.19% -0.61% 
Panel F: Private-Public Bidders [69] 
EW 0.23% 0.71% -0.67% -0.70% -0.31% 0.28% 
vw -0.88% -0.76% -1.29%b -0.96%c -0.46% 0.28% 
Panel G: Subsidiary-Public Bidders [50] 
EW 0.05% -0.61% -0.76% -0.37% 0.05% -0.07% 
vw -0.05% 0.20% -0.73% -0.55% -0.24% -0.16% 
Panel H: All-Targets Bidders [231] 
EW 0.43% 0.25% -0.35% 0.17% -0.23% 0.15% 
vw -0.84% -0.88% -0.49% -0.71% -0.73% -0.71% 
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D. Calendar-Time Fama-French Three-Factor Model Abnormal Return 
As an alternative to the calendar-time rolling portfolio results reported above, post-
acquisition monthly bidder abnormal return is also estimated using the calendar-time FF 3-
Factor model. The CT FF 3-Factor model results, which are reported in Table 4.6, also 
provide the calendar-time equivalent of the event-time FF 3-Factor model results. For the 
full sample, Panel A demonstrates strong and persistent underperformance of the VW 
bidder portfolio. In all windows, this underperformance is significant at the 0.01 level and 
confirmed by both the OLS and MAD estimators141 . The EW portfolio also earn negative 
monthly abnormal return, but one that is only weakly significant and the OLS and MAD 
estimators confirm the result only in the 24-month window. Nevertheless, the magnitude 
of the significant underperformance reported in Panel A is generally in line with the 
significantly negative abnormal return to the U.K. bidders in the domestic sample in Conn 
et al. (2002) 142. 
Since both the full sample in Panel A and the sample in Conn et al. (2002) include 
takeovers of unlisted targets (either privately held or subsidiaries), the similarity between 
the Panel A results and the findings of Conn et al. (2002) provides support for Baker and 
Limmack (200 1)' s findings. Baker and Limmack (200 1) find that controlling for the effect 
of prior performance does not eliminate the pattern of significantly negative abnormal 
return to the U.K. bidders. On the other hand, the results in Panel A are inconsistent with 
141 The model generally has adequate explanatory power. The adjusted OLS R 2 for the full VW sample is 
84.20%, 87.28% and 90.71% for the 12-, 24- and 36-month windows, respectively. These adjusted R 2 
values are comparable to those reported in the previous studies (see Ang and Kohers, 2001; Gregory, 1997; 
Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; Stegemoller, 2001). For the full EW sample, the adjusted OLS R 2 values are 
lower: 61.40%, 57.13% and 60.53% for the 12-, 24- and 36-month windows, respectively. The adjusted 
MAD R2 values are very similar for both EW and VW portfolios. 
142 Employing only the 36-month post-acquisition window, Conn eta!. (2002) compute calendar-time long-
term bidder abnormal return using a six-factor model, i.e., the traditional CT FF 3-Factor model plus 
premiums on portfolios mimicking past performance, industry effects and dividend yield effects. Conn et a/. 
(2002) use only an EW portfolio in computing bidder abnormal return. 
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the insignificant abnormal return reported for the U.S. bidders in the full sample in Moeller 
eta!. (2004) 143 . 
For the sample private-firm bidders, Panel B of Table 4.6 documents results similar 
to those based on the rolling portfolio approach, but contrary to those derived from the use 
of the event-time FF 3-Factor model. As shown in Panel B, there is no trace of significant 
post-acquisition abnormal return to private-firm bidders. Supportive of the rolling 
portfolio results, the CT FF 3-Factor model results in Panel B hence demonstrate that after 
removing the effect of the cross-sectional correlations among abnormal returns, 
shareholders in bidders acquiring only privately held targets breakeven in the long run 
following the deal completion. Further, the similarity between the two sets of calendar-
time results for private-firm bidders suggests that the tendency of the FF 3-Factor model to 
overprice small low-BM firms observed in several U.S. studies does not appear to pose a 
nontrivial concern for the small, low-BM sample bidders in this chapter144 . 
The results in Panel C of Table 4.6 verify the patterns of abnormal return to 
subsidiary bidders observed when using the previous three alternative methodologies. 
Similar in both magnitude and significance to the rolling portfolio approach results, Panel 
C also documents significantly negative abnormal return to subsidiary bidders. Both the 
OLS and MAD estimators yield generally consistent results. With reference to the 
corresponding event-time FF 3-Factor model results, the evidence of significant abnormal 
return reported in Panel C of Table 4.6 is less strong. However, this is not surprising since 
abnormal return in Table 4.6 is net of the effect ofthe cross-sectional correlations. 
143 Moeller et a/. (2004) use the CT FF 3-Factor model with the Carhart (1997) momentum factor as an 
expected return model. 
144 For example, Brav (2000), Fama and French (1993) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000). 
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Panel D of Table 4.6 reports abnormal return to the sample public-firm bidders. 
While the VW portfolio breakevens in all three windows, the EW portfolio earns 
significantly negative abnormal return in the 12- and 36-month windows. Both the OLS 
and MAD estimators yield consistent results. The disappearance of significance with the 
use of a VW portfolio is consistent with Mitchell and Stafford's (2000) observation for 
their sample U.S. bidders of public targets. Although the significance of these negative 
EW abnormal returns is somewhat weak, their magnitude is economically material ranging 
from -0.79% (MAD) in the 36-month window to -1.44% (OLS) per month in the 12-month 
window. These calendar-time results are in line with the results derived using the even-
time FF 3-Factor model, indicating that the wealth losses suffered by shareholders in a 
typical public-firm bidder prevail even after controlling for the cross-sectional correlations. 
This calendar-time evidence is consistent with the significant 24-month EW monthly 
abnormal return of -0.99% to the U.K. public-firm bidders reported by Gregory (1997). 
The Panel D results are also in line with the findings of Agrawal eta!. (1992) that the U.S. 
public-firm bidders earn significantly negative abnormal return up to five years following 
the acquisition145 • When Agrawal eta!. (1992) examine the bidders in their tender offer 
sample separately, however, their unreported results indicate insignificant abnormal 
performance. 
With reference to the rolling portfolio approach results, the abnormal return pattern 
emerging from Panel D of Table 4.6 is consistent with Lyon et al.' s ( 1999) observation 
that the use of the FF 3-Factor model is likely to provide more powerful tests of long-term 
abnormal return. Because the rolling portfolio approach in Section 4.4.3 uses control-firm 
145 Agrawal et at. (1992) compute long-term bidder abnormal return as the prediction errors of the CAPM 
adjusted for the beta of a size-matched portfolio adopted in Dimson and Marsh ( 1986). Agrawal et a/. ( 1992) 
employ Brown and Warner's (1980) CDA procedure in computing the test statistics. The authors also 
compute test statistics using the calendar-time rolling portfolio approach, and find similar results. 
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return as benchmark return, the much lower level of significance it produces is possibly 
attributable to the loss of power arising from the use of control-firm return. Such 
variations in statistical significance are also observed between the two sets of event-time 
results reported above. 
Except for the all-targets bidders in Panel H of Table 4.6 for which there is no 
reliable evidence of wealth losses, the pattern of stronger significance associated with 
using the CT FF 3-Factor model continues to persist among the sample cross-class bidders. 
The cross-class bidders in Panels E through G generally experience significantly negative 
VW abnormal return, computed using either the OLS or MAD estimator. Although the 
difference in VW abnormal return among the bidders in Panels E through G is 
insignificant, the losses appear largest for subsidiary-public bidders (in Panel G)146• EW 
abnormal return, either OLS- or MAD-estimated, to subsidiary-public bidders is also large 
and significantly negative in all three windows- ranging from -1.19% (OLS) in the 36-
month window to -2.03% (OLS) per month in the 12-month window, suggesting that both 
small and large acquirers in this bidder class significantly underperform during the post-
acquisition phase. 
In addition to the inference about relative performance of large bidders in the 
portfolio, the observed significance of VW abnormal returns reported in Table 4.6 also has 
bearings on one ofthe bad-model problems pointed out by Fama (1998). Fama and French 
(1993) note that the FF 3-Factor model tends to consistently misprice small high-growth 
146 Only the differences among OLS-estimated abnormal returns are tested. These differences are tested 
using Zellner's (1962) technique of the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR). Since the SUR technique 
explicitly controls for the effects of groupwise heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlations in the 
regression disturbances, the lack of significance of these differences is not a complete surprise. Because no 
equivalent technique is available for the MAD estimation, differences among MAD-estimated abnormal 
returns cannot be tested in a similar fashion. Given that the OLS and MAD estimators provide similar results 
in Table 4.6, there no reasons to expect the SUR results to be driven by the presence of outliers in any 
important way. 
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firms. Because an EW portfolio of event firms effectively gives more weight to small 
firms, Fama (1998) maintains that equally weighting the event portfolio is likely to lead to 
significant abnormal return being observed more often than when using value weighting 
(see also Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). Fama (1998, p. 296) further notes that significant 
EW abnormal return observed in many existing long-term event studies "shrink a lot and 
often disappears" once return is value-weighted. The stronger significance of VW 
abnormal return observed in Panel A indicates that bidder abnormal return documented in 
this chapter generally survives the value-weighting scheme. Indeed, VW abnormal return 
to the bidder portfolios in Panels E through G of Table 4.6 is also large and strongly 
significant. Moreover, the strong significance of sterling BHAR is also observed in 
various Panels of Table 4.4. 
Table 4.6 
Long-Term Post-Acquisition Bidder Abnormal Return: 
Calendar-Time Fama-lFrench Three-Factor Model Monthly Abnormal Return 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 -
December 1998. All bidders are U.K.-listed companies. The main bidder classes or portfolios 
are mutually exclusive. For each bidder portfolio, monthly abnormal return is estimated over 
three different windows: 12, 24 and 36 months following the completion month. For each 
calendar month, EW or VW average return, Rpt, is calculated for a portfolio of bidders that 
made an acquisition within the previous 12, 24 or 36 calendar months. Monthly abnormal 
return is calculated using the calendar-time Fama-French Three-Factor model estimated as the 
regression model: 
RP1 -Rft =ap +fJp(Rmt -Rft)+spSMB1 +hpHML1 +&pt· 
Rm1 is return on the value-weighted market index, and R ft is return (Bond Equivalent Yield) 
on the 3-month T-Bill in month t. SMB1 is return (EW or VW) to small firms minus return 
(EW or VW) to large firms in month t. HML1 is return (EW or VW) to high-BM firms minus 
return (EW or VW) to low-BM firms in month t. a P is the measure of monthly abnormal 
return to a bidder portfolio during an event window. Both the ordinary least square (OLS) and 
minimum absolute deviation (MAD) estimators are computed. For the OLS estimator, the 
significance level of a p is computed using White's (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors. Where the first-order autocorrelation is detected, Andrews' (1991) automatic-
bandwidth heteroscedasticity-autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are used to estimate the 
significance level. In brackets is the number of takeovers in each bidder portfolio. a, b and c 
denote significance at the 0.0 1, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Ordinary Least Square Minimum Absolute Deviation 
12 24 36 12 24 36 
Months Months Months Months Months Months 
Panel A: ALL [2,004] 
EW -0.70% -0.81 %c -0.66%c -0.57% -0.72%c -0.45% 
vw -0.86%a -0.57%a -0.47%a -0.72%a -0.61 %a -0.46%a 
Panel B: Private-Firm Bidders [678] 
EW -0.42% -0.72% -0.68% -0.24% -0.57% -0.43% 
vw 0.67% -0.78% 0.20% 0.66% 0.14% 0.35% 
Panel C: Subsidiary Bidders (257] 
EW -0.96%b -0.99%b -0.73%c -0.98%b -0.95%b -0.61% 
vw -0.42% -0.27% -0.55%c -0.36% -0.22% -0.45% 
Panel D: Public-Firm Bidders (56] 
EW -1.44%c -0.99%c -1.04%b -1.36%c -0.79% -0.79%c 
vw -0.98% -0.31% -0.08% -0.70% -0.36% 0.06% 
Panel E: Private-Subsidiary Bidders (661] 
EW -0.89% -0.67%c -0.63%c -0.80% -0.49% -0.43% 
vw -1.05%a -0.79%a -0.51% -0.96%a -0.80%a -0.71 %b 
Panel F: Private-Public Bidders [69] 
EW -0.33% -0.74% -0.17% -0.28% -0.69% -0.19% 
vw -0.75%b -1.28%b -1.12%b -0.59% -1.16%b -1.04%b 
Panel G: Subsidiary-Public Bidders (50] 
EW -2.03%b -1.73%a -1.19%b -1.71 %b -1.58%a -0.96%c 
vw -1.35%b -1.24%b -0.61% -0.96%b -1.14%b -0.61% 
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Table 4.6 - Continued 
Ordinary Least Square Minimum Absolute Deviation 
12 24 36 12 24 36 
Months Months Months Months Months Months 
Panel H: All-Targets Bidders [233] 
EW -0.42% -0.69% -0.32% -0.21% -0.71 o/oc -0.22% 
vw -0.91 o/oc -0.27% -0.56% -0.69% -0.44% -0.49% 
E. Summary 
The results reported in Tables 4.3 through 4.6 together demonstrate the importance 
of use of several alternative methodologies in examining long-term post-acquisition 
abnormal return to the U.K. bidders. Specifically, both magnitude and significance of 
abnormal return to the sample bidders generally appear sensitive to the choice of an 
expected return model. This draws attention to the sensitivity of long-term abnormal 
return previously observed with the U.K. data (see Dimson and Marsh, 1986; Franks et al., 
1988; Franks and Harris, 1989). In particular, Franks and Harris (1989) find that average 
long-term CAR to the U.K. public-firm bidders is significantly positive when measured 
against VW market return and expected return generated by the CAPM, but significantly 
negative when measured using the market model147 . The sensitivity of the results in this 
chapter is also broadly similar to the findings of Franks et al. (1991) that once several asset 
pricing models are used, there is no reliable evidence that the U.S. public-firm bidders in 
mergers and/or tender offers earn significant post-acquisition abnormal return. 
For several bidder portfolios or classes, comparisons of results between Tables 4.3 
and 4.4 and between Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show that the use of control-firm return as 
benchmark return tends to give less powerful tests than the FF 3-Factor model. This 
147 Franks and Harris (1989, p.245) explain: "the differences in model results are directly attributable, in this 
case, to the cumulative effects of subtracting the a values from the realised returns of bidding companies 
when the market model is used". 
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appears to be the case in both event time and calendar time. The results documented above 
are also sensitive to the choice between event-time and calendar-time calculations of 
return. When return is calculated in calendar time, abnormal return to several bidder 
portfolios decreases in magnitude and significance. For several portfolios, calendar-time 
calculation reduces the strong significance of event-time abnormal return to mere 
insignificance. This implies that, for several bidder classes, abnormal returns are cross-
sectionally correlated which, as extensively noted in the literature, leads to inflated 
statistical significance. An obvious case in point is the results based on the FF 3-Factor 
model for all-targets bidders in Panel H of Tables 4.4 and 4.6. While the event-time results 
for these bidders show strong evidence of significant abnormal return, the calendar-time 
results show virtually no trace of significant abnormal return. Given that all-targets are the 
most frequent bidders in the sample, averaging around six targets per bidder 
[233 + 38 = 6.13] as displayed in Panel C of Table 4.1, the disappearance of the 
significance of the abnormal return to these bidders observed in Table 4.6 is not surprising. 
Despite the apparent sensitivity to the choice of methodologies, several interesting 
patterns of abnormal return come into view. When abnormal return is estimated in event 
time, bidders in the principal portfolio in this chapter, i.e., bidders acquiring only private 
targets, suffer long-term post-acquisition losses only when using the event-time Fama-
French Three-Factor model. Once the effect of the cross-sectional correlations has been 
eliminated, on the other hand, private-firm bidders earn insignificant abnormal return 
irrespective of the choice of benchmark return, i.e., either control-firm return or the Fama-
French Three-Factor model. Hence, while only one of the models designed to capture 
investors' experience indicates long-term losses for private-firm bidders, both of the 
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models that control for the cross-sectional correlations provide evidence that these bidders 
breakeven in the long run following the deal completion. 
As revealed in Panel A of Table 3.1, private targets and divested subsidiaries have 
strikingly similar relative size. Yet, the strongest and most robust pattern belongs to 
abnormal return to bidders acquiring only divested subsidiaries. The large and significant 
wealth losses experienced by subsidiary bidders survive all of the four methodologies 
adopted in this chapter. As a result, the small relative size of private targets is an unlikely 
explanation for the insignificance of abnormal return to private-firm bidders. It has also 
been found in several existing studies that long-term bidder abnormal return is generally 
not dependent on the relative size of targets (e.g., Agrawal et al., 1992; Franks et al., 1991; 
Loderer and Martin, 1992; Loughran and Vijh, 1997). 
While shareholders in private-firm bidders on balance breakeven, there is evidence 
that public-firm bidders suffer long-term post-acquisition losses even after controlling for 
the cross-sectional correlations. The use of control-firm return as benchmark return, either 
in event time or in calendar time, indicates that public-firm bidders do not experience 
significant long-term losses. Though well-specified in most sampling situations, the 
simulation results by Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999) show that 
insignificant control-firm abnormal return observed in the long run may well be due to the 
inherent lack of power of the use of control-firm return in relation to the Fama-French 
Three-Factor model. It is therefore possible that the insignificant results for the sample 
public-firm bidders in Tables 4.3 and 4.5 are attributable to the lack of power inherent in 
the use of control-firm return ex post. On the other hand, the use of the Fama-French 
Three-Factor model, either in event time or in calendar time, yields consistent evidence 
177 
that the sample public-firm bidders experience significant long-term losses following the 
deal completion. When also considering the implications of the simulations results by 
Barber and Lyon (1997) and Lyon et al. (1999), it is therefore only safe to infer from 
Tables 4.3 to 4.6 together that there is evidence of long-term losses for the sample public-
firm bidders. 
The patterns of abnormal return among the sample private-firm bidders, subsidiary 
bidders and public-firm bidders, as documented above, are inconsistent with the 
insignificant post-acquisition abnormal return to the U.S. bidders reported by Moeller et al. 
(2004). However, Moeller et al. (2004) do not isolate bidders acquiring two or more types 
of targets from those acquiring targets of only one status. Thus, an inadequate sub-
sampling procedure may possibly account for the evidence reported by Moeller et al. 
(2004). Among the sample cross-class bidders, the results reported in Panels E through H 
in Tables 4.4 and 4.6 together show that wealth losses appear largest when the M&A 
programme appears to involve no private target, i.e., for bidders acquiring only divested 
subsidiaries and public targets. 
4.5.2) Interpretations of Results 
The Wealth Maximisation hypothesis posits that managers of a private-firm bidder 
choose a target based on the expected synergy realisation and not on the amount of 
personal utility they obtain from acquiring the target. The hypothesis therefore predicts 
that private-firm bidders earn at least a normal rate of return during the post-acquisition 
period even when the takeover market is fully competitive. The evidence documented in 
Section 4.5.1 that shareholders in a private-firm bidder breakeven during the post-
acquisition period therefore supports the hypothesis. The evidence also indicates that the 
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relatively high pre-takeover market valuation (measured as the BM ratio and q proxy) 
observed in Table 4.1 for these bidders is likely to reflect their relatively low agency costs 
and/or superior ability of their managers in creating growth opportunities (e.g., Lang et al., 
1989; Servaes, 1991) rather than the effects of market overextrapolation of managers' past 
performance put forwards in Rau and Vermaelen (1998). 
In the agency-theoretic framework, the Wealth Maximisation hypothesis also 
provides a plausible explanation for the significant wealth losses documented for the 
sample subsidiary and public-firm bidders. First, these bidders do not appear to have been 
deterred by the prospect of the Shleifer and Vishny (1989) management entrenchment 
inherent in the dispersed ownership structure of divested subsidiaries and public targets. 
Secondly, the bidders are likely to be attracted to the larger size of divested subsidiaries, 
and to a greater extent, public targets vis-a-vis private targets. Thus, subsidiary, and 
especially, public-firm bidders are more likely to be empire-building bidders than wealth-
maximising bidders. In relation to private-firm bidders, the lower pre-takeover market 
valuation for and substantially larger size of subsidiary and public-firm bidders revealed in 
Table 4.1 appears supportive of this agency-theoretic explanation. 
As shown in Table 4.1 and discussed in Section 4.3.2, private-firm and subsidiary 
bidders pay the book-equity premium measured as the BVP ratio for their respective 
targets that does not significantly differ. Although the absence of market valuation for 
private targets gives the bidder managers considerable latitude for overpayment, there are 
two apparent reasons to believe that private-firm bidders did not overpay for their targets. 
These are (i) the insignificant post-acquisition abnormal return earned by the bidders, and 
(ii) the much lower level of agency conflicts in private targets due to their closely held 
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ownership. Moreover, the small size of private-firm bidders may serve to limit the hubris 
in their managers even when the market gives relatively high valuation for the firms (see 
Table 4.1 ). In contrast, the pre-takeover dispersed ownership of divested subsidiaries and 
ensuing agency conflicts suggest that subsidiary bidders may generally have paid too much 
for their targets. To the extent that managers of these bidders pursue their personal 
objectives, the absence of direct market valuation for divested subsidiaries serves to 
facilitate overpayment. Although the managerialism-driven overpayment for divested 
subsidiaries may not be observable at the bid announcement, it may be a plausible 
explanation for the post-acquisition losses earned by the bidders. 
If subsidiary bidders are empire-building bidders, then the substantially smaller size 
of divested subsidiaries in relation to public targets observed in Table 4.1 suggests that the 
degree of agency conflicts is likely to be less severe in subsidiary bidders than in public-
firm bidders. Yet, the evidence of wealth losses documented in Section 4.5 .1 is by no 
means less strong for subsidiary bidders than for public-firm bidders. To this extent, it is 
possible that the post-acquisition losses experienced by subsidiary bidders are attributable 
to factors other than agency conflicts in the bidders. 
If subsidiary bidders are not motivated by the empire-building objectives, their 
relatively low pre-takeover market valuation suggests that they may have been under 
pressure to respond to the market's perception that their growth prospects are poor. The 
Ease of Integration hypothesis implies that the pressure to buy quick and large growth can 
drive even a wealth-maximising bidder to choose a large target over a small target. The 
fact that divested subsidiaries are acquired off the market suggests among other things that 




for public targets. In this view, the wealth losses suffered by subsidiary bidders can be 
explained by the Ease of Integration hypothesis. Specifically, the dispersed ownership of 
divested subsidiaries makes the post-acquisition target integration difficult or problematic 
for their bidders. Consequently, subsidiary bidders suffer losses during the post-
acquisition period even though they may plausibly be wealth-maximising bidders. 
The Ease of Integration hypothesis is also supported by the comparative patterns of 
abnormal return generally observed among the sample bidders acquiring only targets of the 
same status. The closely held ownership of private targets suggests that private-firm 
bidders are likely to encounter very little or no target-side entrenchment or resistance by 
the target employees during the post-acquisition phase. For a given bidder, the smaller 
physical size of private targets means that they are likely to be much easier to integrate into 
the bidder's corporate structure. The dispersed ownership of divested subsidiaries and 
public targets coupled with their larger physical size implies the opposite for subsidiary 
and public-firm bidders. The evidence that gains to private-firm bidders are non-negative 
and gains to subsidiary and public-firm bidders are negative is consistent with this 
conjecture. The evidence is also supportive of Bhagat et al. 's (2002) finding that 
acquisition of a small target creates greater total gains per unit of investment than 
acquisition of a large target148. Since the pre-takeover market valuation is significantly 
higher for private-firm bidders (see Table 4.1), on the other hand, the evidence does not 
seem supportive of the findings of Dong et al. (2002) that bidders with higher pre-event 
market valuation underperform those with lower pre-event market valuation during the 
post-acquisition period. 
148 Bhagat et al. 's (2002) estimate total gains using bidder abnormal return and target abnormal return 
observed during the announcement period. Their sample includes only tender offers of the U.S. public 
targets. 
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The Wealth Maximisation and Ease of Integration hypotheses also provide 
plausible explanations for the abnormal return patterns observed among the sample cross-
class bidders. As shown in Table 4.1, subsidiary-public bidders (i.e., bidders acquiring 
only divested subsidiaries and public targets) are by far largest and associated with the 
lowest pre-takeover market valuation among cross-class bidders. Among other things, 
these characteristics indicate that takeovers by subsidiary-public bidders may well be 
motivated by managerial objectives. In this view, the Wealth Maximisation hypothesis 
implies that the managers of these bidders are not deterred by the target-side agency 
conflicts as their true motive is to maximise their firm size and the ensuing managerial 
perquisites. The negative wealth effects of takeovers by these empire-building bidders 
then surface in entirety during the post-acquisition period. 
As discussed in Section 4.5.1, the evidence of wealth losses appears strongest for 
subsidiary-public bidders. From the perspective of the Ease of Integration hypothesis, this 
evidence also suggests that the negative wealth effects are most pronounced when an 
M&A programme includes only large targets with dispersed ownership. This is because 
the larger the target's physical size and the more dispersed the ownership of the target for a 
given bidder, the more difficult the target integration and hence the more negative the post-
acquisition wealth effects become. 
To sum up, shareholders in private-firm bidders earn non-negative long-term 
abnormal return and generally appear to fare better than those in bidders of public targets 
and/or divested subsidiaries - the findings consistent with the Wealth Maximisation and 
the Ease of Integration hypotheses. Specifically, bidders with the characteristics consistent 
with shareholder wealth maximisation make acquisitions in which their shareholders do 
----------------
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not suffer wealth losses in the long run whereas bidders that exhibit signs of inherent 
agency conflicts are found to experience post-acquisition losses. The documented 
abnormal return patterns also suggest that agency conflicts in the target and its physical 
size have potential relevance to the post-acquisition wealth effects on bidder shareholders. 
The evidence also raises the possibility that takeovers of divested subsidiaries, which are 
relatively large firms with dispersed ownership, reflect an attempt by wealth-maximising 
bidders to respond to the market's perception that their growth prospects are currently 
poor. 
4.6) Factors Influencing Target Choice Decision 
In addition to the wealth effects, the patterns of abnormal return observed in 
Section 4.5 raise the possibility that there are contemporaneous factors at play to influence 
a bidder's decision on target selection. Because different target selections bring about 
different wealth effects, an understanding of a bidder's target selection provides further 
insights into the wealth effects of private-firm takeovers. This section attempts to explore 
the factors influencing a bidder's decision to choose, as a target, among a privately held 
company, divested subsidiary and publicly listed company. 
To make the exploratory investigation in this section manageable within the context 
of this thesis, a working assumption is made such that a bidder faces the target choice 
decision after its need to make an acquisition has arisen149• In order to minimise ambiguity 
in what influences a bidder's target choice decision, only the sample bidders acquiring 
targets of one status (i.e., private-firm, subsidiary and public-firm bidders) are included in 
149 While this assumption is consistent with the majority of the real-world phenomenon (e.g., see Copeland et 
a!., 1996, p. 439 - 450), there undoubtedly exist situations in which firms simultaneously face the decision 
on whether or not to make an acquisition and the decision on the choice of targets. An analysis allowing for 
these situations therefore will be fruitful future research. 
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the analysis. Section 4.6.1 describes the multivariate discriminant model and the 
explanatory variables to be adopted. The results of the multivariate analysis are then 
presented and discussed in Section 4.6.2. 
4.6.1) Logistic Regression Model and Variable .Definitions 
A. Logistic Regression Model 
Because the dependent variable in the analysis in this section, i.e., a bidder's choice 
of acquiring a private target, divested subsidiary or public target, is qualitative or 
categorical in nature, the natural analytical tool becomes a qualitative response regression 
model. The logistic regression model and probit model are similar in the distribution of 
their residuals and hence yield similar outcomes, particularly for the intermediate values of 
the predicted probabilities (Greene, 2000, Section 19.3). Unlike the probit model, 
however, the logit model does not rely on the assumption of multivariate normality of the 
regressors. Because the analysis in this section extensively employs company accounts 
variables which are well known for their non-normal distribution, the logit model is 
preferred, at least from the theoretical view point. 
Since there are three alternative types of targets from which a bidder can choose to 
acquire, the following multinomial logistic regression model is employed in this section: 
(4.9) 
where Po= 0 and i = 1, 2, ... , n for n is the sample size. j takes the value of 0, 1 and 2, 
when a bidder's observed choice is a private target, divested subsidiary and public target, 
respectively. P{Ji = Jlxi} denotes the probability of observing a bidder's choice }j = j 
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conditional upon observing an explanatory variables vector xi. Pj is a vector of unknown 
parameters pj s where k is the number of parameters to be estimated, and k -1 is the 
number of explanatory variables in vector xi. 
~ ~ k Pj is therefore a vector of {31 s, the 
maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) for the model constant and the influence of the 
explanatory variables on a bidder's target choice decision. 
To assess the robustness of the multinomial results, the corresponding individual 
binomial models are also estimated150. For both multinomial and binomial models, the 
significance of /Jj can be computed using White's (1982) robust standard errors. 
Although White's (1982) robust standard errors are in many cases appropriate for /Jj that 
is biased in an unknown direction, they are not robust to heteroscedasticity (Green, 2000, 
Section 19.4.1). As suggested by Pampel (2000, Chapter 2), the log-likelihood ratio test 
can be used to provide an alternative inference for the significance of /Jj . Thus, the 
significance of /Jj, is also computed using the log-likelihood ratio test, which measures 
the difference in the log-likelihood ratio between the models with and without variable xt. 
B. Variable Definitions 
The Wealth Maximisation hypothesis implies that wealth-maximising bidders 
maximise the realisation of expected synergies even when the wealth-optimising target 
yields little or no personal utility to the managers. The abnormal return evidence shows 
150 The individual binomial models are a special case of the multinomial model where j = 0, I and implicitly 
assume that there are only two target choices facing bidder i of characteristics represented by X;. The 
binomial models therefore ignore the inter-relationship between or overlap across different sets of the 
discriminants of j outcomes where j > 2 (Pam pel, 2000). Consequently, the parameters estimated with the 
binomial assumption may well be less efficient than the multinomial parameters (Begg and Gray, 1984; 
Pampel, 2000). In their simulation study, Begg and Gray (1984) fmd that, in a given sample, the binomial 
parameters tend to have a larger standard deviation than the corresponding multinomial parameters. 
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that while private-firm bidders are wealth-maximising bidders, subsidiary and public-firm 
bidders appear to be empire-building bidders. The bidder size characteristics show that 
private-firm bidders are substantially smaller than the other bidders. This apparent 
relationship is consistent with the view that agency conflicts increase with firm size 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Jensen, 1989; Matsusaka, 1993). Because firms with superior 
performance receive higher market valuation, market capitalisation (MV) may well reflect 
managerial performance as well as the extent of agency conflicts. On the other hand, a 
book-value size measure is not affected by market valuation and is hence a less 
contaminated proxy for agency problems. In addition to MV observed two months prior to 
the announcement date, a bidder's total assets (TA), total turnover (TO) and number of 
employees (EMP) observed at the financial year ending before the announcement date are 
therefore adopted 151 • 
For firms with good investment opportunities, as Stulz (1990) illustrates, high 
leverage reduces their managers' flexibility and ability to exploit wealth-creating 
opportunities, and hence, the shareholders suffer. On the other hand, shareholders in firms 
with poor investment opportunities benefit from higher leverage. This is because leverage 
reduces the level of resources under the managers' discretion and hence the overinvestment 
problem. In the context of Stulz (1990), it is therefore implied that shareholders in firms 
with similar investment opportunities should bear similar agency costs if their firms have a 
similar level of leverage. 
The Wealth Maximisation hypothesis implies that while wealth-maximising bidders 
prefer private targets, empire-building bidders prefer large targets. If subsidiary and 
151 See Table 3.1 for the details of the standardisation or deflating scheme for MV, TA and TO. 
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public-firm bidders are empire-building bidders, their pre-takeover leverage may well be 
lower than that of private-firm bidders even for the same level of investment opportunities. 
Given the abnormal return evidence in Section 4.5, this argument is consistent with the 
debt monitoring hypothesis discussed in Maloney et a!. (1993) which posits that leverage 
causes investment decisions to be more aligned with the interests of shareholders. In 
addition to increases in perquisites from overinvestments, low leverage also helps to 
preserve managers' jobs by reducing the bankruptcy risk due to high leverage152 . 
To capture the role of agency conflicts in a bidder's target choice decision as 
reflected in leverage, LEVER is adopted and defined as total liabilities divided by T A 153 . 
The book value of total liabilities instead of long-term liabilities is employed because (i) 
accounting convention gives firms latitude in classifying their borrowings based on their 
claimed intention to repay and (ii) the dependence or reliance on long-term and short-term 
liabilities varies across firms 154. Galai and Masulis (1976) argue that the use ofMV as the 
denominator gives the most accurate description of debt capacity. On the other hand, 
Myers (1977) shows that because a larger portion ofMV is made up ofthe present value of 
real options to make future investments which may not be exercised, book equity is a more 
152 Because managers' employment risk is not diversifiable due to the lack of a competitive market for human 
capital (Amihud and Lev, 1981 ), firms with large agency conflicts are likely to have low leverage even 
though their investment opportunities are poor. 
153 Using a sample of public-fum takeovers in the U.S., Datta et a!. (200 1) fmd that target growth prospects 
(measured as the market-to-book value of total assets) are significantly higher when equity-based 
compensation forms a large portion of the total compensation package for bidder managers than when it is a 
small part of the total package. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) find that managers of the U.S. bidders receive 
large bonuses for making acquisitions and these bonuses increase with the size and complexity of the deals. 
The findings of these two recent U.S. studies imply that the structure of executive compensation for bidder 
managers also provides a measure of the role of agency conflicts in a bidder's target choice decision. Despite 
scarcity of the necessary data, the use of the executive compensation structure in an analysis of the U.K. 
bidders' target choice decision will form part of interesting future research, particularly in the light of the 
differences in the ownership structure and entrenchment level between the U.S. and U.K. firms (see Morek et 
a!., 1988; Short and Keasey, I 999). 
154 In calculating a bidder's leverage, Martin (I 996) defines debt as the sum of long-term and short-term debt. 
Maloney et a!. (I 993, Table 5) find that using total liabilities instead of long-term liabilities does not 
materially affect the empirical relationship between the debt-to-equity ratio and announcement-period bidder 
abnormal return. 
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realistic denominator in the debt-to-equity ratio. Because book equity can take a negative 
value which would make the ratio problematic, T A is used in the calculation of LEVER. 
To control for the variations in investment opportunities or growth prospects, a 
bidder's BM ratio is adopted. Since it is a variable negatively correlated to BM (Rau and 
Vermaelen, 1998), a Tobin's q proxy is employed as a robustness check variable. BM and 
q proxy are defined as in Table 3 .1. In addition, the Ease of Integration hypothesis implies 
that the sub-optimality of target selection can arise from a wealth-maximising bidder's 
need to quickly and effectively respond to the market's perception of its poor growth 
prospects. Given the abnormal return evidence documented in Section 4.5, this possibility 
cannot be excluded. Other things constant, bidders with inferior pre-takeover market 
valuation are thus likely to prefer relatively large targets. Including BM and/or q proxy, as 
an explanatory variable in equation ( 4.9) therefore allows this conjecture to be formally 
verified in a multivariate setting. 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) argue that high pre-takeover market valuation is the 
symptom of the market overextrapolating past performance of bidder managers, which in 
turn causes the board of directors to place too much confidence in them and hence approve 
their acquisition plans too easily. Specifically, they argue that managers of a glamour 
bidder are affected by Roll's (1986) hubris. The abnormal return evidence in Section 4.5 
suggests that this is unlikely to be the case as the sample bidders with relatively low market 
valuation perform worse during the post-acquisition period than those with high market 
valuation. Nevertheless, this does not mean that hubris plays no part in a bidder's target 
selection decision. It means that the U.K. market may correctly extrapolate bidders' past 
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performance and, at least for the sample bidders in this thesis, bidders' glamour-value 
status may not reflect managerial hubris as proposed by Rau and Vermaelen ( 1998) 155• 
Although the hubris argument, among other things, implies a large target premium, 
a large premium is by no means the only symptom of hubris. As mentioned in Section 2.2, 
hubris-affected bidders may bravely acquire targets that turn out to be difficult to integrate 
ex post. To the extent that the information around the bid announcement is incomplete, the 
effect of hubris is likely to show up during the post-acquisition period. Because the market 
extrapolates available information, though not necessarily wrongly, it may well react 
positively to bids announced by bidders with favourable financial performance even 
though the managers of these bidders may be affected by hubris arising from such 
favourable performance. In this view, bidders that have been enjoying revenue growth 
and/or favourable operating performance may well be hubris-affected and aggressively 
choose targets that prove difficult to integrate ex post. 
In an attempt to proxy for the influence of hubris, turnover growth and operating 
performance are adopted. Similar to Martin (1996), a bidder's turnover growth 
(COMGRW) is defined as an annually compounded growth rate of its turnover over the 
four financial years ending before the announcement date156 . As an alternative, turnover 
growth is also calculated as a simple average of annual growth (AVGGRW). Following 
155 Indeed, even the findings of Rau and Vermaelen (1998) suggest that their performance extrapolation 
hypothesis may well be in doubt despite the merit of the hypothesis claimed by the authors. In their Table 7, 
they find that takeover premium is higher for glamour bidders than for value bidders only in their tender offer 
sample, and not their merger sample. Yet, none ofRau and Vermaelen's (1998) findings show that glamour 
bidders in their tender offer sample suffer losses during the 36-month period following the takeover. Their 
evidence hence indicates that the higher takeover premium paid by glamour tender offer bidders reflects the 
level of acquisition profitability or expected synergies as opposed to the market's overextrapolation. 
156 In other words, three annual rates of change in pre-takeover turnover are compounded to give COMGR W. 
Bidders with less than four pre-takeover financial years are required to have at least two. Those with less 
than two pre-takeover fmancial years are omitted from the analysis. Martin (1996) uses turnover growth to 
proxy for growth opportunities of bidders using different payment methods. 
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Barber and Lyon (1996), operating performance is measured as operating income or 
earnings before interest and taxes excluding pre-tax exceptional items. For each bidder, 
annual changes in operating performance are calculated during the four pre-takeover 
financial years. To make the annual changes comparable across firms, following Barber 
and Lyon (1996), each annual change is scaled by the average of total assets observed at 
the corresponding financial yearends. For each bidder, these scaled changes are then 
averaged across years to give a proxy for growth in operating performance (OPPER)157 . 
Under the Wealth Maximisation hypothesis, a wealth-maximising bidder avoids 
acquiring a target that is likely to lead to a problematic post-acquisition phase. The Ease of 
Integration hypothesis implies that, ceteris paribus, the easier is the target to integrate the 
more positive the wealth effects of a takeover. Together with the abnormal return evidence 
in Section 4.5, these hypotheses imply that private-firm bidders may prefer targets from the 
same industry. Moreover, there exists ample literature which suggests that corporate 
diversification is the self-serving behaviour of bidder managers and destroys shareholder 
value 158. If the only available targets within the same industry are large and likely to be 
infected with entrenchment, however, a wealth-maximising bidder seeking external growth 
may opt to acquire a smaller closely held target from another industry. To address this 
157 Note that the purpose of this variable is to proxy for an overall change or trend in operating performance, 
and not a level of operating performance. OPPER could alternatively be calculated as a rate of change in 
Barber and Lyon's (1996) return on total assets (ROA) or as ROA Growth as in Grinstein and Hribar (2004). 
However, a rate of change in ROA or ROA Growth is a valid measure of a change in operating performance 
for a firm if, and only if, the firm has experienced a non-negative ROA in all of the financial years of interest 
except the last one. This is simply because a quotient is meaningless when its denominator is negative. 
Consequently, OPPER in this section is not defmed in this way. 
158 See for example, Berger and Ofek ( 1995), Comment and Jarrell ( 1995), Denis et a!. ( 1997), Doukas et a!. 
(2002), Lang and Stulz (1994), Maquieira et a!. (1998), Servaes (1996). However, the wealth effects of 
conglomerate takeovers have been an on-going debate (for a comprehensive literature survey, see Martin and 
Sayrak, 2003). Recently, there has been a growing body of empirical evidence that conglomerate takeovers 
do not destroy shareholder wealth and can even be a value-enhancing strategy (e.g., for U.S. Campa and 
Kedia, 2002; Graham et a!., 2002: Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002; Villalonga, 2004; for European and U.K. 
Campa and Hernando, 2004). 
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issue, a dummy variable (IND) is adopted where it takes the value of 0 if the bidder and its 
target have the same 2-digit SIC code, and 1 otherwise159. 
As Asquith et al. (1983) observe, the U.S. bidders involved in an M&A programme 
or regular bidders tend to prefer private targets, particularly during the early stage of their 
M&A programme. To the extent that acquisition improves growth prospects, the higher 
pre-event market valuation for bidders choosing to acquire private targets may simply be 
the product of their acquisition frequency instead of their existing growth opportunities. 
To address this issue, RENONRE is also included as an explanatory variable in equation 
(4.9). RENONRE takes the value ofO ifthe bidder appears only once in the sample during 
the sample period, and 1 otherwise. 
Also implicit in the discussion thus far in this section is the assumption that the 
market for corporate assets in the U.K. is complete in the sense that there is unlimited 
supply of targets of various status across industries160. There are reasons to suspect that 
this assumption may not always hold. Examples can be motivated. Given the size of the 
capital requirements in certain industries, such as banking and financial services, target 
candidates are more likely to be publicly listed companies, or to a less extent, subsidiaries 
of a listed parent. Bidders attempting to acquire a bank or financial company are thus 
likely to have their choice naturally restricted to a public target or divested subsidiary. On 
the other hand, firms such as software developers are likely to be a venture business. 
There are also relatively established firms that are likely to operate in the form 
partnerships: these are consultant businesses such as engineering consultants, recruitment 
agencies, brokerage houses, etc. Bidders wanting to make acquisitions of such businesses 
159 Based on the industry classification information provided by Acquisitions Monthly. 
160 Since target selection is made by a bidder, the assumption that there is also unlimited demand for all 
targets is superfluous for the analysis in this section. 
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are therefore likely to have their choice limited to privately held companies. In an attempt 
to address this issue, dummy variables TARFIN and TAR83 are included in the analysis. 
TARFIN takes the value of 1 if Acquisitions Monthly assigns to the target the 2-digit SIC 
code 81 or 82 or 85, which covers the banking, insurance and real estate industries, 
respectively, and 0 otherwise. TAR83 takes the value of 1 if the target's 2-digit SIC code 
is 83, which covers business services such as software developers and consultant 
businesses, and 0 otherwise. 
For estimation purposes, the following variables are log-transformed: MV, TA, TO, 
EMP, q proxy, COMGRW and AVGGRW. Where more than one proxy is available for 
the same hypothesised influence, the variable that yields most stability in the estimated 
parameters, i.e., the inclusion or exclusion of which least affects the parameter of other 
variables, enters the final specification of the model in equation (4.9). All size proxies lead 
to very similar results, and T A is presented in the final set of regressors since it is 
unaffected by market valuation and its use allows the largest number of useable 
observations. q proxy never turned up significant during the model-building process. 
COMGRW and AVGGRW yield virtually identical results, and COMGRW is arbitrarily 
chosen for the final set of regressors. Accordingly, the final set of regressors includes T A, 
LEVER, BM, COMGRW, OPPER, IND, RENONRE, TARFIN, and TAR83. 
4.6.2) Logistic Regression Results -Who Acquires Whom 
Table 4. 7 reports the logistic regression results based on White's (1982) robust 
standard errors. Model (1) is the multinomial model and models (2) through (4) are the 
corresponding binomial models. The results based on the log-likelihood ratio test are 
almost identical and reported in Table AII.6. For the first control variable (IND), there is 
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little evidence that the relative ease of integrating a target from the same industry has 
important multivariate influence on bidders' target choice decision. Specifically, although 
the parameter sign of IND is negative in all models, it is significant (at the 0.10 level) only 
in the first parameter set in model (1 ), i.e., when the likelihood of a privately held company 
being the preferred target choice is evaluated against the likelihood of a public target being 
chosen. RENONRE has a negative sign and is significant in all models. This means that 
the sample bidders that appear to be regular bidders or bidders in an M&A programme do 
prefer targets that are relatively easy to integrate, consistent with Asquith et al. 's (1983) 
observation for the U.S. bidders engaged in an M&A programme 161 • 
T ARPIN is significant and has the expected sign in the first parameter set in model 
(1) and in model (4). In the second parameter set in model (1) and in models (2) and (3), 
T ARFIN is insignificant. These findings suggest that when a bidder attempts acquisition 
of targets in the banking and financial services industries, its choice of targets is limited to 
public targets. The lack of significance in the choice between a private target and divested 
subsidiary is not surprising as firms in these industries require a large capital base and thus 
tend to be listed in the main. TAR83 has the expected sign and is significant in the second 
parameter set in model (1) and in model (3). This result suggests that targets that are 
business service firms are likely to be privately held entities. The insignificance ofT AR83 
in the first parameter set in model (1) and in models (2) and ( 4) may well be attributable to 
such a proportionately small number of takeovers by public-firm bidders in the sample. 
As the first explanatory variable of main interest, T A has the expected parameter 
sign and is significant in all models. This finding suggests that small bidders prefer a 
161 The significance ofRENONRE in the frrst parameter set in model (I) and in models (2) and (4) should be 
interpreted with some caution. This is because there are only five public-fum takeovers by repeating bidders 
in the sample. The results therefore may well be sample-specific. 
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private target and large bidders prefer a public target, ceteris paribus. The positive sign of 
TA in model (4) suggests that after taking into account other influential factors, large 
bidders prefer a public target to a divested subsidiary. To the extent that firm size reflects 
the level of agency conflicts, bidders with relatively large agency conflicts thus tend to 
choose public targets or divested subsidiaries, both of which yield greater personal utilities 
to empire-building bidder managers. 
In model (1), LEVER has a negative sign and is significant for the first parameter 
set. Similar results are also observed for models (2) and (4). The negative sign of the 
significant parameters of LEVER indicates that, for a given level of investment 
opportunities, a bidder with low leverage is more likely to acquire a public target than a 
private target and/or a divested subsidiary. Because the pre-takeover market valuation is 
significantly lower for public-firm bidders than for private-firm bidders (see Table 4.1), 
this finding is further evidence that the decision to choose a public target is likely to be 
driven by managerialism. Given the wealth losses to public-firm bidders documented in 
Section 4.5, this finding is also consistent with Stulz's (1990) argument that low leverage 
allows greater managerial discretion and hence overinvestment. As no evidence of wealth 
losses is found for private-firm bidders, this finding also supports the view that leverage 
causes investment decisions to be better aligned with the interests of shareholders. To the 
extent that public-firm bidders are infected with agency conflicts, their observed target 
choice decision may also possibly reflect Shleifer and Vishny' s (1989) managerial 
entrenchment. Specifically, acquisition of a large target makes it expensive for the market 
to discipline the managers, i.e., to make it expensive for a corporate raider to mount a 
successful hostile or disciplinary takeover. 
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When the likelihood of a private-firm takeover is estimated against a subsidiary 
takeover, however, the parameter of LEVER is insignificant and considerably small. For a 
given level of investment opportunities, as a result, leverage does not differ between 
private-firm and subsidiary bidders. To the extent that private-firm bidders are wealth-
maximising bidders, this evidence suggests that, at variance with acquisition of public 
targets, agency conflicts in the bidder are unlikely to be the motivation behind acquisition 
of divested subsidiaries. 
Except in model (4), BM has the expected parameter sign in all cases. However, it 
is significant only in the second parameter set in model (1) and in model (3). Other things 
being constant, low pre-takeover market valuation is hence likely to motivate a bidder to 
choose a divested subsidiary, but not a public target, over a private target. Together with 
the insignificant multivariate difference in leverage between subsidiary bidders and 
private-firm bidders, this finding supports the view that a bidder's decision to choose a 
divested subsidiary (a large target) over a private target (a small target) reflects the bidder's 
attempt to respond to the market's perception that it is faced with poor growth prospects. 
To this extent, firm size may not necessarily reflect agency conflicts in subsidiary bidders. 
Instead, the relatively large size of subsidiary bidders may reflect their maturity 162. On the 
other hand, the insignificance of BM in the first parameter set in model (1) and in model 
(2) suggests that public-firm bidders are unlikely to be under pressure to buy quick and 
large external growth. The fact that these bidders still choose a large target with dispersed 
ownership despite the ex ante target-side agency problems further suggests that 
managerialism may well be the motive behind their decision to acquire a public target. 
162 As firms progress through their business life cycle, they face increases in the demand for their products 
and services, which require additional investments and expansion in their capital and/or asset base (see Ward, 
1993). 
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Unlike TA, LEVER and BM, both COMGRW and OPPER are insignificant in all 
models. This finding suggests that managerial hubris is unlikely to play a reliable 
multivariate role in bidders' target choice decision. In other words, a bidder's choice of 
targets is likely to be influenced by the level of its agency conflicts and the market's 
perception of its growth prospects rather than excessive self-confidence of its managers 
arising from favourable past performance. 
To sum up, small bidders with a high level of leverage and relatively large growth 
prospects acquire private targets, which are small and closely held firms. Bidders that 
prefer divested subsidiaries are on average relatively large and have high leverage relative 
to private-firm bidders. However, these bidders are faced with poor growth prospects prior 
to the takeover, and possibly attempt to improve the market's perception of their poor 
growth prospects via acquisition. The bidders' high leverage, and in particular, low pre-
takeover market valuation may also contribute to their decision to opt for off-market 
acquisition of a divested subsidiary over acquisition of a public target in the open bidding 
environment. High leverage coupled with low market valuation may generate doubts 
about the bidder's performance among the market analysts and hence negative publicity 
about the bid. In stark contrast to private-firm bidders, bidders choosing a publicly listed 
target are large and characterised by low leverage, but not poor growth prospects. Since 
the managers of these bidders are unlikely to be under pressure to buy quick and large 
growth, the evidence in Table 4. 7 does point towards greater personal utility arising from 
acquiring a large target as the likely explanation for their preference for a public target. 
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Table 4.7 
Logistic Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing Bidders' Target Choice Decision 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 -
December 1998. All bidders are U.K-listed companies, and acquire only private targets or only 
divested subsidiaries or only public targets. The second column shows the predicted sign(s) for 
each variable. Model (1) is the multinomial logistic regression model where the dependent 
variable takes the value of 0, 1 and 2 if a bidder is observed to acquire a private target, divested 
subsidiary and public target, respectively. Models (2) through (4) are binomial logistic regression 
models. The third [fourth] column shows the first [second] parameter set of model (I) which 
measures the multivariate influence of the explanatory variables on the likelihood of a bidder 
choosing a public target [divested subsidiary] with a private target as the baseline category. In 
models (2) and (3), the dependent variable takes the value of 0 if a bidder is observed to acquire a 
private target, and l if observed to acquire a public target and divested subsidiary, respectively. In 
model ( 4 ), the dependent variable takes the value of 0 if a bidder is observed to acquire a divested 
subsidiary and l if observed to acquire a public target. TA, LEVER, BM, COMGRW, and OPPER 
are proxies for bidder characteristics measured at the fmancial yearend immediately preceding the 
announcement date. T A is total assets. LEVER is proxy for leverage. BM is the BM ratio 
calculated as in Table 3.1. COMGRW is three-year annually compounded turnover growth. 
OPPER is a three-year average change in operating performance. IND is a dummy variable taking 
the value ofO if the bidder and target have the same 2-digit SIC code and l otherwise. RENONRE 
is a dummy variable taking the value ofO if the bidder appears only once during the sample period, 
and 1 otherwise. T ARFIN is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if Acquisitions Monthly 
assigns to the target the 2-digit SIC code 81 or 82 or 85, and 0 otherwise. TAR83 is a dummy 
variable taking the value of l if the target's 2-digit SIC code is 83, and 0 otherwise. The 
significance of the parameters is computed using White's (1982) robust standard errors. a, b and c 
denote significance at the 0.0 I, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. N denotes the number of 
observations in each target status category. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Pri. =0 
Sub.= 1 t Pri. = 0 Pri. = 0 Sub.= 0 
Pub.= 2t Pub.= 1 Sub.= 1 Pub.= 1 
Pred'ted 0 vs 2 0 vs 1 
Variable Sign(s) Para.1 t Para.2t Para.t Para.t Para.t 
Constant -7.572a -6.507a -6.533a -6.496a -1.908c 
TA + 0.628a 0.498a 0.553a 0.498a 0.196a 
LEVER -2.582a 0.187 -2.706a 0.109 -2.782b 
BM + 0.230 0.604a 0.044 0.611 b -0.255 
COMGRW + -0.045 -0.160 -0.509 -0.128 0.286 
OPPER + -0.184 0.475 2.984 0.544 -4.600 
IND -0.585c -0.017 -0.683 -0.033 -0.534 
RENONRE -3.479a -0.916a -3.264a -0.908a -2.645a 
TARFIN + 0.835c -0.060 0.803 0.012 1.144b 
TAR83 0.161 -0.792a 0.331 -0.773b 0.779 
Chi-Sq Stat 255.3a 111.4a 167.0a 43.2a 
* R-Sq 0.199 0.334 0.181 0.176 
N [0] 580 580 580 213 
N [1] 213 47 213 47 
N [2] 47 
McFadden R-Square. 
t Pri., Sub. and Pub. denote a private target, divested subsidiary and public target, respectively. 
t Para. denotes parameter. 
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4. 7) Conclusions 
In this chapter, long-term abnormal returns to bidders of private targets are 
examined. Under the Wealth Maximisation hypothesis, private-firm bidders maximise the 
realisation of expected synergies even when acquisition of privately held targets, which are 
very small and closely held, yields little or no personal utility for the bidder managers. 
Even with competition, private-firm bidders should therefore earn at least a normal rate of 
return in the long run. For a given level of the bidder-side agency conflicts, the Ease of 
Integration hypothesis argues that bidders acquiring private targets enjoy the much easier 
target integration than those acquiring public targets due to the ownership structure and 
much smaller physical size of private targets as well as the off-market nature of private 
deals. 
To minimise the possibility of contaminated results inherent in typical long-term 
return studies, this chapter isolates bidders that acquire targets of only one status from 
those that acquire two or more types of targets. Since tests of long-term abnormal return 
are treacherous (Lyon et al., 1999), this chapter adopts four alternative methodologies and 
three different post-acquisition event widows in an attempt to achieve robustness of the 
results. The results documented in this chapter are generally sensitive to the choice of an 
expected return model. The use of control-firm return as benchmark return, either in event 
time or calendar time, is found to yield a smaller number of significant abnormal returns 
than the use of the Fama-French 3-Factor model. Calculating return in calendar time, in 
order to eliminate the cross-sectional correlations among abnormal returns, leads to a 
notable reduction in the statistical significance of abnormal returns. 
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Despite the observed results sensitivity, several abnormal return patterns survive 
the alternative methodologies. After controlling for the effect of the cross-sectional 
correlations among abnormal returns, shareholders in bidders acquiring only private targets 
earn insignificant abnormal return up to three years following the deal completion 
regardless of the employed benchmark return. On the other hand, there is evidence that 
bidders acquiring only public targets significantly underperform even in calendar time 
during the post-acquisition periods. This underperformance is consistent with the recent 
empirical evidence for the U.K public-firm bidders reported by Baker and Limrnack 
(2001), Gregory (1997) and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003). The strongest evidence of 
significant wealth losses is found for bidders acquiring only divested subsidiaries. Among 
the bidders acquiring two or more types of targets, evidence of significant wealth losses 
appears strongest when a private target does not appear to be part of an M&A programme. 
Since private-firm bidders receive relatively high pre-takeover market valuation, 
the evidence that these bidders earn insignificant long-term abnormal return does not 
support the glamour-value effect and the performance extrapolation hypothesis in Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998). On the other hand, this evidence supports the Wealth Maximisation 
hypothesis. The hypothesis also explains the wealth losses documented for public-firm 
bidders. The larger size of public targets yields greater personal utility to self-interested 
bidder managers. Further, the potential agency conflicts inherent in the dispersed 
ownership of these targets do not deter the bidders. In a similar fashion, the hypothesis 
also provides a plausible explanation for the most pronounced evidence of bidder losses 
when a private target does not appear to be part of the bidder's M&A programme. 
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The finding that shareholders in private-firm bidders fare better than those in 
subsidiary and public-firm bidders supports the Ease of Integration hypothesis. Even when 
the bidder is a wealth-maximising bidder, acquisition of private targets leads to a more 
successful post-acquisition phase and hence better wealth effects. This is because private 
targets are easier or less problematic to integrate into the bidder's corporate structure than 
targets with dispersed ownership and large size (i.e., public targets and divested 
subsidiaries). 
In order to gain additional insights into the wealth effects of private-firm takeovers, 
this chapter also empirically investigates the largely unexplored factors influencing 
bidders' decision to choose among private targets, divested subsidiaries and public targets. 
In support of the Wealth Maximisation hypothesis, reliable evidence is found that agency 
conflicts in the bidder play an important multivariate role in its decision to choose a public 
target. The evidence also suggests that wealth-maximising bidders may opt to acquire a 
divested subsidiary instead of a private target if under pressure to buy quick and large 
growth in response to the market's perception of its poor growth prospects. However, the 
pressure to improve growth prospects or to respond to low pre-takeover market valuation 
per se does not drive the bidder to choose a public target over a private target. No 
evidence is found to indicate that hubris arising from past performance motivates bidders 
to choose targets that later prove to be suboptimal or difficult to integrate ex post. 
CHAPTERS 
ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF lP A YMENT METHODS ON 
LONG-TERM POST -ACQUISITION BIDDER ABNORMAJL RETURN 
5.1) Introduction 
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There exists voluminous empirical literature on the long-term wealth effects of 
payment methods when targets are publicly listed firms. Numerous studies show that 
while bidders using cash to pay for their targets breakeven in the long run, bidders that use 
their equity as the medium of exchange tend to experience significant long-term wealth 
losses (for a review of existing studies, see Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000; Bruner, 2002). A 
recent U.S. study by Loughran and Vijh (1997) finds that the difference in long-term 
bidder abnormal return between cash and equity offers cannot be attributed to the form of 
acquisition, i.e., mergers and tender offers, although tender offers are mostly cash 
transactions. On the other hand, the U.S. study by Rau and Vermaelen (1998) find that 
long-term bidder abnormal return is dependent on the pre-event market valuation (the BM 
ratio) of the bidders rather than the means of payment. 
In the U.K., the effects of payment methods are more clear-cut particularly since 
takeovers of the U.K. public targets are mostly tender offers. Extant evidence suggests that 
the U.K. bidders earn zero gains when using cash and earn significant long-term losses 
when using their own equity to pay for their targets (e.g., Baker and Limmack, 2001; 
Franks et a!., 1988; Gregory 1997). At variance with Rau and Vermaelen (1998), 
moreover, Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) find that in the U.K. the payment method effect 
dominates the glamour-value status effect. 
Because an equity payment to shareholders in a public target resembles a public 
equity issue, the significant long-term wealth losses to the bidder shareholders in an equity 
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offer have been associated with Myers and Majlufs (1984) asymmetric information 
hypothesis even though the hypothesis predicts an immediate price drop at the bid 
announcement (see Loughran and Vijh, 1997). Indeed, Fama (1998) notes that the 
negative long-term abnormal return to equity bidders may be the equity issuance anomaly 
in disguise. This argument is in line with the view that bidders use their temporarily 
overvalued equity as the acquisition currency (see Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 2003). As reviewed in Section 2.2, the long-term wealth losses to equity bidders 
of public targets can also be explained by the proportional reduction in managerial 
ownership in the bidder and the ensuing reduction in the costs of divergent managerial 
behaviour borne by the bidder managers. 
Despite extensive research on the long-run impact of payment methods in takeovers 
of publicly listed targets, very little is known when targets are privately held companies. 
This gap in the literature is particularly challenging, both theoretically and empirically. 
Unlike takeovers of public targets, equity financing in takeovers of private targets leads to 
an increase in ownership concentration in the bidder. Since the target owners in an equity 
offer commit a substantial portion of their wealth in the bidder, they become blockholders 
or large shareholders in the bidder. As a result, the target owners accepting bidder shares 
as the medium of exchange have economic incentives to monitor the performance of the 
bidder managers (see Fama, 1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; also Chang, 1998). The 
Monitoring hypothesis therefore argues that equity financing in takeovers of private targets 
should in equilibrium lead to a normal rate of long-term return to the bidder shareholders. 
Since the exchange of shares in takeovers of private targets is transacted by 
informed investors, it is further implied in the context of the Monitoring hypothesis that the 
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level of informational asymmetry inherent in private deals is trivial or much lower than 
that in public deals. In equity offers for private targets, unlike equity offers for public 
targets, bidder shares are issued to informed investors, i.e., the target owners. If the long-
term losses to public-firm bidders in an equity offer are attributable to asymmetric 
information (see Loughran and Vijh, 1997), the low-asymmetry nature of an equity offer 
for a private target implies that equity bidders of private targets should not experience 
long-term losses. 
Thus far, Moeller et al. (2004) appears to be the only study that includes 
examination of the effects of payment methods on long-term abnormal return to private-
firm bidders. The findings of their brief analysis show that the U.S. bidders of private 
targets breakeven in the long run regardless of payment methods - the findings that differ 
from the widely documented significant long-term wealth losses to equity bidders of public 
targets. Moeller et a!.' s (2004) findings therefore point towards the monitoring services 
performed by the target owners in an equity offer and/or the trivial informational 
asymmetry in the private deals. However, Moeller et al. (2004) do not isolate bidders 
acquiring two or more types of targets from those acquiring targets of only one status. As 
a result, their findings are potentially reflective of not only the effects of payment methods, 
but also the potential bias discussed in Section 4.3 .1. 
Hertzel et al. (2002) examme long-term abnormal return to the U.S. firms 
conducting private equity placements. Hertzel et al. (2002) find that private issuers earn 
significantly negative abnormal return, in both event time and calendar time, over the 
three-year period following the placement announcement. To the extent that an equity 
offer for a private target resembles a private equity placement, Hertzel et a!.' s (2002) 
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findings imply that equity financing in private-firm takeovers may serve to entrench 
management in the combined firm ex post. Alternatively, the level of informational 
asymmetry may in fact be similar between private and public deals despite the apparent 
differences between the two in terms of the bidding process and the ownership structure of 
the target firms. 
Given the exceptionally scarce and yet conflicting evidence documented in the 
extant literature, the long-term wealth effects of payment methods in private-firm 
takeovers remain an important empirical gap in the literature. In particular, there appears 
to be no U.K. evidence in this research area. Accordingly, the objective of this chapter is 
to examine the effects of payment methods on long-term post-acquisition abnormal return 
to bidders of private targets. As documented in Chapter 3, the positive announcement-
period wealth gains to bidder shareholders in private-firm takeovers are larger when equity 
financing is used. Thus, examination of long-term abnormal return also serves as the latter 
of the two components of the ultimate test of the wealth effects of payment methods. In an 
attempt to obtain a further understanding of the effects of payment methods on abnormal 
return to private-firm bidders, this chapter also empirically investigates the largely 
unexplored determinants of the choice of payment methods in private-firm takeovers. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 summarises the 
empirical implications of the Monitoring hypothesis. Section 5.3 describes the data and 
sample characteristics. A brief description of the adopted tests of long-term abnormal 
return is given in Section 5.3. The bidder abnormal return results are then presented and 
discussed in Section 5.4. In Section 5.5, the potential determinants of payment methods in 
private-firm takeovers are analysed. Section 5.6 concludes this chapter. 
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5.2) Summary of Hypothesis andl Testable Proposition 
The widely documented negative impact of equity financing on long-term abnormal 
return to bidders of public targets has predominantly been attributed to Myers and Majlufs 
(1984) asymmetric information hypothesis (see Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000). This is because 
the issue of bidder shares to shareholders in a public target resembles a public equity issue. 
In addition, the agency-theoretic argument holds that the long-term wealth losses to equity 
bidders of public targets reflect the reduction in the costs of divergent managerial 
behaviour borne by the bidder managers. The reduction in the divergence costs stems from 
the decrease in the proportional managerial ownership in the bidder (see Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Travlos, 1987). On the other hand, cash financing neither contains 
information about the true value ofthe bidder's equity nor causes a change in the bidder's 
managerial ownership. In a competitive takeover market, bidders acquiring a public target 
using cash financing should therefore earn a normal rate of return in the long run. 
Contrary to deals involving a public target, equity financing in takeovers of private 
targets leads to an increase in ownership concentration in the bidders (see Chang, 1998). 
When accepting bidder shares as the medium of exchange, the owners of a private target 
commit a substantial amount of their wealth and thereby become large shareholders in the 
bidder. It is therefore cost-effective for the target owners in an equity offer, as 
blockholders in the bidder, to monitor the performance of the bidder managers (see Fama, 
1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Because the monitoring by the target owners also 
benefits other shareholders in the bidder during the post-acquisition period, they will 
require compensation. The notion of rational pricing holds that the amount of 
compensation for the monitoring services reflects the incremental benefits of the services 
that accrue to other bidder shareholders. Other bidder shareholders therefore cannot earn 
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abnormal profit from the monitoring services by the target owners. In equilibrium, both 
the target owners and other bidder shareholders should accordingly earn in the long run a 
normal rate of return on their equity investments in the bidder. The Monitoring hypothesis 
hence implies that equity financing in takeovers of private targets should in the long run 
yield a normal rate of return for the bidders. Alternatively, this hypothesis can also be 
stated as: 
H5: Post-acquisition abnormal return to bidders of private targets in equity offers 
is zero in the long run. 
Unlike equity financing, a cash payment to the owners of a private target leads to 
no ceteris paribus change in ownership concentration in the bidder. In other words, cash 
financing does not create post-acquisition monitoring of managerial performance in the 
bidder. The Wealth Maximisation hypothesis suggests that bidders of private targets are 
wealth-maximising bidders163 . With competition, cash bidders of private targets should 
thus earn a normal rate of return in the long run (see also Halpern, 1983). 
When accepting the bidder's shares as the means of payment, the target owners 
commit a large amount of their wealth in the bidder. Prior to their acceptance of the 
bidder's shares, the target owners therefore rationally and carefully assess the bidder's 
prospects and true value. In other words, when equity financing is used in private-firm 
takeovers, bidder shares are issued to informed investors. This is also an important 
deviation from equity financing in public-firm takeovers. If the long-term losses to public-
firm bidders in equity offers are attributable to Myers and Majlufs (1984) asymmetric 
163 The Wealth Maximisation hypothesis is discussed in detail in Section 2.4 and summarised in Section 4.2. 
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information as contended in Loughran and Vijh (1997), the low level of informational 
asymmetry inherent in equity financing in private-firm takeovers implies that equity 
bidders of private targets should not experience long-term losses. Indeed, the low-
asymmetry nature of equity offers for private targets also implies that equity of overvalued 
bidders is unlikely to be accepted as the acquisition currency. 
5.3) Data, Sample Characteristics and Methodology 
The sample used in this chapter is drawn from the set employed in Chapter 4, for 
which the details on payment methods are available from Acquisitions Monthly. Because 
the objective of this chapter is to investigate the impact of payment methods on long-term 
abnormal return to private-firm bidders, the sample cross-class bidders (i.e., bidders 
acquiring two or more types of targets) identified in Chapter 4 are excluded from this 
chapter. For cross-class bidders, it is virtually impossible to disentangle the wealth effects 
of payment methods from the effects of acquiring targets of different attributes. Therefore, 
performing tests of long-term abnormal return for these bidders according to the means of 
payment does not add to the objective of this chapter. As a consequence, the final sample 
in this chapter consists of three bidder classes, namely private-firm bidders, subsidiary 
bidders and public-firm bidders. 
To group the sample bidders according to the payment method, the classification 
described in Chapter 3 is adopted. For each bidder class, bidders are categorised into (i) 
bidders using only cash (cash bidders), (ii) bidders using only their own common equity 
(equity bidders), and (iii) bidders using a combination of cash and their common equity 
(mixed bidders) to pay for their target(s). 
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5.3.1) Sample Characteristics 
Table 5.1 reports descriptive statistics for the deals in which bidders acquire only 
targets of the same status grouped by payment methods. For private-firm bidders, Panel A 
shows that bidder equity is considerably less popular as a medium of exchange than cash 
and a mix of cash and equity. For the comparison sample of subsidiary bidders, cash is by 
far the dominant payment method and equity financing, either for the entire deal or 
combined with cash, is extremely rare. When targets are publicly listed, however, cash and 
equity offers appear equally frequent while a mixed payment appears most popular. 
Various measures of target absolute size for various bidder portfolios are shown in 
Panel B. Although these measures do not carry much economic meanings on their own, 
the ratio of total turnover (TO) to total assets (TA) gives an interesting perspective across 
portfolios. This ratio provides an indication of how much turnover is generated per one 
pound sterling employed in the total assets and hence the degree of potential growth. For 
private targets, the ratio of median TO to median T A hovers around 2.4 regardless of the 
payment method164. This similarity across payment methods appears supportive of the 
conjecture that there is only little informational asymmetry in takeovers of private targets. 
In contrast, only public targets in a cash offer exhibit the ratio above one. This observation 
supports the view that public-firm bidders use equity financing, which has a contingent-
pricing attribute as illustrated by Hansen (1987), when they perceive uncertainty about the 
true value of their target, i.e., when the target-side asymmetry exists. 
164 For example, the ratio of median TO to median TA for private targets in a cash offer and equity offer is 
2.39 (5.24+2.19] and 2.41 (7.1+2.95], respectively. An emphasis is placed on median due to the skewed 
distribution of total turnover and total assets. Nevertheless, the use of mean values gives similar results. The 
ratio for divested subsidiaries is above one only in cash offers. Because of the extremely small sample size 
for equity and mixed offers for divested subsidiaries, the observation is difficult to read into. 
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Panel C displays different measures of target relative size. Looking at the equity-
based measure of target relative size, equity offers lead to an average (median) of 46% 
(22%) holdings in the combined firm by private target owners165 . These post-acquisition 
holdings by private target owners are considerably larger than the average (median) of 
21.2% (13.9%) post-issue holdings by private investors in the U.S. firms conducting a 
private equity placement reported by Hertzel et al. (2002). Based on these comparative 
statistics, an increase in ownership concentration may generally be larger in equity offers 
for private targets than in private equity placements. Shareholders in a public target 
acquired in a share exchange hold in aggregate an average (median) of 44% (43%) equity 
holdings in the combined firm. For public-firm equity bidders, however, the post-
acquisition holdings by target shareholders usually do not translate into an increase in 
ownership concentration. 
For both private and public targets, Panel D shows a persistent pattern that bidders 
tend to be smallest in equity offers. More interestingly, the median market capitalisation of 
equity bidders of private targets in Panel D appears comparable to that for the U.S. private 
equity placement firms in Hertzel et al. (2002). As shown in Panel E, the average 
(median) BM ratio for equity bidders of private targets is 0.38 (0.21). Again, this is 
markedly similar to the average (median) BM ratio of 0.43 (0.26) for the sample private 
equity placement firms in Hertzel et al. (2002). Indeed, the pre-event market valuation for 
the sample private-firm bidders using pure equity financing appears somewhat higher. 
Given these statistics, equity bidders of private targets appear to be small high-growth 
firms similar to the private issuers in Hertzel et al. (2002). This similarity is noteworthy 
165 For example, the average level of holdings in the combined firm by private target owners in an equity 
offer is 0.46 [0.85/(0.85 + 1)]. 
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since Hertzel et al. (2002) find that their sample firms earn positive announcement-period 
gains, but experience long-term losses up to three years following the issue announcement. 
Hertzel et al. (2002) offer three alternative explanations for their findings: (i) the 
creation of blockholders in private equity placements serves to entrench management; (ii) 
managers as well as private investors, who are informed investors, are overly optimistic 
about the firm's future prospects; and (iii) the long-term underperformance of private 
issuers reflects private placement discounts, which in tum reflects informed investors' 
assessments of the true [lower] value of the issuers. With reference to the third possibility 
raised by Hertzel et al. (2002), there is no indication in Panel E that the BVP ratio is lower 
for equity bidders of private targets than for their counterparts using other means of 
payment. As a result, equity bidders of private targets do not appear, at least on the 
surface, to issue new shares to private target owners at a discount. This observation 
deviates from an economically sizeable issue discount associated with private placements 
documented by Hertzel et al. (2002) and many others such as Wruck (1989). 
Table 5.1 
Characteristics of Sample Takeovers and 
Bidders Acquiring Targets of One Status Sorted by Payment Method 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 
1995 - December 1998. All bidders are U.K-Iisted companies and acquire only 
targets of the same status during the sample period - i.e., bidders acquiring only 
private targets, bidders acquiring only divested subsidiaries, and bidders acquiring 
only public targets. In each panel, characteristics are sorted by payment methods-
i.e., cash, equity and mixed offers. Panel A reports the number of deals and deal 
value. Panel B reports measures of target absolute size- i.e., Total Assets (TA), 
Total Turnover (TO) and Number of Employees (EMP). Measures of target relative 
size reported in Panel C also include equity-value relative size. Panels D reports 
bidder size characteristics. Panel E reports other bidder characteristics, namely the 
BM ratio, q proxy and BY-Price (BVP) ratio characteristics. All value-based 
variables are reported in millions of British Pound Sterling. Both means and 
medians are reported. Medians are in brackets. For details of variables, see Table 
3 .1. * the number of deals. 























Panel B: Target Absolute Size 
TA TO 
Mean Median Mean 
Private-Firm Bidders 
Cash 4.88 [2.19] 11.25 
Equity 13.87 [2.95] 17.20 
Mixed 5.26 [2.38] 12.13 
Subsidiary Bidders 
Cash 32.96 [7.78] 25.28 
Equity 7.91 [10.26] 4.03 
Mixed 20.80 [16.20] 15.86 
Public-Firm Bidders 
Cash 91.30 [41.31] 118.17 
Equity 953.61 [63.46] 651.26 













Median Mean Median 
[5.24] 130 [66] 
[7.1 0] 260 [53] 
[5.61] 159 [81] 
[11.08] 251 [94] 
[4.03] 120 [120] 
[8.31] 175 [76] 
[58.01] 1,483 [719] 
[51.23] 4,010 [574] 
[54.96] 2,454 [706] 
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Table 5.1 - Continued 
Panel C: Target Relative Size 
Equity Value TA TO EMP 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Private-Firm Bidders 
Cash 0.096 [0.041] 0.101 [0.041] 0.145 [0.058] 0.182 [0.069] 
Stock 0.850 [0.287] 0.841 [0.350] 1.602 [0.576] 2.152 [0.620] 
Mixed 0.227 [0.090] 0.296 [0.070] 1.243 [0.1 08] 0.423 [0.132] 
Subsidiary Bidders 
Cash 0.151 [0.045] 0.225 [0.072] 0.207 [0.066] 0.261 [0.069] 
Stock 0.252 [0.195] 0.185 [0.185] 0.191 [0.191] 0.167 [0.167] 
Mixed 0.325 [0.345] 0.411 [0.382] 0.687 [0.434] 0.600 [0.244] 
Public-Firm Bidders 
Cash 0.354 [0.142] 0.161 [0.117] 0.305 [0.196] 0.423 [0.181] 
Stock 0.797 [0.749] 1.105 [0.818] 1.917 [0.855] 1.368 [0.747] 
Mixed 0.596 [0.374] 0.460 [0.353] 0.981 [0.500] 0.944 [0.484] 
Panel D: Bidder Size 
Market Cap. TA TO EMP 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Private-Firm Bidders 
Cash 182.5 [42.3] 198.3 [48.2] 224.3 [62.4] 3,364 [745] 
Equity 40.8 [18.7] 110.3 [17.1] 80.1 [17.7] 1,663 [203] 
Mixed 90.3 [30.6] 116.5 [37.7] 155.8 [44.5] 1,885 [607] 
Subsidiary Bidders 
Cash 1,035.0 [98.1] 4,311.2 [136.0] 1,640.2 [150.9] 13,897 [1 ,952] 
Equity 719.2 [46.2] 1,963.1 [83.0] 1,463.9 [41.4] 14,173 [1 ,089] 
Mixed 309.4 [26.8] 519.0 [39.7] 963.4 [31.5] 2,310 [320] 
Public-Firm Bidders 
Cash 741.8 [214.7] 1,081.7 [454.0] 517.7 [327.5] 5,456 [2,952] 
Equity 639.8 [84.9] 1,635.0 [138.9] 889.9 [51.1] 10,049 [517] 
Mixed 1,092.4 [126.7] 2,552.3 [199.5] 621.1 [97.3] 5,538 [1 ,203] 
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Table 5.1 - Continued 
Panel E: Other Bidder Characteristics 
BM Ratio q Proxy BVP Ratio 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Private-Firm Bidders 
Cash 0.389 [0.324] 2.450 [1.557] 0.372 [0.243] 
Equity 0.377 [0.206] 2.484 [1.957] 0.285 [0.232] 
Mixed 0.351 [0.289] 2.173 [1.624] 0.253 [0.198] 
Subsidiary Bidders 
Cash 0.508 [0.442] 1.622 [1.409] 0.592 [0.251] 
Equity 0.509 [0.272] 1.410 [1.577] 0.128 [0.151] 
Mixed 0.373 [0.346] 1.660 [1.686] 0.534 [0.142] 
Public-Firm Bidders 
Cash 0.467 [0.254] 1.589 [1.336] 0.583 [0.435] 
Equity 0.516 [0.472] 1.706 [1.288] 0.570 [0.462] 
Mixed 0.631 [0.561] 1.575 [1.361] 0.566 [0.457] 
5.3.2) Methodology- Detecting Long-Term Abnormal Return 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the effects of payment methods on the 
wealth of long-term shareholders in bidders of privately held targets. Accordingly, the 
four alternative expected return models described in Section 4.4 are adopted in this chapter 
in an attempt to achieve robustness of the results. In short, these models are (i) [event-
time] control-firm buy-and-hold return model, (ii) event-time Fama-French three-factor 
model, (iii) calendar-time rolling portfolio approach, and (iv) calendar-time Fama-French 
three-factor model. For each expected return model, three alternative event windows are 
also employed in this chapter, namely 12, 24 and 36 months following the completion 
month. 
5.4) Long-Term Post-Acquisition Abnormal Return -Results 
As discussed in Section 4.4, event-time return metrics do not control for the cross-
sectional correlations among abnormal returns. The results derived from the control-firm 
buy-and-hold return model and event-time Fama-French three-factor model are therefore 
relegated to Appendix III. Similar to the results documented in Section 4.5.1, the lack of 
213 
significance of control-firm BHAR generally continues to be observed even when the 
sample bidders are divided according to payment method. Despite the lack of power 
inherent in the use of control-firm return reported by Lyon et al. (1999), Table AIII.1 
documents significantly negative control-firm BHAR to cash bidders of divested 
subsidiaries. Equity bidders of public targets also earn significantly, though weakly, 
negative control-firm BHAR - the result generally in line with the existing evidence for 
both the U.S. and U.K. bidders (e.g., for U.K. Baker and Limmack, 2001; Gregory, 1997; 
Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003; for U.S. Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000). For almost all of the 
bidder portfolios, Table AIII.2 shows that the use of the FF 3-Factor model in event time 
yields significantly negative BHAR. Again, these findings are similar to what was seen in 
Section 4.5.1. 
For both of the even-time expected return models, however, irregularity in the 
magnitude of BHAR reported in Tables AIII.1 and AIII.2 is observed. Specifically, BHAR 
to several bidder portfolios is beyond -100%. Such extreme magnitude of negative 
abnormal return is theoretically possible. If (i) the sample firms experience a prolonged 
period of severe declines in share price and (ii) the corresponding benchmark return is 
large and positive, it is possible that the difference between the sample firm return and 
benchmark return exceeds -100%. Nevertheless, such extremely negative BHAR implies 
that the market capitalisation of many firms, not just one, in the event portfolio is almost 
completely wiped out by the end of the event window. At any rate, this irregularity poses a 
serious concern that there may be a data error at source. 
To address the issue of a data error at source, the price series and news related to 
the sample bidders with BHAR lower than -1 00% or bidders in the portfolio with such 
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BHAR are manually checked for on an individual basis 166. No data error is found, and the 
declines in the price series of these bidders correspond with the events and price declines 
reported in the news release. Because return in this thesis is calculated as logarithmic 
return, which can lead to a downward bias in the true return for a large price drop, the 
extremely negative BHARs may be the artefact of how return is calculated. Due to their 
considerable significance, this potential downward bias is particularly worrying for the 
event-time FF 3-Factor model results in Table AIII.2. 
Accordingly, the event-time FF 3-Factor model results are re-estimated using the 
simple return calculation. The re-estimated results are reported in Table AIII.3. Although 
extremely negative BHARs are still observed in Table AIII.3, it is noticeable that their 
magnitude is in the main smaller than the negative BHAR calculated as logarithmic return. 
However, simple return and logarithmic return calculations yield BHARs that are virtually 
identical in sign and statistical significance. To a certain degree, this similarity is not 
surprising. This is because the downward bias occurs both in return to the sample bidders 
and in the benchmark return, thereby largely offsetting each other. The logarithmic and 
simple return calculations therefore yield very similar conclusions on the effects of 
payment methods on long-term bidder abnormal return for the sample bidders in this 
chapter. 
In the remainder of this section, the two sets of calendar-time results are presented 
and discussed. Section 5.4.1 compares the results and assesses their sensitivity. 
Interpretations of the results are then presented in Section 5.4.2. 
166 Company news is retrieved from the LexisNexis Executive database which contains a number of sources 
such as Financial Times and Extel News Cards. 
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5.4.Jl) Alternative Results and Result Sensitivity- Calendar-Time Results 
A. Calendar-Time Rolling Portfolio Abnormal Return 
Table 5.2 reports long-term bidder abnormal return estimated using the calendar-
time rolling portfolio approach. For private-firm bidders, Panel A shows that shareholders 
in cash bidders breakeven in all three windows. On the other hand, private-firm bidders in 
an equity offer earn significantly positive VW monthly abnormal return in the 12- and 36-
month windows, in both mean and median. Both EW and VW abnormal return to the 
mixed bidders is significantly positive in both mean and median, but this positive 
performance is limited only to the 12-month window. Overall, the breakeven situation of 
private-firm cash bidders is consistent with the existing evidence for public-firm bidders167• 
The findings that equity financing, either in part or in full, has some positive effect on 
long-term abnormal return to private-firm bidders are inconsistent with the extant evidence 
based on the experience oftakeovers of public targets168• 
Monthly abnormal return for the comparison sample of subsidiary bidders is 
reported in Panel B. At variance with private-firm bidders in Panel A and the extant 
evidence for public-firm bidders, subsidiary bidders in a cash offer earn EW losses. These 
losses are significant in the 24-month window and in both mean and median. Panel B also 
documents evidence of wealth losses to equity and mixed bidders of divested subsidiaries. 
Since there are in total only four and nine subsidiary bidders in an equity offer and mixed 
offer, respectively, the results for these bidders are difficult to read into. 
167 See for example: for U.K., Baker and Limmack (2001), Gregory (1997), Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003); 
for U.S., Franks eta/. (1988), Loughran and Vijh (1997). 
168 When the sample is divided into repeating and non-repeating bidders, the results are qualitatively similar 
and reported in Appendix III. Because the sample period of this thesis covers only four years, it should be 
noted again that bidders that appear only once in the sample may well in fact be regular bidders. 
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For the companson sample of public-firm bidders, despite the relatively small 
number of bidders in each payment method portfolio, Panel C documents results that are in 
line with the existing studies of long-term abnormal return to public-firm bidders. The 
cash and mixed offers in general earn negligible gains during the post-acquisition period. 
On the other hand, the equity bidders earn significant EW losses in the 24-month widow, 
both in mean and median. 
Table 5.2 
Long-Term Post-Acquisition Bidder Abnormal Return by Payment Method: 
Calendar-Time Rolling Portfolio Monthly Abnormal Return 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 -
December 1998. All bidders are U.K-listed companies and acquire only targets of the same 
status during the sample period - i.e., bidders acquiring only private targets, bidders acquiring 
only divested subsidiaries, and bidders acquiring only public targets. For each bidder class, 
bidders are divided into cash bidders, equity bidders, and mixed bidders. In brackets is the 
number of takeovers in each bidder portfolio. a, b and c denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 
and 0.10 levels, respectively. For estimation details, see Table 4.5. 
12 Months 24 Months 36 Months 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A: Private-Firm Bidders 
Cash [230] 
EW 0.34% 0.03% -0.39% -0.56% -0.33% -0.32% 
vw 0.32% 0.60% -1.92% -0.03% 0.25% 0.83% 
Eguity [41] 
EW -0.13% -0.26% -0.61% -0.97% 0.46% -0.10% 
vw 4.22%a 2.81%a 1.05% 0.97% 4.24%b 1.56%c 
Mixed [225] 
EW 1.08%b 0.38%c -0.27% 0.39% -0.27% -0.15% 
vw 1.48%b l.ll%c -0.43% 0.52% -0.14% 0.19% 
Panel B: Subsidiary Bidders 
Cash [142] 
EW -0.31% -0.44% -1.01 %a -1.05%a -0.39% -0.68% 
vw 0.23% -0.63% -0.11% -0.62% 0.12% 0.03% 
Eguity [4] 
EW -3.05% -3.22%c -1.42% -0.81% 1.59% 2.11% 
vw -2.81% -3.22% 0.41% -0.18% 3.68% 4.09% 
Mixed [9] 
EW -2.63% -0.85% -1.56% -2.26% -2.38%b -2.15%a 
vw -0.36% -0.06% 1.75% 1.21% 0.72% 0.27% 
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Table 5.2 - Continued 
12 Months 24 Months 36 Months 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel C: Public-Firm Bidders 
Cash [13] 
EW -2.53% -3.14% -1.78% -0.29% -1.98%c -2.21% 
vw -1.50% -0.89% -1.27% -2.95% -0.57% -2.39% 
Eguity [16] 
EW -1.84% -1.20% -2.23%b -1.17%b -0.97% -0.31% 
vw -0.51% -1.56% -0.77% -0.99% -0.13% -0.06% 
Mixed [26] 
EW 0.66% 1.42%b -0.06% -0.21% 0.35% 0.81% 
vw 0.23% -0.34% -0.04% -0.03% -0.30% 0.10% 
B. Calendar-Time Fama-French Three-Factor Model Abnormal Return 
As an alternative to the control-firm abnormal return results based on the rolling 
portfolio approach, Table 5.3 reports monthly bidder abnormal return estimated using the 
CT FF 3-Factor model. Panel A reports the results for bidders in the principal sample in 
this chapter, i.e., private-firm bidders. The cash and mixed bidders of private targets earn 
significantly positive VW abnormal return in the 12-month window. The OLS and MAD 
estimators yield consistent results. At variance with the rolling portfolio approach results, 
however, conflicting results are observed for the equity bidders in Panel A of Table 5.3. 
While both EW and VW alphas (in the 12-month window) are statistically significant, the 
EW alpha is negative and the VW alpha is positive. Again, the OLS and MAD estimators 
yield consistent results. 
When the sample of private-firm bidders is divided into repeating and non-
repeating bidders, the results are qualitatively similar for the cash and mixed bidders169. In 
equity offers, the non-repeating bidders earn significant losses, either OLS- or MAD-
estimated, up to 24 months following the deal completion. However, these losses are 
169 The results for the repeating and non-repeating sub-samples are reported in Appendix III. 
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significant only on the EW basis, indicating that while equity financing typically has a 
negative effect on gains to these bidders, it has no significant aggregate wealth effect. For 
the repeating bidders in an equity offer, there is no reliable evidence of significant 
abnormal return. On balance, the wealth effect of equity financing documented for the 
sample private-firm bidders is therefore statistically unreliable, and in part, similar to the 
findings of Moeller et al. (2004) 170. However, this finding is inconsistent with the long-
term losses to the U.S. firms conducting a private equity placement reported by Hertzel et 
al. (2002). Hertzel et al. (2002) report significant monthly losses, both EW and VW, 
measured in calendar time for private placement firms during the 36-month post-issue 
. dl71 peno . 
At variance with the calendar-time rolling portfolio results, the use of the CT FF 3-
Factor model yields no reliable evidence of abnormal return to the cash bidders of divested 
subsidiaries in any event window. However, evidence of wealth losses appears stronger in 
Panel B of Table 5.3 when equity financing is used, particularly in full. Again, the results 
for the equity and mixed bidders of divested subsidiaries are difficult to read into due to the 
very small sample size. 
Panel C of Table 5.3 documents the results that are in line with the corresponding 
rolling portfolio results. That is, cash and mixed bidders of public targets earn 
insignificant long-term abnormal return. In the 12- and 24-month windows, equity bidders 
of public targets experience significant EW wealth losses, based on either the OLS or 
MAD estimator. 
170 Moeller eta/. (2004) find that the U.S. private-firm bidders earn insignificant long-term abnormal return 
during the 36-month post-acquisition period regardless of the payment method. 
171 Hertzel et a/. (2002) estimate long-term abnormal return in both event time and calendar time. In calendar 
time, they employ the Fama-French three-factor model similar to one adopted in this thesis. 
Table 5.3 
Long-Term Post-Acquisition Bidder Abnormal Return by Payment Method!: 
Calendar-Time Fama-French Three-Factor Model Monthly Abnormal Return 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 -
December 1998. All bidders are U.K-listed companies and acquire only targets of the same 
status during the sample period - i.e., bidders acquiring only private targets, bidders acquiring 
only divested subsidiaries, and bidders acquiring only public targets. For each bidder class, 
bidders are divided into cash bidders, equity bidders, and mixed bidders. In brackets is the 
number of takeovers in each bidder portfolio. a, b and c denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 
and 0.10 levels, respectively. For estimation details, see Table 4.6. 
Ordinary Least Square Min. Absolute Deviation 
12 24 36 12 24 36 
Months Months Months Months Months Months 
Panel A: Private-Firm Bidders 
Cash [231] 
EW 0.08% -0.33% -0.16% 0.15% -0.17% -0.05% 
vw 1.27%b -0.71% 0.72% 1.27%b 0.55% 0.88%c 
Eguity [43] 
EW -1.97%c -1.52%b -0.87% -1.72%b -1.04% -0.65% 
vw 1.68%a 0.09% 0.58% 1.17%c 0.81% 0.88% 
Mixed [231] 
EW 0.86% 0.21% 0.38% 0.80% 0.47% 0.65% 
vw 1.68%a 0.09% 0.58% 1.42%a 0.45% 0.54% 
Panel B: Subsidiary Bidders 
Cash [142] 
EW -0.53% -0.67% -0.23% -0.68% -0.81% -0.28% 
vw 0.21% 0.21% 0.01% 0.20% 0.22% 0.23% 
Eguity [5] 
EW -4.52%b -3.22%c -0.68% -3.95%a -2.97%a -0.86% 
vw -4.83%b -0.67% 3.12%c -3.74%a -0.97% 2.21%b 
Mixed [10] 
EW -1.95%c -0.74% -0.78% -2.11 %b -1.13% -0.89% 
vw -0.16% 1.22% 0.89% 0.03% 1.33%c 1.01% 
Panel C: Public-Firm Bidders 
Cash [14] 
EW -1.41% -1.01% -0.67% -0.83% -0.56% 0.00% 
vw -0.19% -0.06% 0.60% -0.07% -0.09% 0.61% 
Eguity [16] 
EW -1.97%b -1.81 %b -1.22%c -1.40%c -1.32%c -0.79% 
vw -1.11% -0.15% 0.05% -0.57% -0.09% 0.09% 
Mixed [26] 
EW 0.23% 0.10% -0.20% 0.08% 0.16% -0.04% 
vw 0.41% 0.47% 0.12% 0.32% 0.45% 0.16% 
C. Summary 
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The empirical results reported in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 are net of the effects of the 
cross-sectional correlations among abnormal returns. For private-firm bidders, both the 
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rolling portfolio approach and CT FF 3-Factor model yield results which suggest that cash 
financing has no reliable incremental effect on long-term bidder abnormal return. The 
evidence in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 together also shows no reliable effect of pure equity 
financing on bidder abnormal return. On the other hand, there is evidence that private-firm 
bidders in a mixed offer earn positive gains during the post-acquisition period, but for only 
within the first 12 months of the deal completion. 
For the sample subsidiary bidders, the results for cash bidders appear sensitive to 
the choice of an expected return model. It is therefore only safe to conclude that the 
evidence that cash financing in subsidiary takeovers has a negative effect on long-term 
bidder abnormal return is less than reliable - the conclusion similar to one widely drawn 
for public-firm bidders in a cash offer (e.g., for U.K. Baker and Limmack, 2001; Gregory, 
1997; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003; for U.S. Franks et al., 1988; Loughran and Vijh, 
1997). The results for the equity and mixed bidders are difficult to read into due to the 
very small sample size, i.e., the maximum offive equity and 10 mixed bidders. 
The results for public-firm bidders are noticeably robust to the choice between 
control-firm return and the FF 3-Factor model. In short, public-firm bidders in cash and 
mixed offers earn insignificant long-term abnormal return. When pure equity financing is 
used, the sample public-firm bidders suffer losses during the post-acquisition period. The 
findings for the comparison sample of public-firm bidders are therefore consistent with the 
extant empirical evidence documented both in the U.K. and in the U.S. (see also, Agrawal 
and Jaffe, 2000) 
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5.4.2) Interpretations of Results 
Under the Myers and Majluf (1984) asymmetric information model, an equity offer 
signals overvaluation of the bidder's shares and should lead to negative long-term bidder 
abnormal return (see Loughran and Vijh, 1997). The finding that the sample equity 
bidders of public targets earn significant post-acquisition losses on its own appears to 
support this view. When taking into account the positive market reaction to the 
announcement of equity offers for public targets documented in Chapter 3, however, the 
Myers and Majluf (1984) model falls short of explaining the long-term losses to these 
equity bidders 172. Alternatively, if the market is convinced at the bid announcement that 
equity offers for public targets represent bidders' positive-NPV projects in the Cooney and 
Kalay (1993) framework, it is plausible that the market may have overacted to the 
announcement of the offer. 
Moving away from the information-signalling explanations, an agency-theoretic 
argument also provides a plausible explanation for the evidence of short-term gains and 
long-term losses to the sample equity bidders of public targets. Since an equity offer for a 
public target is usually a friendly transaction (e.g., Higson and Elliott, 1998), the deal may 
well be motivated principally by personal objectives of the bidder managers as well as the 
target managers. Around the bid announcement, however, the true managerial motives of 
an equity offer may not at all be sufficiently observable, but the profitability of the 
transaction is exaggerated (see Conn et al., 2002). As the effect of the divergent 
managerial behaviour materialises during the post-acquisition period, the market reassesses 
the value of the bidder downwards. 
172 In its original form, the Myers and Majluf (1984) asymmetric information hypothesis predicts an 
immediate price drop upon the announcement of the equity issue. See also Section 2.2.2. 
222 
Since cash financing does not signal overvaluation, the zero long-term gams 
documented for the sample cash bidders of public targets appear compatible with the 
Myers and Majluf (1984) model. Due to the element of equity financing in a mixed offer, 
however, the evidence of negligible gains to the sample mixed bidders cannot be explained 
by the Myers and Majluf (1984) model. Rather, the similarity in abnormal return between 
the sample cash and mixed bidders of public targets may well reflect the bidder's intention 
to deter potential competition by using cash as contended by Eckbo et al. ( 1990) (see also, 
Fishman, 1989). In this view, target shareholders' decision to accept bidder shares in a 
mixed offer is likely to be triggered by the bidder's commitment to its evaluation of 
acquisition profitability signalled by the cash portion 173• Although the signalling of the 
bidder's commitment via the cash portion does not rule out the possibility of the bid 
motivated by managerialism, this possibility is apparently unlikely for the sample mixed 
bidders of public targets in this chapter. 
For the sample bidders of divested subsidiaries, unfortunately, the extremely small 
number of equity and mixed bidders allows no reasonable inference to be drawn from the 
reported results. As a consequence, only the results for the cash bidders are available for 
meaningful economic interpretation. If the lack of reliable evidence due to result 
sensitivity can be concluded as evidence of insignificant post-acquisition abnormal return, 
the findings documented for cash bidders of divested subsidiaries can be interpreted in the 
same way for public-firm bidders in a cash offer. That is, because cash financing does not 
signal overvaluation of the bidder's equity, it produces no incremental impact on long-term 
bidder abnormal return. When also considering the negligible announcement-period gains 
173 Note that this explanation still holds even when the elements of cash and bidder equity in a mixed offer 
for a public target represent multiple target shareholders who choose to be paid only in cash and only in 
bidder shares. This is because multiple target shareholders in aggregate can be viewed as one shareholder. 
The proportions of cash and bidder equity observed in a mixed offer can accordingly be viewed as a mix of 
cash and bidder equity chosen by one aggregate target shareholder. 
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documented in Chapter 3, it is also unlikely that the use of pure cash financing in 
acquisition of divested subsidiaries reflects Jensen's (1986) Free Cash Flow problem in the 
bidder. 
Turning to the principal sample in this chapter, i.e., private-firm bidders, the 
evidence documented in Section 5.4.1 that the equity bidders on balance earn insignificant 
post-acquisition gains support the Monitoring hypothesis. The hypothesis posits that target 
owners in an equity offer perform monitoring services during the post-acquisition period, 
which also benefit other shareholders in the bidder. The target owners then rationally 
require compensation for their monitoring services. In equilibrium, equity bidders of 
private targets should thus earn a normal rate of long-term return. For cash bidders of 
private targets, the evidence that they earn negligible abnormal return during the post-
acquisition period is consistent with the Wealth Maximisation hypothesis. 
The insignificant post-acquisition gains documented for equity bidders of private 
targets also carry additional interesting implications. First, the finding suggests that the 
bidders neither overpay for their target nor issue new shares to the target owners at a 
discount. The BVP ratio characteristic for equity bidders of private targets observed in 
Panel E of Table 5.1 supports this view. Specifically, the BVP ratio in private-firm 
takeovers is by no means lowest in equity offers. Several studies of private equity 
placements find that private placement firms issue new shares to private investors at a 
sizeable discount (e.g., Hertzel et al., 2002; Wruck, 1989). The similarity in the BVP ratio 
across payment methods observed in Panel E of Table 5.1 may therefore provide a 
plausible explanation for the difference between the insignificant long-term gains to the 
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sample equity bidders of private targets and the post-issue losses to private placement 
firms reported by Hertzel et al. (2002). 
As proposed by Hertzel et al. (2002), one plausible explanation for the post-issue 
losses to private placement firms is that an increase in ownership concentration following 
the issue serves to entrench management. In this view, the non-negative post-acquisition 
gains to equity bidders of private targets documented in Section 5.4.1 indicate that the 
ownership concentration increase in private-firm takeovers does not cause Shleifer and 
Vishny's (1989) management entrenchment in the combined firm. As observed in Panel C 
of Table 5.1, equity offers in private-firm takeovers lead to an average (median) of 46% 
(22%) holdings in the combined firm by private target owners. Short and Keasey (1999) 
find that managers of listed firms in the U.K. on average become entrenched at the 
management ownership range of approximately between 13% and 42% of the entire equity 
holdings. If negligible pre-takeover managerial ownership in the equity bidder could be 
assumed, the size of the holdings by the target owners in the combined firm would fall 
rather safely in this empirical U.K. entrenchment range. However, the small size of equity 
bidders of private targets apparent in Panel D of Table 5.1 suggests that their managerial 
ownership may already have been relatively high prior to the takeover (see Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985; Matsusaka, 1993). As a result, the post-acquisition ownership concentration 
in equity bidders of private targets is likely to lie beyond the entrenchment range. 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) contend that the long-term losses to equity bidders of 
public targets are attributable to Myers and Majlufs (1984) asymmetric information that 
the bidders' shares are overvalued. If this is the case, the insignificant gains to equity 
bidders of private targets documented in Section 4.5.1 imply that the level of informational 
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asymmetry in equity offers for private targets is trivial or much lower than that in equity 
offers for public targets. Because the target owners in an equity offer commit a substantial 
amount of their wealth in the bidder, they have incentives to carefully assess the bidder's 
prospects and true value prior to accepting the bidder's shares as the means of payment. In 
equity offers for private targets, bidder shares are hence issued to informed investors. This 
is not the case when targets are publicly listed. 
Since mixed offers involve an element of equity financing, the finding documented 
in Section 4.5.1 that mixed bidders of private targets earn positive gains up to 12 months 
following the deal completion seems perplexing. While the results for the sample cash and 
equity bidders are generally consistent with the results for private-firm bidders in Moeller 
et al. (2004), the results for the sample mixed bidders are not. Moeller et al. (2004) find 
that private-firm bidders in the U.S. earn insignificant long-term abnormal return during 
the 36-month post-acquisition period regardless of the payment method. The difference 
between mixed bidders in the present sample and those in Moeller et al. (2004) is therefore 
unlikely to be attributable to the incorporation of the Carhart (1997) momentum factor in 
the FF 3-Factor model as employed in Moeller et al. (2004). Indeed, if market 
underreaction was to explain the positive gains to the sample mixed bidders, the question 
would be why the market underreacts to these bidders only. Among private-firm bidders, 
as shown in Panel D of Table 5.1, mixed bidders are by no means the smallest bidders174. 
In an attempt to solve this apparent puzzle, future research may examine operating 
performance of private-firm bidders according the means of payment. 
174 Since small firms receive relatively little analyst coverage (see Shushan, 1989), new information about 
these firms may reach the market with delay. 
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5.5) Determinants of Payment Methods in Takeovers of Private Targets 
The vast majority of the existing empirical research examining the potential factors 
influencing the payment method decision is based on the experience of takeovers of public 
targets and implicitly assumes that the choice of payment methods agreed upon in 
corporate takeovers is bidder-oriented 175 . In takeovers of public targets, this assumption 
may hold to a reasonable degree. The dispersed ownership structure of public targets 
allows the bidder to make an offer directly to the target shareholders who possess only 
asymmetric information. On the other hand, there are several reasons to believe that the 
assumption of the bidder-oriented payment method decision does not hold in takeovers of 
private targets. 
As discussed in Section 5.4.2, the non-negative post-acquisition gains to equity 
bidders of private targets imply, among other things, that the level of informational 
asymmetry in private-firm takeovers is very low or trivial in comparison to public-firm 
takeovers. Moreover, there is no price pressure from uninformed investors forcing the 
owners of a private target to agree to the offer, thereby leaving the target in a notably 
strong bargaining position (Ang and Kohers, 2001; Faccio and Masulis, 2003). Strong 
bargaining power held by private target owners implies that their investment objective 
plays a relatively important role in determining the agreed means of payment. As 
documented in Sections 3.5.2 and 5.4, the wealth effects of payment methods markedly 
differ between private-firm takeovers and public-firm takeovers. Insights into the payment 
method decisions in takeovers of private targets therefore help to obtain a further 
understanding of this largely unexplored area in the literature on corporate takeovers. Thus 
175 With an exception of Faccio and Masulis (2003). 
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far, there also appears to be no study that investigates the determinants of the payment 
methods in takeovers of private targets. 
The objective of this section is to explore the potential factors influencing the 
payment method decisions in takeovers of private targets. As mentioned in Section 5.3, it 
is virtually impossible to disentangle the implications of payment methods from the 
implications of acquiring targets of different attributes. The analysis in this section 
therefore includes only deals made by bidders that acquired only private targets during the 
sample period. Section 5.5.1 describes the multivariate discriminant model and the 
explanatory variables to be adopted. The results of the analysis are then presented and 
discussed in Section 5.5.2. 
5.5.1) Logistic Regression Model and Variable Definitions 
A. Logistic Regression Model 
As the dependent variable in this section, i.e., payment method, is qualitative or 
categorical in nature, a qualitative response regression model similar to equation ( 4. 9) is 
adopted. Indeed, the logistic regression model is the dominant analytical approach in the 
literature on payment method determinants 176. Since the sample takeovers with available 
payment method information are divided into three categories, i.e., cash, equity and mixed 
offers, the following multinomial logistic regression model is employed in this section: 
(5.1) 
176 For example, Carleton eta!. (1983), Chaney eta!. (1991), Faccio and Masulis (2003) Ghosh and Ruland 
(1998), Martin (1996), Yook eta!. (1999). See also Brau eta!. (2003). 
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where Po = 0 and i = 1, 2, ... , n for n is the sample size. j takes the value of 0, 1 and 2, 
when a cash, mixed and equity offer is observed, respectively. P{Jt = Jlxi} denotes the 
probability of observing offer Jj = j conditional upon observing an explanatory variables 
vector xi. Pj is a vector of unknown parameters f3j s where k is the number of 
parameters to be estimated, and k -1 is the number of explanatory variables in vector xi. 
Pj is therefore a vector of j)j s, the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) for the model 
constant and the influence of the explanatory variables on the choice of payment methods. 
As with Section 4.6, the corresponding individual binomial models are also estimated so 
that the robustness of the multinomial results can be assessed. The significance of /Jj in 
both multinomial and binomial models is also alternatively computed using White's (1982) 
robust standard errors as well as the log-likelihood ratio test. 
B. Variable Definitions 
Unlike takeovers of public targets, as discussed above, owners of private targets 
have a relatively strong bargaining position. Accordingly, the influence of the potential 
payment method determinants presented below is analysed with consideration, where 
1 . h 1 . 1 b . . f 177 re evant, gtven tot ere at1ve y strong argammg power o target owners . 
177 The control variables adopted in this section represent only bidder and deal characteristics, and not target 
characteristics. It is clearly possible that target characteristics can potentially influence the choice of 
payment methods, particularly in the case of public-firm takeovers wherein the bidder has a relatively strong 
bargaining position. Several existing studies find that target characteristics have important influence on the 
choice of payment methods in public-firm takeovers (e.g., Amihud eta/., 1990; Carleton eta!., 1983; Ghosh 
and Ruland, 1998). In contrast, bidders are likely to have much less bargaining power when targets are 
privately held, especially when the targets are financially healthy (see Ang and Kohers, 2001; Faccio and 
Masulis, 2003). Given that a takeover of a private target by a listed bidder is an alternative to an IPO, 
furthermore, the objective of target owners is likely to dominate the choice of payment methods irrespective 
of target characteristics. Notwithstanding the theoretical gesture, the influence of target characteristics on the 
choice of payment methods in private-firm takeovers remains an interesting empirical question. 
Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this thesis and thus left to future research. 
229 
Martin (1996) finds that investment opportunities facing a bidder, measured as 
Chung and Pruitt's (1994) approximation of Tobin's q and turnover growth, are positively 
related to the probability of equity financing in public-firm takeovers. As their post-
takeover wealth is dependent on the bidder's growth prospects, owners of a private target 
with the objective to stay are better off holding an equity stake in a bidder that is associated 
with relatively favourable growth opportunities. This implies that equity of bidders with 
greater investment opportunities is more likely to be accepted as the medium of exchange 
than equity of bidders with poor growth prospects. Similar to Martin (1996), q proxy and 
turnover growth are adopted in this section as a proxy for a bidder's investment 
opportunities. q proxy is defined as in Table 3.1. Turnover growth is calculated 
alternatively as compounded growth (COMGR W) and a simple average of annual growth 
(A VGGR W), both of which are defined as in Section 4.6.1. 
Since the BM ratio is negatively correlated to Tobin's q (Rau and Vermaelen, 
1998), a bidder's BM ratio is also adopted. In addition to growth prospects, the BM ratio 
is also a proxy for the bidder-side asymmetry as the difference between the book value and 
market value represents the intangibility of the bidder's book equity (see Harford, 1999). 
In addition, a low BM ratio is an indication that the bidder's equity is potentially 
overvalued (Dong et al., 2002). In this view, target owners with the objective to stay may 
be deterred from holding shares in bidders with a low BM ratio. However, rationality 
dictates that the target owners carefully assess the bidder's prospects and true value before 
committing a substantial portion of their wealth in the bidder. When the degree of 
informational asymmetry is low or trivial, the bidder's market valuation ratio may thus 
have an unimportant ceteris paribus role in the target owners' payment method decision. 
A bidder's BM ratio (BM) is defined as in Section 4.6.1. 
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To the extent that the BM ratio reflects the intangibility of the bidder's book equity, 
target owners with the objective to stay may also use the past price performance as an 
alternative indication of the bidder's growth prospects. Moreover, Faccio and Masulis 
(2003) contend that bidders that have been enjoying material price gains can be attractive 
to target owners influenced by momentum strategies. As a consequence, a bidder's price 
run-up is adopted, and measured as cumulative excess return run-up (CER): 
CERi = 2:~~~3 (Rit - R fi); where Rit and R fi are defined similarly to those in equation 
(4.8), and month t = 0 is the announcement month178• Since comparing CERs across the 
sample period implicitly assumes that risks remain unchanged across time, a bidder's price 
run-up is alternatively measured as monthly abnormal return ( ai or ALPHA) during the 
12-month period ending two months before the announcement month. ALPHA is 
estimated using the [event-time] firm-specific FF 3-Factor model as: 
where the variables are defined similarly to those in equation (4.8). For estimation 
purposes, the individual six portfolios SIL, SIM, S/H, BIL, BIM and BIH constituting the 
SMB and HML risk factors are formed as VW portfolios. In order to ensure a reasonable 
ai, a minimum of 12 valid monthly returns is required for the sample bidders 179• To make 
the CER results comparable to the ALPHA results in terms of the sample composition, a 
minimum of 12 valid monthly returns is also required for the calculation of CER. 
178 Since return is calculated as continuously compounded return, CER is equivalent to excess return 
calculated on a buy-and-hold strategy. 
179 As mentioned in Section 4.4.2, this requirement can cause a survivorship bias in the analysis. Given the 
lack of power inherent in the use of control-firm return as observed by Lyon eta/. (1999) and in Appendix III 
(also discussed in Section 5.4), control-firm BHAR is unlikely to reveal any cross-firm pattern and hence not 
adopted the analysis in this section. 
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In addition to growth prospects, the operating profitability of the bidder may also 
have an important implication on the target owners' decision to accept the bidder's equity 
as the medium of exchange. When opting to hold bidder shares in the long run, it is in the 
best interests of target owners to ensure among other things that the bidder not only has 
good growth opportunities, but also has good operating profitability. However, target 
owners may also be willing to accept equity of a bidder with deteriorating operating 
profitability if the combination is expected to create a turnaround in the bidder's 
performance 180. To the extent that target owners in equity offers intend to perform 
monitoring services following the deal completion, the bidder's poor pre-takeover 
operating profitability per se may not at all deter the target owners from holding its shares 
in the long run. Since operating performance is also an indicator of operating cash flows 
(e.g., Barber and Lyon, 1996; Healy et al., 1992; Powell and Stark, 2004), an equity offer 
may indeed be simply reflective of the bidder's inability to pay the target owners in cash. 
To capture the implications of a bidder's operating profitability, its operating performance 
(OPPER) is adopted as an explanatory variable and defined as in Section 4.6.1. 
Growth in net profit before tax, or earnings, is also adopted as an alternative to 
OPPER. Because the earnings figure includes interest expenses, it gives the target owners 
additional information about the true value of bidder equity although it gives a similar 
180 In the U.S., a bidder's operating performance also carries a tax implication. Although a cash offer gives 
rise to an increase in bidders' depreciation tax shields, Chaney eta/. (1991) point out that bidders with poor 
operating profitability are unlikely to take advantage of the benefit from the additional tax shields. In the 
U.S., equity bidders are therefore likely to be less profitable than those with preference for cash fmancing. 
However, bidders with greater profitability may also prefer equity financing since the capital gains tax 
payable by target owners means that cash bidders have to pay a higher premium to compensate for the target 
owners' tax obligations. On balance, it is hence unclear whether the U.S. bidders in fact enjoy any net tax 
benefit from cash fmancing (see Travlos, 1987). In the U.K., such tax credits are not available to cash 
bidders (Franks eta/., 1988). Ceteris paribus, the U.K. bidders thus have clear preference for an equity offer. 
Franks et a/. (1988) observe that although the introduction of capital gains taxes in the U.K. in 1965 
coincided with a notable decline in the proportion of cash offers, this decline was short-lived. By the second 
half of the 1970s, the proportion of cash offers reversed to the level just above the pre-1965 level. Moreover, 
the popularity of cash financing observed in Tables 3.1 and 5.1 further suggests that there are highly unlikely 
to be tax ramifications on the payment method decision in takeovers transacted in the U.K. 
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picture to operating profitability. Similar to OPPER, earnings are scaled by total assets, 
and the annual changes in scaled earnings for each bidder are calculated and averaged 
across years to give a proxy for growth in earnings (NPBT) 181 . 
Using a sample of the European and U.K. takeovers including private deals, Faccio 
and Masulis (2003) find that bidder size increases with the probability of cash financing 182. 
As Faccio and Masulis (2003) explain, this is because larger firms have proportionately 
lower bankruptcy and floatation costs. Lang and Stulz (1994) contend that larger firms 
generally enjoy better access to the capital market. To the extent that the objective of the 
target owners is to obtain access to the capital market for their firm and hence to hold 
bidder shares in the long run, however, a large bidder may be more attractive to the target 
owners than a small bidder. In this view, the likelihood of an equity offer for a private 
target increases with bidder size. As alternative proxies for bidder size, a bidder's market 
capitalisation (MV), total assets (T A), total turnover (TO) and number of employees 
(EMP) are adopted and defined as in Section 4.6.1. 
Unlike managers of a public target, owners of a private target act on their own 
behalf. When opting to hold bidder shares in the long run, the target owners thus have 
181 Earnings are scaled by total assets instead of shareholders' funds because many of the sample bidders 
have negative shareholders' funds. Scaling earnings by shareholders' funds would therefore further reduce 
the already small sample size. Nevertheless, NPBT based on shareholders' funds was also used during the 
model-building stage, but never came up as a significant explanatory variable. Moreover, the variable also 
caused instability in the parameter of other explanatory variables and appeared unstable over different model 
specifications. This indicates that the variable introduces considerable multicollinearity. For these reasons, it 
is omitted at the very early stage of the analysis in this section. 
182 However, Faccio and Masulis (2003) do not examine private-firm and public-finn takeovers separately, 
but instead use a dummy variable in their regression analysis to distinguish between takeovers of private 
targets and public targets. This is because the primary focus of Faccio and Masulis (2003) is to examine the 
importance of the corporate control motive in the bidder's financing choice. With reference to the objective 
of this section, their use of a dummy variable implicitly assumes that the impacts of the potential payment 
method determinants, as measured by the regression coefficients, are similar in private-flllll and public-flllll 
takeovers. As has been argued thus far in this thesis, at least theoretically, the motivations behind the choice 
of payment methods differ between the two types of takeovers. Again, Faccio and Masulis (2003) point out 
that private targets have much stronger bargaining power than public targets especially if they are financially 
healthy. 
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incentives to ensure that the bidder is a low-agency-cost firm. Specifically, the bidder-side 
agency conflicts deter the target owners in an equity offer from accepting to hold equity 
stakes in the bidder in the long run. In the context of Stulz (1990), as discussed in Section 
4.6.1, shareholders in firms with similar investment opportunities and leverage should bear 
a similar level of agency costs. With this analysis, the likelihood of an equity offer for a 
private target should ceteris paribus increase with a bidder's leverage. To empirically 
investigate this supposition, a bidder's leverage (LEVER) is adopted and defined as in 
Section 4.6.1. 
A positive relation between the likelihood of an equity offer for a private target and 
a bidder's leverage by no means excludes the possibility that equity bidders of private 
targets are bidders with good growth prospects but currently cash-strapped. Ceteris 
paribus, bidders with large cash availability should be more able than cash-strapped 
bidders to make an offer to target owners with preference for a cash payment. In line with 
this view, Martin (1996) finds that cash availability or liquidity has multivariate influence 
on the choice of payment methods in public-firm takeovers. To investigate the ceteris 
paribus influence of bidders' liquidity in private-firm takeovers, LIQ is adopted as an 
explanatory variable in equation (5.1 ). Following Martin (1996), LIQ is defined as the 
ratio of quick current assets net of current liabilities divided by deal value. 
Even when short of cash, bidders with large tangible assets or collateral may still be 
able to make an offer to target owners with preference for cash by raising additional 
borrowings. Franks et al. (1988) point out that cash offers are often financed with the 
bidders' additional borrowings (see also Yook, 2003). In particular, real gains from the 
combination provide a strong incentive for rational bidders to utilise their unused debt 
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capacity. In this situation, cash offers are more likely to be made by bidders with large 
collateral 183 . However, several theoretical models of the choice of payment methods rely 
on one common assumption that bidders can use targets' assets as collateral for raising 
additional borrowings (e.g., Cornu and Isakov, 2000; Fishman, 1989). One interesting 
implication of this assumption is that bidders' collateral may carry little multivariate 
importance in the payment method decision. To explore this empirical issue, a bidder's 
collateral (COLLA T) is adopted and measured, following Faccio and Masulis (2003), as 
the ratio oftangible [fixed] assets divided by TA. 
Brau et al. (2003) find that the cost of debt (proxied by risk-free return) has no 
impact on private firms' choice between conducting an IPO and being acquired in a cash 
offer, but is positively related to the choice of an IPO over a takeover involving equity 
financing. As Brau et al. (2003) explain, because cash offers are usually made when 
targets have very small relative size, cash bidders may not be particularly sensitive to 
changes in their cost of debt. Though indirectly, Brau et al.'s (2003) findings suggest that 
equity financing is more likely than cash financing when the bidder's borrowing cost or the 
risk-free return is low. To the extent that the cost of the bidder's additional borrowings 
raised to finance a cash offer increases with the risk-free return, the implication of Brau et 
al.'s (2003) findings may seem counterintuitive. 
Because the risk-free return is negatively related to equity value, bidder managers 
may perceive that their firm's equity is undervalued during the period of high risk-free 
183 To the extent that synergies from the combination are strictly unique to the bidder and the target, the 
bidder's inability to raise additional borrowings to pay the exiting target owners in cash may lead to no trade. 
Depending on the size of the unique synergies expected and desperation of the exiting target owners, 
however, a solution may exist where the exiting target owners accept the bidder's shares as the means of 
payment and subsequently sell them in the secondary market following the deal completion. In this case, the 
bidder will be required to pay an extra premium to compensate the target owners for incurring the transaction 
costs of selling their holdings in the bidder and bearing the liquidity risk associated with the bidder's shares. 
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return. In the context of Hansen (1987) as well as Myers and Majluf (1984), the bidder 
may therefore opt to use equity (cash) financing when the risk-free return is low (high). 
Since an equity offer leads to target owners holding bidder shares, high risk-free return 
means that the opportunity cost of their holdings in the bidder is also high. Thus, the target 
owners with the objective to stay may be reluctant to accept equity holdings in the bidder 
when the risk-free return is high or expected to remain high. To examine this empirical 
issue, the risk-free return for a bidder is measured as cumulative return on the 3-month T-
Bill (RF) from month -14 through month -3. 
Following the deal completion, the success of the post-acquisition phase affects 
only the wealth of target owners with the objective to stay, and not the wealth of those 
receiving cash. Due to the substantial amount of their wealth invested in the bidder, the 
target owners preferring to hold bidder shares in the long run have incentives to maximise 
the effectiveness of their monitoring role in the combined firm. Because the larger the 
proportional holdings the larger the voting rights become, the likelihood of equity 
financing in private-firm takeovers should be positively related to the target's relative size. 
In turn, this argument also implies that the choice of payment methods in takeovers of 
private targets is influenced by the objective of target owners, and that the relationship can 
be captured by variations in target relative size. To examine this conjecture, target relative 
size is adopted and alternatively measured as deal value divided by MV (RELMV) and 
based on total assets (REL T A), total turnover (REL TO) and the number of employees 
(RELEMP). 
Because the bidder-side asymmetry is likely to be higher when the bidder comes 
from a different industry, target owners with the objective to stay may feel more confident 
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in holding shares in a bidder from the same industry. For target owners, cash receipts are 
less risky than an equity payment (Draper and Paudyal, 1999). A cash payment may hence 
be more likely when the bidder comes from a different industry. On the other hand, it is 
also possible that the degree of the bidder-side asymmetry in equity offers for private 
targets, if any, does not materially vary even when the bidder and the target operate in 
different industries. This is because the target owners have incentives to carefully study 
the bidder before accepting its equity as the medium of exchange. Thus, the payment 
method decision of target owners may not necessarily be influenced by whether the bidder 
is from the same or different industry. From a bidder's perspective, the target-side 
asymmetry is higher when the target is from a different industry. When the target-side 
asymmetry exists, as shown by Hansen (1987), the bidder prefers equity to cash as the 
means of payment. This is because the contingent-pricing attribute of equity forces the 
target owners to share uncertainty in the ex post profitability of the acquisition. To the 
extent that target owners are generally indifferent to the bidder's industry of origin, one 
would therefore expect equity financing to be more likely than cash financing in cross-
industry takeovers of private targets. To investigate this possibility, a dummy variable 
(IND) is adopted where it takes the value of 0 if the bidder and its target have the same 2-
digit SIC code, and 1 otherwise. 
For the estimation purposes, the following variables are log-transformed: q proxy, 
COMGRW, AVGGRW, OPPER, NPBT, MV, TA, TO, EMP, LEVER, LIQ, COLLAT, 
RELMV, RELTA, RELTO, and RELEMP. Where several alternative proxies are available 
for the same hypothesised determinant, the variable that yields most stability in the 
estimated parameters, i.e., the inclusion and exclusion of which least affects the parameter 
of other variables, enters the final specification of the model in equation ( 5.1 ). The final 
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set of regressors includes BM, COMGRW, CER, OPPER, TA, TO, LEVER, LIQ, 
COLLAT, RF, RELMV and IND 184• 
5.5.2) Logistic Regression Results - Factors Influencing Payment Method Decisions 
Table 5.4 reports the multivariate influence of the variables described in Section 
5.5 .1 on the choice of payment methods when targets are privately held. In total, there are 
198, 32 and 175 usable observations for the cash, equity and mixed offers, respectively. 
As would be expected in a small sample situation (i.e., when equity offers are included in 
the regression analysis), inclusion and exclusion of some regressors can potentially affect 
the sample size and results. The exclusion of COMGRW and OPPER leads to nine (5%), 
three (9%) and 11 (6%) additional observations for cash, equity and mixed offers, 
respectively. The results estimated without COMGRW and OPPER are generally similar 
and reported in Table AIV.l in Appendix IV. Inferences about the significance of /Jj are 
also generally similar using either the White (1982) robust errors or the log-likelihood ratio 
test. The results based on the log-likelihood ratio test are reported in Tables AIV.2 (with 
COMGRW and OPPER included) and AIV.3 (with COMGRW and OPPER excluded). To 
avoid redundancy, the emphasis of discussion is placed on the key differences. 
The parameter of BM is insignificant in all models in Table 5.4 185 • Though having 
the expected sign in all models, the COMGRW is only weakly significant (at the 0.10 
184 During the model-building process, unlike CER, ALPHA never turned up significant and is therefore 
omitted. Unlike COMGRW, AVGGRW never turned up significant. None of the alternative proxies for 
target relative size appeared to affect either the significance or magnitude of the other parameters. In order to 
position the results in this section relative to the existing studies, RELMV is used. Unlike other proxies for 
bidder size, TO appears persistently significant irrespective of the inclusion/exclusion of MV, TA and EMP. 
This indicates that the incorporation of TO and another size proxy may capture some non-size effects such as 
the growth potential in the product market. 
185 When COMGRW and OPPER are excluded from equation (5.1), the parameter of BM becomes 
significantly negative in the second parameter set in model (I), i.e., when the likelihood of cash offers is 
evaluated against mixed offers in the multinomial model. However, the parameter of BM in the 
corresponding binomial model, i.e., model (3), is insignificant even though its size is strikingly similar. On 
balance, the evidence of significant influence of BM is thus unreliable. 
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level) in the first parameter set in model (1) and in model (3) only. As expected, CER has 
a positive sign in all models and significant in both parameter sets in model (1) and in 
model (3). When COMGRW and OPPER are excluded from the regression, however, the 
parameter of CER becomes notably smaller and remains significant (weakly at the 0.10 
level) only when the likelihood of cash offers is evaluated against equity offers in the 
multinomial model (see Table AIV.l). Yet, the log-likelihood ratio test does not confirm 
the significance ofCER computed using White's (1982) robust errors (see Table AIV.3). 
At variance with the extant evidence for takeovers of public targets reported by 
Martin (1996), the results for BM, COMGRW and CER suggest that the choice of payment 
methods in takeovers of private targets is unlikely to be influenced by the bidder's 
investment opportunities. As long as the combination is expected to yield an improvement 
in the bidder's growth prospects, target owners will gain from the takeover ex ante whether 
or not they are paid in cash or in shares. This explanation is also consistent with the 
implication of the Exit Costs hypothesis. In the context of Harford (1999), the 
insignificance of BM indicates that the level of informational asymmetry in private-firm 
takeovers is likely to be trivial. To the extent that BM reflects market overvaluation of 
equity (Dong et al., 2002), this finding also suggests that overvaluation of bidder shares 
does not lead to an equity payment in takeovers of private targets. This finding is therefore 
consistent with the conjecture that target owners in an equity offer carefully study the 
bidder's prospects and true value prior to accepting its equity as the medium of exchange. 
The parameter of OPPER is negative in all models. In model (1 ), the OPPER 
parameter is significant when the likelihood of cash offers is evaluated against equity 
offers. OPPER is also significant in models (2) and ( 4). Considering that takeovers of 
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private targets are transactions between informed investors, this finding suggests that a 
share exchange is likely to take place when the bidder's operating cash flows or 
profitability are low and the combination is expected to create a performance turnaround. 
This explanation is consistent with the view that target owners in an equity offer perform 
monitoring services following the deal completion. Again, it also supports the conjecture 
that the degree of informational asymmetry in takeovers of private targets is negligible. 
While the results for OPPER are in line with the negative relation between bidders' 
operating performance and the likelihood of equity offers in the U.S. public-firm takeovers 
reported by Chaney et al. (1991), Chaney et al. (1991) attribute their finding to tax 
implications rather than synergistic and/or informational implications. 
In all models, T A is positively related to the probability of equity financing 
although its parameter is significant only when equity offers are evaluated against cash 
offers in the model (1). The positive sign ofTA is consistent with Chaney et al.'s (1991) 
result for the multivariate influence of bidder size measured as total assets. Since TA is 
not affected by overvaluation, its positive sign is consistent with view that target owners 
with the objective to obtain access to the capital market for their firm and hence to hold 
bidder shares in the long run are attracted to the better access to the capital market 
available to a larger bidder. On the other hand, Faccio and Masulis (2003) report a 
negative relation between bidder size (also measured as total assets) and the probability of 
equity financing. In their regression, however, Faccio and Masulis (2003) do not separate 
private-firm takeovers from public-firm takeovers. 
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Contrary to T A, TO has a negative sign in all models and is significant in models 
(1), (2) and (4) 186. Since the variations in TO for a given level of TA effectively reflects 
variations in the amount of revenue generated per unit of investment, the negative sign of 
TO plausibly suggests that a bidder is more likely to make an equity offer than a cash offer 
when its revenue or the demand for its products or services is low. Similar to the 
implication of the finding for OPPER, the acceptance of bidder shares as the means of 
payment hence points towards the expectation of improvements in the bidder's turnover as 
a result of the combination. 
The closely held ownership of private targets implies that target owners with the 
objective to stay prefer a bidder with little agency conflicts as the bidder-side agency 
conflicts serve to destroy the value of the target owners' holdings in the bidder. The 
significantly positive parameter of LEVER in all models in Table 5.4 hence supports this 
argument, particularly as the influence of LEVER is net of the variations in a bidder's cash 
availability (see below for the discussion on LIQ). This finding shows that, holding 
constant the variations in a bidder's investment opportunities, the likelihood of equity 
financing or target owners' willingness to commit a substantial portion of their wealth in 
the bidder increases with the bidder's leverage. Put differently, the smaller the amount of 
corporate resources at the discretion of the incumbent bidder managers, the more willing to 
hold shares in the bidder are the target owners. 
LIQ has the predicted sign in all models and is insignificant only in model (4). As 
a result, bidders with large cash availability are more able than cash-strapped bidders to 
make an offer to target owners desiring a cash payment or to exit. This finding is also in 
186 As reported in Table AIV.2, the log-likelihood ratio test for TO in the multinomial model is also 
significant at the 0.01 level. 
241 
line with the positive multivariate relationship between bidders' liquidity and the 
likelihood of cash offers for public targets reported in Martin (1996). Unlike LIQ, 
COLLAT is insignificant, though carrying the expected sign, in all models. This observed 
insignificance of COLLAT suggests that bidders' collateral is not an important determinant 
of the means of payment in takeovers of private targets - the finding inconsistent with the 
results reported by Faccio and Masulis (2003) 187 . The lack of significance of COLLAT 
suggests that the assumption that bidders can use the assets of their target as collateral for 
raising additional borrowings, which underlies several theoretical models of the choice of 
payment methods, is empirically reasonable for the vast majority of the world's M&A 
activities, i.e., takeovers of private targets. 
Similar to LIQ, RF has the predicted sign in all models and fails to turn up 
significant only in model (4). The negative sign of RF says that equity financing in 
takeovers of private targets is more likely than cash financing when the risk-free return is 
low - the finding broadly in line with the results reported in Brau et al. (2003). This 
finding is open to two plausible interpretations. First, when the risk-free return is high 
(low), bidder managers may feel that the bidder's equity is relatively undervalued 
(overvalued), and as a result, opt to issue cash (equity) as predicted in the contexts of 
Hansen (1987) and Myers and Majluf (1984). However, this explanation is inconsistent 
with the observed lack of importance of BM and CER as well as with the view that target 
owners hold a strong bargain position relative to their bidder. More plausible is that target 
owners may at the margin be reluctant to hold bidder shares when one important 
opportunity cost of their holdings (i.e., risk-free return) is high or expected to remain high. 
187 Because proxies for bidders' leverage and liquidity are not included in Faccio and Masulis' (2003) 
analysis, it is possible that their results for collateral simply reflect the effects of leverage and liquidity. 
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During the period of high risk-free return, target owners may therefore opt to be paid in 
cash rather than bidder shares. 
RELMV has a positive s1gn m all models. Only in model (4) is RELMV 
insignificant. These findings suggest that target owners with the objective to stay prefer a 
bidder with small relative size so that they can maximise the effectiveness of their 
monitoring role. In other words, the larger the target relative size, the larger are the 
proportional ownership in the bidder and the voting rights held by the target owners. Since 
the association between RELMV and the probability of equity financing is net of the 
variations in bidders' ability to pay cash, this finding can also be interpreted as supportive 
of the conjecture that the choice of payment methods in takeovers of private targets is 
ceteris paribus endogenous to the consumption preference or investment objective of the 
target owners. As a result, the positive parameter sign of RELMV provides some support 
for the Clientele Effect hypothesis. 
IND has a positive parameter sign and is significant in determining the likelihood 
of equity offers in models (1), (2) and (4). This finding does not indicate that target 
owners with the objective to stay feel more confident in holding shares in a bidder from the 
same industry. On the other hand, the finding suggests that an equity offer is likely when 
the target-side asymmetry appears high, thereby providing support for the benefit from the 
contingent-pricing attribute of equity as illustrated by Hansen (1987). 
In summary, the analysis of in this section yields several insights into the largely 
unexplored determinants of payment methods in takeovers of private targets. At variance 
with the evidence documented in the existing studies of public-firm takeovers, the results 
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documented in Table 5.4 show that the level of informational asymmetry in takeovers of 
private targets is likely to be trivial. Not surprisingly, the evidence also shows that the pre-
event market valuation of bidder equity is an unlikely determinant of how private targets 
are paid for. It is also documented that poor operating profitability of the bidder does not 
deter target owners from holding its shares. In addition, it appears that bidders with better 
access to the capital market (i.e., large bidders) are more likely to be equity bidders. 
Evidence is also documented to suggest the bidder-side agency conflicts decrease 
the bidder's attractiveness to target owners with the objective to stay. In line with the 
extant evidence for takeovers of public targets, cash-rich bidders are more likely to be cash 
bidders of private targets than cash-strapped bidders. However, there is no indication that 
the bidder's own ability to raise additional borrowings affects the likelihood of it being a 
cash or equity bidder. When the opportunity cost (i.e., risk-free return) is high, target 
owners are found to prefer cash. Moreover, there is also evidence supportive of the 
conjecture that the choice of payment methods in takeovers of private targets is 
endogenous to the investment objective of target owners. Nevertheless, the target-side 
asymmetry is found to increase, at the margin, with the probability of equity offers. 
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TabBe 5.4 
Logistic Regression Analysis of Potential Determinants of Payment Methods 
in Takeovers of Privately Held Targets 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January I995 - December 
I998. All bidders are U.K-listed companies and acquire only private targets. The second column shows 
the predicted sign(s) for each variable. Model (1) is the multinomiailogistic regression model where the 
dependent variable takes the value of 0, I and 2 if a cash offer, mixed offer and equity offer is observed, 
respectively. Models (2) through (4) are binomial logistic regression models. The third [fourth] column 
shows the first [second] parameter set of model (I) which measures the multivariate influence of the 
explanatory variables on the likelihood of equity offers [mixed offers] with cash offers as the baseline 
category. In models (2) and (3), the dependent variable takes the value of 0 if a cash offer is observed, 
and I if an equity offer and mixed offer is observed, respectively. In model (4), the dependent variable 
takes the value of 0 if a mixed offer is observed and I if an equity offer is observed. All explanatory 
variables are bidder characteristics measured at the financial yearend immediately before the 
announcement date unless otherwise indicated. BM is the BM ratio calculated as per Table 3.1. 
COMGRW is three-year annually compounded turnover growth. CER is the cumulative excess return 
run-up measured from months -14 though -3 where month 0 is the announcement month. OPPER is a 
three-year average change in operating performance. T A and TO are total assets and total turnover, 
respectively. LEVER, LIQ and COLLAT are proxies for leverage, financial liquidity and collateral, 
respectively. RF is cumulative monthly risk-free return measured from months -14 though -3. RELMV 
measures target size relative to bidder size. IND is a dummy variable taking the value of 0 if the bidder 
and its target have the same 2-digit SIC code and I otherwise. The significance of the parameters is 
computed using White's (1982) robust standard errors. a. band c denote significance at the O.OI, 0.05 
































t Para. denotes parameter. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Cash= 0 
Mixed= 1 Cash= 0 Cash= 0 Mixed= 0 
Equity= 2 Equity= 1 Mixed= 1 Equity= 1 
0 vs 2 0 vs 1 
Para. 1 t Para. 2t Para.t Para.t Para.t 
97.996 52.90c 89.25c 57.01 a 48.94c 
0.162 -0.360 0.278 -0.359 0.595 
0.484c 0.254 0.291 0.347c 0.204 
0.013b 0.007b 0.009 0.007b 0.008 
-0.883b 
-0.274 -0.695c -0.332 -0.629c 
0.448b 0.054 0.354 0.089 0.355 
-0.988a 
-0.081 -0.861 a -0.098 -0.943a 
1.302a 0.577b 1.325b 0.516c 1.068b 
-0.136a -0.075c -0.122c -0.082a 
-0.067 
-0.197 -0.157 -0.040 -0.156 -0.147 
-0.759b -0.497b -0.951 a -0.492b 
-0.118 
0.458b 0.431 a 0.329c 0.492a 0.011 
1.181a 
-0.077 1.159b -0.131 1.296a 
92.9a 49.9a 53.8a 30.2a 
0.126 0.269 0.104 0.169 
198 198 198 175 




This chapter examines the largely unknown effects of payment methods on the 
long-term post-acquisition abnormal return to bidders of private targets. Unlike takeovers 
of public targets, equity financing in takeovers of private targets leads to an increase in 
ownership concentration in the bidder. Since the target owners in an equity offer commit a 
substantial portion of their wealth and become large shareholders in the bidder, they have 
economic incentives to monitor the performance of the bidder managers (see Fama, 1980; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; also Chang, 1998). Under the Monitoring hypothesis, equity 
financing in takeovers of private targets should therefore in equilibrium lead to a normal 
rate of long-term return to the bidder shareholders. The wealth commitment in the bidder 
by the target owners also implies that the target owners carefully study the bidder's true 
value before accepting its shares as the medium of exchange. In this view, the level of 
informational asymmetry in equity offers for private targets is much lower than those for 
public targets. 
To isolate the long-term wealth effects of payment methods from the confounding 
effects of acquiring targets of different attributes, all cross-class bidders are excluded from 
the analysis in this chapter. As with Chapter 4, the effect of the cross-sectional 
correlations among abnormal returns is accounted for when bidder abnormal return is 
estimated in this chapter. Consistent with the extant empirical evidence (see e.g., Agrawal 
and Jaffe, 2000), cash and mixed bidders in the comparison sample of public-firm 
takeovers earn insignificant long-term abnormal return whereas the equity bidders earn 
significant long-term losses following the deal completion. The evidence also suggests 
that the sample cash bidders of divested subsidiaries on balance breakeven in the long run. 
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Since the market reacts positively to the announcement of equity offers for public 
targets (see Chapter 3), the long-term losses to the equity bidders documented in this 
chapter cannot be explained by the Myers and Majluf (1984) model. However, these long-
term losses are in harmony with an agency-theoretic explanation. Equity offers for public 
targets are usually a friendly transaction (e.g., Higson and Elliott, 1998). Around the bid 
announcement, the true managerial motives behind equity offers are not sufficiently 
observable, but the profitability of the transaction is exaggerated (see Conn et a!., 2002). 
As the effect of the divergent managerial behaviour materialises during the post-
acquisition period, the market reassesses the value of the bidder downwards. 
For the principal sample in this chapter, the evidence shows that equity bidders of 
private targets on balance earn post-acquisition gains that unreliably differ from zero, 
hence supporting the Monitoring hypothesis. This finding also carries further implications. 
First, unlike in private equity placements, a firm's shares are issued to informed investors 
at no discount when they are issued in exchange for privately held corporate assets. In 
addition, an increase in ownership concentration due to the holdings by target owners with 
the objective to stay is unlikely to lead to Shleifer and Vishny's (1989) management 
entrenchment. Further, bidder shares are issued to owners of a private target under little or 
trivial asymmetric information, and the issue therefore does not signal to the market that 
the bidder's shares are currently overvalued. 
Cash bidders of private targets also earn negligible long-term post-acquisition 
gains. Since cash financing does not lead to an increase in ownership concentration ceteris 
paribus, this finding is also compatible with the Monitoring hypothesis. On the other 
hand, the evidence suggests that mixed bidders of private targets earn positive gains up to 
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12 months following the deal completion. Since the market reacts positively to the 
announcement of bids for private targets regardless of the payment method, market 
underreaction is an unlikely explanation for the positive long-term gains to the mixed 
bidders. To this extent, these long-term gains remain a puzzle for future research. 
In order to obtain a further understanding of the effects of payment methods on 
abnormal return to private-firm bidders, this chapter also empirically investigates the 
largely unexplored determinants of payment methods in takeovers of private targets. The 
results of the multivariate discriminant analysis provide further support for the conjecture 
that the level of informational asymmetry in takeovers of private targets is trivial and hence 
much lower than the level in takeovers of public targets. The results also provide support 
for the conjecture that the choice of payment methods in takeovers of private targets is 
endogenous to the investment objective of target owners. Not surprisingly, it is also 
documented that bidders with better access to the capital market are more attractive to 
target owners with the objective to stay. In addition, the analysis reveals that the bidder-
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6.1) Summary and Conclusions 
This thesis sets out to provide, both theoretically and empirically, a comprehensive 
comparative analysis of takeovers of privately held targets - the sector of the corporate 
control market which had hitherto been far from well understood. While private-firm 
takeovers form the vast majority of the world's M&A activities, the existing academic 
research has focused virtually exclusively on takeovers of publicly held or listed targets. 
The evidence documented in this body of research indicates that takeovers generally 
destroy the wealth of bidder shareholders, both in the short run and in the long run, and 
that this wealth destruction tends to be associated with the use of bidder equity as the 
medium of exchange. Only recently has the corporate control market literature seen some 
evidence on the wealth effects of private-firm takeovers. This evidence, albeit sparse, 
suggests that the announcement of private-firm takeovers has a positive impact of the 
wealth of bidder shareholders regardless of the means of payment. 
The findings of the recent studies of private-firm takeovers point towards the 
possibility that the traditional theories of the market for corporate control may not be as 
generalisable as one might have once thought. In an attempt to explain the positive market 
reaction to bids for private targets, the few recent studies of private-firm takeovers offer 
several new hypotheses. Nevertheless, these hypotheses appear deficient given the 
observed empirics. Accordingly, the theoretical objective of this thesis is to provide more 
coherent explanations for the wealth effects, both short-term and long-term, of private-firm 
takeovers on bidder shareholders. As the second objective of this thesis, the implications 
of the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2 are empirically investigated by examining 
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abnormal return, both short-term and long-term, to private-firm bidders in comparison to 
bidders acquiring targets of other status. In order to obtain a further understanding of 
abnormal return to private-firm bidders, this thesis also empirically explores bidders' 
decision to choose among targets of various status and the potential determinants of 
payment methods in private-firm takeovers. 
By recognising the possibility that the decision of the owners of a private target to 
agree to a takeover represents the exit strategy or is reflective of the passage of the firm 
through its life cycle, this thesis puts forwards a new theoretical perspective on the wealth 
effects of private-firm takeovers on bidder shareholders. By empirically examining (i) 
gains to bidders of private targets on a comparative basis, (ii) factors influencing the 
decision to choose a private target over targets of other status, and (iii) the choice of 
payment methods for private targets, this thesis documents distinct differences in the 
wealth effects on bidder shareholders between private-firm takeovers and takeovers of 
public targets and targets affiliated to a publicly listed firm (i.e., divested subsidiaries). 
Considering the costs known to be associated with the decision to go public facing 
a privately held company, acquisition by a listed bidder can potentially be a cost-effective 
means by which private-firm owners can exit or a private firm can finance its unexploited 
investment opportunities. Since the savings on the costs of going public available to 
private targets are commonly observable, their acquirers stand to enjoy a fraction of these 
savings as long as the competition among the rival bidders is imperfect. On the other hand, 
there are no such gains for the bidder to gamer when acquiring a target for which the costs 
of going public have already been incurred. To investigate this hypothesis, announcement-
period gains to private-firm bidders are examined in comparison to bidders of public 
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targets and bidders of divested subsidiaries. The results of the examination show that 
when targets are privately held, the market reacts positively to bidders' share price around 
the bid announcement. When targets are publicly listed, the evidence suggests that bidders 
experience losses during the announcement period. Although bidders of divested 
subsidiaries earn positive gains in windows immediately surrounding the announcement 
date, they suffer negative price run-ups that are large enough to offset the positive gains. 
To the extent that acquisition by a listed bidder is an alternative to the choice of 
going public, a particular payment method can be viewed as simply reflecting the target 
owner's consumption preference or investment objective. In a cash offer, the objective of 
the target owner is a mirror image of an entrepreneur wanting to cash out or exit. In an 
equity offer, the target owner may be viewed as having the objective to stay, and naturally, 
to hold equity stakes in the bidder. When the offer is financed with a mix of cash and 
equity, the target owner can be viewed as simply having the objective to partially exit. A 
mixed offer can also be viewed as an offer in which the bidder pays the multiple owners of 
a private target in cash and/or equity according to their individual investment objective. In 
this framework, the choice of payment methods in private-firm takeovers is endogenous to 
the investment objective of the target owner(s). Thus, it is implied that the announced 
means of payment conveys no incremental valuable information about the bidder, and 
hence, has no incremental impact on gains to private-firm bidders induced by the bid 
announcement. 
At variance with bidders of public targets as well as bidders of divested 
subsidiaries, the announcement-period gains to private-firm bidders are positive regardless 
of the medium of exchange. However, gains to private-firm bidders are more positive 
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when equity financing is used, either in part or in full. This finding suggests that equity 
financing in private-firm takeovers conveys incremental valuable information about the 
bidder. The evidence indicates that this positive effect of equity financing is attributable to 
the positive information about the bidder's prospects rather than the expectation of 
performance monitoring by the target owners. 
Unlike public targets or divested subsidiaries, private targets are closely held and 
considerably small in size. These characteristics of private targets imply that their bidders 
are likely to be wealth-maximising bidders rather than empire-building bidders. Even for 
wealth-maximising bidders, moreover, the post-acquisition phase becomes relatively 
difficult to manage when targets are large and/or owned by atomistic shareholders. In 
other words, there exist several factors pointing out that the post-acquisition target 
integration is much less problematic for private targets than for public targets or divested 
subsidiaries ex post. To investigate these conjectures, long-term post-acquisition abnormal 
return to private-firm bidders is analysed in relation to bidders acquiring public targets or 
divested subsidiaries. The analysis shows that private-firm bidders breakeven in the long 
run following the deal completion. Thus, the announcement-period gains garnered by 
private-firm bidders do not reverse in the long run. More importantly, this finding 
indicates that bidders that choose to acquire private targets are wealth-maximising bidders 
as well as that private targets are not problematic to integrate ex post. In contrast, there is 
evidence that both public-firm bidders and, especially, subsidiary bidders experience post-
acquisition losses. 
In order to gain further insights into the variations in bidder gains in different types 
of takeovers, this thesis also examines the potential factors influencing bidders' decision to 
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choose among private targets, divested subsidiaries and public targets. The results of this 
examination reveal several differences in the motives behind the target choice decision of 
private-firm bidders, subsidiary bidders and public-firm bidders. In the main, agency 
conflicts or managerialism in the bidder carry important influence in the decision to choose 
public targets over private targets, but not in choosing divested subsidiaries over private 
targets. It is the pressure to improve growth prospects that has important influence on the 
bidder's decision to choose a divested subsidiary over a private target. Since divested 
subsidiaries are generally much larger than private targets, this finding confirms the view 
that a takeover is a quick way to achieve growth. However, the pressure to improve 
growth prospects per se is not enough to drive an apparently wealth-maximising bidder to 
abandon the benefits of the off-market bidding and try to acquire a public target in the open 
bidding environment. Interestingly, bidder managers' self-confidence arising from their 
past performance does not appear to have any discernible influence on the choice of 
targets. 
The difference in ownership structure between private targets and public targets 
also leads to the difference in the change in ownership concentration in the bidders. While 
equity financing leads to a ceteris paribus increase in ownership concentration in bidders 
of private targets, the opposite follows for public-firm bidders. Because the owners of a 
private target in an equity offer commit a substantial amount of their wealth and become 
large shareholders in the bidder, it is cost-effective for them to monitor the performance of 
the bidder managers. Since the monitoring services performed by the target owners also 
benefit other shareholders in the bidder, the target owners require compensation for their 
services. The notion of rational pricing holds that the amount of the compensation reflects 
the incremental benefits of the services that accrue to other bidder shareholders. In 
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equilibrium, both the target owners and other bidder shareholders therefore earn in the long 
run a normal rate of return on their equity investments in the bidder. In support of this 
conjecture, the analysis of long-term bidder abnormal return suggests that private-firm 
bidders in equity offers on balance earn a normal rate of return during the post-acquisition 
period. On the other hand, public-firm bidders in equity offers experience losses during 
this period. 
The results that the effects of equity financing on bidder gains, both short-term and 
long-term, vary between private-firm and public-firm takeovers imply that the motives 
behind the payment method decisions also differ between these two classes of takeovers. 
For instance, the evidence that equity bidders of private targets earn normal return in the 
long run suggests, among other things, that the level of informational asymmetry in 
private-firm takeovers is trivial in comparison to that in public-firm takeovers. The 
examination of the largely unexplored determinants of payment methods in private-firm 
takeovers reveals results supportive of this conjecture. The results also deviate in several 
important aspects from the extant evidence based on the experience of public-firm 
takeovers. The choice of payment methods in private-firm takeovers is ceteris paribus 
endogenous to the investment objective(s) of the target owners. In addition, the agency 
conflicts in the bidder diminish the attractiveness of its equity to the target owners who 
want to stay and hold equity stakes in the combined firm. 
In conclusion, there exist several factors pointing out that private-firm takeovers are 
distinct from the extensively researched public-firm takeovers, particularly in terms of the 
wealth consequences. The findings of this thesis reveal that, unlike public-firm takeovers, 
takeovers of private targets clearly benefit bidder shareholders both in the short run and in 
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the long run. The findings also show that bidder characteristics as well as payment method 
decisions differ in several important aspects between private-firm takeovers and public-
firm takeovers. In short, the major contributions ofthis thesis are as follows: 
a. This thesis puts forwards a new theoretical perspective on and understanding of 
the wealth effects on bidder shareholders, both short-term and long-term, of 
takeovers of private targets which have received considerably little academic 
interest; 
b. This thesis comprehensively analyses, on a comparative basis, abnormal return 
to bidders of private targets employing the methodologies that (i) take into 
account the potential biases brought about by bidders making multiple 
acquisitions in overlapping return calculation periods and (ii) reduce noises as 
well as inaccuracy in abnormal return estimation especially when the U.K. data 
is used; 
c. This thesis provides new evidence on abnormal return to bidders of private 
targets, particularly in the U.K. context; and 
d. This thesis also provides an empirical analysis of the factors influencing 
bidders' target choice decision - the issue which has never before been 
empirically investigated. Finally, the largely unexplored determinants of the 
choice of payment methods in private-firm takeovers are also empirically 
investigated in this thesis. 
6.2) Areas for Future Research 
Whilst this thesis makes several important contributions to the existing literature, it 
also opens up the door to a number of interesting issues which may be addressed by future 
research. The primary empirical focus of this thesis is on share price performance of 
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bidders of private targets. Examination of operating performance of private-firm bidders 
will hence provide evidence complementary to the evidence documented in this thesis. 
Since there appears to have been no study examining operating performance of private-
firm bidders, such examination will also constitute a valuable contribution to the literature 
on the market for corporate control. 
Although the existing studies of private-firm takeovers as well as this thesis 
represent an important milestone in the literature, not all private-firm bidders in the M&A 
universe are listed companies. As mentioned in Section 3.3 .1, 460 takeovers in the initial 
sample were made by U.K.-registered unlisted bidders. This figure represents more than 
10% ofthe initial count (i.e., 4,054 takeovers), which in tum suggests that there are highly 
likely to be a considerable number of takeovers by unlisted bidders in the M&A universe. 
Examination of the consequences of these takeovers will therefore constitute insightful 
future research, both theoretically and empirically. In these takeovers, for instance, there is 
no market valuation for either the bidder or the target. 
The sample period adopted in this thesis extends over a four-year period. A short 
sample period helps to ensure that the nature of the sample takeovers is relatively stable 
and that the sample takeovers occur under a similar market condition. On the other hand, 
use of a longer sample period will allow the issue on the impact of bidders' acquisition 
frequency and/or skills on the wealth of their shareholders to be addressed with more 
precision. Specifically, bidders that appear only once during a short sample period may 
actually be frequent bidders or bidders engaged in an M&A programme. In the study of 
public-firm takeovers in the U.K. by Gregory (1997), it is found that long-term bidder 
abnormal return is dependent, among other things, on whether the bidder is a regular or 
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irregular participant in the takeover market. Thus, future research may address the 
implications of bidders' skills in the context of private-firm takeovers (as well as takeovers 
of public targets or divested subsidiaries) by employing a longer sample period. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, with the recent exceptions of Draper and Paudyal 
(2004) and Da Silva Rosa et al. (200 1 ), the previous studies of private-firm takeovers are 
limited to the U.S. experience. This thesis employs the U.K. data. Replicating this thesis 
by using the non-U.K. European or emerging market data will therefore provide further 
out-of-sample findings on the wealth effects of private-firm takeovers and interesting 
future research. 
In the analysis of the factors influencing the target choice decision in Chapter 4, a 
working assumption is made that the decision whether or not to make an acquisition arises 
prior to the decision to choose among targets of different status. While this assumption is 
consistent with much of the real-world phenomenon, there undoubtedly exist situations in 
which firms are required to make both decisions simultaneously. An analysis allowing for 
such situations will form fruitful future research. In examining the role of the bidder-side 
managerialism in the target choice decision, future research may attempt to use, though 
with potential difficulty due to scarcity of the necessary data, a more direct measure of 
agency conflicts in the bidder, e.g., the structure of executive compensation for the bidder 
managers. 
Implicit in the analysis of payment method determinants in Chapter 5 is the 
assumption that the choice of payment methods in private-firm takeovers is independent of 
target characteristics. Specifically, the analysis does not include variables which represent 
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target characteristics, such as leverage or operating performance. There are several reasons 
to expect that this assumption is realistic. Unlike public targets which are owned by 
dispersed shareholders, private targets have strong bargaining power relative to their 
bidders. To the extent that a takeover by a listed bidder is an alternative to the choice of 
going public, the investment objective of the target owners is likely to dominate the 
influence of the characteristics of the target. Furthermore, the extreme scarcity of usable 
data on financial attributes of private targets also prevents the inclusion of target 
characteristics in the analysis. Notwithstanding the theoretical gesture and/or scarcity of 
the data, the influence of target characteristics on the choice of payment methods in 
private-firm takeovers remains a potentially interesting empirical issue which may be 
addressed by future research. 
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Table AI.l 
Announcement-Period Abnormal Return to Bidders of Privately Held Targets 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 -
December 1998. All bidders are U .K listed companies. The sample bidders of private targets 
are categorised into repeating and non-repeating bidders. Panels A and 8 report abnormal return 
on event day t and buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) over a T -day event window, 
respectively, to a bidder portfolio. Abnormal return in both panels is calculated as equally 
weighted (EW) average percentage and sterling (£mil) return. •, b and c denote significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. In brackets is sample size. For details of abnormal 
return estimation, see Table 3.2. 
Panel A: Abnormal Return on Individual Event Days 
Entire Group Repeating Non-Repeating 
[1 ,200] [945] [255] 
Day EW% EW£ EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
-40 0.036 0.294 0.018 0.291 0.103 -0.131 
-39 0.003 0.271 -0.047 0.504 0.216 -0.539 
-38 -0.081 -0.412 -0.103c -0.721 0.022 0.542 
-37 0.125a 0.032 0.089c 0.166 0.254b -0.087 
-36 0.029 0.967 0.012 1.159 0.081 0.230 
-35 0.006 -0.447 -0.005 -0.628 0.053 0.293 
-34 0.017 0.354 0.016 0.433 0.015 -0.415 
-33 -0.025 -0.295 -0.017 -0.265 -0.047 -0.263 
-32 -0.021 0.128 -0.029 0.197 0.019 -0.219 
-31 -0.043 -0.401 -0.005 -0.260 -0.187 -0.542 
-30 -0.017 -0.215 0.019 -0.218 -0.146 -0.078 
-29 0.049 -0.107 0.124b 0.015 -0.231 -0.221 
-28 -0.027 -0.383 -0.051 -0.597 0.069 0.191 
-27 0.003 -0.600 0.051 -0.880 -0.173 0.407 
-26 0.010 0.093 0.017 0.163 -0.020 0.081 
-25 -0.015 0.358 0.047 0.554 -0.253b -0.270 
-24 -0.056 0.162 -0.037 0.131 -0.075 0.222 
-23 0.003 0.444 0.082c 0.591 -0.298a -0.435 
-22 0.029 0.384 0.051 0.665 -0.043 0.040 
-21 0.048 0.032 0.071 0.044 -0.041 -0.086 
-20 -0.056 -0.990b -0.080 -1.270b 0.031 0.174 
-19 -0.023 0.029 0.007 0.013 -0.140 0.132 
-18 0.027 -0.136 0.035 -0.082 0.010 -0.324 
-17 0.029 -1.104 0.007 -1.648c 0.123 0.904c 
-16 0.122b 0.842 0.091 c 1.156c 0.240 -0.399 
-15 0.097c 0.031 0.083 -0.202 0.157 0.923b 
-14 0.065 0.866c 0.011 0.840 0.272b 0.802b 
-13 -0.033 0.110 -0.067 0.142 0.098 -0.024 
-12 -0.093c 0.089 -0.085 0.080 -0.126 -0.205 
-11 0.038 -0.099 0.056 -0.226 -0.039 0.491 
-10 -0.027 -0.446 -0.035 -0.535 0.003 0.008 
-9 0.091 b 0.964c 0.099b 1.201 c 0.061 0.019 
-8 0.122b 1.627c 0.157b 2.018c -0.024 0.127 
-7 -0.022 0.160 -0.018 0.203 -0.023 -0.239 
-6 0.066 0.044 0.052 -0.026 0.117 0.203 
-5 0.096b -0.335 0.091 b -0.437 0.114 0.077 
-4 0.034 1.009c 0.021 1.412c 0.089 -0.532c 
Appendix I 
272 
Table AI.l - Continued 
Panel A: Continued 
-3 0.170a -0.199 0.074 -0.290 0.530a 0.142 
-2 -0.009 0.562 -0.020 0.670 0.035 0.153 
-1 0.289a 1.413b 0.314a 1.586b 0.195 0.985 
0 0.650a -0.129 0.593a -0.538 0.869a 1.583 
+1 0.260a 0.591 0.218a 0.643 0.416b 0.372c 
+2 0.127c -0.199 0.104 -0.083 0.215 -0.507 
+3 0.017 -0.485 0.068 -0.642 -0.165 -0.075 
+4 -0.027 -0.818c -0.043 -0.985c 0.043 -0.203 
+5 -0.107b -0.950b -0.092 -1.155b -0.179c 0.333 
+6 -0.302 -0.436 0.068 1.189c -1.704 -6.870 
+7 -0.014 1.073 -0.018 1.504 0.001 -0.141 
+8 -0.003 -0.367 -0.033 -0.608 0.117 0.099 
+9 -0.144a -1.177c -0.066 -1.368c -0.433 8 -0.468 
+10 -0.035 1.010 -0.034 1.374 -0.040 -0.208 
+ 11 -0.017 0.259 -0.021 0.519 -0.004 -0.429 
+12 0.095c 0.025 0.086 0.167 0.126 -0.367 
+13 -0.042 0.294 0.011 0.541 -0.225b -0.604b 
+14 -0.020 -0.632 -0.015 -0.845 -0.039 0.507 
+15 -0.060 -0.636 -0.096b -0.947 0.070 0.554 
+16 0.034 -0.160 -0.006 -0.362 0.180 0.641 
+17 -0.058 0.399 -0.092 0.243 0.109 0.930 
+18 -0.249b -0.102 -0.326b 0.192 0.043 -0.894 
+19 -0.221 a -0.485 -0.220a -0.721 -0.289 0.349 
+20 -0.040 -1.105b -0.014 -1.199c -0.135 -0.944 
Panel B: BHAR over Multi-Day Holding Periods 
Entire Group Repeating Non-Repeating 
[1,200] [945] [255] 
Window EW% EW£ EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
OLS Estimates OLS Estimates 0 LS Estimates 
(-1,+1) 1.207a 1.974 1.133a 1.777 1.490a 2.856 
(-5,+5) 1.328a -0.411 1.202a -0.905 1.873a 1.431 
(-10,+ 10) 0.654 0.488 0.956a 0.417 -0.397 0.860 
(-20,+20) -0.405 3.065 -0.529 3.080 -0.161 3.107 
(-40,+20) -0.710 3.495 -0.531 4.596 -1.450 -4.655c 
( -20,-1) 0.578b 2.485 0.481 c 1.896 1.017 2.053 
( -40,-1) 0.215 4.104 0.358 5.352 -0.318 -1.271 
(1,+20) -1.072b -2.819 -0.953a -3.160 -1.817 -2.390 
MAD Estimates MAD Estimates MAD Estimates 
(-1,+1) 0.835a 0.905a 0.7788 0.8276 1.0548 1.1238 
(-5,+5) 1.0238 0.441 0.909a 0.168 1.502a 1.242b 
(-10,+10) 0.894a -0.083 0.733b -0.385 1.163c 0.994 
(-20,+20) -0.021 -0.816 -0.491 -1.374 1.334 0.878 
(-40,+20) -0.418 -1.239 -0.514 -0.892 -0.117 -2.391 b 
( -20,-1) 0.346 -0.631 0.261 -1.071 0.690 2.150 
( -40,-1) 0.111 0.172 0.220 0.663 -0.401 -0.717 




Announcement-Period Abnormal Return to Bidders of Divested Subsidiaries 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 -
December 1998. All bidders are U.K listed companies. The sample bidders of divested subsidiaries 
are categorised into repeating and non-repeating bidders. Panels A and B report abnormal return on 
event day t and buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) over a r -day event window, respectively, to 
a bidder portfolio. Abnormal return in both panels is calculated as equally weighted (EW) average 
percentage and sterling (£mil) return. •, band c denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
reseectivel~. In brackets is sam2le size. For details of abnormal return estimation, see Table 3.2. 
Panel A: Abnormal Return on Individual Event Days 
Entire Group Repeating Non-Repeating 
[654] [518] [136] 
Day EW% EW£ EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
-40 0.078 -0.168 0.091 -0.825 0.028 2.472 
-39 0.058 -2.107 0.033 -3.868 0.211b 3.018 
-38 -0.119 -5.047b -0.172c -5.809b 0.065 -1.898 
-37 0.054 1.337 0.043 0.618 0.131 4.278c 
-36 0.048 0.904 0.061 2.071 -0.011 -3.511 
-35 -0.097 -7.148 -0.043 -5.926 -0.313 3.005 
-34 -0.012 0.659 0.047 1.857 -0.262a -3.630 
-33 0.015 0.370 0.040 1.251 -0.084 0.726 
-32 -0.019 1.729 -0.039 0.801 0.050 -1.296 
-31 0.150b 1.245 0.121 c -0.102 0.245 2.616 
-30 0.014 0.024 -0.049 -0.992 0.257 1.960 
-29 -0.005 -1.487 0.006 -1.498 -0.061 -1.938 
-28 -0.010 -1.815 -0.022 -1.710 0.027 -2.813 
-27 -0.038 -1.313 -0.029 -2.223 -0.075 1.840 
-26 0.099 0.302 0.161 b -0.244 -0.132 2.534 
-25 -0.002 -1.122 -0.040 -1.789 0.148 5.555c 
-24 0.004 -0.509 0.000 -0.145 0.017 -1.202 
-23 -0.033 1.828 -0.047 -0.859 0.019 12.259 
-22 0.022 5.790b 0.038 4.812c -0.040 3.977 
-21 0.034 -1.161 0.049 -0.497 -0.010 -3.322c 
-20 -0.070 -8.583a -0.049 -7.482a -0.161 -10.903 
-19 -0.046 0.436 -0.066 2.056 0.060 -6.558 
-18 0.065 0.991 0.087 0.370 -0.019 1.210 
-17 0.000 0.851 0.032 1.257 -0.132 -0.646 
-16 -0.019 0.651 -0.022 0.210 0.004 1.608 
-15 -0.019 -1.118 -0.013 -0.192 -0.021 0.906 
-14 -0.112b -2.253c -0.032 -1.854 -0.420a -1.885 
-13 -0.085 0.686 -0.104 1.296 -0.007 -2.294 
-12 -0.090 0.616 -0.047 0.559 -0.250 0.962 
-11 0.059 -5.953 0.149b -6.246 -0.296b -2.177 
-10 -0.093 -2.891 0.004 -4.012 -0.494 0.332 
-9 -0.054 0.593 -0.045 -0.511 -0.069 3.875c 
-8 -0.048 -3.081 -0.057 -3.130 -0.025 -0.251 
-7 0.140c 2.532 0.138c 2.903 0.148 0.248 
-6 -0.123c -3.214 -0.116 -4.456b -0.151 2.473 
-5 -0.036 -2.233 -0.041 -2.890 -0.049 4.709 
-4 -0.127c -5.418c -0.129c -5.069 -0.119 -3.786c 
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Table AI.2 - Continued 
Panel A: Continued 
-3 -0.019 5.119 0.085 6.929 -0.414 b -1.584 
-2 0.122 2.412 0.088 2.575 0.273 4.771 
-1 0.177b -3.685c 0.155b -4.461 c 0.280 -1.691 
0 0.509a 5.085c 0.527a 5.659c 0.454c -0.778 
+1 0.370a -0.586 0.326a -1.090 0.541 b 1.341 
+2 0.193b 3.811 c 0.230b 4.459c 0.089 0.166 
+3 0.071 -6.389 0.089 -7.236 -0.004 2.171 
+4 0.116 -1.671 0.189c 0.148 -0.154 -7.185c 
+5 -0.199b -4.740b -0.144b -3.969c -0.413 -7.367b 
+6 0.020 -3.634 0.058 -6.534b -0.129 2.241 
+7 -0.029 0.501 0.003 -0.976 -0.143 7.105 
+8 0.001 -0.881 0.020 -1.298 -0.043 -3.411c 
+9 0.016 -4.014c -0.014 -4.482c 0.106 -2.149 
+10 -0.059 -0.365 -0.053 -0.575 -0.085 1.051 
+ 11 -0.017 0.738 -0.089 -1.129 0.256b 7.054 
+12 -0.007 0.165 0.008 -0.375 -0.068 0.569 
+13 -0.127c -0.743 -0.096 -1.293 -0.233 1.322 
+14 0.108 -2.927 0.054 -3.217 0.327 -0.134 
+15 0.079 0.642 0.093 0.772 0.005 0.634 
+16 0.042 1.609 0.066 1.264 -0.050 2.331 
+17 -0.076 -1.446 -0.127c -3.795 0.122 3.074 
+18 0.102 0.970 0.054 0.813 0.311 2.188 
+19 0.077 -4.666 0.179c -6.109 -0.311 -4.250c 
+20 0.040 -1.302 0.066 -2.329 -0.030 2.589 
Panel B: BHAR over Multi-Day Holding Periods 
Entire Group Repeating Non-Repeating 
[654] [518] [136] 
Window EW% EW£ EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
OLS Estimates OLS Estimates OLS Estimates 
(-1,+ 1) l.Olla 1.183 0.963a 1.271 1.225a 0.902 
(-5,+5) 0.945a -5.569 1.227a -0.738 -0.272 -14.245 
(-10,+10) 0.418 -13.855 0.845c -14.602 -1.311 -19.486 
(-20,+20) -0.510 -4.280 0.305 1.027 -3.827b -34.490c 
(-40,+20) -0.844 -11.437 -0.170 -17.510 -3.399c -40.607a 
(-20,-1) -0.772b -8.910 -0.336 -3.931 -2.594a -18.808 
(-40,-1) -1.090c -16.511 c -0.715 -20.469c -2.512c -26.248a 
(+ 1,+20) 0.408 -8.403 0.720c -12.4 78 -0.762 -7.168 
MAD Estimates MAD Estimates MAD Estimates 
(-1,+ 1) 0.574a -0.575 0.510a -0.905 0.816a -0.237 
(-5,+5) 0.720a -2.684 0.808a -1.285 0.127 -4.342 
(-10,+10) 0.421 -5.101 0.588 -4.777 -0.519 -7.956c 
(-20,+20) -0.615 -0.530 -0.186 4.890 -2.766b -11.003 
(-40,+20) -0.978c -3.997 -0.817 -4.337 -1.927 -16.901 a 
(-20,-1) -0.682b -4.428 -0.362 -2.681 -2.067a -12.507 
(-40,-1) -1.121b -12.441 a -0.910c -13.177a -1.999c -12.341 a 




Annoumcement-lPeriod Abnormal Return to Bidders oflPubRic Targets 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 -
December 1998. All bidders are U.K listed companies. The sample bidders of public targets are 
categorised into repeating and non-repeating bidders. Panels A and B report abnormal return on 
event day t and buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) over a r -day event window, respectively, 
to a bidder portfolio. Abnormal return in both panels is calculated as equally weighted (EW) 
average percentage and sterling (£mil) return. •, band c denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.10 levels, respectively. In brackets is sample size. For details of abnormal return estimation, 
see Table 3.2. 
Panel A: Abnormal Return on Individual Event Days 
Entire Group Repeating Non-Repeating 
[150] [99] [51] 
Day EW% EW£ EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
-40 -0.083 -1.700 -0.076 -3.842 -0.088 1.708 
-39 -0.335b -1.369 -0.187 -2.444 -0.619b 0.380 
-38 0.072 -3.148 0.010 -3.805 0.198 -0.082 
-37 0.119 5.950 0.239c 1.827 -0.138 4.141 
-36 0.010 3.187 0.035 1.944 -0.041 2.567 
-35 -0.164 -1.344 -0.098 1.453 -0.306 -6.495c 
-34 -0.171 -0.584 -0.042 -6.787c -0.289 6.600 
-33 0.189 0.236 0.283c -1.635 0.012 4.946 
-32 0.062 8.037c -0.021 9.773 0.226 4.443 
-31 0.074 -2.342 0.020 -3.511 0.184 -0.482 
-30 -0.204b -0.243 -0.311a 0.697 -0.015 -2.042 
-29 -0.067 3.999 0.122 6.468 -0.359 -1.025 
-28 -0.034 -1.502 0.032 -1.766 -0.138 -1.027 
-27 0.122 -1.625 0.085 -3.143 0.142 -0.639 
-26 0.247c -2.304 0.245 -4.380 0.305 1.401 
-25 0.509c 4.080 0.313c 4.969 0.881 -1.571 
-24 -0.075 -2.766 -0.064 -1.978 -0.088 -5.528 
-23 -0.114 2.679 -0.028 -0.098 -0.284 5.633 
-22 -0.034 0.214 -0.105 -1.311 0.070 0.074 
-21 0.016 -3.034 0.139 -0.119 -0.208b -3.179 
-20 -0.219c -2.516 -0.286c -3.497 -0.056 1.962 
-19 -0.034 0.316 -0.017 -0.513 -0.087 0.775 
-18 -0.152 -6.135 -0.079 -7.038 -0.326 3.079 
-17 -0.044 -5.200b 0.076 -7.701b -0.228 -0.717 
-16 0.126 0.264 0.073 -0.895 0.218 1.766 
-15 -0.050 -2.959 -0.211 c -5.059 0.259 1.288 
-14 0.157 7.656 0.179 8.633 0.110 0.180 
-13 0.129 -1.465 0.162 -2.139 0.076 -0.068 
-12 -0.325b -5.155 -0.329b -3.093 -0.347 -7.673b 
-11 -0.093 -3.397b -0.213 -3.935c 0.122 3.652 
-10 -0.315b -0.849 -0.277c -4.524c -0.441 1.940 
-9 -0.139 -0.234 -0.183 -1.234 -0.029 1.736 
-8 -0.063 -3.221 -0.097 -2.402 -0.073 7.662 
-7 -0.217 0.726 -0.023 1.263 -0.475c -3.435 
-6 0.107 3.461 0.193 1.241 -0.036 3.978 
-5 0.137 2.032 0.276c 2.022 -0.113 0.954 
-4 0.018 -3.814 0.079 -3.643 -0.112 -4.353 
Appendix I 
276 
Table AI.3 - Continued 
Panel A: Continued 
-3 0.132 2.237 0.093 2.444 0.198 1.978 
-2 -0.007 3.275 -0.005 5.290 0.015 -0.494 
-1 -0.008 -4.689 -0.044 -1.291 0.052 -8.545 
0 -0.770c 1.396 -1.075b -5.176 0.106 38.226 
+1 -0.027 -1.523 -0.096 -1.503 0.112 -5.435 
+2 -0.098 -2.017 -0.029 -0.611 -0.251 -7.837 
+3 0.063 -0.303 0.044 -2.598 0.090 0.595 
+4 0.315b 6.974b 0.362b 10.675b 0.189 -1.154 
+5 -0.029 1.096 -0.004 1.415 -0.140 -0.993 
+6 0.009 0.405 -0.075 -0.912 0.216 1.764 
+7 0.111 2.769 0.213 3.054 -0.034 2.276 
+8 -0.096 5.353 -0.143 -1.542 0.003 9.960 
+9 0.055 10.367c 0.104 5.757 -0.032 3.112 
+10 -0.025 -0.882 -0.033 1.052 -0.042 -4.638 
+11 -0.127 -7.889b -0.293a -7.861b 0.108 0.129 
+12 -0.076 1.282 -0.063 1.672 -0.107 0.431 
+13 0.027 -3.034 0.083 -3.778 -0.062 -1.324 
+14 0.096 1.155 0.182 2.124 -0.074 -1.011 
+15 0.338b 7.609c 0.593a 11.459c -0.164 0.518 
+16 0.035 -0.330 0.047 -3.195 -0.074 3.333 
+17 0.054 -2.629 0.152 -2.843 -0.156 -2.170 
+18 0.000 -5.178 -0.080 -6.001 0.195 -3.543 
+19 -0.036 0.094 -0.019 1.944 -0.054 -1.767 
+20 0.078 0.611 0.133 3.420 -0.030 -2.960 
Panel B: BHAR over Multi-Day Holding Periods 
Entire Group Repeating Non-Repeating 
[150] [99] [51] 
Window EW% EW£ EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
OLS Estimates OLS Estimates OLS Estimates 
(-1,+ 1) -0.763 -12.531 -1.2386 -11.800 0.279 11.394 
(-5,+5) -0.197 -12.055 -0.275 23.248 -0.025 -16.958 
(-10,+10) -0.764 22.002 -0.629 22.513 -1.020 31.923b 
(-20,+20) -1.583 -0.778 -1.353 8.421 -2.202 14.873 
(-40,+20) -2.580c 27.279 -2.125 24.847 -3.564 55.455 
( -20,-1) -1.102 -22.736 -0.920 -24.462 -1.492 -12.658 
(-40,-1) -1.996c 5.854 -1.508 -1.564 -2.655 22.975 
(+ 1,+20) 0.575 7.858 1.131 16.278 -0.502 4.139 
MAD Estimates MAD Estimates MAD Estimates 
(-1,+1) -0.843 6 -10.188 -1.211 b -12.412 -0.174 3.926 
(-5,+5) -0.296 -0.361 -0.397 1.770 -0.063 0.158 
(-10,+10) -0.731 6.004 -0.683 10.537 -0.786 13.347 
(-20,+20) -1.576 -4.340 -1.706 4.100 -1.401 -0.256 
(-40,+20) -3.129b 3.496 -2.833c 5.468 -3.446 12.899 
(-20,-1) -1.215c -14.054c -1.051 -14.431 -1.513 -7.154 
( -40,-1) -2.181b -5.466 -2.552b -10.089 -1.881 5.688 
(+1,+20) 0.268 2.366 0.697 7.343 -0.671 -0.519 
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Table AI.4 
Announcement-Period Abnormal Return to 
Repeating Bidders of Private Targets by Payment Method 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 -
December 1998. All bidders are U .K listed companies. The sample repeating bidders of private 
targets are divided into cash, equity and mixed bidders. Panels A and B report abnormal return on 
event day t and buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) over a r -day event window, respectively, 
to a bidder portfolio. Abnormal return in both panels is calculated as equally weighted (EW) 
average percentage and sterling (£mil) return. •, and c denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.10 levels, respectively. In brackets is sample size. For details of abnormal return estimation, 
see Table 3.2. 
Panel A: Abnormal Return on Individual Event Days 
Cash [328] Equity [36] Mixed [280] 
Day EW% EW£ EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
-40 -0.023 0.979 0.100 -2.007 0.072 -0.036 
-39 -0.137 -0.137 0.324 0.683 0.010 -0.159 
-38 -0.095 -0.095 0.091 -0.754 -0.098 0.071 
-37 0.068 -0.275 0.278 0.856 0.186c 0.259 
-36 0.063 0.468 -0.174 -0.054 0.153 1.436b 
-35 -0.010 -1.706 0.069 -0.154 -0.024 -0.620 
-34 0.011 1.021 -0.017 0.747 -0.009 0.023 
-33 0.018 1.056 -0.226 -1.890 -0.167 -0.221 
-32 -0.034 0.482 -0.015 -0.402 -0.048 0.380 
-31 0.068 0.560 -0.626 0.342 -0.007 0.416 
-30 0.080 1.852 0.149 -0.965 -0.006 0.105 
-29 0.110 -0.705 0.091 2.235 0.223b 0.598 
-28 -0.152 -2.027 -0.584 -0.052 0.063 -0.207 
-27 0.008 -2.399a 0.222 0.595c 0.127 0.091 
-26 -0.039 1.070 0.459 -1.309 0.069 0.088 
-25 0.007 0.151 0.080 1.563 0.082 0.113 
-24 -0.092 -1.020 -0.186 0.693 0.035 0.420 
-23 0.088 -0.014 0.218 -0.640 0.114 0.221 
-22 0.162c 1.777 0.325 -0.163 -0.045 0.846 
-21 0.141 0.237 0.426 -1.670 0.136 -0.272 
-20 -0.101 -0.821 0.443 -0.189 -0.018 0.083 
-19 0.141 -0.096 0.540 0.197 -0.087 0.267 
-18 -0.069 -0.457 0.128 1.200 0.109 -0.401 
-17 0.033 -0.990 -0.159 1.747 0.014 -0.336 
-16 0.043 0.809 0.386 0.896c 0.055 0.200 
-15 0.141 0.910 0.128 0.104 -0.056 0.064 
-14 0.020 1.044 -0.232 -1.054 -0.026 0.496c 
-13 -0.187 -0.576 -0.007 1.542 0.051 0.155 
-12 -0.103 0.115 -0.832 0.484 -0.087 -0.424 
-11 0.002 -0.733 -0.134 -0.759 0.095 0.017 
-10 -0.125 -0.052 1.049c -5.743 0.015 0.035 
-9 -0.015 1.199 -0.028 -0.498 0.217b 0.240 
-8 0.013 0.791 1.033 -3.211 0.204c 0.201 
-7 -0.043 0.024 -0.146 0.090 -0.104 0.174 
-6 0.027 -0.446 0.016 -1.528 0.196 -0.198 
-5 -0.003 0.288 0.180 -2.503 0.115 -0.278 




'fable AI.4 - Continued 
Panel A: Continued 
-3 0.000 1.627 0.550 -1.059 0.195 0.141 
-2 -0.053 -0.037 0.184 0.451 0.175c 0.566c 
-1 0.066 -0.048 0.567 1.645 0.384a 1.232a 
0 0.794a 0.948 1.849 2.281 0.676b 0.479 
+1 0.217c -0.446 0.031 0.441 0.452a 0.057 
+2 0.081 0.385 -0.324 -0.092 0.343b 0.933b 
+3 0.092 -0.057 -0.260 -0.568 0.071 0.546b 
+4 -0.015 -1.250 0.334 -0.390 -0.064 0.224 
+5 0.047 -0.899 -0.049 0.281 -0.340b -0.318 
+6 0.139 0.255 -0.229 3.836 0.033 -0.319 
+7 0.075 -0.014 -0.569 0.551 0.026 0.041 
+8 0.052 -0.263 -0.137 -0.034 -0.165 -0.095 
+9 0.020 -0.501 0.189 0.377 -0.190c -0.653b 
+10 -0.064 1.751 0.234 1.061 -0.099 -0.430 
+11 0.003 0.282 0.164 0.711 -0.073 0.016 
+12 0.031 -0.472 0.212 -0.522 0.208 0.168 
+13 0.076 0.320 0.212 1.462c -0.002 0.408c 
+14 -0.100 -1.812 0.037 -0.637 0.074 0.346 
+15 -0.162b -0.929 -0.192 -0.022 -0.102 -0.180 
+16 -0.116 -0.649 0.274b 0.285 0.014 0.287 
+17 -0.054 -1.530c -0.789 1.631 0.037 0.265 
+18 -0.003 -0.187 -0.414c 0.259 -0.433 -0.113 
+19 -0.127 -0.366 -0.704 -0.051 -0.355a -0.678b 
+20 0.073 0.141 -0.151 -0.852 0.101 -0.113 
Panel B: BHAR over Multi-Day Holding Periods 
Cash [328] Eguity [36] Mixed [280] 
Window EW% EW£ EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
OLS Estimates OLS Estimates OLS Estimates 
(-1,+ 1) 1.081 a 1.118 2.2926 2.795 1.542a 1.705 
(-5,+5) 1.085a -0.898 2.034 0.441 2.117a 3.026c 
(-10,+10) 0.708 2.011 3.362c 0.240 1.484c 1.218 
(-20,+20) -1.216c -10.838b 0.489 19.971 b 0.879 0.851 
(-40,+20) -0.751 -9.045 1.430 15.871 1.080 1.604 
( -20,-1) -0.649 -2.388 3.122b -0.258 1.303a 0.895 
(-40,-1) -0.353 1.629 3.138 6.345 1.103 1.870 
(+ 1,+20) -0.581 -7.492c -3.228c 5.179 -0.589 -0.467 
MAD Estimates MAD Estimates MAD Estimates 
(-1,+1) 0.762a 2.212a 1.4426 1.242 1.179a 1.170 
(-5,+5) 0.771 b 0.265 1.449 0.295 1.808a 1.794a 
(-10,+10) 0.346 -0.376 2.631 0.849 1.649a -0.048 
(-20,+20) -1.041c -5.487a 0.746 13.172b 0.969 -0.315 
(-40,+20) -0.942 -5.327b 0.515 14.567b 1.115 -0.896 
(-20,-1) -0.457 -2.283 2.562c 0.567 0.819c 1.267 
( -40,-1) -0.249 -0.380 3.291 c 1.352 0.738 0.568 
(+1,+20) -0.663 -2.290 -1.630 1.054 -0.335 -1.331c 
Appendix I 
Table AI.5 
Announcement-Period Abnormal Return to 
Non-Repeating Bidders of Private Targets by Payment Method 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 -
December 1998. All bidders are U.K listed companies. The sample non-repeating bidders of 
private targets are divided into cash, equity and mixed bidders. Panels A and B report abnormal 
return on event day t and buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) over a r -day event window, 
respectively, to a bidder portfolio. Abnormal return in both panels is calculated as equally 
weighted (EW) average percentage and sterling (£mil) return. •, b and c denote significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. In brackets is sample size. For details of abnormal 
return estimation, see Table 3.2. 
Panel A: Abnormal Return on Individual Event Days 
Cash [85] Equity [25] Mixed [79] 
Day EW% EW£ EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
-40 -0.070 -0.292 0.357 0.221 0.171 -0.282 
-39 0.347 -1.333 -0.051 -0.001 0.217 -0.093 
-38 -0.155 -0.282 0.427 0.380 0.245 -0.180 
-37 0.161 0.232 0.171 -0.038 0.547c 0.246 
-36 0.124 1.606 0.674 0.139 0.152 0.245 
-35 0.341 0.479b -0.309 0.178c 0.051 0.067 
-34 -0.277 0.401 -0.017 0.008 0.593 -0.526c 
-33 0.084 0.4 79 0.880 0.162c -0.472 -0.394 
-32 -0.043 -0.095 0.420 -0.014 -0.143 0.162 
-31 -0.437 -1.276 -0.204 0.011 0.049 0.324 
-30 -0.293 -0.043 -0.430 -0.007 -0.189 -0.036 
-29 -0.301 c -0.302 0.354 0.055 -0.652 0.127 
-28 0.103 -0.030 0.750 0.171 -0.232 0.115 
-27 -0.340c -1.205a 0.121 0.052 -0.045 0.414 
-26 0.558c 0.317 -0.005 0.000 -0.491 b -0.286b 
-25 -0.138 -0.246 0.139 0.080 -0.415c -0.258 
-24 -0.208 -0.567 0.193 0.026 -0.050 0.080 
-23 -0.224 -0.714 a -0.111 -0.054 -0.575a -0.580 
-22 -0.067 0.023 -0.156 -0.039 0.127 0.132 
-21 0.280 -0.467 -0.563 -0.004 -0.111 -0.229 
-20 0.000 0.462 -0.525 -0.125 0.240 0.017 
-19 -0.192 0.425 0.149 0.061 -0.343 0.131 
-18 -0.065 0.355 0.225 0.030 -0.046 -0.283 
-17 0.271 0.601 c 0.553b 0.253b -0.400 0.342 
-16 -0.091 0.204 0.532 0.156 0.552 0.156 
-15 0.313 0.967 -0.604 -0.043 0.073 0.106 
-14 0.426c 0.957 0.780c 0.264c 0.159 0.124 
-13 -0.007 0.145 0.807 0.215 0.132 -0.182 
-12 -0.092 -0.046 0.623c 0.247b -0.080 -0.140 
-11 -0.179 -0.294 0.298 0.098 0.026 -0.267 
-10 0.091 0.300 0.032 0.043 -0.004 -0.035 
-9 0.089 0.097 1.004 0.617c -0.055 0.191 
-8 -0.108 -0.066 0.859 0.655c -0.045 -0.074 
-7 -0.012 -0.286 -0.625 -0.162 -0.095 -0.274 
-6 -0.042 -0.428 0.220 0.038 0.136 0.303 
-5 0.079 0.493 -0.072 -0.027 0.180c 0.425 




Table AI.5- Continued 
Panel A: Continued 
-3 0.231 -0.727 1.074 0.103 0.5646 0.646 
-2 0.031 -0.588 -1.058 -0.047 0.430 0.171 
-1 0.276 0.270 -0.719 -0.047 -0.029 0.068 
0 0.010 3.892c 1.615c 0.547 1.425a 0.737 
+1 0.140 0.457c 0.438 0.054 0.437 0.105 
+2 0.129 0.815 1.923 0.326 0.084 -0.208 
+3 -0.038 -0.096 -0.048 -0.108 -0.257 -0.070 
+4 0.252 0.236 0.016 -0.017 -0.230 0.258 
+5 -0.101 0.026 -0.031 0.042 -0.295 -0.097 
+6 0.144 0.151 -0.051 -0.022 -5.727 -22.854 
+7 -0.278 0.318 -0.114 -0.023 0.224b 0.416 
+8 -0.072 -0.349 -0.205 -0.060 0.081 0.061 
+9 -0.672 -1.688 -0.280 -0.070 -0.287c 0.013 
+10 0.016 -0.661 0.018 0.026 -0.130 -0.025 
+11 0.229 0.156 0.016 0.050 -0.350 -0.329 
+12 -0.121 0.192 0.227 0.025 0.216 -0.409 
+13 -0.131 -0.147 0.204 0.045 -0.199 -0.305 
+14 -0.071 0.069 0.287 0.016 -0.108 -0.075 
+15 0.327b 1.115b -0.030 -0.139 0.017 0.079 
+16 0.237 0.924c 0.091 -0.001 -0.016 -0.227 
+17 0.305 0.306 -0.087 -0.066 -0.132 -0.101 
+18 0.210 2.087 0.630 0.084 0.066 0.211 
+19 -0.153 0.327 -2.112 0.051 -0.344 0.538 
+20 -0.049 -1.316 0.224 0.199 0.244 0.094 
Panel B: BHAR over Multi-Dai: Holding Periods 
Cash [85] Eguity [25] Mixed [79] 
Window EW% EW£ EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
OLS Estimates OLS Estimates OLS Estimates 
(-1,+ 1) 0.346 5.425 1.288 0.265 1.855a 0.906c 
(-5,+5) 0.405 0.434 3.186 -0.185 2.276a 1.471 
(-10,+ 10) -0.376 -2.968 3.619c 0.880 -3.869 2.392c 
(-20,+20) 0.932 2.099 5.341 1.861 -4.160 0.469 
(-40,+20) -0.579 -1.891 7.096 2.970b -5.946 -2.374 
(-20,-1) 0.318 0.760 3.135 1.827b 1.080 0.948 
(-40,-1) -0.780 -4.860 5.082 2.979a -0.939 -3.713c 
(+ 1,+20) 0.611 -4.336 0.879 -0.220 -6.426 0.126 
MAD Estimates MAD Estimates MAD Estimates 
(-1,+ 1) 0.472c 0.618 1.293 0.429 1.174a 0.391 
(-5,+5) 0.527 0.706 2.445 0.598 1.767b 0.772c 
(-10,+10) -0.606 -0.573 2.734 0.567 1.220 0.915c 
(-20,+20) 0.308 3.053 4.279 1.158 0.782 0.602 
(-40,+20) -0.654 -2.261 5.146 1.777c -1.307 -1.600c 
( -20,-1) -0.237 3.272 2.272 1.229b 0.869 0.399 
( -40,-1) -1.386 -3.667 4.840 2.191b -0.763 -1.334 
(+ 1,+20) -0.064 0.444 0.675 -0.040 -1.591 -0.111 
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Table AI.6 
Announcement-Period Abnormal Return to 
Repeating Bidders of Divested Subsidiaries by Payment Method 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 -
December 1998. All bidders are U .K listed companies. The sample repeating bidders of divested 
subsidiaries are divided into cash, equity and mixed bidders. Panels A and B report abnormal 
return on event day t and buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) over a r -day event window, 
respectively, to a bidder portfolio. Abnormal return in both panels is calculated as equally 
weighted (EW) average percentage and sterling (£mil) return. •, band c denote significance at the 
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. In brackets is sample size. For details of abnormal return 
estimation, see Table 3.2. 
Panel A: Abnormal Return on Individual Event Days 
Cash [290] Equity [11] Mixed [23] 
Day EW% EW£ EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
-40 0.050 -4.092 -0.265c -0.429 1.366 0.205 
-39 -0.011 -4.202 -0.275 -0.031 -0.219 0.316 
-38 -0.061 -1.738 -0.457 0.306 -0.324 -0.315 
-37 0.050 5.787 2.198 0.281 0.546 0.926 
-36 0.178 1.567 -1.233 -1.152 -0.031 -0.021 
-35 0.025 -6.800 -0.305 -0.143 -0.305 -0.256 
-34 0.222b 5.392 -0.622 -0.408c -0.512c -0.603c 
-33 0.062 -0.369 -0.174 -0.247 0.288 -0.965 
-32 -0.049 2.318 -0.907 -3.415 0.536 2.767b 
-31 0.149c -1.810 -0.678 0.635 0.801 0.352 
-30 -0.025 0.549 0.529 0.130 -0.249 -1.336c 
-29 0.008 -0.556 -0.152 -0.298 -0.129 -0.116 
-28 -0.003 -1.317 0.789 0.522 0.208 0.140 
-27 -0.115 -2.747 -0.055 0.924 0.410 -0.145 
-26 0.053 -1.532 0.296 -0.031 0.591 -0.353 
-25 -0.018 -8.993b 0.375b 0.074 -0.304 -0.426c 
-24 0.013 -1.866 -0.334 -0.170 -0.268 -0.887 
-23 -0.151 -4.513c 0.399 -0.108 0.481 -0.137 
-22 0.024 1.720 -0.633 0.109 0.301 0.036 
-21 0.060 0.175 0.119 -0.102 -0.063 0.313 
-20 -0.091 -2.002 0.286 0.104 -0.467 -0.350 
-19 -0.109 -0.029 -0.752 -2.916c -0.110 -0.268 
-18 0.079 0.155 -0.448 -0.609 0.437 0.127 
-17 0.083 6.187a -0.175 0.162 0.325 0.362 
-16 -0.011 -0.490 0.456 0.237 -0.091 -0.287 
-15 -0.086 1.942 -0.109 -0.127 -0.492 0.112 
-14 -0.103 -1.232 -0.387 -0.239 0.386 0.076 
-13 -0.143 1.023 0.238 -0.347 -0.559 0.401 
-12 -0.100 1.010 -0.088 -0.049 -0.727 -0.317 
-11 0.113 -7.083 -0.779b -0.777b 0.996c 2.257 
-10 0.026 -0.572 -0.833 -0.273b -0.122 -0.839c 
-9 -0.035 2.213 -0.492b -0.119 -0.092 -0.389 
-8 -0.018 0.207 -0.111 0.024 -0.217 -0.460 
-7 0.110 4.516 0.176 0.156 -0.071 -0.201 
-6 -0.127 -3.348 -0.317 0.204 0.016 0.232 
-5 -0.081 -7.722 -0.039 0.624 -0.414 -0.642 




TalbRe AI.6 - Continued 
Panel A: Continued 
-3 -0.134 -0.530 1.469 0.276 0.354 0.671 
-2 0.115 6.238 0.280 0.322 0.603 0.460 
-1 0.190c -2.304 1.817 -0.115 1.329a -5.412c 
0 0.573a 4.786 1.384 0.952 1.096 0.097 
+1 0.379a -1.794 1.797 0.647 0.457 5.407c 
+2 0.317b 4.709 -0.548 -0.373 0.156 -0.226 
+3 0.073 -2.137 -0.046 0.022 -0.102 0.185 
+4 0.236 -1.533 -1.338b -0.223b 1.636 5.954c 
+5 -0.155c -3.467 -0.791 -0.401 -0.178 1.114 
+6 0.070 -3.419 -0.431 -0.293 0.605 0.911 
+7 -0.036 -2.146 0.207 -0.086 0.081 -0.903b 
+8 -0.111 -3.787 0.154 0.051 0.206 0.042 
+9 -0.124 -2.603 -0.088c -0.104 0.294 -0.202 
+10 -0.042 0.134 -0.006 0.162 -0.035 -0.082 
+11 -0.092 0.209 -0.880 -2.590 -0.196 -0.187 
+12 0.012 0.311 0.037 0.017 0.998 -0.490 
+13 -0.061 -2.881 0.352 3.345 -0.325 0.177 
+14 0.063 -0.377 0.753 0.369 -0.174 -0.242 
+15 0.086 -2.231 -0.127 -0.582 0.242 0.442 
+16 0.175c 2.059 0.050 -0.136 -0.088 0.044 
+17 -0.196c -4.655 0.319 -0.317 -0.626 -0.310 
+18 0.032 0.977 0.383 -2.411 0.080 0.792 
+19 0.212c -0.765 -0.126 0.763 0.490c -0.613 
+20 0.097 -0.995 0.341 0.259 -0.069 -9.770 
Panel B: BHAR over Multi-Day Holding Periods 
Cash [290] Equity [11] Mixed [23] 
Window EW% EW£ EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
OLS Estimates OLS Estimates 0 LS Estimates 
(-1,+ 1) 1.120a 2.727 3.782c 1.732 2.979a 10.6196 
(-5,+5) 1.246a 0.940 -3.121 2.698c 2.779 -0.901 
(-10,+10) 0.400 -0.418 0.153 -4.086c 3.504 -1.874 
(-20,+20) -0.228 23.370c -0.285 0.361 2.457 -0.234 
(-40,+20) -0.302 3.389 -3.042 -7.992c 3.499 -3.435 
(-20,-1) -0.976c 0.956 -0.888 0.471 0.472 0.706 
( -40,-1) -1.014 -14.135 -4.422b -0.466 1.510 -1.293 
(+ 1,+20) 0.674 5.012 1.186 0.504 1.566 -0.357 
MAD Estimates MAD Estimates MAD Estimates 
(-1,+ 1) 0.623a -0.079 2.493 0.818 2.6876 8.4206 
(-5,+5) 0.910a -0.829 -3.021 1.893c 2.536 0.622 
(-10,+10) 0.325 -2.289 -1.109 -3.170 1.739 -0.098 
(-20,+20) -0.650 9.110 -1.094 -0.179 1.425 1.215 
(-40,+20) -0.789 0.967 -4.116 -5.880c 0.057 -1.384 
(-20,-1) -0.964b -2.322 -0.656 -0.102 0.183 0.995 
( -40,-1) -1.225c -11.706b -4.362c -0.833 -0.695 -0.165 




AnnoUIIncement-Period Abnormal Return to 
Non-Repeating Bidders of Divested Subsidiaries by Payment Method 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 -
December 1998. All bidders are U.K listed companies. The sample non-repeating bidders of 
divested subsidiaries are divided into cash, equity and mixed bidders. Panels A and 8 report 
abnormal return on event day t and buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) over a r -day event 
window, respectively, to a bidder portfolio. Abnormal return in both panels is calculated as 
equally weighted (EW) average percentage and sterling (£mil) return. •, b and c denote 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. In brackets is sample size. For details 
of abnormal return estimation, see Table 3 .2. 
Panel A: Abnormal Return on Individual Event Days 
Cash [77] Equity [3] Mixed [8] 
Day EW% EW£ EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
-40 -0.048 2.783 na na -0.442 -0.613 
-39 0.173 2.708 na na -0.392 -0.133 
-38 -0.061 -1.719 na na -0.158c -0.008 
-37 0.167 4.594 na na -0.535 -0.030 
-36 0.078 -3.004 na na -0.799 -0.323c 
-35 -0.157 1.207 na na -0.355 -0.454 
-34 -0.278b -1.031 na na -0.857 -0.846 
-33 -0.206 3.216 na na 0.078 -0.001 
-32 -0.235 -1.728 na na 0.522 0.203 
-31 0.098 -5.236 na na 2.142 0.373 
-30 0.470 3.980 na na -0.045 -0.008 
-29 -0.239 -2.493 na na -0.704 -0.111 
-28 -0.090 -6.545 na na 0.044 0.036 
-27 -0.111 2.431 na na 0.007 -0.042 
-26 -0.064 2.927 na na -0.206 0.053 
-25 0.065 8.495c na na 0.821 0.018 
-24 -0.018 -0.914 na na 0.040 -0.934 
-23 0.090 5.631 na na -0.565 -0.044 
-22 -0.161 6.353 na na 0.513 0.266 
-21 0.181 -2.225 na na 0.080 0.428 
-20 -0.056 -12.421 na na 0.498 -0.008 
-19 0.159 -4.025 na na 0.141 0.039 
-18 0.103 3.330 na na -0.677 -0.037 
-17 0.003 2.050 na na 0.012 0.064 
-16 -0.035 1.232 na na -0.514 -0.310 
-15 -0.187 -2.173 na na 0.114 -0.102 
-14 -0.435a -1.498 na na -0.250c -0.087 
-13 0.027 0.174 na na -0.695b -0.033 
-12 -0.069 1.246 na na 0.136 0.063 
-11 -0.346 -2.922 na na -0.661 -0.052 
-10 -0.594 6.694 na na -0.085 -0.017 
-9 -0.440 0.600 na na -0.465 0.039 
-8 -0.347b -1.465 na na 0.212 0.035c 
-7 0.316 -0.849 na na 0.027 -0.229 
-6 -0.236 -1.545 na na 0.198 -0.048 
-5 -0.218 0.713 na na 0.270 0.015 
-4 -0.367b -2.466 na na 0.838 0.004 
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Table AI. 7- Continued 
Panel A: Continued 
-3 -0.204 -0.626 na na -2.927 -0.151 
-2 0.147 6.589 na na 0.543 -0.113 
-1 0.205 -1.752 na na 2.209 -0.175 
0 0.671 b -2.137 na na 1.240 -0.071 
+1 0.468b 0.807 na na -0.654 -0.005 
+2 0.105 -1.325 na na -0.587 -0.207 
+3 0.142 2.263 na na -0.020 0.144 
+4 -0.485c -8.428 na na 1.312 -0.079 
+5 -0.746 -9.690 na na 0.186 -0.007 
+6 0.096 4.379 na na -0.864c -0.154 
+7 -0.102 7.467 na na 0.316 -0.024 
+8 0.098 -1.959 na na 0.188 0.010 
+9 0.093 -2.252 na na -0.004 0.048 
+10 -0.247 -6.568 na na -0.756 -0.328 
+ 11 0.172 -1.273 na na -0.003 -0.008 
+12 -0.173 1.438 na na -0.234 -0.042 
+13 -0.005 5.104c na na -0.492 -0.198 
+14 0.375 -0.782 na na -1.789c -0.867 
+15 -0.096 0.119 na na 0.220 0.010 
+16 0.152 1.254c na na 0.193 0.012 
+17 0.103 -2.860 na na -0.605 0.060 
+18 0.534 2.014 na na -0.366c -0.055 
+19 -0.171 -3.819 na na 0.958 0.141 
+20 -0.013 2.359 na na -0.167 0.003 
Panel B: BHAR over Multi-Da:y Holding Periods 
Cash [77] Eguity [3f Mixed [8] 
Window EW% EW£ EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
OLS Estimates OLS Estimates OLS Estimates 
(-1,+1) 1.340a -0.153 na na 4.232 -0.291 
(-5,+5) -1.370 -27.254 na na 5.344 3.142 
(-10,+10) -2.621 -39.424c na na 3.729 1.154 
(-20,+20) -3.660c -49.739c na na -4.603 -2.352 
(-40,+20) -4.313c -43.482b na na -4.015 -3.315 
( -20,-1) -3.313a -25.207 na na 0.013 -0.492 
(-40,-1) -4.127a -23.816b na na 0.181 -1.915 
{+ 1,+20} -0.257 -11.784 na na -4.971 -3.793c 
MAD Estimates MAD Estimates MAD Estimates 
(-1,+ 1) 0.7976 -0.237 na na 3.389 0.015 
(-5,+5) -0.554 -4.802 na na 6.551 c 2.193 
(-10,+ 10) -1.803 -10.131c na na 6.388 1.337c 
(-20,+20) -3.112c -10.269 na na -4.164 -1.490 
(-40,+20) -3.789b -15.867 na na -4.178 -1.834 
(-20,-1) -2.846a -5.158 na na 0.375 -0.257 
(-40,-1) -3.736a -10.381a na na -0.820 -1.122 
{+ 1,+20) -0.048 -2.489 na na -4.785 -2.781 
* Since there are only three equity offers made by non-repeating bidders, average abnormal 
return cannot be estimated for this group of bidders. 
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Table AL8 
Announcement-Period Abnormal Return to 
Repeating Bidders of Public Targets by Payment Method 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 -
December 1998. All bidders are U .K listed companies. The sample repeating bidders of public 
targets are divided into cash, equity and mixed bidders. Panels A and B report abnormal return on 
event day t and buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) over a T -day event window, respectively, 
to a bidder portfolio. Abnormal return in both panels is calculated as equally weighted (EW) 
average percentage and sterling (£mil) return. •, band c denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.10 levels, respectively. In brackets is sample size. For details of abnormal return estimation, see 
Table 3.2. 
Panel A: Abnormal Return on Individual Event Days 
Cash [28] Equity [22] Mixed [49] 
Day EW% EW£ EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
-40 -0.299 -13.065 -0.201 -2.045 0.114 0.321 
-39 -0.440c -8.766 -0.222 -6.946 -0.016 1.789 
-38 -0.164 -11.744 0.232 0.019 0.063 -1.457 
-37 0.075 2.767 0.377c 11.976 0.269 -2.207 
-36 -0.117 -4.685 0.307 0.760 0.067 6.086 
-35 -0.270 0.963 -0.258c -0.640 0.152c 1.116 
-34 -0.300 -13.448 -0.392 -3.191 0.245 -2.512 
-33 0.271 6.560 -0.041 -5.344 0.436c -1.814 
-32 0.094 32.451 0.048 -1.630 -0.100 2.935 
-31 -0.288 -18.685 0.101 -1.479 0.141 1.683 
-30 -0.512b -7.325c -0.152 0.410 -0.206 1.169 
-29 0.065 21.422 -0.148 -4.306 0.374c 3.339 
-28 -0.439 -14.769c 0.805 0.217 -0.045 0.277 
-27 0.308 -10.305 -0.097 -0.121 0.039 2.997c 
-26 -0.280 -20.781 0.107 -1.905 0.600b 1.973 
-25 0.495 20.012 0.670b 4.745 0.106 -3.336 
-24 -0.293 -0.970 0.234 -2.086 -0.071 -5.878 
-23 0.048 2.918 0.060 8.202 -0.080 -4.526 
-22 -0.071 -9.083 0.084 2.721 -0 .115 0. 812 
-21 0.323 -2.085 0.581 -1.376 -0.128 1. 792 
-20 -0.291 -8.473 -0.247 3.609 -0.302 -5.246c 
-19 0.125 1.182 0.043 -0.954 0.042 -1.626 
-18 -0.202 -11.361 -0.176 -8.551 0.019 -6.516b 
-17 0.029 -6.735 0.337 -10.714 0.073 -2.117 
-16 0.438 -0.191 -0.009 2.917 -0.086 -3.633 
-15 -0.493b -15.281 0.187 2.702c -0.337b -2.914c 
-14 0.088 12.625 -0.157 9.080 0.193 2.678 
-13 -0.255 -13.355 0.717c 1.176 0.150 1.895 
-12 -0.411 1.029 -0.334 -11.079 -0.275c -2.219 
-11 -0.180 -5.954 -0.421 -5.066c -0.176 -4.808c 
-10 -0.176 0.869 -0.061 -1.726 -0.425 -5.396c 
-9 0.232 6.473 -0.149 -3.722 -0.330b -2.974 
-8 -0.352 1.080 0.263 -0.281 -0.111 -3.510 
-7 -0.520b -5.213 0.603 0.394 -0.012 2.902 
-6 0.341 -10.795 0.526c -7.294 -0.141 -1.954 
-5 0.305 1.463 0.582b 5.131 0.153 -0.382 




Table Al.8 - Continued 
Panel A: Continued 
-3 0.048 -4.978 -0.200 6.545 0.257c 4.529 
-2 -0.220 -3.557 -0.088 1.361 0.147 9.627 
-1 -0.287 -15.121 0.259 13.543c -0.099 -5.865 
0 -1.176 -13.606 0.970 73.862c -1.977a -29.875a 
+1 0.019 0.319 0.183 3.128 -0.281 -2.989 
+2 -0.079 -2.457 -0.838c -0.315 0.325 -0.926 
+3 0.298 6.797 -0.554 -10.667 0.162 -1.758 
+4 0.166 11.382 0.622b 12.209c 0.316 3.414 
+5 -0.297 -13.185b 0.403 19.464 -0.188 -3.814c 
+6 0.006 7.328 -0.847 0.808 0.166 -0.195 
+7 0.097 -2.767 0.749 -0.846 0.039 7.666 
+8 -0.052 -5.919 -1.189 -7.176 0.144 2.501 
+9 0.424 4.254 0.033 23.300 -0.055 1.065 
+10 0.034 10.655 0.210 -5.538 -0.116 -4.365 
+ 11 -0.477 -11.599 -0.332b -0.164 -0.173 -4.554 
+12 0.089 3.900 -0.066 -1.291 -0.131 -2.885 
+13 -0.062 -10.197 0.072 -2.154 0.191 2.623 
+14 0.040 3.651 0.588 3.567 0.067 -0.717 
+15 0.398 21.805 1.477b 8.381 0.210 2.210 
+16 -0.432c -19.018c 0.208 2.170 0.244b 4.466 
+17 0.052 -11.834 0.196 -0.055 0.211 0.005 
+18 -0.131 -14.850 -0.795c -6.825 0.273c 5.168 
+19 -0.237 -6.320 -0.100 3.282 0.171 1.545 
+20 0.296 14.500b -0.419 -4.926 0.273b -0.549 
Panel B: BHAR over Multi-Day Holding Periods 
Cash [28] Equity [22] Mixed [49] 
Window EW% EW£ EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
OLS Estimates OLS Estimates OLS Estimates 
(-1,+ 1) -1.467 -40.866 1.174 74.5886 -2.399a -41.5276 
(-5,+5) -0.174 26.774 1.199 121.462c -1.012 -25.060c 
(-10,+10) -0.525 7.626 2.028 136.874b -1.940 -31.409 
(-20,+20) -2.521 -14.557 2.394 106.472 -2.122 -21.416 
(-40,+20) -4.307c 9.105 1.520 82.717 -2.545 2.796 
( -20,-1) -2.053 -93.151 2.737c 39.889 -1.725 -20.072 
( -40,-1) -3.911b -51.553c 2.332 2.691 -2.091 -9.300 
(+ 1,+20) 0.619 24.958 0.344 44.627 2.002b 2.760 
MAD Estimates MAD Estimates MAD Estimates 
(-1,+ 1) -1.233 -18.008 0.892 38.4746 -2.275a -18.9486 
(-5,+5) 0.538 7.827 1.171 53.839 -1.503c -14.339b 
(-10,+10) -0.682 11.588 2.867 65.486 -2.140c -15.661 
(-20,+20) -2.365 8.472 2.689 40.806 -2.701 c -10.954 
(-40,+20) -4.174c -1.382 1.491 28.209 -4.027b -0.578 
( -20,-1) -2.713c -49.913 2.670c 21.001 -1.628 -15.160 
( -40,-1) -5.353a -47.118c 2.011 8.924 -2.796b -7.393 
(+1,+20) 0.410 16.410 -0.147 9.050 1.454 1.884 
Appendix I 
Talble AI.9 
Announcement-Period Abnormal Return to 
Non-Repeating Bidders of Public Targets by Payment Method 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 -
December 1998. All bidders are U .K listed companies. The sample non-repeating bidders of 
public targets are divided into cash, equity and mixed bidders. Panels A and 8 report abnormal 
return on event day t and buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) over a r -day event window, 
respectively, to a bidder portfolio. Abnormal return in both panels is calculated as equally 
weighted (EW) average percentage and sterling (£mil) return. •, band c denote significance at the 
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. In brackets is sample size. For details of abnormal return 
estimation, see Table 3.2. 
Panel A: Abnormal Return on Individual Event Days 
Cash [12] Equity [14] Mixed [25] 
Day EW% EW£ EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
-40 0.663 -0.541 -0.293 5.691 -0.189 -2.567 
-39 -0.727c 1.072 -1.230b -1.760 -0.030 1.287 
-38 -0.193 3.835 1.021 2.517 -0.079 -2.030 
-37 -1.343 -2.648 0.251 -0.644 0.107 5.920 
-36 -0.527 -3.217 0.004 8.303 0.281 3.703 
-35 -0.639 0.477 -0.451 b -9.443 -0.057 -1.339c 
-34 -1.365 -0.529 -0.026 -2.546 0.040 9.772 
-33 -0.448 -2.694 0.273 2.365 -0.036 3.230 
-32 0.841c -2.125 0.007 -0.678 0.503 5.681 
-31 -0.024 -2.689 0.148 1.677 0.347 0.031 
-30 -0.430 -6.989 0.570 2.672 -0.095 -2.622 
-29 -0.116 -0.541 -0.793 1.663 -0.549b -1.158 
-28 -0.569b -2.274 0.052 -0.067 -0.007 -1.406 
-27 0.205 1.036 0.258 1.299 -0.032 -2.046 
-26 -0.153 1.260 0.909 4.088 0.173 -0.745 
-25 2.561 2.379 0.103 1.158 0.240b -0.990 
-24 -1.094 -4.381 0.361 -10.264 0.156 0.736 
-23 -0.063 0.840 -0.821 -1.937 -0.084 24.087c 
-22 0.240 2.532 0.034 11.240 0.012 -3.781 
-21 0.073 0.935 -0.385b 0.314 -0.133 1.012 
-20 -0.100 -2.335 0.114 2.584 -0.112 1.912 
-19 -0.908c 0.696 0.408 6.645 -0.072 0.145 
-18 -0.259 -6.497 -0.897 6.111 -0.018 8.951 
-17 0.708 -3.305 -1.272c -0.985 -0.108 -2.530 
-16 0.049 -1.394 0.730c 12.052 -0.086 -1.515 
-15 -0.396a -2.672c 1.185 -2.403 0.114 3.558 
-14 -0.186 -2.535 0.176c -1.219 0.200 -0.063 
-13 0.185 -3.905 0.203 0.927 -0.080 -1.887 
-12 -0.270 0.717 -1.380 -1.959 -0.035 -8.939 
-11 0.248 3.616 0.468 -2.704 -0.082 1.637 
-10 -1.671c -2.501c 0.024 1.252 -0.036 -1.956 
-9 -0.791 -13.909 1.542 0.952 -0.049 11.005 
-8 0.005 7.223 -0.507 -8.475 0.155 12.151 
-7 -1.764c -6.181b -0.458a -14.462 0.137 3.810 
-6 -0.517 1.481 -0.413 2.360 0.258 10.651 
-5 -1.048c -5.420 -0.095 -0.292 0.362 4.756 




Table AI.9 - Continued 
Panel A: Continued 
-3 0.919 6.332 -0.245c -4.994 0.268 -0.032 
-2 0.089 -3.207 0.294 11.670 -0.151 -2.257 
-1 0.737 1.265 0.511 c 1.767 -0.516a 2.308 
0 3.370b 5.380b 1.017 88.778 -1.933c -2.355 
+1 1.064 5.141 0.225 5.650 -0.464 -3.138 
+2 0.378c 4.800 -0.548 -12.375 -0.294 4.458 
+3 -0.809 -0.303 -0.081 -4.852 0.597b 0.275 
+4 -0.094 -1.777 0.222 -1.836 0.292 -1.362 
+5 -0.040 -1.997 -0.887 -0.316 0.185c 1.875 
+6 0.579 1.167 -0.115 2.534 0.237 -1.044 
+7 0.239 1.021 b -0.085 10.386 -0.353 -5.507c 
+8 -0.136 -2.365 -0.409 17.128 0.275 -7.365 
+9 -0.309c -3.432 -0.259 19.300 0.246 7.028 
+10 0.152 -0.822 -0.097 2.006 -0.072 -9.665 
+ 11 -0.692c -3.652 0.232 -1.992 0.240 7.259 
+12 -0.507 -1.151 -0.449 -17.719 0.209c 6.736 
+13 -0.656 -3.665c 0.350 -7.059 0.004 0.385 
+14 0.046 0.792 -0.336 2.176 -0.095 -4.447 
+15 -0.618 -2.998 -0.082 -0.487 0.115 4.986c 
+16 -0.550 0.625 0.311 12.870 0.066 3.650 
+17 -0.798c 0.057 0.163 -7.052 -0.017 -2.825 
+18 -0.651 -2.790b 1.600 -1.373 -0.272 -5.573 
+19 -0.072 -2.644c -0.797 1.065 0.328 0.206 
+20 -0.426 1.644 -0.063 3.449 0.025 -2.670 
Panel B: BHAR over Multi-Day Holding Periods 
Cash [12] Equity [14] Mixed [25] 
Window EW% EW£ EW% EW£ EW% EW£ 
OLS Estimates OLS Estimates OLS Estimates 
(-1,+ 1) 5.053 -3.321 1.288 15.119 -2.7186 -7.371 
(-5,+5) 2.915 1.674 0.329 44.033 -1.673 -21.942 
(-10,+10) -1.658 -9.789 -0.222 61.853 -0.760 21.439 
(-20,+20) -7.255 -24.761 1.000 91.368 -0.346 1.179 
(-40,+20) -9.680 -16.744 1.609 167.818 -0.593 33.263 
(-20,-1) -6.283b -15.008c -0.485 -3.356 0.662 1.914 
( -40,-1) -7.117 -26.744 -0.052 59.738 0.394 21.353 
(+ 1,+20) -3.676 -12.317 2.246 5.197 1.315 7.157 
MAD Estimates MAD Estimates MAD Estimates 
(-1,+ 1) 3.063 0.391 1.043 5.825 -2.311 b -4.744 
(-5,+5) 2.189 4.663 -0.416 17.024 -1.327 -7.493 
(-10,+10) -2.292 -4.924 -0.565 22.672 -0.010 7.069 
(-20,+20) -5.874 -14.575 2.615 28.272 -0.570 -0.549 
(-40,+20) -7.512 -12.665 2.594 76.510 -0.194 6.443 
( -20,-1) -5.159b -10.224c -0.793 -2.298 -0.228 -4.314 
( -40,-1) -6.607c -21.012 0.658 27.987 -0.241 5.477 




Long-Term Post-Acquisition Bidder Abnormal Return: 
Event-Time Firm-Specific Fama-Frencb 3-Factor Moden Monthly Abnorman Return 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995- December 
1998. All bidders are U.K listed companies. The main bidder classes or portfolios are mutually 
exclusive. For each bidder, monthly abnormal return is estimated over a r-month window, where r = 
12, 24 and 36. Abnormal return to bidder i is computed using the event-time Fama-French 3-Factor 
model estimated as the regression model: 
Rii-Rft =ai +fJi(Rm1 -Rft)+siSMB1 +hiHML1 +£u. 
Ril is return to bidder i in month t, and R ft is the return (Bond Equivalent Yield) on the 3-month T-
Bill. SMB1 is return to small firms minus return to large firms. HML1 is return to high-BM firms 
minus return to low-BM firms. ai measures monthly abnormal return to bidder i during the r-month 
window. Percentage abnormal return to a bidder portfolio, aT' is calculated by averaging ai s with 
equal weighting. Sterling abnormal return (£mil) to a bidder portfolio, AT, is calculated by averaging 
the terms [ MVi,O · ai ], with equal weighting, where MVi,O is MY of bidder i at the beginning of the 
window. MVi,O is standardised using the price level of the FT All Share Index observed at each point 
in time. January 1995 is used as the base period. The following t-statistics: ta = JT /( ~L7=l alT) · n; 
and t A =AT/( ~L7=l MVi7o · a}T) · n are used for determining the significance level for aT and AT, 
respectively. alT is based on regression standard error. The significance level for the median monthly 
abnormal return, both percentage and sterling, to a bidder portfolio is computed using the Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test. In brackets is the number of takeovers in each bidder portfolio. VW average 
percentage abnormal return is equivalent to and has the same t-statistic value as EW average abnormal 
sterling return. VW median percentage abnormal return is determined as the median abnormal sterling 
return divided by the corresponding MVi,O, and thus has no applicable test statistic. •, b and c denote 
significance at the 0.0 I, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
12 Months 24 Months 36 Months 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A: ALL [1933] 
EW -0.31%a -0.17%b -0.43%a -0.19%a -0.54%a -0.36%a 
Sterling -4.435a -0.049 -2.488a -0.058a -2.965a -0.135a 
vw -0.63% -0.44% -0.35% -1.26% -0.42% -1.39% 
Panel B: Private-Firm Bidders 
Entire Class [641] 
EW -0.28%c -0.15% -0.52%a -0.34%a -0.64%a -0.44%a 
Sterling 0.832b -0.021 0.520 -0.044b -0.012 -0.088a 
vw 0.50% -0.05% 0.31% -0.39% -0.01% -0.02% 
ReQeating Bidders [ 407] 
EW 0.00% 0.32% -0.36%a -0.21% -0.58%a -0.59%a 
Sterling 0.585 0.044 0.571 -0.034 -0.206 -0.123c 
vw 0.34% 0.62% 0.33% -0.54% -0.12% -0.43% 
Non-ReQeating Bidders [234] 
EW -0.76%a -0.49%b -0.80%a -0.60%a -0.74%a -0.40%a 
Sterling 1.261 c -0.069b 0.431 -0.051 a 0.324 -0.055a 
vw 0.81% -0.59% 0.28% -1.45% 0.21% -1.42% 
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Table AII.l - Continued 
12 Months 24 Months 36 Months 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel C: Subsidiary Bidders 
Entire Class [250] 
EW -0.73%a -0.69%a -0.75%a -0.49%a -0.79%a -0.53%a 
Sterling -1 0.177a -0.204b -4.116 -0.310a -7.739a -0.339a 
vw -0.89% -1.34% -0.36% -0.70% -0.67% -1.35% 
ReQeating Bidders [121] 
EW -0.59%b -0.48%c -0.38%c -0.50%b -0.49%a -0.40%a 
Sterling -20.582a -0.157 -9.031 -0.525a -11.454b -0.495a 
vw -1.24% -1.42% -0.54% -0.64% -0.69% -0.69% 
Non-ReQeating Bidders [129] 
EW -0.87%a -1.06%b -1.09%a -0.47%a -1.07%a -0.80%a 
Sterling -0.418 -0.207b 0.494 -0.159b -4.254 -0.276a 
vw -0.06% -3.80% 0.07% -3.51% -0.64% -0.47% 
Panel D: Public-Firm Bidders 
Entire Class [54] 
EW -0.55% 0.49% -0.47% 0.27% -0.71 %b -0.30% 
Sterling 13.731 0.166 2.627 0.081 -1.622 -0.501 b 
vw 1.15% 1.23% 0.22% 0.44% -0.14% -3.19% 
ReQeating Bidders [5] 
EW 0.24% -0.19% -0.60% -0.64% -0.29% -0.13% 
Sterling 8.804 -0.341 -11.613 -0.771 -8.408 -2.997 
vw 0.57% -0.28% -0.76% -0.64% -0.55% -0.13% 
Non-ReQeating Bidders [49] 
EW -0.63% 0.55% -0.45% 0.32% -0.75%b -0.30% 
Sterling 14.234 0.211 4.081 0.098 -0.929 -0.492c 
vw 1.23% 0.56% 0.35% 0.26% -0.08% -3.63% 
Panel E: Private-Subsidiary Bidders [639] 
EW -0.26%b -0.09% -0.34%a O.OO%b -0.54%a -0.30%a 
Sterling -6.580a -0.058 -4.49r 0.001 -3.774a -0.142a 
vw -0.97% -1.43% -0.67% 0.00% -0.56% -0.80% 
Panel F: Private-Public Bidders [66] 
EW -0.81 %b -0.71 %c -0.30% -0.21% -0.44%c -0.23% 
Sterling -4.792a -0.340c -3.941 a -0.069 -5.947a -0.171 b 
vw -1.23% -0.98% -1.01% -0.21% -1.52% -1.04% 
Panel G: Subsidiary-Public Bidders [50] 
EW -0.10% 0.18% -0.56%b -0.45% -0.68%a -0.31 %b 
Sterling -4.777 1.197 -4.605 -0.682 -1.836 -0.404 
vw -0.17% 1.01% -0.16% -0.65% -0.07% -0.78% 
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Table AII.l- Continued 
12 Months 24 Months 36 Months 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel H: All-Targets Bidders [233] 
EW 0.08% 0.05% -0.06% -0.05% 0.03% 0.03% 
Sterling -10.914a 0.043 -3.823 -0.125 -3.454 0.084 
vw -0.83% 0.21% -0.29% -0.09% -0.26% 0.22% 
Following Barber and Lyon (1997a), the firm-specific FF 3-Factor model ts 
estimated in event time for bidder i as the following [OLS] regression model: 
(AII.1) 
where the variables are defined similarly to those in equation ( 4.8). a; therefore measures 
monthly abnormal return to bidder i during the r-month window. For estimation purposes, 
however, the individual six portfolios S/L, S/M, S/H, BIL, BIM and BIH constituting the 
SMB and HML risk factors are formed as VW portfolios. For all three windows, i.e., 12, 
24 and 36 months, a minimum of 12 valid monthly returns is required for all sample 
bidders in order to ensure a reasonable a;. 
EW percentage abnormal return to a bidder portfolio (aT ) is calculated by 
averaging a; s using equal weights. Similar to Malatesta (1983) and Alexandrou and 
Sudarsanam (2001), EW sterling abnormal return (£mil) to a bidder portfolio (Ar) is 
calculated as: Ar = (L~=l MV/,o ·air )/n. MV/,o is standardised as in Section 4.4.1. The 




where a}, is based on the regression standard error (SEa ) and n is the number ofbidders 
IT 
in the portfolio. Barber and Lyon (1997a) use the cross-sectional sample standard 
deviation of a to calculate a test statistic in the form of equation (AII.2), which implicitly 
assumes that a} is constant across firms and equal to the estimated cross-sectional sample 
variance. Several studies employ standardisation in an attempt to bring the varying 
specific variance of each estimated individual abnormal return to 1 (e.g., Eckbo and 
Thurbum, 2000; Gregory, 1997). Again, a test statistic based on standardisation assumes 
that a} is constant, but equal to 1. In a small sample situation, these assumptions can 
become particularly demanding. On the other hand, equation (AII.2) allows for the 
varying specific variances by using SEa;r and is therefore a more general and accurate 
form of the test statistic. 
Similarly, the significance of A, can be computed usmg the following test 
statistic: 
A, 
t A=----;====='===· n ~ f(n-I)· 
n 2 2 
"MV.. 0 ·a· L.... I, IT 
(AII.3) 
i=l 
As the non-parametric equivalent of equations (AII.2) and (AII.3), the Wilcoxon sign-rank 




Long-Term Post-Acquisition Bidder Abnormal Retum: 
Control-Firm Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 - December 
1998. All bidders are U.K.-listed companies. The main bidder classes are mutually exclusive and 
represent bidders acquiring only private targets, bidders acquiring only divested subsidiaries, and 
bidders acquiring only public targets. Each bidder class is divided into repeating and non-repeating 
bidders. In brackets is the number of takeovers in each bidder portfolio. •, band c denote significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. For details of abnormal return estimation, see Table 4.3. 
12 Months 24 Months 36 Months 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A: Private-Firm Bidders 
Entire Class [667] 
EW 1.55% 1.15% -6.14% -3.90% -12.52%b -2.76% 
Sterling 10.178 0.160 14.007 -0.773 17.614 -0.505 
vw 2.34% 2.34% -17.28% -17.28% -0.26% -0.26% 
ReQeating Bidders [ 418] 
EW 6.30%c 1.22% -0.81% 1.16% -13.04%c -0.26% 
Sterling 9.614 0.320c 15.404 0.330 10.625 -0.113 
vw 5.64% 1.22% 9.04% 1.58% 6.23% -0.99% 
Non-ReQeating Bidders [249] 
EW -6.43% 0.79% -15.08%b -11.95%a -11.64% -4.86% 
Sterling 11.126 0.073 11.662 -1.783b 29.346 -0.758 
vw 7.16% 0.26% 7.50% -72.76% 18.87% -18.41% 
Panel B: Subsidiary Bidders 
Entire Class [251] 
EW -4.59% -4.10% -17.03%a -13.01 %a -16.40%a -10.69%b 
Sterling 24.313 -0.338 -136.158 -9.239a -205.900 -4.989 
vw 2.12% -9.97% -11.88% -8.35% -17.96% -2.63% 
ReQeating Bidders [121] 
EW -2.10% -4.18% -7.80% -13.63% -8.44% -8.40% 
Sterling -17.405 -0.258 -239.965 -10.902b -106.633 -5.196 
vw -1.05% -4.77% -14.42% -157.76% -6.41% -35.46% 
Non-ReQeating Bidders [130] 
EW -6.92% -3.84% -25.63%a -11.10%b -23.81 %a -13.47%b 
Sterling 63.143 -0.580 -39.537 -6.892b -298.294 -4.844 
vw 9.51% -8.57% -5.96% -35.83% -44.93% -5.07% 
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Table AII.2 - Continued 
12 Months 24 Months 36 Months 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel C: Public-Firm Bidders 
Entire Class [55] 
EW -5.28% 1.14% -20.25%c -11.47% -10.74% 2.80% 
Sterling -26.689 1.648 -181.435 -10.760 -49.623 2.089 
vw -2.34% 7.19% -15.88% -34.51% -4.34% 16.77% 
ReQeating Bidders [5] 
EW -20.51% -0.57% -28.27% -23.92% 1.78% 14.83% 
Sterling -612.371 -14.343 -580.752 -92.124 -184.778 17.739 
vw -39.84% -0.57% -37.78% -50.51% -12.02% 14.83% 
ReQeating Bidders [50] 
EW -3.76% 1.96% -19.45% -6.53% -11.99% -0.87% 
Sterling 31.879 1.771 -141.504 -9.281 -36.108 0.234 




Long-Term Post-Acquisition Bidder Abnormal Return: 
Event-Time Fama-Frencb Three-Factor Model Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 -December 
1998. All bidders are U.K.-listed companies. The main bidder classes are mutually exclusive and 
represent bidders acquiring only private targets, bidders acquiring only divested subsidiaries, and 
bidders acquiring only public targets. Each bidder class is divided into repeating and non-repeating 
bidders. In brackets is the number of takeovers in each bidder portfolio. •, band c denote significance at 
the 0.0 I, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. For details of abnormal return estimation, see Table 4.4. 
Ordinary Least Square Minimum Absolute Deviation 
12 24 36 12 24 36 
Months Months Months Months Months Months 
Panel A: Private-Firm Bidders 
Entire Class [678] 
EW -4.15% -28.04%a -26.98%a -0.88% -23.32%a -14.44%b 
Sterling -14.180b -41.203c -37.293 -6.597 -21.231 -18.162b 
ReQeating Bidders [423] 
EW -0.14% -33.79%a -32.42%a 2.61% -30.83%a -23.24%b 
Sterling -4.907 -0.070 8.424 -2.667 -16.556 -8.825 
Non-ReQeating Bidders [255] 
EW -1 0.47%c 8.71% 6.72% -6.56% -11.57% -3.24% 
Sterling -23.766a -65.970a -66.044a -11.972b -28.761 -24.859a 
Panel B: Subsidiary Bidders 
Entire Class [257] 
EW -11.73%b -26.67%a -29.38%a -7.48% -17.38%b -27.22%b 
Sterling -143.165a -190.466a -156.834a -55.959a -86.911 b -113 .487a 
ReQeating Bidders [121] 
EW -9.86% -32.67%a -43.01 %a -5.13% -26.13%b -43.40%a 
Sterling -136.583a -143.329c -171.614a -63.674a -94.435a -129.580a 
Non-ReQeating Bidders [136] 
EW -13.77%c -17.24% -15.68% -10.65% -6.55% -10.17% 
Sterling -138.105a -215.292a -195.222a -55.862a -106.742a -106.977a 
Panel D: Public-Firm Bidders 
Entire Class [56] 
EW -13.18%c -41.25%b -76.98%a -6.70% -22.85%b -60.37%c 
Sterling -27.258 64.682 3.994 -13.612 13.822 -6.619 
ReQeating Bidders [5] 
EW NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Sterling NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Non-ReQeating Bidders [51] 
EW -13.81%c -41.61%c -80.19%a -7.08% -19.87% -66.89%c 
Sterling -18.402 32.363 -12.156 -6.111 30.312 -22.964 
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Table AH.4 
Long-Term Post-Acquisition Bidder Abnormal Return: 
Calendar-Time Rolling Portfolio Monthly Abnormal Return 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 -
December 1998. All bidders are U.K.-listed companies. The main bidder classes are mutually 
exclusive and represent bidders acquiring only private targets, bidders acquiring only divested 
subsidiaries, and bidders acquiring only public targets. Each bidder class is divided into 
repeating and non-repeating bidders. In brackets is the number of takeovers in each bidder 
portfolio. •, band c denote significance at the 0.0 1, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. For details 
of abnormal return estimation, see Table 4.5. 
12 Months 24 Months 36 Months 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A: Private-Firm Bidders 
Entire Class [667] 
EW 0.30% 0.09% -0.53%c -0.20% -0.55% -0.24%c 
vw 0.62%c 0.79%c -1.13% 0.46% 0.16% 0.95%b 
Regeating Bidders [ 418] 
EW 0.54%c 0.28% -0.36% -0.30% -0.74% -0.36% 
vw 0.73%c 0.54% -1.03% 0.38% 0.05% 0.86% 
Non-Regeating Bidders [249] 
EW 0.23% -0.80% -0.90%c -0.71% -0.14% -0.49% 
vw -0.09% 0.39% -0.43% -0.38% 0.88% 0.24% 
Panel B: Subsidiary Bidders 
Entire Class [251] 
EW -0.29% -0.08% -0.83%b -0.59%b -0.57%b -0.61 %b 
vw 0.07% 0.47% -0.38% -0.36% -0.44% 0.01% 
Regeating Bidders [121] 
EW 0.28% -0.33% -0.11% 0.11% -0.35% -0.02% 
vw -0.10% 1.19% -0.33% -0.45% -0.07% 0.48% 
Non-Regeating Bidders [130] 
EW -0.81%b -0.83% -1.37%a -1.13%a -0.86%a -0.43%b 
vw 0.27% 0.28% -0.77% -0.94% -1.39%b -1.20% 
Panel C: Public-Firm Bidders 
Entire Class [55] 
EW -0.84% -1.03% -0.71% -0.70%c -0.35% -0.70% 
vw -0.58% -0.14% -0.85% -0.58% -0.21% -0.78% 
Regeating Bidders [5] 
EW -2.13% -2.71% -0.95% -0.87% -0.17% -1.66% 
vw -2.57% -2.71% -1.25% -1.85% -0.28% -2.52% 
Non-Regeating Bidders [50] 
EW -0.64% -0.48% -0.69% -1.02% -0.38% -0.48% 




Long-Term Post-Acquisition Bidder Abnormal Return: 
Calendar-Time Fama-French Three-Factor Model Monthly Abnormal Return 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995-
December 1998. All bidders are U.K.-listed companies. The main bidder classes are 
mutually exclusive and represent bidders acquiring only private targets, bidders acquiring 
only divested subsidiaries, and bidders acquiring only public targets. Each bidder class is 
divided into repeating and non-repeating bidders. In brackets is the number of takeovers in 
each bidder portfolio. •, b and c denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. For details of abnormal return estimation, see Table 4.6. 
Ordinary Least Square Minimum Absolute Deviation 
12 24 36 12 24 36 
Months Months Months Months Months Months 
Panel B: Private-Firm Bidders 
Entire Class [678] 
EW -0.42% -0.72% -0.68% -0.24% -0.57% -0.43% 
vw 0.67% -0.78% 0.20% 0.66% 0.14% 0.35% 
ReQeating Bidders [423] 
EW -0.30% -0.60% -0.70% -0.11% -0.42% -0.41% 
vw 0.79% -0.94% 0.13% 0.78% 0.07% 0.44% 
Non-ReQeating Bidders [255] 
EW -0.18% -0.86% -0.58% -0.18% -0.70% -0.45% 
vw -0.38% 0.34% 0.84%b 0.07% 0.35% 0.87%b 
Panel C: Subsidiary Bidders 
Entire Class [257] 
EW -0.96%b -0.99%b -0.73%c -0.98%b -0.95%b -0.61% 
vw -0.42% -0.27% -0.55%c -0.36% -0.22% -0.45% 
ReQeating Bidders [121] 
EW -0.62% -0.51% -0.68% -0.45% -0.49% -0.33% 
vw -0.61% -0.46% -0.58% -0.47% -0.28% -0.52% 
Non-ReQeating Bidders [136] 
EW -1.33%a -1.30%a -0.81%c -1.54%a -1.34%a -0.90%c 
vw -0.71% -0.07% -0.56% -0.72% -0.29% -0.33% 
Panel D: Public-Firm Bidders 
Entire Class [56] 
EW -1.44%c -0.99%c -1.04%b -1.36%c -0.79% -0.79%c 
vw -0.98% -0.31% -0.08% -0.70% -0.36% 0.06% 
ReQeating Bidders [ 5] 
EW -0.51% -0.78% -0.06% -0.24% -0.82% -0.17% 
vw 0.72% -0.34% 0.15% 0.80% 0.39% 0.47% 
Non-ReQeating Bidders [51] 
EW -1.45%b -0.99% -l.ll%b -1.52%b -0.76% -0.88%c 





Logistic Regression Analysis of Factors Influencing Bidders' Target Choice Decision 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 -
December 1998. All bidders are U.K-Iisted companies, and acquire only private targets or only 
divested subsidiaries or only public targets. The significance of the parameters is computed using 
the log-likelihood ratio test. a. b and c denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. N denotes the number of observations in each target status category. For the details of 
the models and variable defmitions, see Table 4.7. 
Model 1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
Pri. =0 
Sub.= 1t Pri. = 0 Pri. = 0 Sub.= 0 
Pub.= 2t Pub.= 1 Sub.= 1 Pub.= 1 
Pred'ted Ovs 2 0 vs 1 
Variable Sign(s) Para.1 t Para.2t Para.t Para.t Para.t 
Constant -7.572 -6.507a -6.533 3 -6.496a -1.908c 
TA + 0.628 0.498a 0.553a 0.498a 0.196b 
LEVER -2.582 0.187b -2.706a 0.109 -2.782b 
BM + 0.230 0.604b 0.044 0.611 a -0.255 
COMGRW + -0.045 -0.160 -0.509 -0.128 0.286 
OPPER + -0.184 0.475 2.984 0.544 -4.600 
IND -0.585 -0.017 -0.683 -0.033 -0.534 
RENONRE -3.479 -0.916a -3.264a -0.908a -2.645a 
TARFIN + 0.835 -0.060 0.803 0.012 1.144c 
TAR83 0.161 -0.792b 0.331 -0.773b 0.779 
Chi-Sq Stat 255.3a 111.4a 167.0a 43.2a 
• 0.199 0.334 0.181 0.176 R-Sq 
N [0] 580 580 580 213 
N [1] 213 47 213 47 
N [2] 47 
McFadden R-Square. 
t Pri., Sub. and Pub. denote a private target, divested subsidiary and public target, respectively. 




Long-Term Post-Acquisition Bidder Abnormal Return by Payment Method: 
Control-Firm Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 - December 
1998. All bidders are U.K-listed companies and acquire only targets of the same status during the 
sample period - i.e., bidders acquiring only private targets, bidders acquiring only divested subsidiaries, 
and bidders acquiring only public targets. Private-firm bidders are further divided into repeating and 
non-repeating bidders. Non-repeating public-firm bidders are also separately examined. For each 
bidder class and sub-class, bidders are categorised into cash bidders, equity bidders, and mixed bidders. 
In brackets is the number of takeovers in each bidder portfolio. a, b and c denote significance at the 0.01, 
0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. For estimation details, see Table 4.3. 
12 Months 24 Months 36 Months 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A1: Private-Firm Bidders- Entire Class 
Cash [230] 
EW 3.36% 1.10% -4.45% -1.55% -7.14% -0.26% 
Sterling 4.274 0.229 -6.370 -0.137 6.891 -0.113 
vw 2.25% 1.96% -3.35% -0.81% 3.63% -0.99% 
Equity [41] 
EW -3.53% -2.52% -14.94% -26.76% -9.05% -25.43% 
Sterling 18.874 -0.150 7.270 -1.193 25.408 -0.990 
vw 32.85% -17.92% 12.66% -30.29% 44.23% -8.89% 
Mixed (225] 
EW 6.63% 8.49% 0.51% -5.74% -9.31% 5.00% 
Sterling 4.987 1.377c -8.890 -0.773 -16.951 0.838 
vw 5.30% 52.81% -9.44% -17.28% -18.00% 23.50% 
Panel A2: Private-Firm Bidders- Re2eating Bidders 
Cash [145] 
EW 7.91% 1.22% 3.11% 12.57% -0.05% 15.28% 
Sterling 1.407 0.320 -31.785 2.343 -31.877 4.793 
vw 0.71% 1.22% -16.15% 17.85% -16.19% 34.54% 
Equity (18] 
EW 4.13% -11.24% -6.76% -6.95% 11.27% 0.02% 
Sterling 42.258 -5.300 30.332 -0.990 65.680 0.914 
vw 51.24% -14.10% 36.78% -9.08% 79.65% 6.42% 
Mixed [148] 
EW 8.35% 9.42% 2.12% -7.13% -13.67% 0.74% 
Sterling 4.056 2.226 -14.019 -0.835 -32.523 0.276 
vw 3.81% 12.90% -13.17% -16.28% -30.56% 0.59% 
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Tabne AHX.l- Continued 
12 Months 24 Months 36 Months 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A3: Private-Firm Bidders- Non-Re~eating Bidders 
Cash [85] 
EW -4.41% 0.79% -17.35% -12.08% -19.23% -7.91% 
Sterling 9.164 0.073 36.985 -2.153 73.025 -2.412 
vw 5.13% 0.26% 20.72% -28.03% 40.91% -3.67% 
Equity [23] 
EW -9.53% -0.32% -21.34% -30.29% -24.95% -25.58% 
Sterling 0.574 -0.036 -10.778 -1.193 -6.110 -3.563 
vw 1.52% -0.34% -28.46% -30.29% -16.13% -33.70% 
Mixed [77] 
EW 3.32% 3.94% -2.58% -2.44% -0.93% 6.25% 
Sterling 6.777 1.202 0.970 -0.582 12.980 1.413 
vw 9.60% 9.33% 1.37% -15.69% 18.39% 5.11% 
Panel B: Subsidiary Bidders- Entire Class 
Cash [142] 
EW -5.71% -4.63% -24.87%a -24.16%a -18.53%b -13.47%b 
Sterling -4.826 -2.103 -105.734 -15.418a -102.511 -11.436c 
vw -0.46% -18.48% -10.13% -108.88% -9.82% -32.21% 
Eguity [4] 
EW -33.99% -60.24% -65.05% -105.40% -14.56% -55.62% 
Sterling -106.980 -50.494 -445.069 -90.014 -533.764 -36.309 
vw -13.41% -117.86% -55.80% -210.10% -66.92% -84.75% 
Mixed [9] 
EW -9.10% -25.42% -16.78% 22.31% -59.26% -89.52% 
Sterling 277.625 -1.729 439.822 2.070 310.786 -12.090 
vw 74.53% -29.16% 118.07% 55.25% 83.43% -185.47% 
Panel C 1: Public-Firm Bidders- Entire Class 
Cash [13] 
EW -17.49% 7.19% -24.52% 4.59% -19.93% -9.04% 
Sterling -222.811 1.180 -188.846 5.111 -83.030 -5.450 
vw -38.00% 9.47% -32.21% 41.03% -14.16% -15.67% 
Equity [16] 
EW -17.63%c -3.63% -49.58%b -32.68%c -41.85% -15.60% 
Sterling -7.492 -5.646 -585.533 -18.003c -349.127 -18.120 
vw -0.59% -25.25% -46.46% -167.40% -27.70% -92.56% 
Mixed [26] 
EW 8.42% 8.66% -0.07% -6.53% 13.01% 16.77% 
Sterling 59.559 6.497 70.945 -18.690 151.391 12.412 
vw 4.42% 32.24% 5.26% -83.14% 11.23% 39.09% 
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Table AIH.l - Continued 
12 Months 24 Months 36 Months 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel C2: Public-Firm Bidders- Non-Repeating Bidders 
Cash [11] 
EW -8.62% 9.47% -21.18% 4.59% -20.67% -9.04% 
Sterling 17.930 1.648 -20.484 5.111 -15.227 -5.450 
vw 7.13% 7.19% -8.15% 41.03% -6.06% -15.67% 
Equity [14] 
EW -21.20%c -8.94%c -51.34%c -32.68% -49.67% -35.07% 
Sterling -9.548 -5.646 -619.420 -13.517 -396.879 -18.120 
vw -0.77% -25.25% -49.68% -60.45% -31.83% -92.56% 
Mixed [25] 
EW 8.15% 7.50% -0.83% -11.47% 12.93% 18.70% 
Sterling 61.217 3.423 72.881 -22.010 156.737 8.816 




Long-Term Post-Acquisition Bidder Abnormal Return by Payment Method: 
Event-Time Fama-French Three-Factor Model Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 - December 
1998. All bidders are U.K-listed companies and acquire only targets of the same status during the sample 
period - i.e., bidders acquiring only private targets, bidders acquiring only divested subsidiaries, and 
bidders acquiring only public targets. Private-firm bidders are further divided into repeating and non-
repeating bidders. Non-repeating public-firm bidders are also separately examined. For each bidder class 
and sub-class, bidders are categorised into cash bidders, equity bidders, and mixed bidders. In brackets is 
the number of takeovers in each bidder portfolio. a, b and c denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
levels, respectively. For estimation details, see Table 4.4. 
Ordinary Least Square Minimum Absolute Deviation 
12 24 36 12 24 36 
Months Months Months Months Months Months 
Panel AI: Private-Firm Bidders- Entire Class 
Cash [231] 
EW -2.32% -26.70%b -12.36% -0.04% -18.55%c 0.88% 
Sterling -25.44a -43.26b -77.55b -19.87a -32.15 -30.35 
Eguity [43] 
EW -36.20% -67.17%c -113.01%c -15.41% -39.57% -85.90% 
Sterling -17.47a -26.21 a -33.47a -14.33a -20.64a -28.47a 
Mixed [231] 
EW 1.85% -36.50%a -40.74%a 5.32% -37.61 %a -31.93%b 
Sterling -7.79 5.88 -18.12c -1.37 3.53 -7.33 
Panel A2: Private-Firm Bidders- ReQeating Bidders 
Cash [146] 
EW 0.43% -31.75%a 6.65% 4.89% -24.04%c 11.44% 
Sterling -33.57a 34.10c 76.47b -25.13a 19.48 24.11 
Eguity [18] 
EW -53.42%c -75.60% -272.65%b -56.40% -45.61% -244.78% 
Sterling -24.90a -34.14a -34.71a -25.54a -30.19a -32.08a 
Mixed [152] 
EW 13.93%c -42.56%a -60.92%a 13.21% -43.11 %a -57.72%a 
Sterling -7.10 13.43 -18.88 -2.63 8.77 -12.72 
Panel A3: Private-Firm Bidders- Non-Repeating Bidders 
Cash [85] 
EW -8.70% -12.39% -43.72% -7.11% -4.25% -19.22% 
Sterling -29.04a -44.52a -112.78a -18.8la -29.83a -54.24a 
Eguity [25] 
EW -14.77% -56.85% -70.31% -19.13% -34.21% -51.74% 
Sterling -8.09b -16.28a -16.53c -6.41 c -9.57 -10.12 
Mixed [79] 
EW -20.57% -23.05% -9.31% -7.38% -25.65%c 3.13% 
Sterling -3.04 -0.07 6.14c -0.41 -0.08 2.72 
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Table AIII.2 - Continued 
Ordinary Least Square Minimum Absolute Deviation 
12 24 36 12 24 36 
Months Months Months Months Months Months 
Panel B: Subsidiary Bidders- Entire Class 
Cash [142] 
EW -7.46% -41.24%a -39.61 %a -2.18% -28.54%b -38.53%a 
Sterling -141.66a -233.73a -177.07a -95.25a -108.01a -106.34a 
Eguity [5] 
EW NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Sterling NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Mixed [10] 
EW 14.96% 17.73% 10.66% 16.24% 11.41% 27.86% 
Sterling -4.44b -21.47b -26.45b -4.44c -17.90a -19.27 
Panel C1: Public-Firm Bidders- Entire Class 
Cash [14] 
EW -20.71% -13.13% -3.96% -11.83% -6.23% -5.78% 
Sterling -13.50 -44.78 -79.12c -11.04 -21.29 -65.43 
Eguity [16] 
EW -45.81 %a -131.22%a -191.17%a -41.68%a -118.04% -187.98%a 
Sterling -32.47c -68.28 -26.03 -22.70 -9.88 -9.20 
Mixed [26] 
EW 4.48% -14.44% -58.41 %c 5.86% -11.22% -36.52% 
Sterling -20.07 -35.46b -85.39b -14.80 -26.91 b -60.77 
Panel C2: Public-Firm Bidders- Non-Repeating Bidders 
Cash [12] 
EW -18.74% -20.43% -2.91% -12.40% -8.59% -5.37% 
Sterling -33.68c -53.20 -16.11 -23.52c -32.76 -13.04 
Eguity [14] 
EW -50.92%a -167.19%a -186.71%a -48.60%a -165.67%b -182.52%a 
Sterling -21.34 18.46 90.94c -13.95 23.85 57.35 
Mixed [25] 
EW 5.23% -9.64% -59.68%c 7.28% -6.82% -37.61% 




Long-Term Post-Acquisition Bidder Abnormal Return by Payment Method: 
Event-Time Fama-French Three-Factor Model Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 - December 
1998. All bidders are U.K-listed companies and acquire only targets of the same status during the sample 
period - i.e., bidders acquiring only private targets, bidders acquiring only divested subsidiaries, and 
bidders acquiring only public targets. Private-finn bidders are further divided into repeating and non-
repeating bidders. Non-repeating public-firm bidders are also separately examined. For each bidder class 
and sub-class, bidders are categorised into cash bidders, equity bidders, and mixed bidders. In brackets is 
the number of takeovers in each bidder portfolio. ., b and c denote significance at the 0.0 I, 0.05 and 0.10 
levels, respectively. Return is calculated as simple return. For other estimation details, see Table 4.4. 
Ordinary Least Square Minimum Absolute Deviation 
12 24 36 12 24 36 
Months Months Months Months Months Months 
Panel AI: Private-Firm Bidders- Entire Class 
Cash [231] 
EW 0.76% -14.52% 6.48% -2.89% -13.44% 13.71% 
Sterling -19.10a -103.70b -132.74b -18.60a -14.98 -20.20 
Eguity [43] 
EW -15.72% -33.44% -73.98%c -11.46% -30.62% -66.24% 
Sterling -18.25a -24.20a -49.67a -14.06a -22.63a -41.69a 
Mixed [231] 
EW 2.05% -51.17%a -22.08% -3.48% -45.39%a -11.74% 
Sterling -8.96 -12.14 -1.92 -0.83 1.81 -2.79 
Panel A2: Private-Firm Bidders- Repeating Bidders 
Cash [146] 
EW 4.56% -19.38% 26.79%c 2.62% -14.58% 29.54%b 
Sterling -28.75b 56.70b 99.17a -13.07 32.22c 39.63 
Eguity [18] 
EW -19.36% -46.38% -167.30%c -16.38% -52.11% -169.18% 
Sterling -27.10a -24.17a -43.55a -24.79a -21.10a -42.17a 
Mixed [152] 
EW 7.83% -66.78%a -41.31 %c 0.83% -54.83%a -32.91 %c 
Sterling -6.86 -12.19 -18.52 -2.61 -2.12 -11.93 
Panel A3: Private-Firm Bidders- Non-Repeating Bidders 
Cash [85] 
EW -11.79% 11.12% -25.55% -15.68%a -6.39% -12.84% 
Sterling -30.04a -121.01 a -204.76a -19.71a -87.37 -123.94a 
Eguity [25] 
EW -6.15% -36.30% -33.02% -9.21% -27.84% -30.90% 
Sterling -7.47b -15.27b -33.68b -6.06b -7.71 -17.05 
Mixed [79] 
EW -10.27% -21.90% 10.52% -10.33% -25.95% 24.94% 
Sterling -1.52 5.53 14.01 a 0.86 2.81 8.20 
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Table AHI.3 - Continued 
Ordinary Least Square Minimum Absolute Deviation 
12 24 36 12 24 36 
Months Months Months Months Months Months 
Panel B: Subsidiary Bidders- Entire Class 
Cash [142] 
EW -11.51%b -69.58%b -33.23%b -11.77%b -35.63%b -35.17%b 
Sterling -119.64b 67.16 -205.80a -74.21b -39.49 -146.71 a 
Egui:ty [5] 
EW NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Sterling NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Mixed [10] 
EW 21.26% 87.15%c 5.09% 19.53% 75.09% -14.61% 
Sterling -3.88b 4.12 -10.77 -3.65 1.04 -8.52 
Panel C1: Public-Firm Bidders- Entire Class 
Cash [14] 
EW -16.01% -12.62% -6.33% -9.51% -6.75% -9.78% 
Sterling 0.36 -41.38 -86.83 -7.24 -32.90 -58.86 
Eguity [16] 
EW -25.17%b -85.21 o/oa -158.22%a -23.73%b -81.90%c -150.04%a 
Sterling -39.04b 54.38c -13.19 -30.42 33.29 8.52 
Mixed [26] 
EW 5.02% -16.66% -170.06% 4.56% -11.76% -69.25% 
Sterling 41.53 -47.60 -80.84 9.16 -28.85c -96.66b 
Panel C2: Public-Firm Bidders- Non-Repeating Bidders 
Cash [12] 
EW -16.07% -12.06% -6.75% -10.19% -5.53% -10.43% 
Sterling -27.61c -85.16b -21.12 -21.88 -63.71 b -19.14 
Eguity [14] 
EW -27.81%b -99.31 o/oa -158.02%a -27.15%b -102.53%b -151.60%a 
Sterling -41.30c 9.90 -118.01b -27.53 3.01 -78.14 
Mixed [25] 
EW 6.56% -13.04% -171.35% 6.71% -8.00% -70.45% 
Sterling 44.35 -50.82 -83.53 11.39 -31.82c -101.22b 
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Table AIII.4 
Long-Term Post-Acquisition Bidder Abnormal Return by Payment Method: 
Calendar-Time Rolling Portfolio Monthly Abnormal Return 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 -
December 1998. All bidders are U.K-listed companies and acquire only targets of the same 
status during the sample period - i.e., bidders acquiring only private targets, and bidders 
acquiring only public targets. Repeating and non-repeating private-finn bidders are separately 
examined. The sample public-firm bidders are non-repeating bidders. For each bidder class or 
sub-class, bidders are categorised into cash bidders, equity bidders, and mixed bidders. In 
brackets is the number of takeovers in each bidder portfolio. a, b and c denote significance at the 
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. For estimation details, see Table 4.5. 
12 Months 24 Months 36 Months 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A1: Private-Firm Bidders- Repeating Bidders 
Cash [145] 
EW 0.26% 0.67% -0.20% -0.15% -0.01% -0.10% 
vw 0.36% 0.16% -2.03% 0.06% -0.21% 0.35% 
Eguitv [18] 
EW 1.16% 1.09% 0.21% -0.78% 1.77% 0.31% 
vw 6.69%a 5.58%a 2.20% 2.59% 4.43% 1.63% 
Mixed [148] 
1.46%b EW 0.88%b -0.24% 0.16% -0.73% -0.09% 
vw 1.60%b 1.14%c -0.30% 0.42% -0.22% 0.61% 
Panel A2: Private-Firm Bidders- Non-Repeating Bidders 
Cash [85] 
EW 1.64% 0.53% -0.65% -0.85%c -0.77% -0.86%b 
vw 1.56% 1.02% 0.04% -0.36% 1.64% 0.32% 
Eguity [23] 
EW -1.25% -1.40% -0.90% -1.40% -0.33% -0.72% 
vw -0.02% -0.02% -0.64% -0.18% 1.39% -0.13% 
Mixed [77] 
EW 0.23% 0.49% -0.15% 0.07% 0.32% -0.23% 
vw 0.52% 1.36% -0.56% 0.93% 0.24% -0.35% 
Panel B: Public-Firm Bidders- Non-Repeating Bidders 
Cash [11] 
EW -1.38% 0.10% -1.83% -0.53% -2.27%c -2.29% 
vw -0.20% 0.48% -0.48% -0.12% -0.24% -0.62% 
Eguity [14] 
EW -1.67% -2.21% -2.60%b -0.99%c -1.26% 0.07% 
vw -0.40% -0.56% -0.80% -1.33% 0.05% 0.51% 
Mixed [25] 
EW 0.66% 1.25%c -0.13% 0.14% 0.37% 0.82% 




Long-Term Post-Acquisition Bidder AbnormaD Return by Payment Method!: 
Calendar-Time Fama-French Three-Factor Model Monthly Abnormal Return 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 -
December 1998. All bidders are U.K-Iisted companies and acquire only targets of the same 
status during the sample period - i.e., bidders acquiring only private targets, and bidders 
acquiring only public targets. Repeating and non-repeating private-firm bidders are separately 
examined. The sample public-firm bidders are non-repeating bidders. For each bidder class or 
sub-class, bidders are categorised into cash bidders, equity bidders, and mixed bidders. In 
brackets is the number of takeovers in each bidder portfolio. a, band c denote significance at the 
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. For estimation details, see Table 4.6. 
Ordinary Least Square Minimum Absolute Deviation 
12 24 36 12 24 36 
Months Months Months Months Months Months 
Panel A1: Private-Firm Bidders- ReQeating Bidders 
Cash [146] 
EW -0.11% -0.27% 0.12% 0.18% -0.01% 0.36% 
vw 1.08% -1.12% 0.34% 0.96% 0.15% 0.62% 
Eguity [18] 
EW -1.06% -0.20% 0.25% -1.21% -0.72% -0.28% 
vw 1.84% 2.06%b 1.11% 1.43%c 1.53% 1.18%c 
Mixed [152] 
EW 1.29%b 0.37% 0.34% 1.18%b 0.65% 0.69% 
vw 2.10%a 0.39% 0.73% 1.83%a 0.76% 0.77% 
Panel A2: Private-Firm Bidders- Non-Repeating Bidders 
Cash [85] 
EW 1.89% -0.27% -0.45% 1.13% -0.16% -0.34% 
vw 0.87% 1.56%a 1.59%b 0.44% 1.56%a 1.57%b 
Eguity [25] 
EW -2.76%c -2.12%b -1.30%c -1.73%b -1.35%c -0.73% 
vw -0.76% -1.38% 0.11% -0.35% -0.41% 0.63% 
Mixed [79] 
EW -0.19% 0.05% 0.46% 0.02% 0.23% 0.33% 
vw -0.51% -0.59% 0.15% -0.11% -0.03% 0.39% 
Panel B: Public-Firm Bidders- Non-Repeating Bidders 
Cash [12] 
EW -1.03% -1.18% -0.95% -0.50% -0.63% -0.13% 
vw 0.28% 0.60% 1.19%c 0.31% 0.77% 1.45%b 
Eguity [14] 
EW -2.09%b -2.20%b -1.36%c -1.44%c -1.56%c -0.90% 
vw -1.69% -0.10% 0.15% -0.90% -0.20% 0.10% 
Mixed [25] 
EW 0.24% 0.11% -0.24% 0.04% 0.18% -0.09% 





Logistic Regression Analysis of Potential Determinants of Payment Methods 
in Takeovers of Privately Held Targets 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 -December 
1998. All bidders are U.K-listed companies and acquire only private targets. All models are estimated 
without COMGRW and OPPER. The significance of the parameters is computed using White's (1982) 
robust standard errors. a, band c denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. N 
denotes the number of observations in each payment method category. For the details of the models and 





























t Para. denotes parameter. 
Modell Model2 
Cash= 0 
Mixed= 1 Cash=O 
Equity= 2 Equity= 1 
0 vs 2 0 vs 1 
Para. 1 t Para. 2t Para.t 
89.42a 49.56a 89.88c 
-0.111 -0.501 b -0.016 
0.009c 0.004 0.005 
0.438c 0.068 0.305 
-0.948a 
-0.109 -0.829a 
1.231 a 0.604a 1.217b 
-0.130b -0.072a -0.129c 
-0.210 -0.206c -0.063 
-0.570b -0.470a -0.730b 










Cash= 0 Mixed= 0 





















Logistic Regression Analysis of Potential Determinants of Payment Methods 
in Takeovers of Privately Held Targets 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 - December 
1998. All bidders are U.K-listed companies and acquire only private targets. The significance of the 
parameters is computed using the log-likelihood ratio test. a, band c denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 
and 0.10 levels, respectively. N denotes the number of observations in each payment method category. 

































t Para. denotes parameter. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Cash= 0 
Mixed= 1 Cash= 0 Cash= 0 Mixed= 0 
Equity= 2 Equity= 1 Mixed= 1 Equity= 1 
0 vs 2 0 vs 1 
Para. 1 t Para. 2t Para.t Para.t Para.t 
97.99 52.90a 89.256 57.01 a 48.94 
0.162 -0.360 0.278 -0.359 0.595 
0.484 0.254 0.291 0.347c 0.204 
0.013 0.007b 0.009 0.007b 0.008 
-0.883 -0.274b -0.695b -0.332 -0.629c 
0.448 0.054 0.354 0.089 0.355 
-0.988 -0.081 a -0.861 a -0.098 -0.943a 
1.302 0.577b 1.325b 0.516c 1.068b 
-0.136 -0.075a -0.122c -0.082a -0.067 
-0.197 -0.157 -0.040 -0.156 -0.147 
-0.759 -0.497b -0.951 b -0.492b -0.118 
0.458 0.431 a 0.329b 0.492a 0.011 
1.181 -0.077b 1.159b -0.131 1.296a 
92.9a 49.9a 53.8a 30.2a 
0.126 0.269 0.104 0.169 
198 198 198 175 





Logistic Regression Analysis of Potential Determinants of Payment Methods 
in Takeovers of Privately Held Targets 
Sample takeovers consist of deals involving U.K. targets completed during January 1995 - December 
1998. All bidders are U.K-listed companies and acquire only private targets. All models are estimated 
without COMGR W and OPPER. The significance of the parameters is computed using the log-
likelihood ratio test. a, band c denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. N 
denotes the number of observations in each payment method category. For the details of the models and 





























t Para. denotes parameter. 
Modell Model2 
Cash= 0 
Mixed= 1 Cash= 0 
Equity= 2 Equity= 1 
0 vs 2 0 vs 1 
Para. 1 t Para. 2t Para.t 
89.42 49.56a 89.886 
-0.111 -0.501 -0.016 
0.009 0.004 0.005 
0.438 0.068 0.305 
-0.948 -0.109a -0.829a 
1.231 0.604b 1.217b 
-0.130 -0.072a -0.129c 
-0.210 -0.206 -0.063 
-0.570 -0.470c -0.730c 
0.458 0.400a 0.362b 








Cash= 0 Mixed= 0 
Mixed= 1 Equity= 1 
Para.t Para.t 
51.69a 43.11 
-0.509 0.450 
0.004 0.009 
0.092 0.342 
-0.115 -0.873a 
0.559c 0.956b 
-0.076a 
-0.063 
-0.208 -0.097 
-0.439b 
-0.029 
0.447a 0.047 
-0.151 1.143a 
50.6a 27.79a 
0.093 0.144 
207 186 
186 35 
